quote=“Whack-a-Mole, post:89, topic:989383”]
I have lots of ideas I think could improve the US government. Age restrictions (and/or term limits) are not top of the list.
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Fair enough. I have some thoughts myself. Here’s one that’s been kicking around my brain for awhile;
Any bill passed by either house of Congress shall receive a full vote within the other house within no more than thirty days of its passage (or within ten days of its next convening if said house is in recess at the time). If such a bill has neither been approved or rejected by the other house by the end of that time, it shall proceed to the president for their approval or rejection as if it had been approved by said house.
Any executive appointment requiring the approval of the Senate shall be voted on within 30 days of the appointment being issued (or within ten days of its next convening if the Senate is in recess at the time). If such an appointment has neither been approved or rejected by the end of this time, the appointed person shall assume the position as if the appointment had been approved.
Except as required by this constitution, no vote or resolution in either house of Congress shall require a grater margin of passage than a majority of representatives or Senators voting yea or nay.
The intent of this amendment is to prevent a speaker or majority leader, or another single member of either house, from blocking a vote that is likely to pass by refusing to schedule a vote or attempting to delay a vote indefinitely, by having the law proceed as if passed if it is not acted on. It further prevents the Senate from keeping vacancies open indefinitely and abolishes the filibuster while maintaining the supermajority requirement for impeachments, expulsions, and amendments.
Feel free to nitpick, tear apart, and find loopholes in this idea (keeping in mind that there’s a near-zero chance of this passing in the real world).
I don’t have any particular nitpick or loophole, just a question about the background: are there no instances where a “deadlock” of the type you are trying to prevent serves the best interests of the country? Followup: if there are such instances, what is the calculus about which condition is better, your proposal or the current state of things?
My first thought about major changes in the ways laws are passed (and appointments confirmed, although that might be better considered separately) is to consider whether the perceived benefit depends on which party is in power. If we had a nutso Republican President instead of a Democrat right now, might not deadlock in the Senate be our friend?
I think I understand what you are trying to accomplish, and with regard to appointments I think it may have merit, but not so much with legislation. I am open, as they say, to conviction otherwise.
None that come to mind. It’s possible that with no filibuster an ACA repeal might have passed the Senate in 2015 - but then again they couldn’t muster 50 votes when they tried it in 2017, and Obama would have repealed it anyway.
On the other hand, I can think of a number of popular policy ideas - public option, codifying Roe, legalising marijuana, statehood for Puerto Rico and DC, etc - that likely would have passed by now if not for one party leader learning how to grind the Senate to a halt whether they have the majority or not.
Need to ponder further. At first glance the general shape seems okay, though it’s necessarily designed to stymie bad actors rather than promote good governance and is therefore inherently a confession of unhealthy politicking. My own country doesn’t have anything like this, but then it’s a multi party parliament so the combative two-party shenanigans don’t apply.
And of course in a world where it’s politically possible to amend the Constitution at all, there are other more powerful changes to consider. But to object on those grounds would be fighting the hypothetical.
First thought: include a caveat that when a bill is passed by one house and then sent to the executive due to inaction by the other house, and the executive rejects it, there is no option for the original house to override the veto unilaterally. An override must always require both houses.
There’s still room for shenanigans. If one party holds the White House and only one House of Congress, they could use procedural means to delay the vote in the house they don’t hold and kick it straight to the President, effectively bypassing one house of Congress.
#1 I wouldn’t object to this but as part of a bigger picture of how Congress does business overall. #2 A minority could filibuster and get the appointment through. #3 Under basic parliamentary law, some votes should require larger than majority to pass.
On #1, you’re only giving the second chamber the opportunity to approve or reject? They can’t amend? That seems to give a lot of “first mover” power to the chamber that can ram their version of a bill through fastest. Do we really want both chambers incentivized to pass legislation as fast as possible?
Also, in this scenario the House would be setting the stage for what the Senate can consider. Even setting the filibuster aside, under current rules and precedents it’s much easier and quicker for the House to advance legislation than the Senate. I imagine the Senate would be so swamped with House bills they need to vote on within 30 days that they’d have almost no time to consider and advance their own measures.
I think both of these could be solved through housekeeping. If this amendment were in place, I believe the majority party could set up a rapid-voting scheme just by a majority vote for new rules. Something like, “On the second and fourth Thursdays of every month, the speaker/president may call for an up-or-down vote on any bill that has been passed by the other house of congress within the period of one to three weeks prior. These votes may be combined in an omnibus vote.”
My understanding is that eventually both Houses have to approve a single bill–identical in both Houses–before it goes to the president. That’s where the conference committees come into play. An extra step would enter the process here: a bill from the quickly-producing house would get a quick no vote, before the slower house took up a very similar bill. Once both houses had similar bills approved by themselves (and rejected by the other), the conference committee would proceed as before.
But wouldn’t you want the second chamber doing some due diligence on these bills? Taking testimony in committee, asking questions, exploring potential unintended consequences, debating alternatives, etc. Or are they just to assume the originating chamber did all necessary due diligence?
Also, changing the Senate Rules to affect the rapid voting scheme you propose would take a 2/3 vote of the Senate.
That’s not how conference committees work. Conference committees are convened to resolve differences when the same bill (e.g. HR 1234) is passed by both chambers in different forms. What you’re proposing would be a new process that would present its own problems (e.g. who decides whether two bills are “similar bills” for the purposes of conferencing).
I think @Fear_Itself is on the right track, if you have an R House, D Senate and R White House, the House can just pass a whole bunch of whackadoodle bills in short order, or hold them at the desk and then dump them all on the Senate at the same time. Republicans in the Senate can use their right of unlimited debate, quorum calls, objections to unanimous consent agreements and other dilatory tactics to run out the timer. Democrats in the Senate might be able to vote down some of the bills, but would be hard pressed to schedule votes on all of them before the time limit expires.
The idea behind section 3 is to abolish those tools by establishing a simple majority requirement for everything that the Constitution doesn’t explicitly authorize a supermajority vote for. Perhaps that could be made more explicit.
What the Constitution is explicit about, is that each House of Congress may establish their own rules. If the Senate doesn’t vote to abolish the filibuster, such a ban cannot be imposed on it.
You do realize, don’t you, that an amendment amends, or changes, what comes before?
Otherwise (just one example) alcohol would be simultaneously legal and illegal. You could be arrested for buying wine. And when you complained to the police, “But alcohol is legal under the 21st amendment,” they would reply, “We’re arresting you under the 18th amendment.”
The Constitution trumps any rules the Senate might create. Otherwise, the Senate could vote to declare Ted Cruz to be Emperor of the Senate and bestow that same title unto his issue until such time as his bloodline runs dry.
Look past the current nonsense to answer a larger question. In a two chambered legislature, why should the enthusiasms of one chamber demand a response from the other? Getting a proposal through a chamber has, historically, been fairly easy to do. Some fraction form a block, which then pushes the bill. Others go along. If no such block exists in the other chamber, the proposal has no champions and disappears.
Why must there be a response? Responses require time and effort. Each chamber is allowed to do its own research - have committee hearings, interrogate experts. Doing so to no purpose subverts all the other work that the chamber could have been doing. Forcing a process through in 30 days ignores all the preliminary work that goes into passing any legislation.
You might argue that the chamber should just have a pro forma vote of no to accede to the law. That puts them on the record. Again, why? Why should they have to vote unintelligently just for the sake of a law?
The philosophical objection to this plan is that it throws out bicameral government. We all understand in today’s environment why someone might want to do this. Today’s environment won’t be next year’s or next decade’s or next century’s. Such a law would apply to everything forever, upending the most basic forms of Congressional procedures, processes that require enormous amounts of time that may need several sessions before fruition. Wouldn’t an early, immediate, vote - yes or no - create havoc?
More specifically, it is a massive general solution applied to a small array of problems, which could have major unintended ramifications. Look at the way that politicians spend twenty-five hours a day seeking to game today’s system.
Dropping a giant anvil from space is one way of getting rid of the bugs in your house. Before you rush off with enthusiasm, you might want to ask what else would get squashed.
I don’t think what I’m proposing is any more radical than when Parliament took away the power of the House of Lords to block legislation, and it seems to have worked out well for them.
None of the tools I mentioned – unlimited debate, quorum calls, objecting to unanimous consent agreements – require supermajority votes. The cloture motion to cut off debate requires a supermajority, but I assumed that would go away under this scheme (maybe you meant it would be reduced to a majority vote). Other tactics can include requiring bills and amendments to be read out in full, objecting to committees meeting, and strategically denying quorums in committee and on the floor. There are innumerable parliamentary tactics currently available to Senators that could draw out consideration of legislation beyond the 30 days, particularly if the Senate is going to try to get any other work done (voting on nominations, debating their own legislation) and if you’re going to let them have weekends and holidays off.
I guess you can handwave all of these by saying that the proposed amendment will simply require that they vote within 30 days. But @Exapno_Mapcase really summarizes well my objections to this proposal. The second chamber is fatally compromised on its ability to conduct its own independent investigation and consideration of the need for and merits of the legislation. And I just don’t see the heinous crime currently being committed that would warrant such an enormous and unpredictable upheaval of the legislative process.
That was caused by hereditary peers, completely unaccountable to the people, blocking legislation that the elected government had successfully campaigned on and got a popular mandate from the people.
Both chambers in Congress are elected. No comparison.
