That depends very much on the situation. If they are absolutists (and I think most people are) then they are disagreeing about whose moral evaluation accurately reflects objective moral truth. I, as a relativist, would think that they are both wrong, in the sense that there is no objective moral truth for either of them to reflect. However, I might agree with one or the other of them in the sense that my moral system might produce the same result that one of them reached.
When two relativists disagree over a moral evaluation, that is, when each thinks that the other is objectively wrong, then this usually means that relativist A believes that relativist B is erroneously applying B’s own principles or is applying them to incorrect data to reach the wrong conclusion about what B’s system implies.
Most often, however, moral disputes aren’t of this nature, because the disputants do not share all of the same principles. If I’m in a dispute with someone over a moral issue, and if I believe that they are reasoning correctly from their principles, then of course I won’t conclude that they are objectively wrong. However, if I find that I can’t just “agree to disagree”, I may still try to change their views by finding the psychological root of their principles, and effecting change at that level. For example, if someone believes that society should work to stamp out homosexuality, I might try to change that view by getting them to feel more sympathy for homosexual individuals. Perhaps, given enough luck, skill, and time, I could get them to re-evaluate their principles.
The Absolutist says that there is a universally applicable code of right and wrong, which is more or less discoverable.
The Absolutist says that the Relativist believes “whatever people think is right is right.”
The Relativist says, “Wait a minute, what do you mean by ‘right’?”.
Is that at all helpful? Put another way, perhaps the construction that might fit best is, “Whatever people think is is right is just whatever they think it right; it probably does not point to a universal truth.”
I dunno, perhaps you consider yourself one who believes in moral absolutes. What difference do you see between that statement and what you believe?
It doesn’t make sense under relativism. If you tried to formulate it under relativism, the first time you encountered “right” it would have to be “relative to X” and then it would make sense: in order to make a moral judgment, one uses a moral system. It is from the perspective of this system that the judgment is made. Perhaps, as in moral subjectivism, it is that person who makes the appraisal. But even at that the individual might hold some kind of agent’s relativism, where “I can only say what is right by figuring out what the person who did it thought.” (Leaving their own actions suspiciously void of any motivation, but never you mind.) We could, of course, have appraiser’s relativism… much like, “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” so, too, the morality of deeds, thoughts, and entire moral precepts themselves.
Because you’re not making the only one that mattered. “Whatever people think is right is close enough” is a moral judgment. This judgment must be made from within some moral system. I don’t make that judgment; do you?
But that does not capture the essence of moral relativism itself which has surprisingly little to say about who, exactly, is doing the judging. (As you might deduce given a few moments thought on the matter… it wouldn’t be very relative to anything if it stated unambiguously “whose” perspective we were supposed to use!)
The key component to relativism, generally, is that all moral judgments are made relative to something, usually some kind of system of thought, though it needn’t be so. There is no question that we can hypothesize the existence of a system which gives equal weight to all moral decisions, though you have to admit it is hardly the hallmark of an interesting system.
Colour me confused. I have read this thread; I have read the OP in the linked thread; I still have no idea what relativists actually believe.
Perhaps a simple question is in order.
Tyrrell McAllister has eloquently stated as follows:
erislover, with equal eloquence, stated the following in the linked OP:
I am confused. Is the validity of a moral system a moral claim or not? Is the statement “your system of morality is wrong, mine is right” a moral claim or not?
When moral relativists say to a moral absolutist, “your system of morality is wrong, or at least, not as good as mine, or mine is preferable”, are they or are they not making a moral judgment?
It seems to my simple brain that moral relativists and moral absolutists alike believe that they are “right” and that the others are “wrong”. In both cases, they believe that there is something fundamental in the nature of reality itself which supports their claims - that, on some level, it just plain is that way - the way they support.
If, by “wrong” and “right”, you mean “morally wrong” and “morally right”, then I would say that the statement you quote is a moral claim.
The relativist is making a moral or value judgement in this case. But you should keep in mind that they are leaving off an unspoken qualifier: “with respect to a particular moral/value system (probably my own).”
Now I think you may be sliding from using “right” in “wrong” in the moral sense to using them in the truth-value sense. On the one hand, a moral relativist may believe that moral absolutism is factually incorrect, in that it asserts the existence of something which does not exist. In this sense of “wrong”, the moral relativist would believe that moral absolutism is objectively, universally wrong (i.e., not in accordance with the facts).
On the other hand, the relativist may also believe that moral absolutism is morally wrong, but here they would mean that, with respect to some particular moral system, it is morally wrong to be a moral absolutist. In this sense of “wrong”, moral absolutism is not being judged to be objectively, universally wrong. It is merely (morally) wrong with respect to some specific moral system.
Would I be correct in stating that to a moral absolutist, there is no difference between statements using “right” and “wrong” in the truth-value sense when discussing moral questions, and statements that are “right” and “wrong” in the moral sense? And that for moral relativists, this distinction both exists and is highly significant?
Apply this to the quote from Flashman: “It has been said that Apaches do not know right from wrong, and this is why they do what they do. To everyone who says this, I have one answer: wrong an Apache, and see whether they know it.” [No insult intended towards Apaches]
In this case, for example, a cultural relativist may say that in the Apache’s sense of morality, doing bad stuff to non-Apaches is okay in their moral system, presumably not okay in Flashman’s moral system, and that neither of these ought to be privileged. This is descriptive (thus a truth-statement).
To Flashman, who may be presumed to be a moral absolutist, the fact that both Apaches and non-Apaches recognize something as “wrong” is sufficient to show that there is a commonality of moral knowledge. This is a truth-statement as well, but also an implied moral indictment of Apaches (since they allegedly know what is wrong, but do it to others anyway - which is, presumably, immoral).
The often heard criticism of moral relativism is that the “relativist” truth-statement above is also an implied moral statement - that neither morality (in this case, Flashman’s nor the Apaches’) ought to be “privileged” and thus no judgment is possible concerning either.
Ok, perhaps I meant that the possible Ps are not unlimited. That is, they are limited to people.
Not exactly. I am not saying that there are moral statements on which every single human being agrees. I am saying that there are essential characteristics of humans which can be used to justify some moral statements on which most would agree, but almost all should. I’m not sure that makes it any clearer though.
I think whatever point I was trying to make in this regard was nonsensical as Snarky_Kong kindly pointed out.
Understood. But simply rephrase it so that it does. I think this is possible.
Ok, “Whatever people think is right, is right.” Might become “Whatever people think is right relative to them is right relative to them.” Is that better? The basic question still remains. What is the difference between these two statements? I cannot see the actions of a believer in one as that much different from the actions of a believer in the other. Excluding interactions with others, perhaps (but only perhaps).
No, I was not making a moral judgement on any holder of such a belief. I was honestly trying to restate it from a relativist’s point of view. I would sincerely appreciate you help in doing so.
I constructed that very badly. I meant to say that relativism seems to allow for any concept of morality to be equally valid with any other. That is, it seems to remove the context in which morality exists.
What I meant to say, perhaps was more along the lines of “It still says that any person should act however he thinks is right, and that he should only judge such actions within teh same framework.” I’m not sure that helps, however. I still think there is some basic aspect of relativism that I am missing.
Ok, but this seems unnecessarily vague. Even absolutists make moral judgements relative to their percieved position within the system of moral rules they try to live by. It seems relativism has some other aspect which you are not capturing in this sentence.
Well, yes. It is just this which is confusing me.
it seems to me an unavoidable consequence of relativism that such a system be adopted.
2)You, a person I much respect in this regard, are saying emphatically that this is not the case.
These are quite exclusive propositions. I cannot find the mistake I am making. I suspect it is in 1.
if i may intervene, i might be able to add something. here’s to hoping:
when a moral relativist gives equal weight to all systems, it is an ontological judgement. functionally, an absolute moral system can not exist. if there is such a system, even if we can discover it, we can’t know that we’ve discovered it. thus, no person knowingly follows an absolute moral system. everyone chooses a moral system to follow.
however, this does not mean that we give equal moral weight to all systems. when i say someone is morally wrong, i am applying my moral system to make a moral judgement. this is not an ontological statement - it is with respect to my morality, not reality as a whole. perhaps rather than say someone is morally wrong, i should say i believe he is morally wrong.
the reason moral absolutism is objected to as being factually incorrect (not morally incorrect) is because no one can say “he is morally incorrect”; the best one can say is “i believe he is morally incorrect”. we can’t know this theoretical absolute moral system, so we can’t adhere to it. we simply recognize that we can only do the best we can.
if this sounds self-centered, it should. my perspective is the only one i can know, so i can’t center my beliefs around anyone else’s.
I think I understand this distinction. I disagree with the proposition that we cannot “know” we have discovered such a system, but I understand the distinction you are trying to make. It is similar to the one Tyrrell McAllister made in his note above.
But this is where I think the logic fails. If there is no relationship whatsoever between a small set of moral systems (say yours, mine, and erislover’s) and anything outside those systems, then you have to say that they are not independantly evaluatable. That is, they are either all equally correct or equally incorrect. Now, if your moral system evaluated by mine is “bad” so what?
But you do not have to. Your persepctive is not so unique in the universe that it bears no relationship whatsoever to the experience of other beings. If we restrict the “others” further to the set of human beings your experience will be even more relevant.
Now, I can certainly agree that one cannot make much of an argument that wearing hats or not is some sort of moral absolute. But I cannot understand the point of view that there are no moral statements whatsoever which do not apply to virtually all human beings.
The recognition that the determination of moral correctness is relative, and not absolute. Pretty much the point of the whole divide.
Think of it like having to give a cite for every moral judgment. The dispute of morality then becomes a truly awesome spectacle: a war of citations. But that really is a good analogy. Now extend it to suggest that you are incapable of making a moral judgment without a cite. That is almost all the way to relativism. The final step is easy: “There is no perfect citation.” Done!
Should I suppose that your morality is equally valid with mine… hmm. I suppose the only way to interpret this is to think that your morality is as good as mine, that is, as morally proper. Of course, what is morally proper is a moral question, and to answer it, I have to be working from within a moral system. So unless my system declared the conditions under which I held someone morally equivalent to me, there is no situation in which any concept of morality is equally valid with mine.
There are multiple contexts, that’s part of the point.
The link I gave to the post I started here a while back outlines the issue as thoroughly as I am capable of. I am not trying to be obtuse, but it is hard to know why you are missing what you’re missing. Moral validity is itself a moral judgment. Moral judgments are made within moral systems. Does every system have to suggest that all moral ideas are equally valid? Does non-Euclidean geometry have to admit the parallel postulate?? Are they “equally valid”–that is, can you derive them both from the same system? There are multiple governments each with their own laws… are all laws equally valid?
Cite? Abortion has been consistently condemned by the Church fathers, for centuries. A better example would be usury: definitely prohibited by the Church until around the Renaissance, now they seem to have no problem with it.
Yes, but totally irrelevant. Can you explain the difference in behavior between adherants of the two? It seems to me that you just admited that there is no observable difference between my statement of a relativist and the one earlier to which you objected.
This is looking worse and worse. You are saying pretty explicitly that morality has no context outside an individuals head. Do you really mean it that way?
Yes, but they are not mutually exclusive. They each exist in a meta context, if you will. Even short of that they each have characteristics so common to each other it just seems silly to suggest that there is no way to generalize amongst them at some level. Yet this seems exactly what relativism does. It suggests that none of these “contexts” may be judged outside of itself. This seems tantamount to saying that each and every person is so unique that no characteristics exist common enough to make generalizations amongst them. It seems the fact that we can communicate at all disprovs this.
No, but notice how your contexts change. Geometry’s context is the universe as a whole. Or more precisely a language for measuring the univers as a whole. You can judge whether or not Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry solve the same real world problems with enough accuracy to be called sufficiently valid. That is they can both be “judged” outside themselves based on their purpose or context.
Is it possible that relativists have droped the idea that morality has a purpose? That various moral systems aught to be “judgeable” based on this purpose? It seems to me the only way you can say that moral systems cannot be judged except from within other moral systems is to say that
there is no way to judge anything except on a moral basis.
moral systems exist as something unique enough as to defy any unique characterizations.
Both of these seem odd to me and yet indispensible to the relativist position.
morality has no moral context outside an individual’s head, perhaps. however, the context is everything to the moral relativist. he forms his moral system based on context. it is akin to saying there is no ether through which the earth is moving. we can still say where we are and how we’re moving; we must simply justify it by giving a context.
this is not strictly what’s being said. i would suggest a more precise version would be:
the morality of any moral judgement made by a moral system cannot be judged except from within other moral systems.
the difference is perhaps subtle, but i think it is definitely noteworthy. a moral system can be judged, however you want to go about doing that, but it can’t be assessed morally without a moral system through which to assess it.
what do you mean able to be independently evaluated? can you morally evaluate anything but through your own perspective? if so, how, cuz i’d like to try it?
then you think i’m a bad person, i suppose. you may do with that knowledge what you wish.
the only way i can experience other beings is through my perspective. to me, they are simply experiences. i can’t know “what it’s like to be a bat.”
no one said that there are no moral statements that do not apply to most human beings. however, that is not an indication that some absolute morality exists through which all humans get their moral values. it simply indicates that, as one might expect, the moral systems of all humans have similar origins (survival of the species, perhaps).
??? What difference in behavior? What do you mean?
Because for some reason you find them equivalent. I am not sure why.
I would never suggest such a thing. Relativism surely has nothing to say on the matter, either. It is a meta-moral system, a way of looking at morality. Relativism is not where moral judgments are made from. It has nothing to say on which moral systems are good ones.
Relativism is this generalization. What is unclear to you, apparently, is what, exactly, is being generalized.
Relativism has nothing to say on that matter whatsoever. It says that judgment comes from a system-of-judgment. What those judgments are is of no concern for relativism. What characterizes the systems is also of no concern.
Geometries are systems of deduction. We generalize them and call them “geometry” for various reasons, but this generalization is not a system of deduction. Individual geometries are systems of deduction.
I am not sure I understand the question. It seems broader in scope than relativism intends to be.
If so, then it is “simply” another system of judgment.
Relativism in general has two qualities which I outlined in the other thread.
Judgments come from systems.
No system is uniquely privileged above all others.
(1) Is definitional in nature, or at best “true by inspection”. (2) is, depending on the analysis, ontological or epistemological in nature. I prefer the epistemological position that, given (1), any suggestion of privilege in (2) is a begged question.
Neither relativism nor absolutism are codes of behavior. Therefore, no difference in behavior inevitably follows from one but not the other (except, perhaps, for inconsequential things like taking a particular side in moral discussions like this one). Perhaps there are psychological conseqeunces of adopting one view rather than the other which could incline the adherant toward certain patterns of behavior, but that’s an empirical question (one which I doubt, btw).
As Ramanujan wrote, each context can be morally judged outside of itself, but that moral judgement must happen in the context of another moral “context” (i.e., system). So, two moral systems can each judge the other system wrong, just as two governments could each declare the other to be illegal (leaving aside the notion of international law).
Moreover, one can indeed pass outside of moral contexts altogether and comparatively study all moral systems at once. That is, one can “gereralize amongst them at some level”. However, since we are no longer inside a specific moral system, all of the conclusions of our analysis must be non-moral. Rather, our conclusions will take the form of statements in psychology, sociology, evolutionary biology, comparative mythology, logic, or some other field besides moral philosophy. We might state things like “Most moral systems held by large enduring cultures include some version of the Golden Rule.” But if we are trying to remain outside of any specific moral context, we cannot then conclude that “therefore, the Golden Rule is morally correct.”
I think the analogy with axiomatic systems is a good one, though using geometry specifically might be confusing because people are used to interpreting its statements as being about actual physical space.
Consider intead axiomatic set theory. There is an axiom in set theory called the Axiom of Choice, which some people consider controversial. This axiom asserts the existence of certain maps on infinite sets. However, unlike the parallel axiom in Euclidean geometry, there is no way this axiom could be experimental verified or falsified by looking at actual collections of objects in the real world. People have developed theories based on either accepting or rejection the Axiom of Choice. Does it make sense to say that one of these theories is objectively wrong, while the other is objectively right?
I can’t speak for all relativists, but I, at least, disagree with both of these statements.
Moral standards can be judged by many criteria besides moral ones. One could use economic profitability, convenience, level of reproductive advantage conferred, or desirability of psychological consequences to oneself or to those one cares about. And so on.
Moral systems can be compared in many ways, as I mentioned above. We can compare their logical structures, their historical influences and consequences, their robustness (i.e., in how wide a variety of situations do they provide definitive answers), and so on.
Thank you, all three, for the responses to my posts. I think you each hit the meat of the matter rather well. I am going to respond to just that part of your posts. If I left anythin out which you would like me to address, please ask again.
Ok, I understand this distinction. However, if I were to propose a couple moral rules and demonstrate that they are better for the purpose of living life as a human being in the context of what it means to live life as a human, would you consider that a moral or ontological judgement of the various moral rules?
Given 2, how does this not devolve into exactly the phrasing you objected to earlier. When you said that no relativist would accept the phrase “What people believe is right is right”, you meant only that they would reject the phrase on semantic grounds? Not that no relativist believes such a moral policy could result from their ideals.
Ok, but given similarities between the goals of large societies, could one also not amass evidence (I’m not saying anyone has) that the presence of this golden rule confers some advantage on said societies. Concluding then, that such societies are better off (within the context of these common goals nad the aformentioned advantage) with the Golden Rule would not be a moral judgement, no? Further concluding that societies which possess the rule are “better” (again, in the context of the goals and advantage mentioned) would not be a moral judgement. Doesn’t this seem to reduce morality to personal opinion somewhat?
For the record, I am not strictly talking about judging moral systems only based on a moral frame work. Given the morality is not itself self evident, some method of assessing morality seems unavoidable. I don’t think I have used the word judgement in any way which implies moral judgement exclusive of other types of judgements.
“Only” semantic grounds?! That you say this suggests that you have yet to grasp the distinction in place here. Relativism does not say what is morally right. If you think it does, you have failed to grasp what relativism is about.
Relativism is not a moral ideal. It does not comment on whether actions are moral or not. It outlines what conditions must be met to discuss morality in (1) I gave, and makes a comment about the merits of these conditions in (2), which, in my case, are motivated by avoiding circular reasoning.
