To al who wer kind enough to respond/comment on my original posting, I refer you all to look at site: http://www.clinton.net/~mewilley/peral.html
and in particular to the handwritten notes of Secy of War Stimson"
25 Nov. - Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diary “FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday.” FDR asked: “the question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone’s mind as to who were the aggressors.”
Sorry! correct site address is: http://www.clinton.net/~mewilley/pearl.html
A very interesting study going back to the Battle of Taranto (which the Japanese emulated when they attacked Pearl) on to a day by day examination of who knew what and when they knew it.
FDR most assuredly did want to maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot. While hardly a big fan of FDR, I must say the requirements of leadership seem to me to include, if in your perception war is inevitable, motivating the public to rise to the occasion. Vietnam is the obvious example of a what can happen if you try to wage war w/o the public’s resolve.
Despite a successful war game attack on Pearl a few years before, that was a double for the real thing, Washington was not expecting the strike at Pearl. The Orange war plan anticipated the first encounter in the Philippines. FDR and crew were arranging their provocation trip wire in the USS Lanikai, a schooner equipped w/a cannon and some machine guns that was ordered to sail to Indochina in early December 1941. The idea was basically to draw fire on a “bona fide” but quite expendable United States naval vessel. The idea was predicated on the intense public reaction, during the buildup in December of 1937 to the Japanese’ rape of Nanking, to the sinking of the USS Panay. Anyway, the Lanikai was putting to sea out of Manila on the morning of Dec. 7, and the mission became moot.
V. Emilio
(Italics mine.)
Had FDR known the time and the place, he could easily have ordered the fleet (or the more modern ships in the fleet) to sail after dark on the night of Dec. 6-7. The Japanese were in no position to not attack, so the battle would have occurred anyway (and we would still have probably lost), but it would have been a battle intead of a slaughter. It makes no sense for FDR to have simply sacrificed the whole fleet just to accept a first strike.
(I realize that V. Emilio made no such charge; I am just using his post as a starting point for an observation.)
Tom~
I’ve read that MacArthur was a brilliant general who was very good at sidestepping non-important enclaves of the enemy to take more ground with little loss of life. I read one biography of him where various military people were asked what they thought of him, and most gushed about his skill.
Anyone have the straight dope on MacArthur?
It would be really useful if you took the time to look up the word “evidence.”
Nowhere in this quote does it indicated that Roosevelt expected a mass attack, or that he knew it would happen at Pearl Harbor.
In order to prove your assertion, you need to show both. You have shown neither.
Only the incredibly naive believe in conspiracies.
Screwed up the date, it was Dec. 8 in Manila.
In my opinion, MacArthur was highly overrated. He was very skilled at self-promotion which was why he had such a high reputation (he was one of the few military men with a public image at the start of WWII). Most of his reputation however was derived from his ability to slide the blame for his bad decisions onto others while collecting the credit for other peole’s good decisions onto himself. The policy of side-stepping Japanese bases was an example of this. It was created on an ad-hoc basis by field commanders under MacArthur’s command. But once it became apparent that it was working, MacArthur declared it had been his strategy all along.
I believe there was an anecdote from WWII, that said you could tell how well MacArthur’s forces were doing by reading the names in his reports. If you only saw MacArthur’s name, you knew his forces were making progress. But if you started to see other people’s names being mentioned, you knew there was some hold-up.
Though I defended FDR against charges that he “knew” of an impending attack on Pearl Harbor, I never denied that he WANTED to enter the Second World War, and was hoping the Japanese or (preferably) the Germans would give him some excuse to do so. That’s NOT controversial. Even FDR’s greatest admirers would admit that, and it wouldn’t trouble me to see a document in which FDR stated clearly that he was hoping for some kind of Japanese attack.
BUT… there is NO WAY Roosevelt wanted a disaster like PEarl Harbor. FDR wanted to BEAT the Japanese, remember? The attack on PEarl Harbor put a serious crimp in our ability to fight the Japanese at all, and with a few more bad breaks (if ALL the ships/subs that were supposed to be at PEarl were really there… if the Japanese had followed up the first strike with the planned second strike), out fleet would have been almost completely wiped out.
Do you REALLY think Roosevelt would have let THAT happen, just to get us into a war?
Actually, I’ve seen several analyses of MacArthur (none of which I can recall) that rated him quite highly. The main problem with viewing him objectively is that he was a glory hog.
Name Ike’s generals: Bradley, Clark, Patton, Hodges, Taylor, even Brigadiers such as McAuliffe.
Now get even historically literate people to name MacArthur’s. The only one most people can name is Wainwright who had to stay behind in the Phillipines.
MacArthur always made sure that he controlled the press releases. On the other hand, many of his decisions were good ones. (And it has been speculated that much of his glory-grabbing was a personal reaction to treatment he had received during WW I when he was denied several medals for personal bravery–that he truly deserved–because of personal feuds with Pershing’s staff.)
Tom~
More on Gen. MacArthur’s military prowness:
he was ceratinly capable of brilliant strategic thinking and had the ability to plan and execute very complex maneuvers. I refer to the Korean War , specifically the Inchon landings. Here he managed to place an army group behind N. Korean lines, leading to a panicked withdrawal of the N. Korean forces.
But there was also a bad side-his advance into N. Korea was a disaster-the famous Battle of Choisin Resovoir (where the US Marines covered MacArthur’s retreat) was one of the worst defeats for the US in history.
So I guess the man’s record is mixed-as it is for most generals who make it to theatre commands.
Actually a bigger problem during WW2 other than the US’s ineffective prepping for a japanese attack would be the total disreguard of the facts and failure to intervene during the rape of Nanking in 1937. The US govt had facts and proof of this holocaust going on at the hands of the japanese and did not intervene. I do realize we weren’t at war at this time, but still, how can you turn away from such things?
Worst of all, once the war was over, the Germans were tried for war crimes for their concentration camps and treatment of POW’s but the US and other countries failed to impose such sweeping justice on Japan. Mainly because of their interest in uniting with them against the communists immediately following the war. Manay Japanese class A war criminals lived free with no consequence until their natural deaths, some of them taking positions in politics.
To deal with men by force is as impractical as to deal with nature by persuasion.
I don’t know if I agree with you on that one, Burn. The Tokyo trials may not have gotten the same press that the Nuremberg trials did, but I do think they were quite extensive. A great many bios of Japanese generals end with “convicted and hanged in 1946”!
In fact, IIRC, the only Axis head of government to be executed by the Allies was Japanese (Tojo). Also, keep in mind that many more Japanese war criminals were inclined to “off” themselves at war’s end than their German conterparts.
actually a very small percentage of the generals were punished by hanging. The emperoro, who knew full well what was happening was above reproach, as was his cousin who was a high ranking general who gave the orders in the first place. Both weren’t required to stand trial at all.
Very few of the soldiers involved “offed” themselves, as they saw the directive coming from the emperor negated and admission of wrongdoing, after all, he was a direct decendant of the gods.
To deal with men by force is as impractical as to deal with nature by persuasion.
The Japanese had obtained an Enigma machine from Germany, and decided to use the same principle to encode their messages. Rather than using rotors operated by keypresses from the keyboard, they employed electro-mechanical “stepping switches”. An electromagnet, acting through a pawl and ratchet mechanism, caused rotating contacts to pass over banks of electrical contacts. The overall machine, although constructed differently, was equivalent to a four-rotor Enigma with electric typewriters on each side. A message was entered on one typewriter, and printed out, encoded, on the second. Although this eliminated some errors in copying an encode from illuminated light bulbs, the weight of the stepping switches and typewriters made it far less portable than the German field Enigma. The Japanese machine was called “97-shiki o-bun in-ji-ki,” or informally “J.”
The Japanese, more helpful than the Germans, frequently started their messages with “I have the honor to inform your excellency …”. This known correspondence between letters in the coded message and the corresponding plaintext afforded a toehold into breaking the code. We had broken the previous code “Red,” and many Japanese mistakes helped them solve “Purple”. Operator errors, transmission of exactly the same message in both Red and Purple codes, using stylized names and addresses, and the use of the same keys for a month, shuffled every 10 days, allowed the Americans to discover the “rotor” wiring and build an analog of the Japanese machine.
William Friedman, mainly responsible for the effort, suffered a nervous breakdown. He had followed the same route as the Poles used to break the original Enigma, but independently. Incredibly, he had decided to build his “Purple analog” from stepping switches also, which were readily available as stock telephone exchange equipment. The first successful Purple decode was sent to Washington in August, 1940.
Thanks for the info on the “Enigma” code machine!
Is it true that a complete Enigma machine was brought to England by a Polish intelligence officer in 1940? Also, why didn’t the Polish intelligence service receive more of the credit for cracking the German codes-it seems that the British had considerable help from them (the Poles).
I understand that the Russians had complete understanding of all of the German Army codes by 1943-which is why the Germans suffered some shocking defeats later in the war (like the battle of Kursk).
BurnMeUp- Outside of the Royal Family, I’m curious about the Japanese war criminals that got off for political reasons. I found a great site on the Tokyo Trials:
http://www.cnd.org/mirror/nanjing/NMTT.html
It’s very objective as regards the proceedings, so I wasn’t able to infer any political motivations for the sentences. I was perturbed to find that almost all those sentenced to “Life” were parolled after just ten years, though.
Actually, having read that link a little more closely, it confirms a lot of what BurnMeUp said, esp. concerning biological warfare and narcotics.
Thanks for spurring me to learn more about the subject, Burn.
Here’s a link to a good article on how the Poles broke the German enigma code(s) in the 1930’s:
There is a fabulous book about the failure of the golbal community to correctly punish the japanese war criminals for their atrocities it’s called “The Rape of Nanking” bu Iris Chang. A real eye opener to what we will do in the name of politics.
For exapmle, the us ignored much of the war ciminals behavior so Japan would side with us in the cold war since Russia, china and korea were all in the same politcal arena, we anted an ally in the asiatic community.
To deal with men by force is as impractical as to deal with nature by persuasion.