Under this scenario, the only people who are consenting to the search are those who believe they have nothing to find. anyone who believes that they have something the cops are looking for will not consent to the search.
so, if the terrorists plant something on some one w/out their knowledge (“here, would you mind carrying this backpack for me, and by the way, I’ll be taking the next train, but I’ll meet you up at the next station, I promise”), this plan might work in an astonishingly small number of cases.
But since a suicice bomber generally (given the term) knows that they’re carrying something, they would, of course, step out of line etc etc etc.
Given that:
any search that is being done would be able to be spotted before the person being searched would potentially be searched
and especially
2. there is absolutely no consequence for refusing to be searched,
to have this scenario ‘work’ would mean that the suicide bomber is stupid enough to continue to go through the line** and** consent to the search and be the random person being searched and fail to set off the device at the point of search.
So at best: if the bomber is an absolute moronic automatron who cannot deviate from his given task and happens to be the one being searched (both very very statistically rare events), the bomb will merely go off in the crowded area where folks are being detained from being searched vs. the subway itself.
and for this statistically remote possability (not to mention merely changing who the victims are vs. preventing the victims) we’re spending what amount of money that could be used to actually, you know, investigate potential bombers, and detaining what number of otherwise law abiding citizens? and this seems like a good idea???
And it’s the same question you’ve been asked, in various forms, a dozen times already without prociding a decent answer.
Well, we’ve already had Dopers in this very thread attest to arriving at extremely busy stations like Wall Street and see no cops at all.
You continue to assert this, yet refuse to deal with the fact that unless you specifically instruct the actor not to walk away from the search (as he or she will be able to do), there is no way the actor will ever be caught.
Please explain, based on your obviously vast knowledge of explosives, how heavy a bomb used in a scenario like this would be, and how unstable it is. Compare different types of explosive devices, taking account of issues such as weight, volume, expense, difficulty of obatining materials, difficulty of construction, stability of materials, ease of detonation, etc.
You’re accusing everyone else here of making statements unsupported by evidence, and then you talk out your ass like this. It’s incredible.
How do you know? The NYPD have conceded that not every station will be watched at any one time. Do you have access to some information i’m not aware of that lets you know when 23rd St. Station will and will not be covered?
Also, are you talking about the 23rd St. Station at Eighth Avenue (C, E trains), the one at Seventh Avenue (1 train), the one at Sixth Avenue (F, V trains), the one at Broadway (N, R, W trains), or the one at Park Avenue (6 train)? Which of these stations will and will not be guarded in your scenario?
As others have pointed out, access to any particular station is not restricted to that station’s stairways. You can get on at one of the less-popular stations and ride the train (whaddayaknow? the trains actually go to the big stations!) to Grand Central or 14th Street or wherever.
You still haven’t explained how anyone is ever going to be caught, given that they have the option of refusing to be searched every time such a request is made.
Yes, you ‘experiment’ was already done and found lacking, even in an environment with controlled entrances and exits and supposedly 100% of bags checked.
So the 70% of the people (number made up) who disagree with you have an irrelevant opinion, while you and your 30% have a relevant opinion? Neither based on facts.
All these things about what a terrorist can or can’t do are opinions being presented as facts. We would see what a terrorist can or can’t do, and can test the efficiency of every single one of the scenarios you all have come up with, which would then make them fact. It might be your opinion that it is very obvious that your scenarios nullify the system, but for the love of god, prove it. I am perfectly willing to accept the conclusion that it IS in fact ineffective.
I am making one simple, absolutely true statement: There is no proof that this is an ineffective technique. I suggest some read the thread in GD about proving a negative, and how it CAN actually be done in limited systems such as this (ie the good example of proving that there is nothing in my pocket, or in this case “random searches of passengers on the NYC subway system has no discernible effect on morbidity/mortality or frequency of terrorist events).
For 8 pages, people have been screaming that this is a system that WILL not work. And, in typical groupthink, you shouted down those who suggested that it MIGHT work to some extent. Experts (the police commissioner) as well as other reasonable people have said that they think it could work. Not that they are any more correct than you, but this points out that even though it appears that 99% of dopers believe that it won’t work, it is far from the “common sense” that it has been portrayed as.
[QUOTE=mhendo]
Well, we’ve already had Dopers in this very thread attest to arriving at extremely busy stations like Wall Street and see no cops at all.QUOTE]
Then we have dopers who are lying. I live near four blocks away from Wall St. There are army dudes with very (very) large guns, and very (very) angry dogs there all the time.
[QUOTE=BiggirlEven your own government shows these security checks are ineffective.
In February, the Office of Management and Budget found that only four of the 33 homeland security programs it examined were “effective.” In March, the Homeland Security Department’s inspector general noted “the lack of improvement” in the performance of passenger screeners. In April, the Government Accountability Office reported that “the implementation and transformation of DHS remains high-risk.”
Okay, I’m your actor. My goal is to blow Penn Station. I enter via the number 3 line, see a Cop, who asks me to open my bag. I refuse and I leave.
I walk a few blocks and take the 1. There are no searchers. I hop on the train, reach 34th street and pull my fake bomb. You take the data.
I try again. I go directly to the 18th street station, but there’s a cop. He asks, I refuse. I walk back to 34th street, enter at one of the side entrances and blow my bomb. You have your data.
Repeat, repeat, repeat. Do you believe there is ANY way that I can be prevented, from finding an alternate entrance into the subway of my choice, either via connections or secondary entrance?
If so, please tell me; if not, then what’s the purpose of the searching?
You are too obtuse for words. You act like our belief in its ineffectiveness is based in some sort of tea-leaf-reading exercise, or simple fantasy. This is not the case.
We have presented very specific details about how the subways work, and how the search system works, with make it entirely reasonable to conclude that the system will not only fail to catch a terrorist, but it will even fail to deter a terrorist because he or she can, with no conseuqences, refuse to submit to a search.
How are the police going to identify and prevent a bomber if they never get to look in his or her backpack?
I can only conclude that this particular issue makes you completely irrational, or that you are always an idiot. The evidence allows no other conclusion.
Do, I think that there is any way that a determined terrorist can be stopped from getting into the subway system and setting off an explosive? No. I don’t. It is GOING to happen. This is my opinion, not fact.
However, I THINK we can minimize the damage by having increased security, with searches, at major hubs. I THINK that if there are searches at major hubs, terrorists will have to settle on smaller stations. I THINK that this will make it more difficult to get an explosive into a major hub and cause major damage. I THINK that there is a chance that many attacks can be averted entirely.
You THINK the opposite, and neither of us KNOWS we are wrong or right.
However, I’m prepared to test my hypothesis and I’m prepared to be wrong.
Yes and now that it has already been done, there’s no need to do it again. It is ineffective. Even with supposed 100% of bags check, this idea is ineffective.
You know, I said you were an idiot 5 pages ago. I think you are now slipping into foam speckled insanity.
Yes, they tested **a more secure system than the proposed one ** and found it to be ineffective. and somehow you think that making the system less secure exponentially will somehow magically make the system itself more effective?
I submit to you that since the system at the airports have been found ineffective, where all passengers and baggage is searched, where there are stringent **limits **of entrances and exits that by increasing the amounts of entrances and exits, by limiting the number of people searched you would increase (not decrease) the ineffectiveness of the security system described. Hence our proof, without the expense of testing it out yet again.
If you have some reason to believe the system with more holes would operate** less** like a seive, please explain. Otherwise admit that you’re an idiot.
That’s the point. I don’t have to be detemined , just not stupid enough to agree to a search, when I know I have a bomb.
Again you ignore the fact of how the subway system works, it’s designed to allow as many people as possible access to the main hubs. Unless you guard every entrance, every underpass, overpass, crossover, connection, etc. It is a waste of time…again how detemined am I to hop on a train in brooklyn or the bronx and ride into on of the major hubs?
You have the ability to come up any scenario you want. Stop me from taking the 1 on Canal Street and reaching Penn. Stop me from taking the shuttle. These arent’ extraordinary tasks, this are tasks that people do every day…easily.
It’s easy to prepared to be wrong. You’re willing to lose some of your liberty, you’re willing to waste resources; I’m not.
How? If there’s no way to prevent me from easily reaching ANY station I want and don’t consider having to walk a few blocks and transfer stations difficult, how have you minimized my attack?
I’m not trying to be difficult, but I don’t see it.
See guys, I respond to the questions posed seriously and calmly.
Two scenarios:
There are no searches. I can directly go into Penn Station, with no fear of being searched and caught. I can explode at will in the most crowded area.
I don’t think this is a controversial idea. Correct? So, the problem arises with:
There are searches. They are concentrated in stations such as Penn Station, but there are still police at other stations. I see them all the time at 23rd St.
Now, a terrorist can either try to get into Penn, and have a chance of being caught. Or he can, as has been noted, get asked to be searched and walk away (though, I doubt it would work this way in practice. I mean, C’mon, suspicious looking guy with big box refuses search and walks away is going to be tailed, but for the purposes of this argument, I’ll ignore this). The plan gets altered and has a lower chance of success.
He can, as noted, go to a station with less security and either do the deed there with less damage or try to get to Penn, where again, he might get caught as in scenario one above, or he might lose his nerve, or he might have unstable explosives that go off before he gets to Penn, or he might decide to detonate at 23rd St with lower casualties, or he might get to Penn and do what he originally intended to do.
You can disagree with the likelihood of these events, but none warrant the vitriol hurled here, or the certainty with which supposed facts are being thrown.
From what I understand they are searching the bags of people entering the subway. I am on the 1 train entering Penn. I am ALREADY in the system. You see my point? You’re keep focusing on people trying to enter Penn or Grand or 14th from the street. I’m not, because I know that I don’t have to enter Penn from the street, when I can just transfer from the local or walk from the Shuttle, or walk via any to the mulitude of underground connections and there will be NO cops.
Again, this isn’t difficult or dangerous or hard to do.
I absolutely see your point. But, I think my above post shows the ways that I think damage can STILL be minimized or even avoided if you are now forced to get to a crowded station from an outer station as opposed to just heading in from the street (bomb going off, losing nerve, etc…)
To me, the entire disagreement is just that you don’t think this is likely, and I think that it is.
Well, I think that I can abridge your right to go unmolested and attempt to hit you on the head with a hammer. It may not hurt at all if, on the way to whacking you I fall down. I think it may even be likely that I’ll fall down instead of hitting you on the head.
To me, it’s a matter weighing real world events against a comedy of errors. Your whole plan is based on either the stupidest terrorist or the most unlucky one and that seems to me, to a very weak basis to create a plan whose purpose is to prevent tragedy.
Fortunately for all us, the terrorists seem uninterested in proving which of us is correct.
Bullshit, but we’ll ignore the fact that you haven’t answered the question I asked regarding just how much of my privacy you’re willing to compromise.
Other than how likely it is for this to happen, if at all, I have no issues with it from a hypothetical standpoint.
Not all police are performing the random searches, but I’ll even play along and pretend that there are police at every single busy station, and I’ll even pretend, just for shits and grins, that they are asking to inspect every single person that comes through, and miraculously are able to do this without slowing down any progress. That’s about as big of a reach as I can give, but it makes no difference to the end result, so what the hell.
In what way does he have a chance at being caught? He’d have to be more dense than you’re being to think “Well, I have this bomb and I don’t have to consent, but maybe he won’t notice that my bag has nothing but a container with what looks like a plastic explosive, along with some sort of electromechanical device attached to it, so what they heck.” Considering that no one with an IQ above 25 would actually be that stupid, we’ll assume he leaves and is followed for looking "suspicious. What will the policeman do when they tail this suspicious looking guy into the next station, stop and ask to search him, and he refuses? Nothing is the answer. They aren’t allowed to. He can just go on his merry way, and they can either tail him forever, or he can decide to change targets and go into McDonalds, where he can’t even be asked to search.
First off, in scenario one above he doesn’t get caught, even by your own words. In fact, IN NONE OF YOUR ABOVE SCENARIOS IS THERE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANYONE WOULD GET CAUGHT. IF YOU TRULY THINK THAT THERE IS, TELL US HOW, SPECIFICALLY. Next, you talk about losing his nerve. These aren’t 15 year old boys trying to buy condoms from the local drugstore. Besides, the terrorists have not shown to have any shortage of volunteers. If by some far fetched scenario, and I’ve yet to hear of a terrorists losing his nerve, Joe “Chickenshit” Terrorist returned home after wimping out, his bomb would just be used by someone else against either the same or a different target. Regarding the instability of his explosives, this isn’t the 60’s, and we’re not on Mission Impossible. Explosives are not made up of flimsy glass test-tubes, filled with nitro, that go boom when the bad guy hits a bump in the road. Finally, you argue that he might decide to detonate somewhere else that would have lower casualties. By the exact same token, he might decide to detonate somewhere that has more casualties, so that’s a wash.
If you were to implement mandatory searches, where once you were stopped you were either shot or searched, then you might be onto something. That would at least have a chance of working. I’d be completely against it, but I’d be against it purely on privacy issues, not on the utter stupidity of it.
That. is. not. what. is being. implemented. If you offer 100 New Yorkers $500 dollars apiece, and all they have to do is get to a subway car in a station, any station, without being searched, sometime in the next 24 hours or so, and are allowed to turn around and walk away every time they are stopped, without repercussions. you’d be out $50,000. Every time.