iamnotbatman: Can anyone reasonably deny the overwhelming probability of a multiverse? On what basis? I realize we cannot at present observe other universes, rather we would infer them.
Put another way, is there a significant (>1% or even 0.1%) argument for a monoverse?
Website on Anthropic Principle and its history. I have only read page 1. It does not follow my presentation: it seems to hinge on carbon-based life, as opposed to technological intelligence. So at the very least, I need to tighten my terminology.
Why do you say that? What evidence do you have regarding the probability of a multiverse? If you have no evidence, we are talking about a philosophical opinion.
There really is nothing to explain. We are how we are because the universe is how it is. The puddle analogy nails it. I’m amazed that intelligent people are at all amazed by the Fine Tuning argument. It’s not spooky at all. It’s simply an obvious truism that physical events in the universe will conform to the physical laws of that universe. Life is nothing but an odd chemical fire caused by molecules bumping together. It is no more incredible or unlikely than a star or a black hole.
On the basis that we have no evidence for a multiverse.
Your whole argument rests on the claim that a multiplicity of universes exists. As others have pointed out, it is possible that there are other universes out there, but that doesn’t mean that they do. Nor does it mean that their existence is plausible, much less “overwhelmingly probable.”
If one is going to claim that the existence of other universes is overwhelmingly probable, then that person must shoulder the burden of proof. One cannot simply assert it, then challenge others to prove him wrong.
Measure for Measure stated it as incontrovertible fact. His exact words, which I quoted in the post to which you responded, were “Let me be succinct: we live in a multiverse.”
There is another possibility, perhaps a form of #3, #6 and/or #7.
All possible universes exist.
Imagine a fictional universe. It might exist in a novel, in a dream, or even in an unwritten novel or undreamt dream which might exist. In that fictional universe there are individuals who are conscious. Or rather they would be conscious if that fictional universe were “real.”
Anyway, how can I distinguish my consciousness from the “fictional” consciousness of one of the fictional individuals in a fictional universe? I know that I’m conscious, but within its own fictional universe, the fictional individual knows it’s conscious also!
… I’m sure I explained this poorly, but don’t blame me. After all, maybe I, like all of you, am just fictional!
I’m stating it as a hypothesis:[ETA: the hypothesis is that there is no reasonable basis to believe that we live in a monoverse.]
The evidence is analytic – I’m using the process of elimination. List the logical possibilities and rule out the empirical absurdities. What remains are the empirical possibilities.
That’s a valid methodology, right? If something is either A, B, C or D and A is absurd, then we are left with the remainder. If the remainder shares a single characteristic, then we have indirect -though valid- evidence of that characteristic.
Incidentally, I forgot about #2. Under this scenario [1], with further research, we will either turn up evidence that all the fundamental constants have an underlying cause, so the fine-tuning problem will go away. Or we might find direct evidence of a multiverse. The problem is that I generally hear of physicists describing reality, as opposed to saying why it happens. But if you want to attack my conjecture, this might be a fruitful approach.
Thank you for the reply. Do you agree that Davies’ taxonomy is comprehensive? Are you arguing for #1? Which of his choices is consistent with a monoverse and is not absurd? (That’s a real question, by the way – I’ve noted that I don’t understand #6). I’ve discussed variants of #3, 4, 5 and 7 though and found them to be consistent with a multiverse.
My argument should be easy to shoot down: just sketch a plausible resolution of the fine tuning problem that involves a monoverse.
[1] Must I keep saying, “According to this view…”?
I’ve always had a soft spot for a reciprocating universe (or universes).
Each time it recycles there is a degree of random variation in the constants.
Most universes end up staggeringly dull or dangerously exciting and fleeting.
We happen to live in one that is “just so” and are able to wonder at it.
We have no idea how many have gone before or will come after so why consider the fine tuning to be amazing in any way.
It was bound to happen sooner or later and to mutilate the old adage. "does a trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion trillion years feel like a long time if there is no-one round to experience it?
More specifically, there is no time between universes. The only thing (ASFAIK) that gives time a direction is entropy and there is no reason to assume that a different universe would have the same entropy as our own. Furthermore, if there is no time between universes and no transfer of anything between universes it is irrelevant whther they are concurrent or sequential. In fact there is no way of even determining if they are concurrent or sequential.
Whether or not other universes exist external to our own is an entirely different question. Given that our observations are restricted to our own universe it’s possible it’s not even an answerable question.
No, I don’t agree that his taxonomy is comprehensive. Davies omitted the very scenario which he purports to rule out – namely, that the universe was indeed finely tuned in a manner that’s designed to support life.
Now, this is the point at which Diogenes always says “But there is no designer!” or “You haven’t proven that there’s a designer” or words to that effect. That objection is irrelevant, though. If Davies wants to provide a comprehensive list of explanations for the appearance of fine-tuning, he can’t simply rule out that possibility from the get-go.
As an aside, I find the puddle analogy to be woefully inadequate. It amounts to saying, “The universe is like a hole in the ground, and life is like a puddle. The puddle simply fits the shape of the hole, just as we simply fit into the ‘shape’ of the universe.” Life is not just anything though; rather, even the most basic form of life demonstrates tremendous complexity and improbable organization with every appearance of purpose – thriving, self-propagation, complex interactions, and so forth. It’s not like having any mere puddle; rather, it’s more like having a puddle with graphically depicts the final battle scene from Star Wars. Someone might say, “Sure, that puddle shows X-wings in combat against TIE fighters and the Death Star, but that’s only because it’s sitting in a hole which has that particular shape.” One would have to explain, however, WHY the hole has that particular shape. Saying “It just does” wouldn’t cut it. Nor does postulating the existence of trillions of such puddles and holes – not without darned good evidence that such holes exist.
This is a classic example of special pleading. “But life is special. It’s so improbable and complex.”
Life is no more improbable or incredible than anything else in the universe, or than the universe itself. The “appearance of purpose” you see is completely subjective - imaginary. Your analogy to tie fighters is not valid. Nothing about earth’s biology shows intention or design, and no part of it is especially improbable.
I would ask you what hypothetical universe could exist for which a “fine tuning” argument could not be made. In any possible universe, everything in it is going to be precisely calibrated by the properties of that universe.
I prefer #2 because it’s perfectly in line with the way science has worked for the past few hundred years.
Imagine that we’re pondering magnetism 300 years ago. People propose various explanations:
It’s just a coincidence that metal bits seem to pull towards where magnets happen to be. There’s not really a cause and effect, it’s just that the times we have magnets are the only times we notice its happening.
There is some as-yet-undiscovered physical law or laws that explain the action.
There are infinite universes, and only the universes where metal bits just happen to fall towards magnets will have intelligent life to observe it.
Now as of 300 years ago we didn’t yet have the physical laws that would support #2, but isn’t it obviously the one to favor out of those choices?
Nonsense. Pick up a rock from your garden. Or look at a drop of dew. Would you honestly claim that life is no more complex than that rock or that little drop of dew? Your claim is absurd on the face of it.
Even the most complex computer in the world cannot compare to the complexity of am amoeba. To sayt hat life is no more improbable or incredible than anything – not even the universe itself – is ridiculous in the extreme.
That’s not my problem. That’s only a problem for people who purport that Paul Davies has devised a comprehensive list of explanations for the appearance of fine-tuning. If his list truly is comprehensive, then it must either include the possibility of genuine fine-tuning or provide a darned good reason for ruling it out from the very start.
Yes, I would say that. I am no more amazed by a flower than a rock.
How are you defining “complex,” and why do you think this complexity is so amazing?
His list does include that with the “creator,” but that’s easily dismissed. The real answer is that the appearance of “fine tuning” is simply an illusion. It’s drawing a bullseye around an arrow.
Certainly you cannot rule out #2. Physicists do describe whyl when possible. For example, the appeal to symmetry as a philosophical axiom is common, and fruitful (see gauge theory).
I have not ruled out that scenario either. Indeed, I discussed it in posts 1, 8 and 11. I even stated in the OP that #3 and #4 were my preferred explanations. I argued in posts 8 and 11 that both were consistent with a multiverse (#3 entirely and #4 mostly).
You appear insufficiently informed – join the club!
My (very shaky) understanding follows:
The “Obvious truism” apparently refers to WAP, the Weak Anthropic Priniciple. That’s less controversial. But there are also ponderous versions:
So, no this stuff isn’t easy.
It is so spooky! (AFAIK). It is, however, not woo. See post #9 by iamnotbatman, who apparently knows at least a little about the topic. Apparently the parameter intervals necessary for star formation are very narrow, and the realized values appear pretty arbitrary. “Spooky” probably isn’t a the best term though: “Puzzling” might be more on target.
Nice use of language. But again, star formation only occurs under narrow circumstances and apparently the other sorts of universe are rather boring. And boring universes seem unlikely to support the sort of scientific reasoning necessary to perceive the fine tuning problem (unless high level consciousness/technology is ubiquitous, which doesn’t seem likely).
Incidentally, my multiverse-necessity hypothesis can be falsified if there is a nonrefuted scientific theory that states the necessity of a monoverse (thereby ruling out a multiverse). I gather there are a number of theories that do not require a multiverse (eg the Participatory Anthropic Principle or #5). Are there other posited solutions to the fine tuning problem that do not involve a multiverse? Methodologically, I would not want to pull out Occam’s razor absent a presentation of each monoverse-consistent theory.
iamnotbatman and CurtC: Thanks for your help: I should like to think harder about #2.
This might falsify my hypothesis: we could have a chain of sequential universes as opposed to a number of universes running in parallel. Then again time is an aspect of our universe so, no, I have no idea what I’m talking about. […] Is this a variant of #3, the multiverse after all?
Incidentally, our friend wikipedia maintains that a big crunch is possible, though not observationally supported at present. Big Crunch - Wikipedia