Bumping my own zombie thread to point out that we’re rattling sabers at Iran, and Secretary of State Pompeo just abruptly canceled a trip to Germany to attend to “pressing issues”. The press corps traveling with Pompeo has not been told where they are going and have been warned that they may not be able to report on the trip until after their departure.
The administration has been saying that they fear Iran will strike US troops or interests, likely through proxies.
Well, that’s just dandy. Setting the expectation that the attack will come from proxies lowers the threshold for retaliation. Some group of ten whackos no one has ever heard of before could suddenly become a proxy for Iran. And “interests” is a bit broad for my liking. What are our interests? Other than Bolton being interested in war, that is?
I think I’ve predicted 9 of the last zero attacks on Iran, so what the hell do I know? But having our foreign policy in the hands of a belligerent madman and a senile fool has me permanently on edge.
It’s hard to set an expectation that was built into security policy and thinking long before Trump announced he was running for President. The IRGC uses proxies to advance it’s interests across the middle east. That’s not exactly a controversial position. Iran doesn’t always even deny this.
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We do not have direct military force in Lebanon but we do have a military power called Hezbollah, which undermines the policies of the Zionist regime and the United States.
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When an adversary partly gives up plausible deniability it’s probably worth believing them. That does present some risks that an adminstration can either intentionally or accidentally overstate ties. It’s in Iran’s interests to generally keep things vague so they can make the world, and the American electorate, doubt any given claims and prevent the US responding. (Publicly admitting the Hezbollah connection doesn’t really undermine that. Nobody was really buying that there wasn’t one anymore.) Simply doubting any connection is also subject to the same kind of intentional or accidental errors.
It seems odd that a pretty typical term like “national interests” seems to cause you discomfort. You might want to check out the archive of congressionally mandated National Security Strategy reports. Presidents tend to ignore the updating it every year requirement in the law. Congress gives them a pass for ignoring the law. Still they do get published and are out there. Trump’s NSS from 2017 is there to read. It’s probably not going to give you the clear black and white I’d guess you want. Check against other older ones from administrations you trusted more. That level of clarity isn’t in the broad guidance of the NSS. Reading through can give you a good idea of what the current administration sees as the nation’s interests that the strategy supports.
Thanks for bumping this, I was going to start a similar thread titled “Wag the Dog”. Although Trump denies it, his legal jeopardy multiplies on a daily basis and nothing will push that off the front pages like an actual war.
Yes. Note that the fact that Iran is allied with Putin’s ally Syria does NOT argue against Trump starting a war with Putin’s default ally. Instead Putin will be delighted by any U.S.-Iran War.
[ul][li] Unlike al-Assad’s Syria, which might be fragile without Russian military support, Iran is not in jeopardy of falling to anyone; in fact a U.S. attack will strengthen the Iranian regime.[/li][li] Putin will be happy to see Iran become increasingly dependent on Russia.[/li][li] Any War by, or weakening of, the U.S.A. presence in the Middle East serves Russian interests.[/li][li] Increased conflict involving Israel serves Russian interests.[/li][li] Reduction in Iranian petroleum output will serve Russian oil interests.[/li][/ul]
It’s all win-win for Putin; Trump gets wins while serving his Russian master. An intense war might reduce U.S. domestic consumption and investment but spending on munitions etc. will keep the stock market and employment up, for at least the appearance of continued economic growth.
Trump’s hooligans aren’t very smart, but have probably figured this much out; and Putin may be egging Trump on via covert channels. The only question is when, not whether, Bolton-Trump will start the War.
US sanctions are hurting and people are upset with the theocracy. That’s not a first. The Shia clergy increasingly turning to Najaf (in Iraq) and the more secular approach of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani makes the dynamic different than it’s been before, though. Unhappy people combined with the Shia clergy starting to turn against the notion of clerical rule is a significant problem for the theocracy.
That difference does comes with obvious possible upsides for the region and US interests. It also has pretty serious dangers IMO. Iran’s current leadership has an incentive to wag the dog themselves. They wouldn’t want a full scale and direct war with the US but when you dance on the brink sometimes you fall over it. There’s also other dangers that might involve the US to lesser degrees. Arab Spring mostly didn’t result in lasting democratic reforms. Egypt ended up more repressive. Then there’s the extreme ugliness of Libya and Syria. There’s a real potential for a transition from theocratic government in Iran that plays out in a really ugly and brutal fashion.
People in Iran have been questioning their hard line against the US for at least a generation. In my own anecdotal experience, I can tell you that Iran produces an educated population. If you encounter an Iranian abroad and, say, someone from the Gulf States, the Iranian is far more likely to be educated. They’re not dumb. They know their theocracy does dumb shit. They just don’t want to be dominated by outside interests, which is what was happening before 1979. That’s why I think attacking Iran militarily would be a horrible mistake, not just because they could fuck up the region economically and otherwise, but because there’s a population in Iran that wants better relations with the West, and has wanted that for at least since the 1990s.
My prediction is that if the US pressures Iran into re-starting their nuke program, Israel will have something to say about that, and maybe that’s the idea. I think the US is goading Israel into attacking Iran so we don’t have to. I hope that Israelis understand that they are being used here.
This thread could claim a place in Elections when it was driven by speculation related to the 2016 presidential election, but while it is still a legitimate thread, it is currently more of a Great Debate and I am moving it there.
I don’t think there’s going to be a conflict with Iran. I base this on the fact that people have been saying there will be a conflict with Iran seemingly since forever, and it hasn’t happened, and my intuition about this stuff is usually correct.
What would Iran have to gain by initiating a conflict with anyone? Nothing, as far as I can tell. Nor do I think that Trump’s administration is going to start anything in Iran, or anywhere, really. I think Trump is too preoccupied with getting re-elected to risk getting entangled in another war.
I agree that Iran is unlikely to start anything. They know an all out war with the US ends for them the way it ended for Iraq (who didn’t initiate it, either). But I think there are some in the Trump administration, namely Bolton, who just want to attack someone and Iran suits them fine. Trump himself doesn’t have the brains to have a fixed opinion on it. He’ll do whatever the people on Fox tell him.
But it’s precisely his domestic troubles and re-election concerns that might cause him to “Wag the Dog.” He may not start a quagmire, but content himself with isolated strikes like the 59 Tomahawks he was so proud of that he ordered a special dessert at Mar-a-Lago.
There’s many months until the election, and the fights with Congress will ebb and flow, so I won’t try to predict exactly when saber-rattling will turn to bombing. But Trump will continue promoting Iran as a bugaboo for the duration, for reasons that have nothing to do with Iran itself.
The US might not necessarily set out to attack Iran. If Iran begins its nuclear program, Israel might have something to do with stopping it, but then the US might feel compelled to defend its ally and its regional interests. Putting pressure on the Iranian regime could force Iran to capitulate to the Great Satan (unlikely), or it could compel Iran to act out and do something as a way of acting out in retaliation. I think a lot depends on how Iran calculates its defensive position and its ability to withstand an assault from different angles. If it believes that sanctions are going to squeeze the regime into a position whereby there might be a popular uprising, then it will feel compelled to act sooner rather than later.
I think Israel is far more likely to attempt to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program through sabotage and cyberwarfare than any kind of direct military action.
There shouldn’t be a conflict with Iran - there’s no need for one. But it’s clear that this administration views applying pressure as the preferred way to deal with Iran, and Iran is going to feel increasingly cornered.
I go back to the influence of Bolton. He is both ideological and delusional. Keep in mind that he had a lot to do with the Iraq debacle, which by the way he doesn’t view as a debacle. Bolton believes that we would have had a different outcome in Iraq if liberals hadn’t criticized Bush/Cheney and if we had fought a no-holds-barred fight against Iranian militias and Iran itself. For all we know, he might view this as a chance to give Iran some payback. And I’ll tell you now: it doesn’t necessarily matter if Trump doesn’t want a war. If Bolton wants a war, he’ll lie his ass off to get one.
Saudi Arabia reports that two of its oil tankers were sabotaged by unknown actors. No one was hurt and no oil was spilled, but the tankers were badly damaged, according to the reports.
Iran says it wasn’t them. The US reissued a warning about Iran and those pesky proxies attacking commercial shipping.
Those pipelines move oil and gas from the Persian Gulf side to the Red Sea side of Saudi (and vice versa, of course). They help relieve supply shortages should there be any blockage of the Straits of Hormuz, as Iran has allegedly threatened to cause, if sanctions against Iran aren’t alleviated. The Houthis are backed by Iran.
Then there was the whole, ‘We’re moving the Abe Lincoln and a few B-52s into the area’ brouhaha of a few days ago. (Never mind the B-52s can kill just as many Iranians if they stage from Barksdale, vs flying out of Al Udeid.)
Still hope it’ll be nothing, but actually bombing tankers and pipelines isn’t something that I remember happening recently. Assuming the Iranians or their allies actually were responsible.
Thanks. It’s that I understand Iran feeling threatened, if the new sanctions advocated by the US will have real teeth, and prevent them from selling their oil. Sort of a related situation to how Imperial Japan felt, summer 1941. It’s just that I don’t see the point of Iran inflicting a small injury on other oil trading nations. Neither set of assaults meaningfully threatens to close either oil supply corridor, though it can certainly annoy both. So why heighten tensions?
OTOH, the Gulf states would love for either the US or, LOL Israel, to remove the specter of a Shi’ite Bomb for the near future. I don’t think the attacks were false; I’m not sure what to think other than the US can ill afford an overt shooting and terror war with Iran. Bad enough, all of the US servicemen that Iranian ordnance killed during OIF.
That does present some risks that an adminstration can either intentionally or accidentally overstate ties. It’s in Iran’s interests to generally keep things vague so they can make the world, and the American electorate, doubt any given claims and prevent the US responding. (Publicly admitting the Hezbollah connection doesn’t really undermine that. Nobody was really buying that there wasn’t one anymore.) Simply doubting any connection is also subject to the same kind of intentional or accidental errors.