You miss the point.
If you’re going to institute a policy of random searches on the subway, it should be up to you to demonstrate that they will be effective. It’s not up to us to demonstrate that they won’t.
I believe the OP is the one who made the first assertion here, namely, that these searches are ineffective. And yet we haven’t seen a single shred of evidence to support that.
I’m not talking about this thread in particular.
I’m talking about the general principle that, if you want to make major public policy changes that affect people’s privacy by subjecting them to random searches by law enforcement, then the burden is on you to show that these policy changes might actually have some beneficial effect rather than simply being window dressing.
I agree 100%, which is why I posited that the random searches being instituted should be studied for a year, and it should be determined whether they are effective or not.
You can’t ask me to provide evidence to support an argument and then tell me that I’m not allowed to gather that evidence.
This is such a lame tactic, the “My opinion is so far superior to yours that I pity you”. It’s lamer than the “I haven’t been able to convince you that I’m right, therefore you are an idiot” tactic.
I’ve been 100% logical and respectful in this thread.
What, exactly, are you going to study?
Are you going to study the number of terrorist attacks?
Because it’s already been established that there have been no attacks on the New York subway over the past three years, despite the absence of random searches. And if there are no further attacks, how are you going to determine whether it was simply a case of “business as usual,” or whether the searches actually prevented attacks?
Are you going to study the number of people caught with bombs?
Again, the same problems apply. If you don’t catch anyone, you have no way of knowing whether it was the searches themselves that were responsible for the lack of bombs, or whether it was simply the case that there are no terrorist cell operating in New York City.
And what if there is, in fact a successful attack? What do you comclude from that?
After all, a successful attack would indicate that the searches didn’t work. But you might also reasonably argue that the successful attack simply shows that more people need to be searched.
As i’ve already said in this thread, this is a debate you can’t lose. If there are no attacks, you’ll simply stand there smugly and say “We told you so.” And if there are attacks, you’ll simly use that as evidence that you were right all along.
First, study to what extent the actual people being affected feel that their civil liberties are being infringed upon and to what extent. While there is a lot of hand waving on this, I think much of it is a vocal minority. Talking to people in a bar the other night, in an admittedly entirely unscientific poll, no one seemed to mind all that much . It would be nice to know to what extent this is generalizable.
Second, study to what extent people are being inconvenienced. It would be nice to institue airline like security in the subway, but this wouldn’t work as there are too many people. So, this is a compromise. But how much of one?
Third, study the effectiveness of this. I feel that an attack in the NYC subway is inevitable and it will occur soon. Will the attack be detected by the current plan? If an attack does not occur, are attacks occuring in other subway systems around the world and in the U.S? Seems to me this is on the rise, and will continue, and likely escalate in frequency. Are these systems using random searches? Is there a decrease in attacks in systems using random searches compared to those not. Of course there are confounding variables, but much more complicated correlations have been teased out of much more complicated systems. If no attacks happen anywhere in the world (which I find unlikely), does intelligence indicate that any were planned and thwarted. These searches are not occuring in a vacuum.
If there is no problem in one and two, and there is reason to believe that three is working, then continue. If there are big problems with one and two, and three shows no indication of working then stop.
Again, seems that I have to defend two sides of this:
- I have no data to support my assertion that it would be somewhat effective
and - I shouldn’t be able to gather evidence to support it.
It seems an entirely reasonable hypothesis that random searches will provide some degree of protection from terrorist attacks. Why not test it?
It seems to me that you got your priorities ass backwards.
After all, surely the thing we should be most concerned about is number (3). If the strategy can’t be shown to be effective, then it’s moot whether or not people are happy to accede to it, or whether it can be done without too much inconvenience.
And your criteria for demonstrating number (3) are so nebulous as to be largely useless. It may not have occurred to you, but New York is not London or Madrid. There are a multitude of factors suggesting that we should probably not simply look at what goes on there and assume that the same thing will happen here.
And there’s a lot of “i feel” and “seems to me” in there. Forgive me if i don’t accept policies based on your gut.
Well, it also seems an entirely reasonable hypothesis that random searches will provide some reduction in the number of people carrying drugs. Why not institute random searches on the street also?
It also seems an entirely reasonable hypothesis that random searches of people’s cars and houses will provide evidence of even more violations of the law. I think we should probably start trying those as well.
I’m not asking you to accept policies based on my gut. I’m asking to accept them based on data. Your gut tells you that it is untestable? Very little is untestable. This is testable.
You are asking mt to accept the policy of not having random searches based on your gut feeling that it is ineffective. Seems that if you are going to disallow the collection of data, then the burden of proof has shifted to you to prove that is in ineffective.
Because those very clearly go against one and two. I’ve lurked long enough to know a strawman when it is put in front of me.
I would hate to be a police officer given the task of searching people.
Search without bias (little old ladies, young teenagers, businessman, bike messengers, etc.) and you waste lots of time and energy while pissing off upstanding citizens. It’s like trying to find a needle in a very large haystack by inspecting each piece of hay. It will be meaningless and it won’t do much to stop the bad guys.
Search with bias (swarthy, Middle-Eastern, Arab-looking, Muslim-looking people) and you get accused of racism and prejudice. Furthermore, you encourage these attitudes among civilians (Well, the police officers not around. Let me avoid getting on the same train as the Sikh guy over there. No telling what he’s packing in his turban). We aren’t talking about Bumfuck, Idaho. How many citizens does NYC have that would “fit the description”? Every Puerto Rican, light-skinned black person, Indian, Arab, Mediterranian, Middle-Eastern, and bearded man better watch out. And Muslim women? Better not go out with those hijabs, or you’ll raise eyebrows.
(I can envision that in the latter situation (cops looking for people “fitting the profile”), there would be easy ways to circumvent the process. For instance, people always feel weird searching old folks in wheelchairs or the severely disabled. If I were a bomber who wanted to significantly lower my chances of being searched, all I would do is get a wheelchair and pretend that I have severe cerebral palsy. No one would guess that I have a bomb secured to the bottom of my seat. Everyone would be too busy averting their eyes or feeling sorry for me.)
People keep bringing out the fact that we submit to searches in airports. But they are not the same. Everyone is subject to basic searching at the security gates. Occassionally you will be singled out for more extensive searches, but they always happen in monitored, specially designated areas . Furthermore, you know that the security guards are looking for specific contraband beyond explosives, such as box cutters, aerosol cans, and knives. These are things that are banned in the cabins of commercial jetliners by policy (and probably by law). You know not to bring these things on your carry-on luggage.
But there are no such restrictions on subways. What if a police officer finds out that I’m carrying plastic compound (which I use for artwork) or an Exacto-knife (for breaking down cardboard boxes at the job)? What if he stumbles across an acetylene torch in a welder’s tool box or a timing device in an electrician’s satchel? What if finds that a woman is carrying a steak knife in her bag (she was raped last month and feels better having protection). Will he have the power to bar us from getting on the train? Can we be arrested on “probable cause”? If he’s just looking for explosives, wouldn’t it be better to just install bomb-sniffers near the turnstyles?
Another issue I have is that of security. Citizens need to be informed of their rights before subjecting themselves to a search. If an officer approaches you and demands to see your backpack, you should be able to both request the presence of another person to serve as a witness and presentation of that officer’s badge and other ID. No questions asked. I can just see pickpockets having a field day with this shit. “Let me see your bag, sir. Yoink!”
What about the example of Israel. They have searches and then some. It sure stopped all those suicide bombers, didn’t it.
Oh wait. No it didn’t.
OK, how about you focus on the data available before these searches even go into effect.
Tell me:
[ul]
[li]How many places of access are there to the New York City subway system?[/li][li]How many New York City police are available to search people?[/li][li]What percentage of possible entryways will be covered at any one time?[/li][li]What percentage of possible entryways will be covered over the course of a week or a month?[/li][li]How many entryways will have no coverage at any given time of day?[/li][li]How many entryways will never be covered at all?[/li][li]How many people ride the subway each day?[/li][li]How many people do you think they will search?[/li][li]What percentage of subway riders will end up being searched?[/li][/ul]
The answer to the very first of my questions above already makes it impossible to believe that this will actually prevent an attack. From yesterday’s Washington Post:
If i actually believed that this measure might do some good, i could perhaps be convinced that it was worth the cost and the effort.
Not only that, but because airports have a very small number of entry points (sometimes only 1), the chances of someone getting past the entry point with a dangerous package is very small. That is, the way that searches are conducted at airports means that there is a very high likelihood of getting caught, thus providing the deterrent effect that authorities are hoping for.
Such a deterrent is almost completely absent on the subway system, because the sheer volume of people, number of entryways, and lack of police staff means that well over 99% of those entering the turnstiles will never be checked. And even of those people carrying the type of large bags that the cops are looking for, very few will ever be searched.
And the fact that they are looking for oversized bags tends to discount the possibility of terrorists using high-tech explosives like plastic explosives, where a lethal amount could be carried in a briefcase or other smaller receptacle not subject to the search policies.
You assume that because you think one and two are valid arguments, that i must therefore share your assumption. Just because some people—even a majority—are willing to put up with this policy doesn’t mean it’s a good one.
Maybe he figures that there’s no point in in – after showing everybody on the train that this guy has a big wad of cash, he ain’t getting far anyway… :eek:
That gets back to my point about the various minor offenses (e.g. drug possession, bootleg MP3s, etc) that would turn up.
In an attempt to recover from the diversion into silly quibbling about whether everybody could be caught at some crime or other by a sufficiently determined cop, I pose the question again:
If the police are doing spot searches for backpack bombs (which might or might not be reasonable given the current threat) and find something of this sort (for which random searches are clearly not reasonable), what is the proper outcome?
If there were 7 bombers ready to get on the train and every station was manned and the police were able to check 10,000 bags, the odds are less than one in 700 that even one stinking bomb will be found. So, under the most optimum of conditions, your ass is still blown up.
But these aren’t the conditions, are they? You can refuse to be searched. This lowers the odds to very close to zero that any bomber will be caught with a bomb. There is that very small .0000000001 % chance that he is the world’s stupidest bomber and actually shows the cops his bomb. We have more of a chance doing The Robot.
This is the data. What other data are you looking for?
Do you normally make up data, and then call it “THE” data in debates?
There’s something else about this policy that i hadn’t previously noticed. From yesterday’s New York Times:
Can someone explain to me how the fuck this is going to deter a terrorist?
He walks into a station. The police ask to search his bag. He says no. He is told that if he refuses to allow a search of his bag, he cannot enter the station. He says OK, and leaves.
Of course, this iron curtain of security has now completely thwarted his evil plan.
Oh wait, no it hasn’t. He can now walk two blocks to another station and try again.
Lather, rinse, and repeat until he gets through without being inspected.
Sorry.
Here is the link for the artcile cited in my previous post.