Wow.
Issues for debate:
Does anybody outside Belarus care enough about this to do anything about it, even to the extent of sanctions?
Is there anybody outside Belarus – e.g., Russia? – who wants Belarus to remain the last dictatorship in Europe?
How long can the Lukashenko regime hold on to power under these circumstances? Indefinitely, like NK and Castro’s Cuba? Or is the enviroment in Europe today too dictator-hostile for that?
So long as he makes nice with Russia, no other nation will do a thing. Belarus is part of what Russia considers its sphere of influence, and it will not suffer intervention by anyone for any reason.
It sucks. What would you have the West do, though?
And this is different from Iran how?
There are dictators all over, some are more subtle than others.
Indeed, and Belarus has had one of the less subtle ones for a while. Probably the closest thing in Europe to the old dictators of the 1940s. Also, as Alessan said, Russia is not going to allow us to have any influence there.
In that no one is afraid of Belarus.
Economic sanctions, perhaps. Those sometimes work. Dunno how much foreign trade Belarus has to sanction, though. And presumably trade with Russia would be unaffected.
I’m not sure how many Americans have even heard of Belarus.
Agreed. I confess, though, that I’m not entire sure what Russia’s sphere of influence is for. I mean, do they seriously fear invasion from the European democracies? Is a Western-leaning Ukraine a less reliable natural gas customer than one thoroughly in the Kremlin’s pocket? Russia certainly goes to a lot of trouble to keep democratic institutions weak or nonexistent in its backyard - what’s the point?
I dunno. What’s the point of the Monroe Doctrine?
Even West Europeans might, most of the time, forget it exists.
Incorrect. If they turn the gas pipes off, then a lot of Europe suffers.
At the time it was articulated? A desire to maintain markets for American goods in Latin America, access to cheap raw materials, and ward off threats to American sovereignty from European colonial powers still very much engaged in the kill-people-and-take-their-stuff game.
I’m not saying that there can’t be sound reasons for a state to want to maintain an exclusive sphere of influences. I’m just saying that I don’t see how those reasons apply to Russia’s position. No one in Europe has the desire or capacity to invade Russia, and Russia’s not likely to have any great difficulty in selling gas and oil to its neighbors whether or not they’re firmly under its thumb. So how does resisting the expansion of NATO and the EU, while working to advance its own influence in the Near Abroad, actually advance Russian economic or security interests?
Yes, they fear invasion: by the Swedes, by the Mongols, by the Teutonic Order, by the French, by the Germans… especially by the Germans. The Russian need for “buffer zones” - room for its qualitatively inferior troops to retreat and draw their enemies in to their deaths - is ancient and so deeply ingrained that it transcends logic. Yes, Western European nations may be peaceful. For now.
You seem to think that nations act in a reasoned manner. I say that they’re no more rational than their inhabitants, and often quite less so.
One would hope nations would be at least as rational as their leaders, in their actions as nations; especially when their leaders are not really all that accountable to the electorate, as in Russia.
Keep in mind that there is a tendency amongst people to believe that they all think the same way you do, which is to say that some leaders will behave in the belief that other national leaders will make the same choices they would, in those circumstances.
Putin (and Russian leadership in general) believes that we would use a friendly Georgia or Ukraine in order to put financial pressure or even military pressure on them, because that is what THEY would do if the circumstances were reversed.
…but aren’t Putin & co. sort of right? Georgia received US military training, and then Georgia promptly used the freshly-trained troops to attack Russian territory (or if you like, separatist states that aim to be either independent or Russian) in 2008. If the Ukraine joins NATO - a Western organisation deliberately developed to oppose the USSR/Russia and their interests - or otherwise breaks off further from Russia while approaching the West, it makes the situation of the Russian navy in Sevastopol even more precarious. Not to mention the proposed nuclear missile shield, which was said to be aimed at “rogue states” in the middle east and North Korea, but in practise was to be primarily based along Russia’s European border (at least as the system was conceived under GWB). Not to mention the US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, and the delays in the ratification of the New START treaty. In our eyes, Putin & co. may be focusing overmuch on military security and the Western erosion of their sphere of influence, but I think they still have a point.
Anyway, my father was one of the election observers in Belarus. He was surprised at how it went. A lot of people were expecting the Belarussian government to try to at least make a show of democracy, such as needing a second runoff election, under the understanding that a show of openness would lead to trade agreements and other deals with the EU. In my opinion Lukashenko has just decided to side firmly with Russia over the EU, perhaps because the Western EU’s relations with Eastern European states seem fickle and not always beneficial… At least Russia is rather predictable.
I realised I didn’t actually address the original debate points. So, in my opinion:
Outside of Belarus, this election outcome will probably prevent an increase cooperation with the EU, but beyond that, no states are likely to impose any more negative consequences on Belarus. Belarus doesn’t have much trade - the economy is dominated by the public sector - so sanctions wouldn’t do much, and Russia and other allies won’t oppose Belarus for this anyway.
I doubt anyone wants Belarus to remain a dictatorship. Russia and other neighbours, however, probably very much want Belarus to remain both stable and predictable; and keeping Belarus’ government as it is achieves this.
Probably Lukashenko’s hold on power hasn’t been much affected by this election in the long run. Considering that the global economic downturn, life for the average Belarussian probably hasn’t really been getting steadily worse and worse, although it hasn’t been getting considerably better either; I guess it’s like a more modern version of the Brezhnev era. The population are likely to accept this stability (even from sheer apathy) because a popular revolution for change isn’t sure to lead to great improvement, but could actually make things much worse, especially for the vast numbers of public servants (many of whom are totally unnecessary). Furthermore, Belarus is so closed off and forgotten, that outside pressure for change is unlikely to appear at all and even more unlikely to achieve anything, in my opinion.
When they don’t even pretend to pretend any more, interesting times are ahead.
Lukashenko is by no means Russia’s puppet, he’s way too independent minded for that. Pressure on him is not useful without Russia, but Russia is not the warm friend it used to be.
Lukashenko sits on a pipeline, so he’s safe. Any sanctions lead to energy shortage in Europe. However, he’s lost some goodwill by playing with this pipeline. The Belarus economy is based on using and even selling cheap (under world market) energy and Russia’s not too happy with it.
There are lots of pipeline projects built and planned. If there ever will be a situation where Europe gets all its gas by-passing Belarus (and it might be just behind the corner), Belarus goes nicely back to Russia’s pocket. In good and bad, it will be entirely up to them to do whatever they want with Lukashenko.