Pascal’s wager expressed in semi-mathematical notation (subscripts are denoted by braces).
I assign the values because I’m assuming that Pascal considers his wager valid at any non-zero probability of God’s existence, and asserts (by implication) that the belief has neither cost nor intrinsic reward in mundane reality (“if you lose, you lose nothing”).
Therefore:
-
p{God} = 1/infinity
The probability of God’s existence is infitesimal but greater than zero.
-
r{belief} = infinite
The reward of belief in God is infinite.
-
c{belief} = 0
The cost of belief in God is zero.
-
r{disbelief} = 0
The reward of disbelief is zero.
-
c{disbelief} = 0
The cost of disbelief is zero.
Therefore the payoffs come to:
-
q(belief) = (p{God} * r{belief}) - ((1 - p{God}) * c{belief})
the probability-weighted payoff of belief
-
q(disbelief) = (p{God} * c{disbelief}) - ((1 - (p{God}) * r(disbelief))
Therefore, Pascal asserts that:
- q(belief) > q(disbelief)
Thus, by subsitution:
- (p{God} * r{belief}) - ((1 - p{God}) * c{belief}) > (p{God} * c{disbelief}) - ((1 - (p{God}) * r(disbelief))
and further:
- (1/infinity * infinity) - ((1 - 1/infinity) * 0) > (1/infinity * 0) - ((1 - 1/infinity) * 0)
Now probability is not generally applicable to infinite quantities, but we’ll give him the benefit of the doubt and allow that (infinity * 1/infinity) has some unspecified value greater than zero, noted as Q.
Therefore:
Q - 0 > 0 - 0 and thus Q > 0
Q.E.D.
BUT!
Pascal has included a faulty premise: The cost of belief is not zero! The cost of belief has a measurable value: the difference between my ‘natural’ will and the that which my belief, accepted through only the evidece of the Wager. This cost is not only nonzero, but it’s not infitesimal. Thus we have to replace premise (4) with
- c(belief) = x
The cost of belief is some numerically meaningful nonzero quantity
Therefore, the proper expression of the wager is:
- (1/infinity * infinity) - ((1 - 1/infinity) * x) > (1/infinity * 0) - ((1 - 1/infinity) * 0)
Since (1 - 1/infinity) ~ 1,
Q - (1 * x) > 0 and thus Q > x
Since Q does not have a definite value and x does, the conclusion that Q > x cannot be proven and thus fails to prove the wager.
To make Pascal’s Wager a true statement you must assert that belief costs nothing, which trivializes the nature of belief.
By this analysis, Lib, I make my claim that Pascal’s Wager is conclusively refuted.
Note that if you assign a non-zero value to the cost of disbelief, you contradict a premise of the wager that, “if you lose, you lose nothing”.
He’s the sort to stand on a hilltop in a thunderstorm wearing wet copper armor, shouting ‘All Gods are Bastards!’