If I understand you correctly, then I agree with everything in this paragraph, including the last sentence.
If this were not true I would not have kept asking these questions.
So, you are agreeing that it is a system for evaluating moral systems although not morally evaluating them?
The idea that morality is simply personal opinion and nothing more is one of the big problems I have with relativism.
I do appreciate very much your willingness to discuss the issue. I think I have learned quite a bit. Thank you.
Perhaps a note as to where I am coming from will help.
I do not think that there is some supernatural source for morals. I do, however, think that the nature of existance and the nature of moral agents within that context provides a source for morals. Perhaps it is not a moral judgement to say that one set of morals is more closely aligned to reality than another one. But it seems to me that
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this sort of judgement implies a sort of “one moral system is “better” (even if we only mean better for living in reality) than another” is in some way a moral judgement.
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relativism denies the possiblity of such judgements and so leaves the choice amongst moral systems to chance, whim, or worse deny that even these are appropriate tools.
In this respect, I think relativism is, in fact, a moral ideal. It holds that no moral system is priviledged above any other. But that assumes that no common moral frame work is possible, or that if such a frame work exists that all systems are equally good. Given that I think living in reality provides such a common moral framework, I cannot understand how relativism simply dismisses it.
I hope this makes my confusion more clear. I fully expect that I am misunderstanding something.
Why would I agree that it is a system of evaluation? Evaluating moral systems is a problem for a moral system. Relativism is not a moral system. It is a framework that describes moral systems without making moral judgments.
It would be a strange moral system which did not suggest that it was a good one.
How, exactly, does it deny such judgments?
It holds that there is no uniquely privileged system, and it gives no means of evaluating privilege. If it did, it would be a moral system. It is not, and does not.
::tears out hair:: “Equally good” is a judgment made from within a moral system. Relativism is not a moral system. Relativism cannot say such things or make such judgments because it is not a system of judgment. It does not assume there is no common moral framework. It suggests that any moral judgment is relative to its own framework. It does not suggest that frameworks must be mutually exclusive or have everything in common or any combination of those.
It doesn’t, so that might help explain why you are perplexed.
Did you use judgement in different ways in these two statements? I fnot, you have answered your own question.
Ok, but it also holds that makeing a judgement about moral systems cannot be made outside them. That is, there is no way to judge amongst all possible systems without apealing to one of them.
Yes, and if relativism is incorrect about some of its assumptions it is an apt observation. Put your hair back in. I am just asking some questions. 
Right. This is the basic premis. Perhaps I am wondering if this is a useful observation? I’m still not sure where the confusion is.
If not, then you are using “morality” in a sense that I am not familiar with. If a moral system is a system for choosing amongst options, then it only applies to specific types of beings with specific characteristics. That’s what I mean by reality and the context it provides.
I suggested that relativism is not a system for making moral judgments. I have not suggested that it forbids moral judgments from existing.
This is true.
Is it useful to recognize that there are multiple moral systems? I will leave that up to you to decide.
Yes, there are more things we can say about moral systems. We might even be able to draw a line about them and suggest why they are all called “moral systems”. However, if a moral system is a system for choosing amongst options, it is trivial to develop two systems which each give unambiguous results and which are mutually exclusive. Consider a “Magic 8 Ball” moral system, which I will abbreviate M8B. Under M8B, a person determines what is the ‘right’ action by asking a yes or no question, shaking the Magic 8 Ball, and turning it over to see the response. This meets the requirements of “choosing amongst options”. Now consider another system, the “Not Magic 8 Ball” system, abbreviated !M8B. In this system, you behave exactly the same except that you interpret the response of the Magic 8 Ball in reverse, such that if it gives a positive response, you behave negatively, and vice versa. This also has the characteristics of a moral system, given your definition.
Q & A:
Q1) Is there more than one moral system?
A1) Yes, there are at least two, by inspection.
Q2) If I have an option to choose between several, and if choosing amongst alternatives is the job of a morality, can I choose between these two systems without a system?
A2) No, by definition.
Q3) Can either system answer the question, “Should I choose this system over its alternative?”
A3) Yes. By definition, if it is a moral system it can answer this question.
Q4) Is either system compelled to give a certain answer to the hypothetical question in (3)?
A4) No. The definition of ‘moral system’ does not assert which answers must be given.
(I would not consider that definition of ‘moral system’ exhaustive, FWIW, but it is useful to work with for the moment.)
does anyone believe that choosing amongst moral systems needs to be the job of morality at this point?
i think this might be another sticking point, and a few of the things you’ve written have suggested you would answer “yes” to the above question. i would say that one can evaluate a moral system without making moral judgements about it. there are plenty of ways to assess value without assessing moral value.
If you feel it does not, then all I ask is how one determines the validity of a moral system in such a way that avoids moral judgments in the first place.
There are indeed other means of assigning value, though it is not very obvious to me that they constitute the entire mechanism for deciding upon various moral frameworks or individual tenets. Can you describe such a method of value assignment which yields an unambiguous choice but does not itself rely on morality? (This would require, of course, a more thorough definition of “morality” than the one I was hypothetically operating with in the post you responded to.) In addition, to avoid stacking one relativism on top of another, can you suggest why that value system isn’t prey to relativism’s critiques itself?
No, I don’t. You are saying that the only way to chose which one of them to follow is to adopt one of them and make the choice that way.
No, not if that is the only thing you recognize. If you say that there are more than one moral system and there is no way to evaluate them outside of them, then you have accomplished nothing in regards to chosing which system to adopt. Now, if that was your purpose, purhaps it is useful. Personally I don’t see the utility of such an approach.
No, of course not. I am being short for the sake of discussion.
I agree. But my point is that there are ways to measure the effectiveness of each of these systems based on the purpose (essential characteristic in other words) of moral systems in general.
I’m suggesting that the essential characteristics of morality (and your right a more regiorous definition is required) or the purpose of morality shoould lead to such a method. In other words, I am talking about the context in which moral systems exist. It is interesting and sometimes useful to construct moral systems in a vacuum and examine them for internal logic or for ease of description or some other random criteria. But the fact is that moral systems either serve the purpose to which people put them or they do not. Choosing between them ratiionally is only possible by evaluating them on this basis.
Let me ask you. You say your moral system woks for you. I take that to mean you have a moral system. Can you answer why you chose that one? Which moral system did you adopt in order to do so? If these questions are too rude, please feel free to ignore them. I mean no disrespect.
To explain further, this approach seems to me sort of like recognizing that there are multiple things that one could ingest without bothering to note that some of them might be poisonous. It seems to me that relativism notes that people adopt different moral systems without bothering to learn anything about moral systems, what they do, or even who uses them. I suppose it is a useful oservation on a certain level. but it does not seem very informative regarding morality is all.
I’m more than willing to learn that I am wrong about this.
My best guess is that I was instilled with basic hedonism, and my parents used that and a natural aversion to pain in order to instill some of their values in me. At a bare minimum, that would be where it all started: me being told (trained, taught) what is “good”.
Eris,
Do you leave open the possibility that just as cognitive-perceptual systems have been produced by eons of selection processes with specific overlays of learned experiences so have your ethical systems been selected for by the self-same mechanisms? And that both operate by selection at genetic and cultural levels?
None of which brings anything to bear on the question of “Right/Wrong” vs “right/wrong” since some absolute power could be responsible for setting those balls rolling.
Personally I’m a soft believer that there is some absolute standard out there. That some things are Right or Wrong whether anyone believes it or not. I wish I could believe it more strongly. Life would be simpler.
if i may jump in for a quick question?
suppose a pacifist were dropped in a warzone where he meets an enemy soldier sworn to defend his homeland with the command to kill all enemies on sight, what would go through the mind of the:
[ul][li]pacifist as a relativist? [] pacifist as an absolutist?[/li]
[]enemy soldier as a relativist? enemy soldier as an absolutist? [/ul] thanks.
erislover, let me answer these questions and see if I have not understood at least some of what you have been talking about.
[QUOTE=shijinn]
if i may jump in for a quick question?
suppose a pacifist were dropped in a warzone where he meets an enemy soldier sworn to defend his homeland with the command to kill all enemies on sight, what would go through the mind of the:
[ul][li]pacifist as a relativist? [] pacifist as an absolutist?[/li]
[li]enemy soldier as a relativist? [] enemy soldier as an absolutist? [/ul] thanks.[/li][/QUOTE]
If I have understood erislover at all, there would be no difference between either of the people in either of the cases. That is, relativism has nothing to say about how to hold, put into practice, or which moral system a person believes in. The relative pacificist is a pacifist. The absolutist pacifist is also. Meanwhile the soldiers moral code allows, even requires, him to shoot the intruder pretty quickly.
Imagine, however, that for some reason the two fell to talking with the purpose of convincing the other to adopt their moral system. Here is where you might see a difference. Most notably in the way each might frame the argument. The absolutists might argue that their morality is superior on the grounds that it more closely aligns with clear and proper universal morals. Relativists would not. In fact, relativists might be less inclined to argue that their morals should be adopted at all.
How did I do, erislover?
Might not. If the nature of this absolute morality were difficult to follow or worse, difficult to identify, it might not make life much easier.
So far, you have a resounding stamp of approval from me.
Hard to say. Have you known me to have an inclination to not argue? But how one would go about arguing it would certainly be a marked difference between the two. Understand that I am fully aware that there are plenty of relativists who do not quite understand the motivation for relativism, these are the “we can’t judge other people!” types who are generally agent relativists for reasons which I am sure they would be unable to elucidate, if we desired (yes, I have a low view of agent’s relativism). 
As ever, you present me with an open mind, and tolerate my frustrations with a patience I could only hope to approximate.
PS–if you read that thread I linked to, you would see an old poster presenting his ideas about an absolute morality’s foundation that was not moral. It was a good discussion (like all good discussions, I was right and he was wrong, I hate it when discussions are the other way ;)), and I would love to revisit it some time, in this thread, or another later. At various times I’ve held that there might be an absolute foundation for morality, but I have been unable to do anything other than suggest there might be one, and have no ability to distinguish it. (Also, as I indicate to Ramanujan, I have no way to dodge relativism in the next level of value assigment.)
It is worth noting what I feel an absolute morality should be in order to qualify.
- It should delineate moral issues from amoral issues
- It should be objectively discoverable i.e. it needn’t be complete, but it does need a method of investigation that is itself able to be exercized without reasonable ambiguity
- It should be the only one that satisfies these properties
I usually find (1) and (2) to be characteristic of all moral systems I like, and (3) is the sticker. When I try and further restrict what an absolute morality should be like, I find that a whole mess of systems are no longer moral systems, which seems absurd (they should still be moral systems, just that in the presence of an absolute system they would be wrong).
Somebody give an example of a moral absolute.
in that discussion, what kind of ist would the pacifist be if he would not retaliate should the soldier choose to kill him, while understanding and accepting (approving even) the soldier’s moral duty to his command?
google returned many pages for “catholic abortion quickening”.
He could be either. What I was trying to explain is that it does not matter why the pacifist is a pacifist. If he is one (we are speaking sterotypically here), then he will not retaliate, and may not even defend himself beyond running away or something. But whether he came to his pacifist beliefs by accident or because of a moving religious experience, his behavior would be the same.
What I have been arguing with erislover about is what sorts behaviors might look like before the absolutists or relativist accepted pacifism in the first place. This is the only place where I see a useful distinction.
As I recall, I stopped lurking in that thread because I thought most of it went way over my head. I have to go out of town for the weekend, but when I come back I promise I will go through that thread and see if it sparks more questions.
Yea, I though that assertion was pretty weak on my part. That’s why I weasled with the “might be less inclined” phrase.
Qualify as what, a moral system?
I’m not sure I understand why 3 is in there. How far down into the system would you require this exclusivity to go? I have a vague idea that we can agree on a morality based on the life of the individual, but I’m not sure I can promise that when we get to the decision wether or not to wear hats that a unique formulation is possible. Would it be alright for the purposes of this discussion if we limited ourselves to a possible first (or at least top 10) moral principle? That is, if I can formulate a moral principle based on non moral characteristics of reality and those in it who need morals would that satisfy? Providing, of course, that alternative formulations of the same principle don’t satisfy 1 and 2. Or would we have to expand it into a more expansive working moral system?
Also, shouldn’t (2) include something about a method of investigation which does not rely on acceptance of the moral system in question?
As an absolute morality.
If there are more than one system, then we face the problem of relativism. (3) is there to suggest that an absolute morality should be the only one–or it is hardly absolute.
(I am here taking the position that the OP meant moral absolutism and not just an objective morality; many, many systems could qualify as an objective morality i.e. based on objective standards; my M8B and !M8B systems for example are totally objective but hardly what we mean by absolute.)
It depends a lot on how we’re supposed to go about discovering it. Is it just a set of rules/duties?-- then how do we go about discovering them uniquely? Is it an absolute methodology whereby we can decide every moral question (given that the methodology should also be able to make that distinction relatively unambiguously)?-- then what is this methodology? (And why are there no others?)
Probably not. We demand quite a bit from moral systems yet rarely encounter any that are actually up to snuff; certainly not in a message board thread.
But the question has not been whether such a construction is possible. Surely it is possible. The question is: why would this represent a privileged system? Why are all others lesser or completely excluded? And how can we avoid addressing one relativism by adopting another (i.e. if we don’t exclude then how are we assigning value without walking into another kind of relativism, say, epistemological relativism)?
[quote]
Or would we have to expand it into a more expansive working moral system?[/quiote]That is far too much of a demand for this medium, I’m afraid, but it is also far more than I would require to say, “Hmmm… maybe there’s something to this absolute morality…”
Not unless “discovering moral systems” is itself “good”. (If it is, we might have a problem of some begged question, but not necessarily.)