There is no question that Iran supports Shi’ite militias of various sorts, and that (similar to many other non-state militias the world over) these militias fight their enemies with techniques that, in some cases, are reasonably described as “terrorist”, such as using car-bombings.
Hezbollah, for example, was and is extensively funded by Iran, originally used to fight against Israel. However, lately they have been used more to fight alongside the Assad regime in Syria, against the encroachments of Sunni militias.
Similarly, Iranian funded Shi’ite militias are now a more significant military force in Iraq than the Iraqi Army:
The concern here is that what this will do is create a basic sectarian battle - Shi’ite (paid for by Iran) vs. Sunni (mostly, these days, ISIS). The US would prefer a legitimate, non-sectarian Iraqi government to rule, eliminating both ISIS and Shi’ite independent militias.
Same deal in Syria - the US would like Assad out, to be replaced by a “moderate” resistance coallition that will eventually end up with a non-sectarian state.
A much-richer Iran is a very unlikely route to such an outcome, which is why I think the decision has been made that the original goals are not achievable, ISIS is the more dangerous of the two, and so it makes sense to lift restrictions on the power and influence of the Sh’ite side … whether one describes either or both sides as “terrorists”, or not.
I’m sorta on the same page … but likewise, it was useful to have the threat of Iranian nukes in order to curb Iranian economic power through sanctions, so as to curb Iranian influence.
My read is that both sides eventually realized the real “game” was Iranian regional power, not nukes, worked out a face-saving formula (for both) that frankly doesn’t mean very much (delays Iran getting a nuke for a decade at most and that assumes compliance), in order to put some weight on the Sh’ite end of the regional scales.
The REAL issue is whether supporting (well, or at least, not opposing) the Shi’ite end of the local scales proves a good idea in the long run. That’s the question, not easy to answer.
There are lots of low-tech ways within Iranian means to deliver a nuke if Iran was so inclined. The trick is to figure out one that has an acceptable chance of escaping detection until it is too late.
For example (say) buying though intermediaries a neutral-flagged old freighter, sending it into Haifa’s harbour on allegedly legitimate business - but loaded with a nuke.
The use of boats for nukes isn’t a new idea - Einstein mentioned it in his letter at the dawn of the nuclear age.
Who’s saying that? For the duration of the agreement, it will not be possible for them to abide by it and build a bomb. After the expiration, we come back to the table.
Actually, like Ravenman says, some obligations of the agreement are indeed permanent. That doesn’t mean that Iran will abide by them for all time, but if they do, they cannot develop nuclear weapons.
Well what could possibly go wrong, since blowing up Israels best harbor would surely neutralize its military capacity in a stroke, so no worries about them retaliating. Or the US, for that matter, President Graham or President Cruz would surely not be stupid enough to use thermo nukes to scold the Iranians, and besides, Allah would not permit it!
Now, I don’t doubt there are Iranians stupid enough to go for that, there are. But recent evidence would seem to indicate that the Sane Party holds some sway there, at least for the moment.
And they aren’t going to test it? I know that may seem a minor point, but permit me to insist that it is not. We tested “the gadget”, even though we were pretty sure it would work, and even though Japan was in no position to meaningfully retaliate. All in all, seems to me that Iran using a nuke would be a very spectacular way to commit suicide. And that’s if the damned thing works! If it doesn’t, then all the drawbacks are effective and the upside is gone.
I don’t think the main concern about Iran having the bomb is the fear that they might launch an attack on Israel right away. More worrying is what would happen, if Iran were to experience a development similar to what we are currently seeing in Syria. A stable and at least moderately prosperous country would - as you say - have way too much to lose. But if it should ever break down into warring factions … who knows?
That deal edges Iran further away from the bomb, and I for one like that idea.
Ravenman is. And, as iiandyiii says, the deal as proposed says that Iran will sign and abide by the NPT, which AFAIK does not have an expiration date. Signatories can, I believe, notify of their intent to withdraw from it, but Iran didn’t do that.
Even if Iran had nuclear missiles by the score, they would still face retaliation - just like any other country threatening a nuclear power.
‘Mutually Assured Destruction’ has certainly worked so far to avoid nuclear war in the RoTW (well, except for against Japan). However, that did not prevent people - notably those on the political Left - frim being concerned about nuclear proliferation. Are you now saying that their concerns were pointless, because sanity is bound to prevail?
The particular relevance of the issue in this case hinges on the fear of apocalyptic-minded religious extremists either taking over the Iranian government, or (more worrisomely) hijacking some vital bits of it for just long enough. How likely that actually is, I dunno.
The concern is that “mutually assured destruction” isn’t going to deter such folks, who may be slighly less rational than US or USSR Cold Warriors.
When the US first built a nuke, no-one knew for sure whether they worked. That really isn’t an issue these days. The actual engineering problems have long since been ironed out, and really aren’t that complicated (assemble a critical mass); the hard part is getting the stuff.
I understood him to be saying that Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons as long as they abide by the agreement, not that they necessarily would always abide by the agreement.
The problem here is that you think your mistake was following the administration’s misinformation. You should have opposed the war regardless of whether you thought Saddam had WMDs.
This is the smartest thing you’ve ever posted on these boards.
No question that they are a huge source of funding for various terrorist groups, particularly Hizbollah. Hizbollah is intimately linked with the Iranian government, without question.
Various countries have not called Hizbollah (to continue the one example) a terrorist group. However, as a general matter, Russia isn’t happy to have a terrorist-supporting Islamic country so near to them. Over the decades, it’s kind of been a little kabuki dance of Iran and Russia not trying to step on each others’ toes too much.
Although a lot of people think that this should have been part of the deal, I can’t see how any initiative like this could have possibly succeeded. Imagine the dialog:
US: “We demand that you stop supporting Hizbollah, which is supporting Assad in the wonton killing of Syrian civilians!”
Iran: “So, you’re going to stop supporting the Syrian opposition, then?”
US: “Er, no… but then we want you to stop meddling in Yemen!”
Iran: “So, you’re also going to stop your intervention in Yemen?”
US: “Er, no… but we demand you stop sending your Qods Force to Iraq!”
Iran: “Dude, they asked for us to be there. Are you going to pull your advisors out of Iraq, then?”
US: “Er, no…”
etc.
If Iran abides by the deal, more specifically the commitments to the NPT and the Additional Protocol, there’s no legal way that they can produce a nuclear weapon. Whether they abide by the agreement, I’m guessing that they probably intend to at the moment, because rebuilding their economy appears to be a much higher priority than building a nuclear weapon (which we don’t actually seem to have evidence that they have done anything in terms of a breakout).
In the future, however, who knows? Iran’s calculation could change. But I do think the agreement leaves the West and the IAEA in a much better position to know about Iran’s nuclear activities, so that we would probably know much earlier if they try to do something sneaky.
Please note that I view nothing about this agreement in terms of absolutes – I will not say “Iran cannot cheat” or “Israel has nothing to worry about.” I’m saying that the odds of us catching them if they cheat are much, much better under this agreement as opposed to today. The one absolute is that the terms of the agreement constitute a legal prohibition with no sunset on Iran developing a nuclear weapon – if Iran abides by the terms.
ETA: Let me add that I don’t think there is anything that can permanently prohibit Iran from developing a weapon. Even airstrikes would probably set them back some number of years – who knows how many – but there’s no bomb invented that would stop them from rebuilding a nuclear program later. Like Clausewitz wrote, and I’m butchering this, the way to win a war is not through killing a certain number of people, or taking a certain amount of territory. It’s doing what you have to do to convince your opponent to bend to your will. We have to make Iran agree not to develop a weapon. Is this agreement enough to make Iran agree not to build a bomb? It might be, because at this moment, rebuilding their economy seems to be a much higher priority than building a bomb.
No, but as a practical matter, every other issue you tack on makes it exponentially harder. How many more years were these negotiations going to take?
If you want to solve a big problem, you have to do it one step at a time. Trying to do everything at once usually just leads to nothing getting finished.
Let’s see how this agreement goes for a while, and then we can start talking about solving the next step.
OK. Thanks. But then again. Russia and Iran are certainly allies in Syria in support of Assad.
Yeah, but when we do it it’s for the good.
Now, what about these “snap back” sanctions? Seems to me that Iran can easily play us off each other. What does this deal do to make it so easy, as the administration claims, to put sanctions back in place if Iran is found to be cheating. Won’t there have to be, potentially, endless meetings to get everyone on the same page as to whether cheating is happening, how bad it is, and what the consequences should be?
I haven’t totally figured this out, but my understanding at the moment is thus:
Someone accuses the Iranians of cheating
Lots of meetings and discussions could result in sanctions being voted back into place
Or those meetings could stall
If the meetings are inconclusive, the UN would basically unilaterally reapply sanctions
I haven’t quite figured out all the details missing in that high-level summary, but at first blush it seems quite a bit stronger on snapback than I would have expected.
For people questioning the wisdom and worthiness of the Iran agreement, I hope you’ll take the time to watch the President’s press conference held today. He answered all of the detractors’ talking points and then some. When the press ran out of questions he pulled out notes with additional detractors’ talking points so that he could address those as well. He had quite a good time.
From what I read, once the US issues an accusation, the UN Security Council must vote to NOT put sanctions back in place. Since the US has a veto, that means sanctions go back into place simply on our say-so.
