Randomness is not free will; where’s the “will” part ?
How does that follow ?
That’s simply incorrect; the “notion of a deterministic entity” is quite understandable; in fact, it’s quite easy.
That’s rather incoherent.
Will is the primary assumption; the first memory.
Perception begins itself, then it branches according to past impressions. How can the past impessions be anything but chaos? They only have meaning when sliced up and compared. They can’t be anything, because the universe has no structure. Action itself implies that there is something to act, which cannot be. I attribute freedom to chaos because lack of freedom cannot apply, but neither are accurate descriptions.
How could you begin to understand it? First there must be an entity.
Hoodoo Ulove was right; that is living up to your name. You make no sense at all.
“Free will” implies that we have a “will” in the first place - that is, a mind, something independent of the activity within our brain. I don’t want to put words into Der Trihs’s mouth, but I would assume that he denies the existence of mind; if will doesn’t exist, it’s meaningless to talk about it being “free”, or to ascribe any other properties to it.
Of course the mind exists; it’s a pattern of nerves impulses and neurotransmitters in the brain and most certainly not independent of the brain.
I can’t say anything about 1b or 2, but as has been pointed out, 1a is the familiar problem of freedom and determinism.
People seem to assume that determinism and freedom are antonyms, such that if you say “we are determined” you are saying the same thing as “we are not free”. But there is a long philosophical tradition of arguing that determinism and free will are compatible. Hume thought that freedom was the power of acting or not acting according to your will: freedom was the ability to do X, if you chose to do X. Of course, what we choose to do is determined by our character, and we cannot be ultimately responsible for our character, but that didn’t matter to him. He and others argue that if you focus on how people actually use the word ‘free’, it is used to mean “free from compulsion,” not “free from determinism.” To illustrate this, the philosopher Walter Stace gives the following pairs of examples:
[ul]not eating because you are on a hunger strike[/ul][ul]not eating because you are in a desert and there is no food[/ul]
[ul]signing a confession because you want to tell the truth[/ul]
[ul]signing a confession because the police beat you[/ul]
[ul]leaving the office because you want lunch[/ul]
[ul]leaving the office because you are forcibly removed[/ul]
Stace argues that we would commonly call the first action in each pair free. These actions are determined by our wants and desires (e.g., the desire for lunch, or the desire to protest against injustice), but we would still consider them free. The second item in each pair, however, is unfree because in each case, the action in question is the result of compulsion. Stace concludes that if we look at what the word ‘free’ is actually used to mean in the common language, freedom is compatible with determinism, but not with compulsion.
The brain is a conception in the mind. The mind is a conception in the mind. There has to be a mind to conceive a brain. The mind ceases to exist, the brain ceases to exist. It’s all the same, so there is no pattern. Without assumed connections there are no differences.
Err…
I don’t think that there’s any sort of response to that sort of statement. See you all in another thread. 
The basis of his/her statements is that consciousness is the primary vehicle of being and that all experience and beliefs are objects of consciousness. Consider why solipsism seems unfalsifiable. The physicalist framework of the mind is a semantic output of the mind.
Coming to the topic at hand, our epistemology disallows us knowing whether “pure randomness” (of QM) exists. Randomness gives us wiggle room to accomodate a vague notion of free will, but the two aren’t equivalent.
Ultimately, both mean the same. ‘Compulsion’ is a term used in situations that humans cognitively analyse as leaving no possible resolutions save one. ‘Determinism’ is a more theoretical term given to the concept that events in the world follow a grammar. Situations of ‘compulsion’ are simply those events where the human brain deterministically outputs a thought that recognizes the situation as deterministic.
What was that experiment where moments before a human subject makes a ‘conscious decision’ to press a button, an action potential is measured in a nerve fibre of the subject.
The experiment indicated that the body ‘decides’ to press the button before the conscious self does.
Anyway, the self is an illusion, so then must be will and hence also free will.
Libet’s experiments. Too lazy to find links.
Exercised by whom???
The self is exercised by the brain and this self collects perceptions into a narrative illusion after the fact.
I, too, consider that free will is an illusion, but it is worth exploring a few key words here in detail.
Firstly, what is a “choice” or “decision”? Your silicon PC makes choices and decisions all the time, for instance in a game of chess. According to its preprogrammed algorithms, if you put before it the exact same arrangement of pieces and say “your move”, it will output exactly the same choice of move every time. This does not sound like free will to me: quite the opposite. On the other hand, do dice have “free will”? Surely not, either - we do not say that the dice chooses the face it shows!
So what about some machine which outputs a decision whose basis is part calculation and part random? It would not output the same choice for identical input, but neither would it randomly throw itself off cliffs at the drop of a hat. This, surely, is the basis of the illusion: even though neither part itself is in any way “free”, the consolidation of the two leads to behaviour which looks that way. An insect does not go to the same flower each time, nor does it randomly seek flowers miles away: evolution has balanced its decision processes such that there is enough of both calculation and randomness to be flexible in its “choices”.
And so to the OP…
Everything is truly random - it is just that macroscopic objects statistically tend towards predictability.
But there may well always be a practically undetectable difference in a later decimal place which makes all the difference in our being able to correctly predict the correct outcome. Deterministic does not necessarily mean Determinable: the former just means external to the “will”, whatever it is. The path of next year’s hurricanes are unpredictable, but hurricanes are neither random, unphysical nor examples of free will.
I disagree that the universe was “created”, but your point stands for the sake of argument.
But the point is that it couldn’t be predicted - it is computationally intractable, even ignoring quantum effects which are truly random (but still deterministic in that they are “external to the will”, unless you go for Penrose’s quantum consciousness model which I find utterly unnecessary).
Correction: the universe is the Big Bang, and always has been.
Nothing particularly relevant, IMO.
I would argue that it was the first evolved organism which would not react precisely uniformally to identical stimuli: a bee rather than an amoeba, say.
Because by doing so we change future calculations in people, including the offender. “IF crime THEN punishment” is the programme introduced to biological computers thereby.
I actually think that the key to reconciling free will and determinism lies here. Even if you deny that there is free will, you will wind up punishing and rewarding people in order to affect people’s future calculations. Indeed, even if you deny that there is free will, you will still need an analog of free will to find out when you ought to punish someone and when you ought not. If my action is determined by my character, then punishment might (by altering my calculations) make me behave differently in the future. But if I act under *compulsion * (say, someone has a gun to my head) then punishment would be pointless, as it would not alter my future behavior when in a similar circumstance. So not only will people like **SentientMeat ** punish and reward people, they will also have to invent some concept similar to freedom to determine when a person ought to be punished. My view is, if it looks like freedom, walks like freedom, and quacks like freedom, why not just call it freedom?
Oh, certainly that’s a useful word: it effectively describes the THEN’s in the IF-THEN’s as being generally less injurious, or whatever. The word I don’t like in free will is not free, but will.
I don’t think I disagree with you. The idea that there is a faculty of will is too bound up with the bad idea that there is an autonomous self which is capable of initiating, uncaused, new causal chains. If someone is using “will” as a convenient shorthand for “whatever brain processes caused this action,” that is unproblematic, as long as we remember that it *is * shorthand, and doesn’t refer to some autonomous faculty or entity.
Thanks. S and I. At last, someone willing to state it baldly. Free will is an uncaused cause. Sounds like some people’s definition of God.
No, what (& more importantly, how) is ‘free will’ exercised by?
Therein lies the paradox. There cannot be causes to the uncaused - there is no first event, thus no chain. Determinism implies a chain of events, but that is only because of our absolute freedom. The conception of unfreedom can only arise when so-called wrong is interpreted. Chaos cannot be wrong until it is divided. Absolutely there is no division, so the perception of victim and victimizer has no reality. Free is the essence of it.