I think its biggest flaw is the muddy travesty it offers of logical reasoning.
While I have nothing against either people who sincerely oppose all abortion because they believe in a human embryo’s right to life or people who sincerely oppose carnivory because they deplore the sufferings inflicted by factory farming, these two positions have nothing to do with each other, except in the mind of a moral sentimentalist like the article’s author who combines them by way of his own subjective categories of “kindness”, “cruelty”, and “dignity of life”.
If the problem with killing or the modern livestock farming practices that produce animals to be killed is that they’re brutal and painful, okay, but that is irrelevant to the ethics of killing, say, an early-term human embryo that doesn’t even have diversified organs, much less a nervous system capable of feeling pain or suffering with.
If, on the other hand, the problem with killing a human embryo even at the blastocyst stage is that it is considered on philosophical or religious grounds to be fully human with the same human right to life that we accord to every human individual, okay, but that is irrelevant to the ethics of killing a non-human animal for food, or of determining what counts as minimally humane treatment for non-human animals. (In fact, Scully doesn’t seem very clear as to whether he’s advocating radical-vegan-style renunciation of any “trafficking” of animals whatsoever, or just a rejection of brutal factory-farming methods in favor of humane livestock treatment.)
Is Scully’s argument that both non-human animals and human embryos have the same legal right to life that we all recognize for born humans? If so, then you can’t kill any animal to eat it under any circumstances, no matter how non-cruelly you treat it prior to killing, and animal cruelty per se becomes a secondary issue.
Or is Scully’s argument that both non-human animals and human embryos must be protected from “suffering and violence”? If so, then you can’t use this argument to justify banning abortion of human embryos before they have any consciousness or feelings to experience suffering or violence with. (Nor can you use it to justify opposition to any use of animal products that doesn’t involve suffering for the animals.)
Instead, Scully tries to encompass both anti-abortion and pro-vegan positions with vague and emotional button-pushing buzzwords about “cruelty”, “dignity”, “pro-life”, “protecting the weak”, “children”, “moral intuition”, and so forth.
These are not in any way adequate arguments to offer to anybody except those who already agree with you in their subjective “moral intuition”. Sentimental morality is full of such self-regarding pleasant feels. But feels are ultimately no substitute for thinks.