So, in general (and increasingly) corporations are treated as persons under the law, with most of the rights of actual people (including first amendment rights).
So, given that, does the apparently specify prohibition of Planned Parenthood receiving Medicaid payment for non-abortion services run afoul of the prohibition of bills of attainder?
I think that the leading case on this is ACORN v. United States, where the Second Circuit found that withholding appropriations isn’t “punishment” within the meaning of the clause. I assume a similar analysis applies here.
PP doesn’t receive appropriations like ACORN did. It gets reimbursed as a provider of medical services. I can think of a few reasons why that might distinguish the result, though I don’t know anything about attainder jurisprudence.
Which would make them a government contractor. We place all types of limitations on government contractors and require they meet lots of different standards they must adhere to to maintain their status as a contractor. Requiring military equipment be made in the US or requiring contractors not discriminate against LGTB etc. Some things are written into law others are just the policy of the executive branch.
The current proposal is we don’t ‘hire’ organizations that provide abortions. This isn’t specific to Planned Parenthood so I don’t see how it would be a Bill of Attainder.
They don’t mention Planned Parenthood but they make the criteria so specific that they only apply to Planned Parenthood in practice. Look at that (B) part.
From Bricker’s quote of three (necessary and sufficient?) requirements for attainder:
(1) “specification of the affected persons,” - this one seems covered (and probably was for ACORN as well). I would think the question would be answered by the specificity of restriction - a court might require that the government show that there is more than one entity that fits the restriction?
(3) “lack of a judicial trial.” - IANAL, so not sure what this means. I guess “punishment without trial but instead via legislation”, so if #2 were met, we might be there.
(2) “punishment,” - so this is the kicker, and might balance on reimbursement vs appropriation (with thanks to Richard Parker). Which leads to this quote from Bricker’s cite:
My understanding of current laws/regulations is that any provider who meets various requirements (which PP does) is entitled to reimbursement for covered expenses. It doesn’t seem like you need to stretch things much to describe that as a property right. Does that get us over the hump?
Fair point. I don’t know if it makes a difference. The emphasis in the cases that I’ve read is on punishment as of the type you would see for violating a criminal statute (death, imprisonment, etc.). Certainly seizure of property counts, but does this get there? I don’t know.
In Lovett, the Court struck down as statute that prohibited the payment of a salary to three specific employees.
But, in Nixon, the Court rejected the notion that the Attainder Clause operates as an equal protection clause, saying
So I don’t know the fact that it excludes one participant from an otherwise generally available government program makes it “attainder.” Is a provider really “entitled” to reimbursement? Is failure to pay “confiscation” of property? I don’t know.
Same. It seems like a stretch argument to me, but I don’t know that the precedent really forecloses it.
There are other constitutional arguments. I think better than Bill of Attainder is arguing that this would be an unconstitutional condition. Not only is the government saying it won’t fund abortion services–which it has long said and done–but saying that if you provide those services then you will lose funding. When you condition a privilege, including money, on the waiver of some constitutional right, then you’re squarely in unconstitutional conditions territory.
Could the government threaten to cut funding to Legal Aid unless they promise to stop bringing cases against Trump-owned properties?
That doctrine is a complete mess. Probably the least coherent constitutional doctrine there is, and that’s saying something! So who knows how it comes out. But I’d say it’s a jump ball, at least at first glance.