I didn’t say you called him a shirker. I mocked your contention that he is somehow to be held in low regard as a historian since he didn’t serve in the military by pointing out the reason for his lack of military service was TB, which made him physically unqualified for military service. I hate to be the one to break it to you, but military service or the lack thereof doesn’t make one a more or less qualified historian. Or shall we toss all of the works of Tacitus into the bonfire rather than regard him as one of the greatest historians of the Roman era since he probably didn’t serve in the Roman military, and if he did it was being appointed to command of a legion based solely on his being a member of the aristocracy, not on any prior military experience? Here’s another shocker for you: historians have different opinions from each other all the time. Their military service record or lack thereof doesn’t on its face give greater weight to their opinions. To claim that it does is frankly childish.
Here, I’ll even link the wiki entry for RMA Sandhurst for you. It’s the officer training academy for the British Army. Keegan was the senior lecturer in military history there for a number of his 26 years in that post. His lack of military service didn’t seem to bother the British Army when it came to teaching military history to their officers.
Hang on a second - weren’t you the one trying to claim that other posters were arguing with different posters in their head? Oh yeah, you were:
Here’s a clue: I never said Keegan said anything. That’s Sailboat. You are literally arguing with me over something another poster said as if I had said it.
Thank you, TokyoBayer, for the far more nuanced and informed position than either Oliver Stone or my own previous knowledge.
I have certainly heard the claim that the bombs prevented US soldier deaths. I only recently became aware that the Soviets joined the War against Japan. I was aware there was a lot of internal debate in Japan and that it took Hirohito to sway the surrender.
[QUOTE=TokyoBayer]
There were a number of concerns which could have lead to the decision by the Emperor to break the deadline. There was a real concern that if the Soviets joined the attack on the homeland, that the emperor would not be allowed to continue even in the limited role, as he was under US occupation.
[/QUOTE]
Could you clarify, allowed by whom? Are you saying that Japanese people (or elements of the government) would oust him, or that in the eventual surrender that the conquerers would deny him that role? Or both?
I came across this argument first many years ago; Isaac Asimov had referenced the debate on the use of the atom bomb and felt that it was justified by the show of force to the Soviet Union, thereby preventing worse during the Cold War, and not so much by the need to force japan to surrender.
Recently, there were some threads on reddit AskHistorians and this article arguing that the Bomb didnt accomplish the surrender but helped save face for the US and for the Emperor (during surrender) and that the Soviet declaration was critical.
The article’s argument places emphasis on the timing of the meeting of the Supreme Council on Aug 9 & the argument that devastation by nuclear bomb of two more cities was not different in scale/impact than the devastation already wrought upon 66 other cities by the american bombers that year. I mean, dropping more atom bombs would have just helped to make the rubble bounce at that point; there was equally no material defense against conventional bombing at that point.
An equally significant point (of the article) is that the entry into war of the Soviet Union removed Japan’s strategic end-game options in a way that no bombing could have. At that point the hopes for Stalin to mediate a cease fire or for a last ditch strike against the US to force concessions would have been eliminated and the prospect of surrender to the soviet union would have been surely less appetizing than surrender to the US; (as it was for many germans who voted with their feet).
(i.e. any concession by the US would simply have been swallowed/negated by a greater Soviet claim.
The Soviet Union had a VERY sizeable war machine that had just chewed up German army and the speed of the collapse in Manchuria was also stunning. The article does seem to have omitted the fact that the soviets had far less amphibious/expeditionary equipment and experience than the US, even if logistically they were far closer.)
The article does seem cogent to me, and makes a case that the Soviet declaration was a more significant factor as the straw that broke the camel’s back than the atom bomb.
However, since roosevelt/churchill had pushed for exactly thiscommitment from Stalin at Yalta, (Stalin in response to roosevelt & churchill promised to declare war against Japan 90 days after V-E day, and as duly committed, did so on the 90th day), it surely couldn’t have been a surprise to the US/UK.
In fact I wonder if any argument has been made by any historians that knowing this schedule, the timing of the US dropping of the atom bomb was aimed at enlarging the US control of post war Japan. (i.e. In Germany, Eisenhower kept his forces at the Elbe river un-reinforced while the Soviets pushed for Berlin, thereby assuring themseloves a stronger hand in post war Germany. By this time, under Truman, who was far less trusting of the Soviet Union than Stalin*, the US must have had generals determined not to minimize Soviet influence in the east and the atom bomb as the best way to achieve that at that specific time.
I think Roosevelt had far more confidence in his ability to influence Stalin, mistakenly or otherwise, so not sure if trusting is the right word.)
Would appreciate more information/insight.
–
In ref to the below:
[quote=“TokyoBayer, post:170, topic:666628”]
We’ve done this on a number of times, but there really isn’t a way to determine which of the two factors, the atomic bombs or the Soviet entry into the war was more important in the decision to surrender.
The facts are: Hiroshima occurred August 6, the Soviet declared war on the night of August 8th and the second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9th. The Japanese government made a counter offer on the terms of surrender on August 10th.
The debate among scholars has gone on for decades and will likely go on for decades more. However, the average person isn’t really aware of the importance of the Soviet entry into the war and believes that it was simply the dropping of the bombs.
I don’t think it was a “great lie” but it was a gross simplification of history, and there certainly were many factors which contributed to that becoming the quick explanation. Among them was the interservice rivalry post WWII and fighting for budget. Others was the minimization during the cold war of the Soviet contributions to WWII.
As for the decision, I always have to stress this, but one simply cannot use broad terms such as “Japan” when discussing the decision to surrender.
And by that very definition, it didn’t happen. There was not a consensus in any sense of the word. After days of bitter debate and an attempted coup, most of the military finally acquested in resignation when the Emperor finally pushed them.
Fair enough. I don’t debate creationists, either. If someone refused to discuss their unsupported, crazy assertions, then there’s nothing left to talk about.
Give me a break, fighting ignorance is a full time job.
Others don’t seem to share your opinion on my contributions to the thread. The only ones who are complaining are the ones with the absurd ideas.
Thanks, I guess. I’ve gone back and forth myself, growing up in America believing that it was only natural to use the atomic bombs, then after living less than a kilometer from point zero in Nagasaki and reading more material, I was antibomb for a while in my youth.
I’m back to believing they were necessary. Tragic, but necessary. That was a horrible war and it needed to be ended with the militants out of power. I have seen nothing by any of the critics which makes a better moral case other than “it was a new way to kill so it was much more evil.”
Not only were less US and Allied soldiers killed, but the end of the war saved the Allied POWs which were slated to be mass excecuted. And the civilians, both in Japan and the occupied countries. And the Japanese soldiers as well.
The was real danger of both.
There would be hardliners within the military who would ever want to isolate him and ruling in his name or depose him and find another member of the imperial family who would follow their lead.
For most of the history of the Chrysanthemum Throne, the Emperor was a figurehead at best and a royal prisoner at worst. The mid 19th century drive to overthrow the bakufu (shogun) government and “restore” the emperor was yet another case of one faction of Japan’s powers using the symbolic power to persuade people to join their cause.
The Emperor’s principal responsibility was quasi religious in nature, performing the symbolic ceremonies and then being part of the longest royal dynasties in the world. The Japanese didn’t take this lightly. In addition, from the 20s and 30s, the military, primarily the army had developed a sort of personality cult around the Emperor which had not existed prior to that. As there was compulsory military service for all Japanese males, a generation had grown up with greater attachment to him.
Up until the very end, there had been placed an equal weight on what is called kokutai, a word which has no exact English translation, and has been called “national policy” but is really much more. From wiki
For the military leaders, it was the essence of every unique and special about Japan and it naturally required them, the Yamato warriors to lead the country. The military had demanded that any talks of surrender could not touch either the emperor or the kokutai. At the end, that had to be jettisoned and they settled on insisting on some sort of preservation of the emperor.
There had been real danger of the emperor being tried as a war criminal. In my opinion, in a just world he should have. However, the US decided to do the politically expedient things and utilized him in order to change the nation. Hirohito escaped being used by his own army into being used by a foreign army. The US allowed him to remain as a figurehead emperor but severely limited his personal powers and dismounted the greater imperial household, making commoners out of all but a few direct relatives.
This has been hotly debated by many scholars. I’m not going to rehash all the arguments here, but I agree with those who argue there was perceived need to drop the bombs in order to end the war. There are clear paper trails demonstrating that everything was being driven by a desire to beat the Japanese as soon as possible. The timing of the bomb was driven by its completion date. It was simply coincidental that the two bombs were dropped at the same time as the Soviet declaration of war.
As a little more history, there was a strong feeling of destiny in Japan. They had come out of a feudal society less than 100 years prior, buzzed through their own industrial revolution, beat the Chinese, the great Middle Kingdom and the Russians, winning an empire in the process.
By July of 1945, that empire was in tatters. Japan’s cities lay in ruins, her once proud navy destroyed and her army beaten up. Still, they were delusional. Although they new they were defeated, they still occupied a great deal of territory and believed that they could negotiate favorable terms.
I can’t agree with many of the things in the article linked in the post but parts are spot on. Speaking of not agreeing and agreeing, let’s look at this part.
OK, Ward Wilson the author of the piece is not an unbiased historian, he’s committed to curtailing nuclear weapons and cherry-picks facts. For example, his description of the IJA as being “well-equipped.” Not really. It had enough weapons to cause a lot of damage to the US, but it wasn’t unbeatable.
The point is that some of the Japan leaders were hoping for Soviet intervention. The military was also using that as a stalling tactic to postpone any hard discussions. The Foreign Service had sent a list of proposals to the Japanese ambassador to the Soviets and had been waiting for a reply. Stalin had kept them unanswered for a long time in order to string them along as his generals prepared their attack on Japanese positions in Asia.
Ward makes a big deal of the timing of the Big Six on the 9th, after the Soviet declaration of war. I believe he is ignoring so many facts that it’s misleading at best.
From here:
This author, Sadao Asada, is Professor of International History at Doshisha Universityi n Kyoto, Japan. He received his doctorate from Yale University.
His paper is a must read for understanding the end game in Tokyo.
And, for Little Nemo, the reason I don’t propose my own reasons is that scholars do a far better job.
I have heard that statement. I think that there certainly is an element of wanting to use the bomb to show up the Soviets, but I don’t think that was the primary reasons why the A-bombs were dropped on Japan.
That article certainly sounds well-argued. However, TokyoBayer links to a great rebuttal.
Yes, he does rely on the argument of the timing. Specifically, he says
He then says
Whereas the Soviets declared war and invaded on early August 9, and Nagasaki didn’t happen until after the meeting was underway. Sounds convincing, except it isn’t quite accurate. From the article TokyoBayer linked, as soon as Truman announced the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Foreign Minister Togo tried to get information from the army concerning the blast. But the army was in denial, refusing to admit it was an atomic bomb. It was mid-August 7th when Kido Kiochi took word of the atomic bomb to Emperor Hirohito, and Hirohito was displeased by the lack of information available to him. Information was slow going, the army was either too-discoordinated or too embarrassed to confirm the attack was an atomic bomb.
Furthermore,
This is cited from a source document: Kiruhana and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku 2: 356; Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 98.
So which was it? Was the request for war council refused and then recalled, or was the war council delayed a day because military members were unavailable (perhaps even stalling)? Seems to me the War Council was already planned prior to the Soviets declaring war and invading Manchuria, so it’s hard to see that as the cause of their meeting. Seems like we’re back to Hiroshima and complications of actual real-time confusion and disagreement.
Yet TokyoBayer’s article shows Emperor Hirohito and Togo were explicitly concerned over the atomic bomb and the difference it made.
[SIZE=2]
Furthermore,
That’s not looking good for Ward Wilson’s premise.
[QUOTE=barath_s]
An equally significant point (of the article) is that the entry into war of the Soviet Union removed Japan’s strategic end-game options in a way that no bombing could have. At that point the hopes for Stalin to mediate a cease fire or for a last ditch strike against the US to force concessions would have been eliminated and the prospect of surrender to the soviet union would have been surely less appetizing than surrender to the US; (as it was for many germans who voted with their feet).
[/QUOTE]
This is a fair point. It is reasonable to think that the Soviet entry into hostilities added to the momentum to accept the terms rather than push back. However, it cannot take the primary role for triggering the War Council meeting, because the meeting was already scheduled before the attacks. And it cannot be considered the most salient feature, because the Emperor was already pushing for acceptance of the Potsdam terms with only the condition of retaining his position.
Pardon? I think you’ve got an extra “not” in there or something.
Thanks for your brilliant post TokyoBayer. It seems to be a good objective summary of the Japan War endgame.
There’s a quote I once read from a Japanese General(?) that I’ve not been able to find with Google. It was made shortly after the Hiroshima bombing, IIRC, and stated in effect that “the suicide of the Japanese nation would be like beautiful poetry.” Does anyone recall this quote?
I don’t recall that specific quote, but suicide in battle as romanticized poetic beauty was a common motif in Japan as the war drew closer to the end. Gyokusai or “shattering like a jewel” was the term used to describe suicidal attacks such as banzai charges - those taking part in banzai charges were not expecting the charge to succeed, they were expecting to honorably die in battle. Ichioku gyokusai - “100 million shattered jewels” was the propaganda slogan endlessly drummed out by the government from the end of 1944; the hundred million should die together in battle rather than surrender. Notably the 100 million was itself an exaggeration, the population of Japan was only 70 million. The slogan ichioku tokkō was also used, “one hundred million as a special attack force”, special attack (tokkōtai) being the euphemism for suicide attack units such as kamikazes.
That element of wanting to show the Soviets has been documented, but the overwhelming purpose was the to get the Japanese to surrender.
If you enjoyed that, here’s a handout for a class at Stanford taught by Prof. Martin Hellman which specifically addresses Ward Wilson, although for an earlier article with the same conclusion. I’ll quote from it below.
Wilson bases almost his entire argument on how other country leaders immediately reacted to crises by having meetings and because Japan did not, then the Hiroshima bomb could not have set off the stage. Not only does my earlier quoted source refute the timing issues, it can be clearly shown that Japan was in a situation completely incompatible to the ones he cites.
The most obvious difference is that with JFK, the United States could actually do something about about the crisis. All that Japan could *do *would be to surrender and three of the four Big Six members of the Supreme War Counsel were dead set against surrender. They would gain nothing by having a session of the Supreme War Counsel. They wanted to continue waiting and they didn’t have to have a meeting to do that.
I’m going to interrupt the narrative to plug a book which became a bible for me in business, Getting to Yes written by members of the Harvard Negotiation Project, and which focused on the psychology of negotiation. In the book, they explain that when negotiating, you must consider the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for both yourself and the person on the other side of the table.
Sometime ago, I became convinced that the key to understanding the surrender of Japan was to study the situation as a negotiation process within the factions of the military, the Big Six, the Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal and the Elderly States. Were I independently wealthy, I would return to the states and do this as a dissertation, because it’s a book to be written.
I really like Prof. Hellman, not only because he’s brilliant, but also because his analysis is exactly what I had independently observed.
I lied to Little Nimo when I said I wasn’t intending to contribute anything original to the process. The following are my thoughts. Most of it is based on what I’ve read both in English and Japanese, as well as almost 25 years of business experience in Japan including conducting negotiation. The analysis isn’t batshit insane, irrelevant to the discussion or based on war gamming so I don’t know if it belongs in this thread, though.
This is a limited examination of various parties’ positions and BATNAs.
Prime Minister: Admiral Suzuki Kantarō.
Position: More pro peace faction, but wavering.
Style: Taciturn. Often people didn’t know if he were awake or not. Not particularly forceful.
BATNA: If the deal to surrender fail, he not only would be out of a job as the military was preparing to impose martial law, but likely arrested
Summary: The first wartime PM who was not Army, Admiral Suzuki had been brought on board after the defeat in Okinawa by Hirohito to bring about the surrender of Japan. Faced with the unspoken threat by the Army, he moved at a glacier pace. He wavered and also almost sunk the agreement after the initial acceptance and before the final agreement.
He wasn’t the most powerful man in the room, as that would be General Anami. The only wartime PM who actually had any power was Tojo, and that due to his holding the Minister of War (Army) concurrently.
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Togo Shigenori
Position: Pro surrender. The driving force for the “peace faction”
Style: Faced off against Anami, the leader of the hardliners.
BATNA: Extremely weak. If the deal to surrender fail, he would also be out of a job and arrested.
Summary: Togo had been attempting to nudge the cabinet into considering not committing national surrender from months prior. He seized on the atomic bombing to force the issue, successfully got PM Suzuki on board, managed to keep pressure on the militants without provoking a constitutional crisis. As the sole civilian of the Big Six, he had to move extremely carefully.
Minister of War: General Anami Korechika
Position: Fight to the last man, woman and child. The strongest of the no surrender allies.
BATNA: This is where it gets interesting. Amani (or Admiral Yonai) could unilaterally overthrow the government just 'cuz. Yup. Resign and refuse to allow anyone else to be appointed as War Minister.
This severely limited Togo’s ability to press the issue. All General Amani or Admiral Yonai had to do to change Japan’s destiny was to step out of the meeting room for a piss and keep walking out the door. The government would fall. The Emperor could invite a candidate to become Prime Minister but it required an active duty general and admiral for the positions of ministers of War and Navy. Without the support of the services, no government could be formed and the Army would then declare martial law, appointing General Amani as the leader. How is that for a BATNA?
All the negotiations were conducted under the threat of a bloodless, 100% assured coup d’etat. Normally, there is a certain risk for attempting a coup, but in this case, there would be no downside. It was, in fact, what his most of fellow officers wanted him to do. When you look at the Kyujo Incident, it was clear that the Army would have backed the leaders had Anami nodded his head.
How is that for pressure on Togo?
I’ll abbreviate the analysis of the following members of the Big Six
Minister of the Navy: Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa
No surrender.
BATNA: Could also cause the government to fall.
Chief of the Army General Staff: General Yoshijirō Umezu
No surrender
Chief of the Navy General Staff: Admiral Toyoda Soemu
Surrender
Hitorito
I’m sure that the term “despicable coward” is disrespectful to my former adopted country, and undoubted not fair to the late emperor, but he certainly placed the imperial interests above all. While I agree with the US’s politically expedient decision to not hold him responsible for his war crimes, in my private alt-hist, he goes straight to hell.
However, in reality, the “sacred decision” to impose his will on the government was unprecedented under the Meiji Constitution, and for the man who was raised to protect the constitution and the imperial imperial institution, many people argue that the was very brave.
Postion:
Cautiously pro surrender
BATNA: Life in a gilded cage if he agrees with the military and life in a little more tarnished cage otherwise when the find a relative to become the new emperor.
Summary: Damn near everything concerning his responsibility for the war and failure to take more steps to end it were purged from history.
With the Big Six in hopeless deadlock, he finally did push the issue and brought about the surrender.
While stopping the suffering of his subjects was the stated reason, he was very concerned about the real possibility of the ordinary man rejecting the Imperial family post war. I belief that was a – if not the most – significant factor in his decision.
The Army:
Position: Fucking nuts
Not really, but they had bought in their own myths too far. The nature of Japanese society is such that there is rarely a case where the top leadership can force things on the levels just below them, and the militants in the meetings repeatedly reminded everyone that they couldn’t control their own men.
BATNA:
Die in glory protecting the homeland.
The people:
Position:
Wanting the war to end, but cowed and unable to say anything. Martial law would
The only reason they play a part in here is that the emperor was concerned about their reaction to the imperial family should the government not surrender. One of the point of discussion was if the people under an American occupation would reject the emperor if they didn’t give up.
BATNA:
Death for many of them.
Back to the main story, if you critically reread the various accounts of the final days with the above in mind, it seems to present a clear, understandable picture.
By not resigning, as he was urged by other generals, and by not giving his approval to the attempted coup, Anami changed the outcome of the war.
Let’s look at what happens it him if the negotiations are successful?
He dies. Either as martyr sharing the gallows with Tojo, or as a samurai by his own hand. His BATNA is to be the leader fighting the good fight to protect Daippon from the impure barbarians.
It may take sacrificing everyone, but really would you expect anything less from a military? Was the Alamo remembered because Sam Houston decided that it was more rational to give up? Had the world been completely different, and the USSR much stronger than the US, had they invaded the US, and knowing that everyone was to become atheists at gun point, all land taken from owners and the world completely turned upside down, wouldn’t you expect voices within the Pentagon to vow to carry the fight as long as possible? For the ultanationalists, it was be a similar belief.
What then made these people end it?
Togo knew from a long time prior that it was hopeless and that the longer the war continued, the worse it would be. If it were up to him, Japan would have surrendered much earlier, but he needed a game changer to convince Hitohito and the military, and used the excuse of Hiroshima to force the issue.
Hirohito was in favor of ending the war, also from several months prior and was looking for a way to bring it about, within the limits to his direct actions dictated by the constitution. He as well, latched onto Hiroshima
For the militants, none of the Big Three, were willing to surrender, even after Hiroshima, the Soviet entry into the war and Nagasaki. It look being told by the emperor and even then things were dicey.
Why did Anami decide to follow his leader and not resign or permit the coup? The other top generals were deferring to his lead.
My guess is that his deep personal commitment and loyalty to Hirohito as a man and the emperor as an institution was the reason that Japan didn’t have to fight on the beaches of Kyushu and Kanto, and finish somewhere in the Japan Alps of Nagano, with part of Japan divided into a red country, with more than a million additional casualties.
However, would he have made that decision without the atomic bombs or the Soviet entry into the war? As he killed himself, we’ll never really know the answer to that question. It’s my guess that the double shock of both events did play a part. But I don’t know for sure.
three of the four military representatives out of the Big Six members of the Supreme War Counsel
e.g., there are six members, four of whom are representing their services (two for army, two for the navy) and three out of the four of these were dead set against surrender.
The point I’m attempting to make in my post is that there wasn’t some magical thing which suddenly transformed Japan from absolutely hell bent on fighting until the last man, woman, child and great grandmothers were killed in the process into a peace-seeking country in the flash of a fission light.
The atomic bombs provided a way to force the issue from those who had already decided they wished to surrender, including the Emperor, and directed to those who would never surrender on their own accord, but who, in the end, acquiesced to the decision of that emperor.
One of the best books is the 1968 Japan’s Longest Day written by Japanese researchers and translated into English. An excerpt is here and includes the following account of the showdown at the War Ministry (Army HQ)
Anami goes on to further equivocate, and as noted by Dissonace, knew about the coup attempt but did not attempt to stop it.