On the subject of the windows, this links to a CNN article with a picture of classroom windows opening up pretty wide.
So… no need to go plowing heavy vehicles into loading bearing walls that my have children on the other side. Just open a window. You don’t even really have to go in at that point. Just scan the room. Use a camera if you must. Unless there simply are no windows in the classroom in question, it really doesn’t make sense that the police let a locked door hold them up. Even if blinds were down, I mean, really… it’s kind of appalling they couldn’t figure out some way to access or even assess the situation in the classrooms through the windows, with essentially zero risk to officers or children.
It seems to me that good old fashioned terror took over. Someone with authority felt that terror, and because they felt it, the entire organization acted on it, and failed to act in the way they were supposed to.
Again: I’ve got no interest in playing Judge Judy here and chewing out the people who didn’t act. What’s much more productive is to say, humans are gonna act like this. That terror is 100% natural to feel in a circumstance like this, and if we’re going to rely on police to solve the problem of mass murder, we need to have design a system that accounts for that terror and works anyway.
Our system didn’t account for that terror. It failed.
This is also the reason why I’m not gonna condemn the teacher who propped the door open. I’ve propped doors open myself, and so has nearly every educator I’ve ever known. For damn sure I’m changing my habits now, but relaxing on a safety protocol because it’s super inconvenient is also a very human response, so a system that relies on nobody relaxing on a protocol is a failed system.
True, but a small tow truck with a chain and hook could have ripped out the windows.
The overarching issue is that the shooter was in control. They did nothing to confuse or distract him. 19 guys in the hall, doing nothing, is stupidity.
I don’t think it’s necessary or helpful to assume that. It may be the case, but then again if that’s the story then the focus will—wrongly, I think—be on how we need braver police officers. I think it’s also possible—and even more likely, since there is no sense the police Chief would ever have been expected to put himself in mortal danger—that this came down to indecisiveness, perhaps “paralysis by analysis” coupled with making a wrong decision early on when the situation was still in the opening stages, and then letting that go on for too long without identifying and/or considering alternatives.
It might also prove to be the case that there were team resource management shortcomings, both interagency and interagency. I wouldn’t be shocked to learn that one or more officers, for instance, had the idea that maybe they should at least look through the windows, but then either didn’t feel empowered to make a recommendation to whoever was in charge, or even didn’t know who was actually in charge. Or if they knew who was in charge, maybe didn’t have a good way to reach them in a crisis.
Anyway, point being, if we just settle on cowardice (eta: or even just being overcome by “terror” as you put it), then all of that much harder, more nuanced discussion gets stymied (as many seemed to do in the Stoneman Douglass massacre as well: foist all the blame on the SRO—who I believe is still pending felony charges for child endangerment or the line—for not charging in, and stop to consider whether it was ever realistic to expect police to be able to intervene decisively in a mass shooting to begin with).
I agree, but, when it comes to why on scene commanders didn’t act decisively, I don’t know that “terror” is necessarily required to lead to indecisiveness. I think we need to account for more than mere terror in understanding how people are liable to react to chaos.
I wonder what passed for training. I mean, did they do a Saturday morning simulation? An officer plays shooter and they pursue him into the building and he enters a room and locks the door.
After the exercise they discuss the issues raised, and what’s needed to overcome them, like the keys, breaching equipment, communication and portable surveillance. Easy to obtain at modest cost.
According to this source and this source, this police department was trained according to the manual published by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement. Excerpts from this manual:
I take your point that constitutionally nobody can be required to die for someone else, but this is not the same as taking a risk that is inherent to the job. A risk that is spelled out, a risk that they were directed to take in a training class that they were paid to attend.
Honestly I don’t know how well they were trained to breach doors and take down an active shooter, but it is clear that their training directed them to take risks and act immediately. It appears they didn’t do that.
Certainly in depth training would be essential, but then again I think it would be unrealistic to expect any level of training to prepare officers nationwide to respond effectively to a school shooting through anything by put chance (ie: the SRO happens to hear the first shots, runs in, and happens to shoot the shooter—and not one of many innocent bystanders—before the shooter happens to shoot the SRO with a much clearer target and far less need to be concerned with bystanders than the SRO would have).
If the goal is to substantially reduce the death toll or the prevalence of school shootings, I have a fairly strong sense that “more training (or funding or screening or whatever) for police officers” will not be the answer. Unfortunately, this thread has been decoupled from certain alternatives, but I want to make clear that my participation in this thread should not be taken as an endorsement by me of the idea that police response should be the primary focus for preventing mass shootings. There is some worthy discussion here, but it is necessarily an incomplete discussion by virtue of the parameters of this thread.
ETA:
It’s worth highlighting that some officers, very early on, did attempt direct confrontation, but of course (yes, of course) they pulled back when shots started coming their way and a couple got grazed by bullets. That’s the thing. The whole “rapid police response” model hinges on the assumption that officers will take risks that they almost certainly wouldn’t be ordered to take in any other situation. It’s all well and good to tell individual officers they should expect to take a bullet for the kids, but it’s another thing for them to (1) actually do it, and (2) even if they do it, that still doesn’t take down the gunman by itself. A police officer getting shot, absent an opportunity to return fire, doesn’t do anything for anyone. It plays well in the news (see the recent Buffalo shooting, where the retired police officer turned security guard actually did draw and fire, but failed to take down the suspect, and so was himself murdered) but it doesn’t necessarily save lives if the gunman is unscathed after he encounter.
Agreed, but there are some basics: shooter enters school; shooter enters room; shooter locks door; wounded and dead are present; time is critical.
It looks like a lot of these issues are being addressed. But, training needs to match local situation. As I outlined above a simple exercise would expose critical issues. Police observation during the daily routine is valuable. Periodically check the outside doors. If one is unlocked pull the alarm and make a big deal out of it. Establish personal communication between the school office and local 911 operators.
I call 911 and verify that my cell phone makes the contact and that they have my correct address associated with that phone. I sometimes ask for police drive bys of my parents home. I’m not suggesting much more for the school.
As Chronos suggested above, it seems that a special school police force would concentrate on these issues. Is that just a legal dodge by the city to avoid potential liability?
Pressing the attack does not require, or imply, that the officer place himself directly in the line of fire. It assumes that the officer will harass the shooter in order to distract him from his goal.
The post upthread that they used the janitor’s keys would contradict that statement.
That’s conjecture on your part. It matters greatly which way the door opens, the material it’s made of and the frame it sits in.
Not having keys readily available is a massive fail between the school and police. Going through the window is not something they are going to be able to do with an element of surprise. the same applies to trying to destroy the door. All that does is give the shooter an opportunity to finish what he started and kill the remaining children.
Their best bet, by far is to silently unlock the door and storm the room so there’s an element of surprise.
But not when there is (or has been) active shooting and the only way to achieve silent entry involves waiting for the perfect means to enter. You are describing the tactics appropriate for a barricaded hostage-taker who has not yet fired a shot. I’m hearing universal agreement that these are the wrong tactics for the situation in Uvalde.
On the subject of how the doors were constructed, there’s this bit from a CNN article:
Miah Cerrillo, 11, was watching the Disney movie with classmates. Alerted to a shooter in the building, teachers Eva Mireles and Irma Garcia moved to protect their young charges. When one teacher tried to lock the classroom door, the gunman shot out a door window.
This article, written after an interview with a teacher, states that her students, with the aid of the police, escaped through a window in her classroom.
Well, unless those were a different type of window from the classroom where the shooter was, that’s as damning as it could possibly be as evidence that first responders could have engaged by forcing entry through the windows. Opening the windows from the inside would have been quicker and easier, so no doubt they would have been horribly exposed, but that’s the job.
So let me get this straight: 1 shooter, actively killing students. 2 rooms, connected by a short hallway. Minimum of 4 windows between the 2 rooms. Windows in the classroom doors, already broken in one case. 19 heavily armed cops who had recently completed active shooter training.