PNAC's new line: U.S. military presence in ME is a "generational commitment"

[BrainGlutton]

The neoconservative movement’s principal think-tank, the Project for the New American Century, just sent a message to Congress urging an increase in the size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps – http://www.newamericancentury.org/defense-20050128.htm:

While estimates vary about just how large an increase is required, and Congress will make its own determination as to size and structure, it is our judgment that we should aim for an increase in the active duty Army and Marine Corps, together, of at least 25,000 troops each year over the next several years.

There is abundant evidence that the demands of the ongoing missions in the greater Middle East, along with our continuing defense and alliance commitments elsewhere in the world, are close to exhausting current U.S. ground forces. For example, just late last month, Lieutenant General James Helmly, chief of the Army Reserve, reported that “overuse” in Iraq and Afghanistan could be leading to a “broken force.” Yet after almost two years in Iraq and almost three years in Afghanistan, it should be evident that our engagement in the greater Middle East is truly, in Condoleezza Rice’s term, a “generational commitment.” The only way to fulfill the military aspect of this commitment is by increasing the size of the force available to our civilian leadership.

As The Nation’s Jason Vest points out, this is an about-face from PNAC’s position two years ago, at the start of the Iraq War – http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20050221&s=vest:

“Generational commitment?” Quite a shift from PNAC’s March 19, 2003, letter, in which it envisioned that US troops would constitute the bulk of military forces in Iraq for not much more than a year. “Should be evident?” It was, in fact, quite evident to scores of civilian and military professionals well before March 2003 that an Iraq war was likely to be a long, costly endeavor, especially in terms of manpower. And it was those people whom many of PNAC’s signatories ignored or disparaged at every turn.

Signatory William Kristol’s Weekly Standard, for example, gave little consideration to the estimates of then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki, who held that it would likely take hundreds of thousands of troops over a decade to secure Iraq; one Standard writer tacitly praised Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld for publicly rebuking the general. Indeed, the pages of the Standard in spring 2003 were confident on every front, proudly boasting of copious support from “coalition forces.” Signatory Max Boot held, contra Shinseki’s estimate, that a mere 65,000-70,000 US troops would be adequate to secure Iraq’s future. Signatory Thomas Donnelly declared Iraq a victory with little possibility of a serious insurgency. (“The street-by-street slogging long predicted never materialized… If there ever was an Iraqi plan for bleeding U.S. or British forces in urban combat, it could not cope either with the British care and precision in Basra or with the boldness of the American attack into Baghdad.”)

Elsewhere, signatory Eliot Cohen described the war as “clearly won,” called experts leery of the endeavor “fools,” sneered at those who thought the US military force “too small to win” and bragged about the US military’s “relentless technological development.” In late 2003 Cohen was confidently predicting an imminent decrease in US troop presence.

In light of past and present circumstances, one might have hoped that PNAC’s demand for Congress to rustle up more soldiers would be accompanied by at least a circumspect apology for past misjudgments, and some measure of detail as to where an annual 25,000 new troops might come from (the word “draft” is conspicuously absent in the letter to Congress). But as PNAC letters are notoriously short on humility and long on hazy and disingenuous rhetoric, why should this be any different? Indeed, to the PNAC crew, it’s only a matter of numbers.

Issues for debate:

1. Has the U.S. taken on a “generational commitment” in the Middle East, in the sense that we’re going to have substantial numbers of American troops fighting in, or occupying, one Middle Eastern country or another at all times for a decade or so to come?

2. Is there any way out of that? If so, is there any good reason not to take it?

3. If we do have to maintain our military presence in the ME for the long haul, where are we going to get the troops and the funding?

[BrainGlutton]

And another issue:

4. Is there some way we can withdraw all, or nearly all, American forces from the ME, and still guarantee the steady supply of cheap imported oil upon which our national economy, in its present physical form, depends?

[PatriotX]

@BrainGlutton

1. Has the U.S. taken on a “generational commitment” in the Middle East, in the sense that we’re going to have substantial numbers of American troops fighting in, or occupying, one Middle Eastern country or another at all times for a decade or so to come?

We’ve already built “enduring camps” out of concrete and steel. They sure seem like permanent bases.
linksies

So, what’s the point of spending nearly a $billion building these things if we’re only going to use them for another year?

[David_Simmons]

@BrainGlutton

Issues for debate:

1. Has the U.S. taken on a “generational commitment” in the Middle East, in the sense that we’re going to have substantial numbers of American troops fighting in, or occupying, one Middle Eastern country or another at all times for a decade or so to come?

I’m at the bottom of the totem pole in expertise but it sure looks more and more that way to me. If not Iraq then somewhere else. Those in the Middle East might claim we are de facto occupying Saudi Arabia right now.

2. Is there any way out of that? If so, is there any good reason not to take it?

If there is I can’t see it. If there is one we should grab it even if we have to leave most of GW’s face behind.

3. If we do have to maintain our military presence in the ME for the long haul, where are we going to get the troops and the funding?

No problem as long as foreigners are willing to buy our trillions of dollars worth of bonds. The problem is paying the interest on the bonds while still maintaining some semblence of an societal infrastructure here in the US. Of course GW’s corporate cronys won’t care, they can move to Switzerland or Cannes or maybe Bangladesh or China where their employees are.

4. Is there some way we can withdraw all, or nearly all, American forces from the ME, and still guarantee the steady supply of cheap imported oil upon which our national economy, in its present physical form, depends?

Again, I don’t see how. It seems to me that we, through GW’s acts, have pissed off so many in the ME they can’t wait for our big military force to be gone so they can go to work.

[BrainGlutton]

@David Simmons

Those in the Middle East might claim we are de facto occupying Saudi Arabia right now.

But, we don’t have any troops there. Any more. (Apparently the Defense Department has learned its lesson from the Gulf War – the presence of infidel troops on the soil of Mohammed’s homeland angered Muslims all over the world.)

[David_Simmons]

@BrainGlutton

But, we don’t have any troops there. Any more. (Apparently the Defense Department has learned its lesson from the Gulf War – the presence of infidel troops on the soil of Mohammed’s homeland angered Muslims all over the world.)

You’re right, if there are any US forces there now they are merely trainers for Saudi forces.

I guess if there is any feeling about US troops in Saudi Arabia it would be resentment for past actions. That may or may not be significant.

[David_Simmons]

And, by the way, wouldn’t this be a violation of the doctrine of GW and Rummy to stand tall in the face of opposition by terrorists? After all, if the terrorists actions can make us leave Saudi Arabia why shouldn’t the same tactics be useful elsewhere?

Whatever happened to “Bring it on!”?

[Jonathan_Chance]

@David Simmons

No problem as long as foreigners are willing to buy our trillions of dollars worth of bonds. The problem is paying the interest on the bonds while still maintaining some semblence of an societal infrastructure here in the US. Of course GW’s corporate cronys won’t care, they can move to Switzerland or Cannes or maybe Bangladesh or China where their employees are.

I’m just not seeing this, David. The PNAC isn’t so much about corporate cronyism as it is about advancing american interests and ‘freedom’ through the world. These people aren’t cynically manipulating the system…these are true believers. So if they ended up damaging the US and it’s ability to dominate the world and had to flee to Cannes they would have failed in their goals.

[BrainGlutton]

@David Simmons

And, by the way, wouldn’t this be a violation of the doctrine of GW and Rummy to stand tall in the face of opposition by terrorists? After all, if the terrorists actions can make us leave Saudi Arabia why shouldn’t the same tactics be useful elsewhere?

But we don’t need to station troops in SA. In the Gulf War, we were involved at SA’s invitation, because they were afraid that after Hussein was done digesting Kuwait, SA would be next; and it was necessary to use SA as a staging ground for the counter-invasion of Kuwait. But in the more recent Iraq War, we had Kuwait to use as a staging ground for the invasion of Iraq. It sufficed. So long as a U.S.-friendly government remains in power in SA, we won’t be sending in troops. And it’s easy to save face – to say, we’re not afraid of the terrorists but we’re not stationing troops in SA out of respect for the wishes of the kingdom’s sovereign government.

[David_Simmons]

[QUOTE=Jonathan Chance]
I’m just not seeing this, David. The PNAC isn’t so much about corporate cronyism as it is about advancing american interests and ‘freedom’ through the world.

[quote]

Sure.

These people aren’t cynically manipulating the system…these are true believers.

Sure.

So if they ended up damaging the US and it’s ability to dominate the world and had to flee to Cannes they would have failed in their goals.

But they would still be so rich it wouldn’t matter to them. I think their goal is to advance their own interests.

[BrainGlutton]

@David Simmons

But they would still be so rich it wouldn’t matter to them. I think their goal is to advance their own interests.

Believe it or not, David, some people are more interested in power than in money.

[David_Simmons]

@BrainGlutton

But we don’t need to station troops in SA.

Do you think that really matters in a propaganda campaign by Al Qaeda about the US being forced out of Saudi Arabia?

[elucidator]

Perhaps. But happy, indeed, is the man who discovers that his own personal interests align perfectly with what is best for the Republic. Such a man can be very resistant to persuasion.

[David_Simmons]

@BrainGlutton

Believe it or not, David, some people are more interested in power than in money.

Oh sure, but power isn’t all that hard to buy if you want it and you’ve got enough money.

[Brutus]

@David Simmons

Do you think that really matters in a propaganda campaign by Al Qaeda about the US being forced out of Saudi Arabia?

But since we still have uniformed troops (what, if they are trainers or radar techs, they don’t count?) in SA, the only folks that buy into the ‘we abandoned SA’ myth are the sort that believe the Tet offensives were NVA successes and whatnot.

[David_Simmons]

@Brutus

But since we still have uniformed troops (what, if they are trainers or radar techs, they don’t count?) in SA, the only folks that buy into the ‘we abandoned SA’ myth are the sort that believe the Tet offensives were NVA successes and whatnot.

You’ll have to talk to BrainGlutton about the significance of what kind of troops and how many are in Saudi Arabia. He’s the one who pointed out that we no longer have troops there.

And, incidently, I see only one other response to the OP and that was from PatriotX. What about some others?

[Jonathan_Chance]

OK, I’ll play.

To wit: I have no doubt that the leading neo-con thinkers (if anyone can truly be said to ‘lead’ the thinking of a diverse group) of strong minded people) believe that our presence in Iraq is a ‘generational commitment’ because they want it to be a permanent commitment. This would give the United States the ability to project force throughout the middle east for the forseeable future.

But I think it’s awfully shortsighted of them. I think both political and economic forces will end up limiting both our commitment to the region AND our ability to expand the military to serve those overarching ambitions.

If the military must claim a larger and larger share of the American tax base while killing social services we’ll find ourselves in the same position the Soviets did in the late 1980s…spending so much on military personnel and hardware that the very infrastructure of the nation collapses…leading to a political revolution that puts the neo-cons and their followers on the bench for a generation or more. If they can’t see this I don’t see a way to explain it to them.

American politics is a damn fine balancing act. The electorate will only go so far in any one direction before wanting to push back towards the center. Politicians and policy makers ignore that at their own peril.

[BrainGlutton]

@Brutus

But since we still have uniformed troops (what, if they are trainers or radar techs, they don’t count?) in SA . . .

Maybe they count, maybe they don’t, but with that kind of presence nobody can say we’re “de facto occupying” SA, as David Simmons suggested. In any case, I was under the impression – perhaps mistaken – that we had no troops there at all, other than Embassy guards (and Paul in Saudi, of course!). Do you have a cite?

[Ludovic]

@Brutus

But since we still have uniformed troops (what, if they are trainers or radar techs, they don’t count?) in SA, the only folks that buy into the ‘we abandoned SA’ myth are the sort that believe the Tet offensives were NVA successes and whatnot.

Who won the battle between the Germans and the Warsaw uprisers? Russia.

[Well]

@BrainGlutton

Maybe they count, maybe they don’t, but with that kind of presence nobody can say we’re “de facto occupying” SA, as David Simmons suggested. In any case, I was under the impression – perhaps mistaken – that we had no troops there at all, other than Embassy guards (and Paul in Saudi, of course!). Do you have a cite?

Considering we have been “de facto occupying” SA for the last decade or so, I don’t see why we would remove our presence in the area for the next decade. We are at war with Islamic fundamentalism. And until it becomes the government’s policy to fight the terrorists by leaving them alone (or ceding to their demands), I don’t see how abandoning the ME would be even somewhat prudent.