That should be that they’ve explained how it cannot possibly succeed, not fail.
While I Am Not A Terrorist (Honestly, Mr Policeman), it seems to me that there are a few obvious points some of you might not have thought through.
Why use suicide bombers rather than some other cunning method?
Basically, the advantages of suicide bombers are that they are:
-Very Scary. Not a key consideration, but having someone willing to die to kill you gives people the heebie-jeebies
-Hard to defuse. If you find a normal bomb, you can clear the area, get EOD technicians on-site, and have a pretty good chance of disarming the bomb with minimal casualties. Not so easy with a person, even if they don’t have an emergency detonator handy, which one assumes they would do if they were expecting searches.
-Hard to spot. On the tube/subway/bus people very rarely walk away from things. They keep their belongings with them (unlike on trains such as in Madrid). If you were to leave a bomb behind it’s likely it would be identified quickly. However a person just blends in. This also applies to cars.
-They are very adaptable. A person carrying a bomb (and no need for a getaway) can work their way through security by adapting to changes in routine, divert to an alternate target, or just make up and implement a new plan on the spot.
Bear in mind that despite this being Al-Quada, this isn’t 9/11 style mega-terrorism, just post-modern blowing people in the style of the 1970s with a garnish of suicide. While it gives the planners a hard-on to score four simultaneous detonations, it makes little practical difference. The objective behind hitting mass transit like this is to cause mass fear and inconvenience to the general public. Once tight security is implemented (thereby causing huge inconvenience and cost), mission is accomplished and you just move on to the next juicy crowd of people.
Further to the comments about searches stopping bombers in Israel - according to the CIA world factbook, Israel has a population of about 6.3 million and is about the size of New Jersey. For comparison, there are about 6.3 million journeys on London red buses EVERY DAY - NYC is presumably similar. Also, I’m guessing the checks in Israel are not exactly random. And still:
“2003 September 9th. - Israel, Jerusalem, Cafe Hillel: a suicide bomber blew himself up at 11:20 p.m. at Cafe Hillel on Emek Refaim St., the main thoroughfare of the German Colony neighborhood. According to an eyewitness, the bomber tried to get into a Pizza Meter restaurant but was rebuffed by a security guard, so he went into the crowded Cafe Hillel next door. The guard at the cafe tried to prevent the bomber from entering, but the bomber managed to get several meters inside. As in the Tzrifin attack, the assailant was a member of Hamas from the village of Rantis in the West Bank and studied at the Bir Zeit University in Ramallah; 7 people died and more than 50 were injured” from disaster-management.net. So hardening individual targets just diverts the attacks onto somewhere else unless you have checkpoints everywhere that might be attacked. And while the OP concerns NYC, I can think of a dozen places to go where the pavement will be packed to a density exceeding that of the trains where the failed attacks took place last week.
If you as an individual want security from a suicide bomber, the only rational response is to assidiously avoid any place where there are more than a handful of people gathered together, and any high-value targets such as symbols or key pieces of infrastructure. In other words, move to somewhere in the mid-west. 
From a society perspective, intelligence, infiltration and explosives access control are the only real way of stopping terrorism.
If you want the citizens of NYC to submit to pat-downs before they are allowed into Pizza Hut, Madison Square Gardens, the Metro, their local bar, supermarket or the queue to buy a hot dog while STILL facing the risk of being blown up while they queue for the pat-down then, at the risk of a near-Godwin, the terrorists have won.
ps. Bear in mind this is only talking about small-scale blowing shit up. You’d need a whole different set of security measures to stop someone filling a cement mixer with ANFO and driving it into Manhattan. And 9/11 markII will probably be something intended to blindside everything discussed on this thread so far.
Well, the guy seems to have walked out of a residence that was under surveillance as part of the operation, and was shot by police/military plainclothes officers carrying out the operation.
You’d struggle to find a closer link to something than being killed by it. :eek:
The fact he turns out to have been just a random fly who walked into the web and panicked appears to be one of those thing that just happens sometimes.
How many nit-pick points do I get? 
Ok, not to pick on you, because I think this is a common sentiment in this thread. But the above typifies my problem with the thinking here.
This statement is untrue for two reasons: First, of course you have to prove things that are common sense. Where did you hear otherwise? We need water and oxygen to survive. These are common sense, but they have been tested. They have been deprived from people, who have died. We know the biochemistry behind what each of the molecules does for chemical reactions which are essential for life. So, it is an absolulely untrue statement that things that are common sense don’t need to be tested. I can’t put in an article in Nature that I didn’t run an experiment because it is common sense, and if I make a statement like “It is widely known that…”, then I damn well better have a reference at the end of the sentence.
Second, I call bullshit that it is common sense. Quite a few people disagree with you, including the police commisioner of NYC. I haven’t seen any polling data yet, but I venture to guess that more than a handful of New Yorkers will disagree with you. You can dismiss these people as “sheeple” as was done earlier, but this just belies your own arrogance, not truth. I could come up with more evidence that it is common sense that such a security system would, in fact, work.
Besides, even if 100% of people think that it is ineffective, since when do we get to vote on the truth?
What happened here is that one person made a claim, “This is ineffective”. A second repeated it, then a third and fourth. Then it was a “fact”. Then a fifth and sixth repeated it to the point where it became an “entrenched fact” where anyone who disagreed with it was a “useless idiot”, as if vitriol made one correct.
If anyone wants to argue that even if proven effective, that this system is a bad idea, that is a truthful and respectable opinion and worthy of debate. But anyone who says that they KNOW this will be ineffective is taking that on faith, which is frowned upon around here, I believe.
Sorry, snailboy, didn’t want to make it look like you said these things. They were done earlier and by others.
what if Backpack Boy is not a real diversion, i.e. is not part of the terrorist organization, is just a guy with a backpack (a la the guy in London who was just murdered by police)? Now we have an innocent man rotting in prison without trial, and the bomber still gets thru…
But no one is willing to answer my question, so I will: Yes, this could happen.
This is not the America I was raised to believe in. This is not the America I want to live in.
So did you make it to work today?
We are not taking it on faith.
We’re basing our opinions on a reasonable assessment of the structure and the rules of the inspection system itself. Those rules allow someone carrying a bomb to simply refuse to be searched, with no ramifications or repercussions. That person can then simply try again later and/or at another station, and can repeat this without ever getting caught until finally he succeeds in entering a station where he is not stopped.
All your wailing and gnashing of teeth to the contrary, you have yet to even posit a reasonable explanation of how these structural aspects of the inspection system might discourage someone who wanted to bomb the New York City subway. The very conditions under which your (still inadequately explained) experiment would have to operate mitigate against any possible success.
If I stated somewhere that humans need water to live, would you ask for a cite? Yes, assumptions can be dangerous. However, in this case, nobody has mentioned any reasonable way that this whole security setup could possibly work. Are you keeping it a secret from us or do you not know a way? If you’re going to trample people’s rights, spend who-knows-how-many tax dollars, and remove cops from the streets to put them in subway stations to stop bombers, you better have something better than, “There’s a remote possibility that bombers could be stopped in some manner that we haven’t thought of yet with this plan.” (The instances of “you” in that last sentence are in general.) I for one won’t settle for a plan that seems to have no conceivable success rate and doing it as an experiment still messes with people’s rights and wastes money.
Then come up with more evidence. Like I said, name one reasonable scenario where a terrorist could get caught under the given circumstances. Remember, there aren’t policemen in every station and you can refuse a search and just walk to another station. Just name one reasonable scenario and I won’t treat it as a blantantly obviously sure-fail plan.
Fiveyearlurker, just admit that you are a sheep and don’t mind being led around by the “shephards”. Also, you still haven’t answered some questions that have been asked of you (if you have and I missed it, I apologize, this thread is a joke and a long one at that).
And yet others have looked at the same structure and rules and come to a different conclusion:
From the New York Times letters to the editor:
"Random bag searches will deter the terrorists, if they see that we are on high alert and being vigilant. It is when we let down our guard that the terrorists will try to strike.
It is another way of life, but it is for the safety of all New Yorkers.
Amy Rosenfeld
New York, July 22, 2005"
from an article in the New York Times:
“Everybody understands,” said Sgt. Betsy Guzman, who was monitoring the station entrance at 42nd and Eighth Avenue, along with eight other police officers. “It’s a little time out of their day, and a few people rushing to catch their train have been upset, but most people are O.K. with it.”
from the same article, quoting police commisioner:
Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly said this morning that most people seemed to be cooperating with the searches.
“So far it’s been going well,” he told CNN. “The public understands we live in changed times. This is a tool, not a panacea. I think it gives potential terrorists something to think about. I think this is a reasonable step to take.”
So, apparently, it is NOT common knowledge. You can disagree with them all you like, but apparently, common knowledge might actually be in the opposite direction.
As for my experiment, as I stated, it has been outlined. It is a pretty basic experiment. If you have holes in the experiment, go for it, and I’ll address.
But, your “hole” so far, as I pointed out, was a flaw in the system. It is akin to me making a new HIV drug, setting up a clinical trial, and you complaining that the experiment can’t work because HIV can mutate. Sure it can. But, that doesn’t mean that the EXPERIMENT won’t work, it means that the drug MAY NOT work. You are starting with the conclusion and working backwards.
Make a list of said questions and I’d be more than happy to address them.
Funny to call me a sheep, and yet, I’m the one disagreeing in this thread…
Yes, a flaw that allows potential terrorist to metaphorically and literally sidestep the measures put in place to stop them.
No, actually, this whole thing is akin to you making a new HIV drug, setting up a clinical trial, and then only testing the drug on people who don’t have HIV.
I’m not sure I understand why you think that.
Granted, you are getting close to an actual hole in the experiment, namely that I said that some of the actors carrying “bombs” would “act suspiciously”, but how the hell do I know how a person about to blow up a subway acts? We could interview people who have witnessed such events, and come up with a reasonable approximation, but never exact.
Is this what you are getting at? Realism? If so, I agree. But, as I mentioned, no experiment is perfect. We would still end up with a pretty damn good data set to make an informed decision based on rather than no data set and common sense.
** Fiveyearlurker** what’s the purpose of searching? That’s what your experience should focus on. If the purpose is to prevent a bomb from being placed on a subway, then do you agree that’s not possible, with the current policy?
If the purpose is the create an environment that may dely or cause a terrorist to change targets, then I guess that’s a possibility, but again what purpose does that serve? Instead blowing up the “A”, he blows the “D”? Instead of blowing the 9:45 “A”, he blows the 10:15 or waits until tomorrow and blows the 9:45?
It seems to me, the purpose of a search should be prevention, not delay. If I have a bomb, see the searchers and leave… walk two blocks and blow the next train; which doesn’t have any searcher, then what have you accomplished? I have still blow up a train.
Unless the police detain anyone who refuses to open their bag, or “turns around” when they see the searchers, I fail to see any results, save perhaps a different target being selected.
What do you see happening, with this policy in place?
[QUOTE=holmesUnless the police detain anyone who refuses to open their bag, or “turns around” when they see the searchers, I fail to see any results, save perhaps a different target being selected.
What do you see happening, with this policy in place?[/QUOTE]
Now THIS is a reasonable question.
What I see happening is (and this is my OPINION, not a FACT) that the well traveled stations (Penn, Grand Central, 14th St) will have better security. My actor will get caught a significant number of times. We can have him/her travel to a nearby station (23rd St) but he/she is limited in travel because he/she has to travel with a bomb, and is therefore limited by weight and instability of explosives.
It is possible that at 23rd St, he/she will get in (still not a certainty as there will be security there as well). If he/she does get in, we at least know that a less populated station will be attacked. Perhaps we can draw conclusions of casualties based on this attack. Are there fewer casualties because major stations are better protected? Is this acceptable to New Yorkers? It’s not my call, it’s the call of the people of New York as a whole. I want them to have the data to make an informed decision.
Maybe he/she WILL get caught at this station. Either way, we have figured out a weakness and can institute better plans as a result.
Or, we have identified that it is, in FACT, an ineffective technique and should be scrapped.
Oh for fuck’s sake. I don’t care if 70% of people in this city think random searches of bags is a good idea. Their opinions are irrelevant.
Of course the police commissioner is going to say it’s a good idea. He’s in charge of implementing it. But the only thing it’s going to give potential bombers to think about is the notion that they may have to WALK TO ANOTHER FUCKING SUBWAY STATION.
Not all cops agree with the commissioner. The police captain who is the head of 100 Blacks in Law enforcement thinks it’s a dumb idea, and he’s been trained to look for explosives and anthrax. Why does he think it’s dumb? Because anybody approached to be searched can WALK AWAY TO ANOTHER SUBWAY STATION-- and because your average police officer has no idea how to spot a bomb unless IT’S GOT WIRES STICKING OUT OF IT OR LOOKS LIKE A STICK OF DYNAMITE.
The only people who are going to have their bags searched by cops are those who don’t care if cops look inside their bags. Since a person carrying a bomb BY DEFINITION does NOT want police to look inside his bag, he will refuse a search and go to a station that doesn’t have any cops-- and that’s most stations.
If you can’t realize that fiveyearlurker, then you’re a fucking moron. You’re in good company with the police commissioner and the mayor. Feel safe as you travel on the subway in the blissful belief that the guy sitting beside you, who got on the train at a stop that did not have any cops, or who managed to avoid being one of the 10 to 20% of people being searched at a station that did have cops, could not possibly have a bomb in his bag.
Gorram simulposts.
fiveyear, under your scenario nothing stops a bomber from getting on the subway at any station where there are no cops and riding the rails to Grand Central station, then detonating his explosive device. And that is why the current policy is useless.
What? Do you know how many connections there are in Penn, Grand and 14th st? Will they guard the shuttle train between Penn and Grand? Will they watch the local trains, and check my bag when I transfer to the express? What if I get on the 2 in Brooklyn, and ride all the way into Penn, will they check my bags before I blow? Will they check my bags as I walk underground from the D to the 2?
Explosives are unstable? Which ones? What am I carrying bottles of nitro tied with string? Old sticks of dynamite with a lit match?
You really have no idea, do you?
I do not see how the actor can be caught even once, unless you instruct him/her to get caught.
Why would a terrorist not refuse the search and leave? Even if he is limited by weight to not go to another station, he’ll still refuse the search. He’ll just leave, or detonate right there.
Are you relying on the terrorist not knowing the search can be refused, and instructing the actors to act accordingly? That’s the only was I can see even one actor getting caught. Otherwise, I completely fail to see how any of the actors can get caught.