relativism vs. objective morality

[pervert]

@Lilairen

Providing such a means is not a part of its purpose.

No, I agree. But it seems to me that destroying such a means is its purpose (if it has one). Forgive the negative conotation of that.

False.

Any set of moral systems can be ranked. This merely requires that one define the standards to rank them by. (Further, any selection of standards can be ranked as well for superiority, though this requires yet another standard for doing so, and thus do we escape into metagenie land.)

Yes, but no set of standards can be devised (under relativism) and used to rank other sets of standards which itself has any privilege to do so. So, before you can rank the set of possible moralities, you have to choose one. Randomly or in some way not based on one of them. This in effect says that no system can be devised to reasonably choose a morality. At least no system which has the authority to do so.

(I have encountered a number of people who have submitted potential The Standards. Most of them require that I believe in the tenets of a religion not my own, which is a bit of a non-starter. The others have mostly been variations on raising sociobiology to a moral system and either defining the core instinctual stuff in humans as good-because-it’s-the-way-we-are or bad-because-it’s-what-we-must-overcome.)

I have encountered this as well. This is why I have strived so hard not to participate in this thread from the standpoint of A is the one and only true moral philosophy. I’m not so much interested in witnessesing as in determining a method by which we could discuss the merits of two witnesses’ ideas.

[erislover]

@pervert

Randomly or in some way not based on one of them.

Or based on them. The point in choosing one based on its own judgments is that, from there, to then turn around and assert privilege is a begged question.

This in effect says that no system can be devised to reasonably choose a morality. At least no system which has the authority to do so.

Many, many systems can; that authority is an illusion.

I have encountered this as well. This is why I have strived so hard not to participate in this thread from the standpoint of A is the one and only true moral philosophy. I’m not so much interested in witnessesing as in determining a method by which we could discuss the merits of two witnesses’ ideas.

Well, they would need to adopt some standard which they would agree to use for the purposes of discussion. “Let’s look at the issue pragmatically,” or, “Let’s look at it from the perspective of any moral agent,” or, …

But isn’t that what we do?

[pervert]

@erislover

Or based on them.

Yes, but based on which one? Again, relativisim says we cannot choose without having already chosen.

The point in choosing one based on its own judgments is that, from there, to then turn around and assert privilege is a begged question.

But you see, I agree with this logic. I really don’t think I have done this anywhere.

Many, many systems can; that authority is an illusion.

But only if relativism is correct.

Well, they would need to adopt some standard which they would agree to use for the purposes of discussion. “Let’s look at the issue pragmatically,” or, “Let’s look at it from the perspective of any moral agent,” or, …

But isn’t that what we do?

Well, we come close every now and then.

But at some point you say “Well pragmatism or rational-actorism is really only another frame work, and not even very unique one at that. Why should such a thing be privileged over the method of randomly tossing bones into the air to tell us which moral principles are appropriate for our daily lives?” And we are stuck with nowhere left to go.

[erislover]

@pervert

I am suggesting that a judgement reference frame exists which is objective and not itself a moral system.

My M8B system fits that bill, doesn’t it?

It is in fact, the only framework for judgements which is not itself a moral system.

Hardly, though of course we still haven’t nailed down what qualities a moral system has so I know what not to look for. (Is this what your later definition is meant to serve as?)

But it is not me which has placed existence in any position. I am not suggesting that I have a set of rules which is the one true morality. I am merely suggesting that there is a way to judge moralities without reference to any of them (or any others) and that this way is the one true way to do so.

By all means, I’m not stopping you from saying so.

What I am saying is that not all frameworks are moral systems.

In what way have you gotten the impression that relativism is only about moral systems? To be sure, we’re talking about moral relativism in this thread, but many kinds of relativistic ideas have come forward. Aesthetics and epistemology, to be broad. Then there was the issue of relative measurements. Didn’t I give an example of book categorization? (That might have been a post I wrote then thought better of posting.) When I indicated that you “beat one relativism, you beat them all” that was not to say that undermining one relativism somehow implied all others were impossible, but that to actually undermine one relativism, say, moral relativism, you would have to leave it and find some other kind of method of judgment other than morality, which itself is a relative method, which means you’d have to beat relativism there, etc. Now, I was being a little shorthanded. Of course it is possible that beauty always will be held to be in the eye of the beholder, even after this analysis is complete (though given some of your comments, it is possible you also believe in absolute beauty, too). We wouldn’t know until one was actually developed.

If “Morality is a complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs by which an individual determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong.” Then there may be a necessary framework from within which to privilege some moral systems above others whithout itself being a moral framework.

There may be.

How am I wrong in this belief?

Don’t you first have to show me how you are right? Else that is a very difficult question to answer, especially since I have not logically denied that some absolute reference frame exists. I’ve indicated I don’t believe one does, and I’ve indicated some generic epistemic arguments about why I don’t feel we will ever know one even if one exists, but that is in no way meant to deny the possibility of you being right.

[Smartass]

@pervert

My point is that the “chain” with regards to morality has an end. You can (and probably should) push the decision up the chain as far as possible. But at some point you simply do not have the freedom to make non existant choices.

I think the point where one of us is confused (and I’m not sure which one) is on the difference between an option and a choice. There can only be a choice where there is more than one option. If an option does not exist, then one cannot choose it, but morality does not enter into it. If “reality” does not make an option available to me, this does not make the option immoral, it makes it unavailable.

And on some level, it seems to me that you are saying that recognizing that certain options are not available to me is some sort of guide for decision-making. I cannot transform myself into a kangaroo, but that does not mean that it would be immoral for me to do so, and I don’t think that it indicates on any level that any part of “reality” prefers that I not be a kangaroo.

When we talk about “pushing the preference up the chain”, a key issue is what sort of entities can indicate a preference. For all I know, the board does have a preference, but I have no way of discerning it. Nonetheless, the fact that I can’t build a rocket ship out of it does not mean that the board would prefer not to be one. In the same way, the board has no way of discerning that I would prefer for it to be a house prior to my making it into a house. Even then, the board has no way of knowing my preference–for all the board knows, I believe myself to have just committed an immoral act. My preference is not observable; my actions are.

But this is exactly my complaint about relativism. It provides no means to prefer one moral system over another.

It provides no “objective” means. I think the example with my daughter is the more telling one. In and of itself, a pile of shit is neither good nor bad. The only “goodness” or “badness” lies in mine and my daughter’s “purposes”. However, even then, the only way my daughter can determine my “purpose” for the shit–or whether I think it is good or bad–is if I have some way of communicating it to her. Unless she can discern my preferences, the fact that I have given her a pile of shit does not communicate anything to her about me. She only knows how she feels about a pile of shit.

If I think shit is good and she thinks it is bad, there is no objective source that I can find that says which one of us is right. It could well be that there is a God or that reality has a preference, but in either case I have no way of discerning it.

Moving further, the fact that “reality” does not give me the option to be a kangaroo is not indicative of a preference. I know whether I would prefer to be a kangaroo, but I do not know that reality or God has a preference in the matter. In fact, since I am not able to become a kangaroo, I don’t believe there is a moral choice to be made, and if a choice has already been made by reality, I have no way of discerning what its “purpose” was.

In other words, I see no way to push the “preference” any farther up the chain than to an individual human–and I can only do that to the extent that a human can communicate its preferences.

One last example: I can observe a kangaroo jumping over a fence, but I have no idea whether the kangaroo thought this was the right thing to do or whether the kangaroo preferred to jump over the fence. If there is a purpose, it exists in the kangaroo, and I cannot even know that it exists, much less what that purpose might be.

Makes sense?

Maybe. But only if you pick your scope carefully enough. I think if you limit morality to only those possible moralities which choose between possible choices, you have effectively provided some moralities with a privilege over others. Have you not violated the tenets of relativism by doing so?

I don’t think so. I think you have merely determined what your available options are. I would say that, where there is no choice, there is no morality. Otherwise, I am left trying to figure out whether I am moral for being human or immoral for not transforming myself into a kangaroo, and this makes no sense to me.

I simply pointed out that this argument loses sight of the fact that other frameworks from which to make such judgements might exist.

The question (as I understand it) is not whether they exist, the question is whether there is one absolute one that can be determined objectively.

-VM

[pervert]

I’m going to just refer to this one part as my posts are getting too long for me to keep track of.

@Smartass

And on some level, it seems to me that you are saying that recognizing that certain options are not available to me is some sort of guide for decision-making.

Yes, let me show you.

I cannot transform myself into a kangaroo, but that does not mean that it would be immoral for me to do so, and I don’t think that it indicates on any level that any part of “reality” prefers that I not be a kangaroo.

The fact itself does not say that it would be immoral to transform yourself, all it says is that it is impossible. However, this fact also indicates that a moral system dependant on the principle that all of your actions should advance the goal of transforming yourself into a kangaroo is both impossible and immoral. At the very least it suggests that such a moral system is less applicable (and thus less privileged) to the life of a human being than one which is not so dependant.

You seem to be under the misunderstaning that I am profering a particular moral framework over another. I am not. I am not trying to say that the nature of men means that you should wear hats. All I am arguing is that the nature of humans and the purpose of morality provide a framework for “privileging” some moral systems over others. And that this disproves the relativist claim that moral systems cannot be privileged over other moral systems.

[pervert]

@erislover

My M8B system fits that bill, doesn’t it?

No. Read more of the paragraph you quoted.

Hardly, though of course we still haven’t nailed down what qualities a moral system has so I know what not to look for. (Is this what your later definition is meant to serve as?)

Partly, I’ll summarize in another post. I thought we were on the same page about this. Sorry

In what way have you gotten the impression that relativism is only about moral systems?

Because that’s the context we have been talking about.

To be sure, we’re talking about moral relativism in this thread, but many kinds of relativistic ideas have come forward. Aesthetics and epistemology, to be broad. Then there was the issue of relative measurements. Didn’t I give an example of book categorization? (That might have been a post I wrote then thought better of posting.) When I indicated that you “beat one relativism, you beat them all” that was not to say that undermining one relativism somehow implied all others were impossible, but that to actually undermine one relativism, say, moral relativism, you would have to leave it and find some other kind of method of judgment other than morality, which itself is a relative method, which means you’d have to beat relativism there, etc. Now, I was being a little shorthanded. Of course it is possible that beauty always will be held to be in the eye of the beholder, even after this analysis is complete (though given some of your comments, it is possible you also believe in absolute beauty, too). We wouldn’t know until one was actually developed.

Let me ask the question this way.

If I show a framework from within which moral systems may be “privileged” which frame work is neither avoidable (objective and unique) nor itself a moral system, does this not violate the second tenet of relativism with regards to morality? Perhaps you have gone over my head and confused me as to the thrust of this thread.

There may be.

And if there is, does this not violate relativisms second tenet with regard to morality.

Don’t you first have to show me how you are right?

I felt that I have done this in other posts. Let me try again.

Given - “Morality is a complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs by which an individual determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong.”

Given - A framework from within which moral systems can be “privileged” violates the second tenet of relativism with regard to morality if it:
not itself a moral system;
is unavoidable (objective and unique)

I am proposing that the nature of the “individual”* in the definition provides just such a framework.

There are some necessary truths about this “individual”. The definition of morality assumes that such a being is capable of actions and determinations among other things (the capability to deal with a hierarchy of concepts and abstractions stikes me as one further assumption, but it is not necessary for this thread). This limits our set of possible existants to living beings at least (It limits us even further, but living beings is good enough for now). Without an individual who conforms to these truths, morality has no meaning. Therefore, a morality which does not put the life of this “individual” pretty high up in the “complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs”, risks becoming meaningless.

This suggests that moral systems may be privileged according to the relative position within them of the life of the individual. The only frame of reference necessary to do so is this definition of morality. In fact, this frame of reference is the only one suitable for such a task since it is implicit in the definiton of morality.

This framework is unique (the only one suggested by the definition of morality), objective (relying only on the characteristic of the individual), and therefore absolute. Additionally it is not itself a moral system so it does not violate Relativism qua Relativism while at the same time violating relativsm as it relates to morality.

Now, is that a strong enough argument to tear apart? Can you help me identify where I have missed something? Do we need to start a new thread to hash this around?

[Smartass]

@pervert

The fact itself does not say that it would be immoral to transform yourself, all it says is that it is impossible. However, this fact also indicates that a moral system dependant on the principle that all of your actions should advance the goal of transforming yourself into a kangaroo is both impossible and immoral. At the very least it suggests that such a moral system is less applicable (and thus less privileged) to the life of a human being than one which is not so dependant. (emphasis added)

Reality does not provide any objective evidence that I have a soul or that actions I take can cause that soul to go to heaven after my death. Does this mean that actions that I take with the goal of sending my soul to heaven are both impossible and immoral? Did you just declare religion immoral? While I can’t say I agree with you, I’m starting to approve of the results…

In truth, I would say that you are declaring that trying to achieve the impossible is immoral. In other words, you would prefer that I not take actions whose purpose is to transform me into a kangaroo. I see no way of knowing that reality dictates this preference. In fact, I would say that the preference is yours and you are trying to blame reality for it.

Worst of all, I think this puts me in the position of defending religion, for which imposition I am holding you morally responsible.

Suppose I propose a moral system that says it is right for everyone to strive to transform themselves into kangaroos. Is it your claim that reality dictates that this morality is not as good as yours–as opposed to admitting it as your personal preference?

-VM

[pervert]

@Smartass

Reality does not provide any objective evidence that I have a soul or that actions I take can cause that soul to go to heaven after my death. Does this mean that actions that I take with the goal of sending my soul to heaven are both impossible and immoral? Did you just declare religion immoral? While I can’t say I agree with you, I’m starting to approve of the results…

No, I did not say this. I agree with it to a degree, but it is not necessarily a part of my argument here.

In truth, I would say that you are declaring that trying to achieve the impossible is immoral. In other words, you would prefer that I not take actions whose purpose is to transform me into a kangaroo. I see no way of knowing that reality dictates this preference. In fact, I would say that the preference is yours and you are trying to blame reality for it.

No, I am not saying this either. In no way am I saying that trying to do the impossible is immoral. If you read very carefully my posts you will find that I have not said any particular thing is immoral at all. I am saying that since becoming a kangaroo is impossible, a moral system based on such an act is itself less of a moral system than one which is not based on an impossible act.

I can imagine a set of moral systems each of which contain a certain value for attempting to be kangaroo like or to emulate some facet of the noble kangaroo which my analysis would be powerless to differentiate. I’m only trying to disposes you of the notion that no differentiation between moral systems is possible outside moral systems.

Worst of all, I think this puts me in the position of defending religion, for which imposition I am holding you morally responsible.

I certainly would regret such a turn of events. Again, I am not arguing in favor or against any particular morality. I am only arguing that there is a framework from which to judge moralities which makes moral relativism useless.

Suppose I propose a moral system that says it is right for everyone to strive to transform themselves into kangaroos. Is it your claim that reality dictates that this morality is not as good as yours–as opposed to admitting it as your personal preference?

It is my claim that reality (the definition of morality) means that such a system is not as useful for the purpose of morality (good if you want) as a system not so constrained. Yes.

Personally I have no preference regarding the transformation of a human into a kangaroo. Please, by all means, enjoy yourself. I will not condemn you in any way shape or form. In fact, if you need help defending your right to choose such a moral system, give me a call. I’ll be the first ones over the barricades so to speak. But if you ask me if such a moral system is better than one based on real choices, I would be forced to say that it is not. If further you suggest that there is no way to measure the two outside of personal opinion, I would have to disagree as well. This last bit is the only thing I am arguing in this thread.

[erislover]

@pervert

Let me ask the question this way.

If I show a framework from within which moral systems may be “privileged” which frame work is neither avoidable (objective and unique) nor itself a moral system, does this not violate the second tenet of relativism with regards to morality?

If this hypothetical, unavoidable, objective, and unique framework yielded unambiguous results, you may be on to something. We would have to now pin down what we mean by “absolute morality” to be more clear, but WRT moral relativism in particular, an unavoidable framwork for value judgments would indeed be a good start. But note, of course, that we simply leave the context of morality completely here and focus on this framework, its value judgments, and whether it sufficiently responds to the completely analagous relativistic critique in its own context.

Allow me to offer my own suggestions here of a deductive moral system and absoluteness, if not for discussion proper, at least for the fairness of you not being the only one on the chopping block tossing out ideas. Here I will use the mathematical notation for domains such that square brackets mean “up to and including” and parentheses mean “up to but not including.” Any finite set is put between curly braces ‘{’ and ‘}’.

By “deduction” I mean simply an unambiguous procedure for manipulating strings, semantic elements, etc., in order to assign value. I am not requiring that a deductive system include first order predicate logic, for example.

By “morality” we mean some system of judgment (a “moral system” or “system of morality”) which any “moral agent” can use to determine what moral weight to give various choices; that is, roughly, moral systems are decision routines for moral agents. The value assigment of a moral system takes on a spectrum of values [most immoral, less immoral, …, amoral, moral, more moral, …, most moral]. Of course, some systems may reduce this range to distinct values {immoral, amoral, moral}, though this is a matter of implimentation and not definition. By convention, “moral” is an assignment that suggests a decision so assigned should be made, “immoral” is an assignment that suggests a decision so assigned should not be made, and “amoral” yields no information (some other value assignment is necessary to make a decision). We will not impose a criterion of completeness, so it is not necessary for a moral system to be able to assign values to any arbitrary set of choices; however, we will require that when it does assign values, its assignment is reasonably unambiguous, and that there is no deductive equivalency relationship between choices which are unable to be assigned a value (i.e., when a moral system declares itself incapable of choosing in multiple cases, we are not able to derive the equivalency of those cases; paraphrased that “undetermined” is not a value). Finally, a we will restrict our attention to deductive systems such that every value assignment is a well-defined procedure. (Compare unambiguous procedures to unambiguous meaning previously required.)

Now onto “absolute”.

An “absolute” moral system shall be a deductive moral system which satisfies the following properties:

1. Every other moral system (meaning non-duplicates) is given the moral assignment somewhere between [most immoral,amoral] and hence never assigns other moral systems any value between (amoral, most immoral], or it suggests that choosing between moral systems is undecided. Should a moral system be able to assign value to other systems, it must declare a copy of itself most moral.
2. The privilege of this system, meaning its “absoluteness”, is determined by an external value system which is itself absolute and follows the exclusions of ambiguity as given above (procedural and semantic).
3. It must be knowable. (Without this, there is no way to violate relativism’s second point from the perspective of moral agents; i.e., we are not looking for existence theorems here.)

By “absolute value system” in general we mean the analog of (1) where “moral/immoral/amoral” are replaced by the system’s respective value assignments, and (2) and (3) remain the same.

Now, I feel that we can suggest absolute morality if we violate (3), though its epistemic status is quite undecided and the relativist, if making an epistemic point, is not unjustified. (2) can suggest the makings of infinite regress of foundational perspectives, familiar to any skeptic. (1) covers the idea that an absolute system is absolutely ‘right’, if it is anything.

Given - “Morality is a complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs by which an individual determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong.”

I think this is a good position, but it is remarkably vague. I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on what I propose above.

Given - A framework from within which moral systems can be “privileged” violates the second tenet of relativism with regard to morality if it:
not itself a moral system;
is unavoidable (objective and unique)

I do not believe this is the case. Its epistemic status is critical to moral discussions. If it is not knowable as the absolute morality, the discussion consists of angels-on-pins.

I have to travel to NY tonight, so I am unavailable to continue this discussion and give the rest of your post (truly the more interesting part) the attention it deserves. I will pick up on it when I return over Thanksgiving break.

[Smartass]

pervert, I think I understand what you are saying. But I also think you are in a circular trap.

@pervert

If you read very carefully my posts you will find that I have not said any particular thing is immoral at all.

Yes, you are. You are saying that if trying to be a kangaroo is impossible, then it is less moral than trying to do something else.

See here:

I am saying that since becoming a kangaroo is impossible, a moral system based on such an act is itself less of a moral system than one which is not based on an impossible act.

Well, what if I said that trying to become a kangaroo is fun, and your moral system is boring and that I would rather have fun than be “successful”. You are claiming to be “outside” of a moral system when in fact, you are inside one that declares the possibility of success to be “preferable” to having fun.

Another quibble: Though I may not be able to succeed in becoming a kangaroo, I can certainly succeed at trying to.

As an expansion–not involving hats–I could suggest a system that preferred helping others and you could suggest a system that preferred helping yourself. Both are equally possible and your “objective” moral system offers no guidance in preferring one of them at all. In fact, for every example that I can think of where I actually have “possible” options, your objective system offers no guidance in choosing. For almost all of the meaningful moral choices I might have, your system is useless.

I’m only trying to disposes you of the notion that no differentiation between moral systems is possible outside moral systems.

I don’t think anyone has claimed that no differentiation is possible. The problem is in trying to find a “preference” while remaining outside of them altogether. You are claiming to be outside of them when you are actually inside one that “prefers” something–achievability, possibility of success. When you say that a moral system that has a chance to succeed is better than one that doesn’t because it is more likely to succeed, you are begging the question.

But if you ask me if such a moral system is better than one based on real choices, I would be forced to say that it is not.

In one what is choosing to try to become a kangaroo not a real choice. If it were not a choice, how could I choose it?

If further you suggest that there is no way to measure the two outside of personal opinion, I would have to disagree as well.

You can measure it, you just can’t prefer it. Other than your opinion that trying to do the impossible is silly, you have no way of saying my system is better or worse than any other–you can only say which is more likely to succeed. The fact that you favor success does not make your preference objective.

Are we gettin’ anywhere?

-VM

[pervert]

@Smartass

pervert, I think I understand what you are saying. But I also think you are in a circular trap.

No, I think you still misunderstand. Let’s examine the specifics.

Yes, you are. You are saying that if trying to be a kangaroo is impossibe, then it is less moral than trying to do something else.

No, I am not. I am not saying that trying to be a kangaroo is imoral. I am saying that a moral system based on this (not necessarily one which merely contains it) is itself less useful as a moral system than one which is not based on such activities.

Well, what if I said that trying to become a kangaroo is fun, and your moral system is boring and that I would rather have fun than be “successful”. You are claiming to be “outside” of a moral system when in fact, you are inside one that declares the possibility of success to be “preferable” to having fun.

Again, I am not claiming that trying to be a kangaroo is itself an imoral act. I am claiming that a moral system which puts such an act above the life of the moral actor, for instance is less useful than a system which reverses this relationship.

Another quibble: Though I may not be able to succeed in becoming a kangaroo, I can certainly succeed at trying to.

Of course. And as I said before, knock yourself out.

As an expansion–not involving hats–I could suggest a system that preferred helping others and you could suggest a system that preferred helping yourself. Both are equally possible and your “objective” moral system offers no guidance in preferring one of them at all. In fact, for every example that I can think of where I actually have “possible” options, your objective system offers no guidance in choosing. For almost all of the meaningful moral choices I might have, your system is useless.

Forgive me, but I think this is still because you are focussing on very limited acts as either moral or not. I have been trying to avoid this specifically because the conceptual link between the life of the moral actor and “helping others” vs. “helping oneself” is much more complex. I’m not looking (in this thread) for a way to tell if individual actions are imoral. That’s the definition of a moral system. I am looking for a way to evaluate moral systems themselves. Preferably reasonbly. I am arguing that relativism is no help, and indeed denies the applicability of reason in this endevour.

I don’t think anyone has claimed that no differentiation is possible.

I disagree. I think this is exactly what relativism claims. That no differentiation is possible without an arbitrary frame of reference. To put it another way, relativism claims that no differentiation of frames of reference is possible without a frame of reference which is itself not differentiable ad infinitum.

The problem is in trying to find a “preference” while remaining outside of them altogether. You are claiming to be outside of them when you are actually inside one that “prefers” something–achievability, possibility of success.

Again, no. I am not “prefering” anything. I am stating that without limiting our choice of moral systems to those which are useable (possible / achievable if you want) we are no longer talking about moral systems as “a complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs by which an individual determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong”. If we accept that impossible actions can be the foundations of moral systems, the highest of highs within them, then we have to accept that we are no longer talking about human beings living on earth. An interesting intellectual exercise, perhaps, but not really useful in deciding on which moral system I should adopt.

When you say that a moral system that has a chance to succeed is better than one that doesn’t because it is more likely to succeed, you are begging the question.

No, I am not. Especially not if the question is how do I rank various moral systems without adopting any of them.

In one what is choosing to try to become a kangaroo not a real choice. If it were not a choice, how could I choose it?

Exactly my point. If becoming a kangaroo is not a real choice how can a moral system based (and I mean based as in one of the tope 10 values) on such such a choice be a real moral system? Without judging it in any moral way, I suggest that it cannot. And thus that it can be privileged less than one which is not based on such an unrealistic expectation.

You can measure it, you just can’t prefer it. Other than your opinion that trying to do the impossible is silly, you have no way of saying my system is better or worse than any other–you can only say which is more likely to succeed. The fact that you favor success does not make your preference objective.

Yes it does. Because again, it is not that I prefer success, it is that the possibility of success is implicit in the definitions of “moral systems” and “moral actors”. If those terms are to have any meaning, then they must mean that moral systems perform some function for moral actors. This function allows us to propose that some moral systems are not “privileged” above others.

Are we gettin’ anywhere?

I’m not sure. You seem to keep asking the same question. I think I am getting a clearer picture of what I am talking about each time, so I have no interest in stopping.

[Lilairen]

@pervert

No, I agree. But it seems to me that destroying such a means is its purpose (if it has one). Forgive the negative conotation of that.

You are assigning relativism that moral weight; that is your choice of means of evaluation, not mine.

The purpose of relativism, if any, is to recognise that there exists no discernable The Standard.

You may consider this recognition an intent towards “destruction of a means of discernment between systems”; I cannot comprehend why you believe this. (It strikes me as about as sensical as claiming that someone who notes that there is no universal agreement on what gods exist and how to worship them is trying to destroy religion.)

[pervert]

@erislover

If this hypothetical, unavoidable, objective, and unique framework yielded unambiguous results, you may be on to something. We would have to now pin down what we mean by “absolute morality” to be more clear, but WRT moral relativism in particular, an unavoidable framwork for value judgments would indeed be a good start. But note, of course, that we simply leave the context of morality completely here and focus on this framework, its value judgments, and whether it sufficiently responds to the completely analagous relativistic critique in its own context.

Yes. That’s why I suggested that such a system might not violate relativism qua relativism but might violate moral relativism.

Please forgive my ignorance. I am not at all sure I follow your proposal. I think it is beyond me. I am going to ask several questions in an attempt to understand. I am also going to turn off the little filter in my head which stops me from asking stupid questions. I don’t seem to be able to tell. So if any of my queries seem dumb please accept my appologies.

Allow me to offer my own suggestions here of a deductive moral system and absoluteness, if not for discussion proper, at least for the fairness of you not being the only one on the chopping block tossing out ideas. Here I will use the mathematical notation for domains such that square brackets mean “up to and including” and parentheses mean “up to but not including.” Any finite set is put between curly braces ‘{’ and ‘}’.

Ok. I get this bit. I’ll have to keep refering back to it so forgive me if I get the syntax wrong on occasion.

By “deduction” I mean simply an unambiguous procedure for manipulating strings, semantic elements, etc., in order to assign value. I am not requiring that a deductive system include first order predicate logic, for example.

Your talking about a function of some kind which allows us to manipulate concepts (or actions in the case of a moral system) without ambiguity between us. Right?

By “morality” we mean some system of judgment (a “moral system” or “system of morality”) which any “moral agent” can use to determine what moral weight to give various choices; that is, roughly, moral systems are decision routines for moral agents.

I think I understand this part. It seems to fit rather closely to the definiton I gave above.

The value assigment of a moral system takes on a spectrum of values [most immoral, less immoral, …, amoral, moral, more moral, …, most moral]. Of course, some systems may reduce this range to distinct values {immoral, amoral, moral}, though this is a matter of implimentation and not definition. By convention, “moral” is an assignment that suggests a decision so assigned should be made, “immoral” is an assignment that suggests a decision so assigned should not be made, and “amoral” yields no information (some other value assignment is necessary to make a decision). We will not impose a criterion of completeness, so it is not necessary for a moral system to be able to assign values to any arbitrary set of choices; however, we will require that when it does assign values, its assignment is reasonably unambiguous, and that there is no deductive equivalency relationship between choices which are unable to be assigned a value (i.e., when a moral system declares itself incapable of choosing in multiple cases, we are not able to derive the equivalency of those cases; paraphrased that “undetermined” is not a value). Finally, a we will restrict our attention to deductive systems such that every value assignment is a well-defined procedure. (Compare unambiguous procedures to unambiguous meaning previously required.)

Much of this goes over my head. I think I understand it though. This is the part of my definition which read “determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong” greatly expanded upon.

Now onto “absolute”.

An “absolute” moral system shall be a deductive moral system which satisfies the following properties:

1. Every other moral system (meaning non-duplicates) is given the moral assignment somewhere between [most immoral,amoral] and hence never assigns other moral systems any value between (amoral, most immoral], or it suggests that choosing between moral systems is undecided. Should a moral system be able to assign value to other systems, it must declare a copy of itself most moral.

Is that a typo in the set “(amoral, most imoral]”? Did you mean “(amoral, most moral]”? Are you trying to say that an absolute moral system should never assign any of the values “moral” to another moral system? If so, I think this might be too strenuous. At least below the tope few values of the system, and certainly for our purposes here. A moral system which is identical in every way to this hypothetical absolute system except it changes the value of wearing hats, say from mostly mostly mostly mostly amoral to mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly amoral, should never get a value of any sort of “moral” in the hypthetical system? That seems too strict. As always, however I am willing to believe that I have simply misunderstood.

2. The privilege of this system, meaning its “absoluteness”, is determined by an external value system which is itself absolute and follows the exclusions of ambiguity as given above (procedural and semantic).

Right. So a proposed absolute moral system has to absolute and unambiguous without reference to itself. Right?

3. It must be knowable. (Without this, there is no way to violate relativism’s second point from the perspective of moral agents; i.e., we are not looking for existence theorems here.)

I agree with this as well.

By “absolute value system” in general we mean the analog of (1) where “moral/immoral/amoral” are replaced by the system’s respective value assignments, and (2) and (3) remain the same.

Right I agree with you on this as well. I think talking in terms of values and morals are somewhat interchangeable. Values have the added benifit of being more easily seen as relative to each other. But then, you are arguing that morals are exactly the same in that respect, no?

Now, I feel that we can suggest absolute morality if we violate (3), though its epistemic status is quite undecided and the relativist, if making an epistemic point, is not unjustified. (2) can suggest the makings of infinite regress of foundational perspectives, familiar to any skeptic. (1) covers the idea that an absolute system is absolutely ‘right’, if it is anything.

For the purposes of this thread, I have only been hinting at such a system. I have been concentrating on the first (or at least one of the top) values of such an absolute system. I’ve been trying very hard not to propose such a system for the simple reason that I cannot expect to complete it in this sort of forum if at all.

What I am saying is that if we formulate a system whereby moral systems can be ranked as more or less suitable for particular, or sets of, moral agents, then I think we have already violated relativism as it relates to moral systems. So long as the system in question is itself absolute, although it does not have to be a moral system.

I think this is a good position, but it is remarkably vague. I would be interested in hearing your thoughts on what I propose above.

If I have understood it, I think it is workable.

I do not believe this is the case. Its epistemic status is critical to moral discussions. If it is not knowable as the absolute morality, the discussion consists of angels-on-pins.

Forgive me. I tend to take this sort of thing for granted. Very dangerous in these waters.

How about this as a reformulation of that Given?

Given - A framework from within which moral systems can be “privileged” violates the second tenet of relativism with regard to morality if it:
is not itself a moral system;
is unavoidable (objective and unique)
is knowable by the moral actor(s) in question

I have to travel to NY tonight, so I am unavailable to continue this discussion and give the rest of your post (truly the more interesting part) the attention it deserves. I will pick up on it when I return over Thanksgiving break.

Have a good trip and I will watch for the threads return after Friday afternoon. If I miss it please feel free to bump it up. I have enjoyed this discussion very much. Both you (as always) and Smartass (newly) have provided a valuable stone with which to sharpen my ideas. Thank you very much.

[pervert]

@Lilairen

The purpose of relativism, if any, is to recognise that there exists no discernable The Standard.

Yes, this is a restatement of what I said.

You may consider this recognition an intent towards “destruction of a means of discernment between systems”; I cannot comprehend why you believe this. (It strikes me as about as sensical as claiming that someone who notes that there is no universal agreement on what gods exist and how to worship them is trying to destroy religion.)

Allow me to try and ellaborate. If we had a simple word, say “chair” and I claimed that via my new formulation no such thing existed. You might characterize the purpose of my new formulation as ‘destroying the definition of “chair”’. I would simply point out that no, I was merely recognizing the no chair exists.

Relativism does not merely recognize that no one agrees on absolute morality. It seeks to suggest that no such thing exists. In your scenario I postulate that no one has agreed on which religion is correct because no religion exists. Can it not be fairly stated that I am trying to destroy religion? Even if I have evidence that religions are bad in some way, is it really only true that I am “recognizing no religion exists”?

For the sake of clarity, let me reiterate what sort of standard I am proposing. I am proposing that the nature if moral systems and the nature of moral actors provides a framework outside of any moral system which allows us to rank various moral systems. I’m not claiming any special knowledge of a One True Morality. I’m not even claiming that (in here) that such a beast could be formed. I am simply claiming that moral relativism’s claim that moral systems cannot be ranked because there is no standard by which to do so is untrue.

[pervert]

@pervert

Given - A framework from within which moral systems can be “privileged” violates the second tenet of relativism with regard to morality if it:
is not itself a moral system;
is unavoidable (objective and unique)
is knowable by the moral actor(s) in question

I think this goes without saying, but I have been bitten by that assumption a couple times.

I would like to add “but not necessarily known” to that last part.

[Smartass]

@pervert

I am saying that a moral system based on this (not necessarily one which merely contains it) is itself less useful as a moral system than one which is not based on such activities. (emphasis added)

There’s another adjective. I think we are running up against some sort of language constraint or some sort of confusion on what it means to “evaluate” something. The thing is, we don’t really have any way of evaluating things without some sort of built-in comparison. That is, how high is high?

We were talking about length. If you ask me if a board is long, I have to know what we are comparing it to. It’s longer than a centimeter and shorter than a foot. Is a centimeter long? Is a foot long? What about a light year?

When talking about moral systems, you tend to talk about “useful”. Well, where is the dividing line between “useful” and “not useful”? I say x is more useful than y, but is either really useful?

In other words, with any sort of measurement or evaluation, there is a positive and negative direction (more beautiful, less beautiful) and there are comparisons with other things (as long as a centimeter, as short as a foot). For any “standard” of evaluation you can name, we can evaluate a moral system in one direction of it or another (more useful, less useful; more hare-brained, less hair-brained), but we almost axiomatically have to be within a moral framework to prefer one direction along the scale to another. We have to decide that “more useful” is preferable to “less useful” (or vice versa), otherwise we are just making comparisons.

I believe that the relativist argument is that you can make comparisons among moral systems objectively (this is more useful than that), but that you can’t decide between them without being inside of one (“more useful” is better than “less useful”).

Whether we are talking about length, beauty, usefulness, practicality, achievability, selfishness, or verbosity, all we can do objectively is place them on the scale with relation to each other. In order to say that it is better to be at one end of the scale than another, we have to be operating in a moral framework.

Yet another phrasing: All moral frameworks can have preferences between other moral frameworks, but you can’t pick a winner objectively because “picking a winner” is, in and of itself, a moral act (requires a framework). And while any framework can declare itself absolute (I am God and I say it is so), we can’t objectively believe it unless we are in the framework ourselves (I don’t believe you are God…).

The point is, either what you are striving for is impossible because it is paradoxical, or the language we are using is making me not able to follow. And, so far, I am not sure I AM following, because your descriptions have themselves been somewhat paradoxical.

Um, are you with me?

-VM

[pervert]

@Smartass

There’s another adjective. I think we are running up against some sort of language constraint or some sort of confusion on what it means to “evaluate” something. The thing is, we don’t really have any way of evaluating things without some sort of built-in comparison. That is, how high is high?

It depends on the context. Of course. But just because it depends on the context, does not mean that it depends on a moral context. And just because it depends on the context does not mean that this context is arbitrary or mere opinion.

When talking about moral systems, you tend to talk about “useful”. Well, where is the dividing line between “useful” and “not useful”? I say x is more useful than y, but is either really useful?

Look at the definition of moral and the definition of who uses or needs morals. I’m not complaining that no “framework” is necessary to rank moral systems. I am complaining that such a framework does not have to be a moral one and it does not have to be arbitrary.

[…]but we almost axiomatically have to be within a moral framework to prefer one direction along the scale to another. We have to decide that “more useful” is preferable to “less useful” (or vice versa), otherwise we are just making comparisons.

This is where you fail. This is simply not true. Moral systems can be evaluated from entirely different sorts of frameworks. Not all frameworks are moral after all.

I believe that the relativist argument is that you can make comparisons among moral systems objectively (this is more useful than that), but that you can’t decide between them without being inside of one (“more useful” is better than “less useful”).

Right. This is where the moral relativists fail IMHO.

Whether we are talking about length, beauty, usefulness, practicality, achievability, selfishness, or verbosity, all we can do objectively is place them on the scale with relation to each other. In order to say that it is better to be at one end of the scale than another, we have to be operating in a moral framework.

No, we don’t. We have to be in a moral framework in order to make a moral judgment perhaps (I’m not yet convinced this is exclusively true), but we do not have to be in a moral framework to say that a thing is “better” than another thing all we have to do is name the standard. A thing can be “better” morally, it can be better pragmatically, it can be better existentially, it could even be better epistemologically in the sense that knowledge which can be known is better than knowledge which cannot (which is somewat axiomatic I know).

Yet another phrasing: All moral frameworks can have preferences between other moral frameworks, but you can’t pick a winner objectively because “picking a winner” is, in and of itself, a moral act (requires a framework).

Yes, this is another phrasing. It is just as incorrect as all of the other phrasings you have used. If two dogs run a race is the winner morally superior to the loser? He is the winner objectively observable, but is he morally superior? Picking a winner is not in and of itself an exclusively moral act. This is the falacy of moral relativism.

And while any framework can declare itself absolute (I am God and I say it is so), we can’t objectively believe it unless we are in the framework ourselves (I don’t believe you are God…).

This is also untrue (the second part). Frameworks can be judged from within other frameworks. Nowhere in relativism does it say one cannot judge a framework from outside of that framework. IT merely says that such judgements themselves have to made within frameworks. Not necessarily the same framework which is being judged.

The point is, either what you are striving for is impossible because it is paradoxical, or the language we are using is making me not able to follow. And, so far, I am not sure I AM following, because your descriptions have themselves been somewhat paradoxical.

Um, are you with me?

No. I do not understand where you have failed to follow.

Unless you mean this business about moral systems only being able to be judged from within themselves. I don’t think this is even a part of relativistic morality.

Can you point out an argument of mine which does not make sense to you?

[Lilairen]

@pervert

Yes, this is a restatement of what I said.

That’s a neat trick; I was flatly contradicting you.

You have chosen an additional set of axioms and are considering those to be a part of a statement that does not include them; this is leading you to some perplexing conclusions.

Allow me to try and ellaborate. If we had a simple word, say “chair” and I claimed that via my new formulation no such thing existed. You might characterize the purpose of my new formulation as ‘destroying the definition of “chair”’. I would simply point out that no, I was merely recognizing the no chair exists.

You are either speaking a language other than English, or attempting to claim that no objects are constructed for the purpose of sitting upon. One of these is trivially disprovable; the other is evidence for subjectivity.

Relativism does not merely recognize that no one agrees on absolute morality. It seeks to suggest that no such thing exists. In your scenario I postulate that no one has agreed on which religion is correct because no religion exists. Can it not be fairly stated that I am trying to destroy religion? Even if I have evidence that religions are bad in some way, is it really only true that I am “recognizing no religion exists”?

Well, if there’s no evidence that a thing exists, it’s a reasonable position to take that it does not exist, right?

You’re taking an absolutist position on religion, too, by the way; why posit the existence of a “correct religion” in the first place? It strikes me as being on its face ludicrous; the existence of the huge variety of evolving religions and the huge variety of religious experiences stands against it. (Not to mention the lack of “correct religion” as a universal religious concept.)

And there’s an example of your inserting other axioms, by the way; “there is no universal religion” is only equivalent to “no religion exists” with the addition of other axioms. “There is no universal morality” only equates to “no morality exists” if one presumes that the only genuine morality is a universal one. Personally, I’m inclined to bet that my morality exists, and I’m pretty sure yours does too; I don’t buy into that axiom.

For the sake of clarity, let me reiterate what sort of standard I am proposing. I am proposing that the nature if moral systems and the nature of moral actors provides a framework outside of any moral system which allows us to rank various moral systems. I’m not claiming any special knowledge of a One True Morality. I’m not even claiming that (in here) that such a beast could be formed. I am simply claiming that moral relativism’s claim that moral systems cannot be ranked because there is no standard by which to do so is untrue.

We’re not going to get anywhere until you stop holding that that’s a claim of relativism, by the way; it’s not true.

Moral systems can be ranked in any number of ways. “Popularity” is a common one (ad populum). “So-and-so (often “my preacher”) said so” is another (ad verecundiam). “If you do it that way, these things will happen” is a third (appeal to emotion/consequences/fear). “Utility” seems to be the one you favor, though you don’t seem to recognise that people’s goals differ. “What makes the most people most happy” is popular, as are the related “What makes me most happy” and “What makes my leader most happy”. Then you can get into trivial ones, like “What makes things the most pink” or “What produces the most puppies”. And the intrinsically subjective ones like, “This one suits my personal prejudices, background, and get feelings.”

You can choose which one of these is best – but first you have to define “good”. There’s no way of bowing out of the responsibility of defining “good” by pointing to some Goodness Rubric that exists in Platonic Ideals Space.

Personally, while I’m willing, as I said in my original post, to be convinced that such a The Standard exists, I have seen no evidence for it, much against it, and cannot see a way that it can logically exist given the obvious pattern of recursion of choice. Further, such a The Standard would have to counter my gut feeling that its existence would be, in and of itself, something that promotes immorality (or is itself immoral), by providing a means by which actions could be justified without being open to challenge by reason and rational questioning.

[Smartass]

@pervert

It depends on the context. Of course. But just because it depends on the context, does not mean that it depends on a moral context. And just because it depends on the context does not mean that this context is arbitrary or mere opinion.

Clearly we are disagreeing on what the moral framework is FOR. The morality is not the method of making comparisons (this is longer than that, this is more useful than that); the morality is the method of deciding which to prefer. We can come up with a plethora of ways of evaluating that may be more or less objective (more radiant, more pleasing to George W. Bush) without need of a moral framework. Where we get stuck is when pick an end of the evaluation “scale” to prefer.

I can even, to some extent, “measure” one moral system with respect to another. For instance, I can have a moral framework based on what is pleasing to George W. Bush and compare it to one based on what is most pleasing to the most number of people and I can place them on a “scale” with respect to a third system that I call “fairness”. Based on this, I can say that “most pleasing to most people” is more “fair” than “most pleasing to George W. Bush”. It is the presence of this third one that causes trouble. Unless this third one is already preferred, I still cannot objectively choose between the other two–I can only describe the various ways that they compare to one another. In your search for a non-moral framework for evaluation, you are basically trying to prefer without preferring.

I’m not complaining that no “framework” is necessary to rank moral systems. I am complaining that such a framework does not have to be a moral one and it does not have to be arbitrary.

Based on the word “morality” as it is being used here, this is axiomatic: Any method for preferring is a morality. You are complaing that a “method for preferring must be a morality” which, based on the axiom, is equivalent to complaing that “a method for preferring must be a method for preferring”. When we try to determine an absolute morality objectively, we are trying to “prefer a method for preferring without using a method of preferring”.

The possibilities for circularity are practically endless. What is the best method for preferring? Um, the one that you prefer? I would say that the only way to have an “absolute method for preferring” would be to have an “absolute preferrer” and to know what that absolute preferrer prefers. If there is a God, we would have to be able to discern His preferences. If reality “determines” a preference, we would have to be able to discern its preferences. Unfortunately, reality, as we understand it, does not prefer any more than my board did. It just is.

Moral systems can be evaluated from entirely different sorts of frameworks. Not all frameworks are moral after all.

They can be evaluated, but they cannot be preferred without using a “method to prefer”, i.e. a morality.

Right. This is where the moral relativists fail IMHO.

The moral relativists are basically concluding that either there is no absolute method of preferring because there is no “authoritative preferrer” or if there is an authoritative preferrer, we cannot discern His preferences. They are not saying that preferring is impossible, they are saying one act of preferring cannot be shown to be preferable to another without, um, preferring.

We have to be in a moral framework in order to make a moral judgment perhaps (I’m not yet convinced this is exclusively true), but we do not have to be in a moral framework to say that a thing is “better” than another thing all we have to do is name the standard.

To say that a thing is better than another thing is to prefer and is therefore to use a moral framework. This is not a conclusion; it is axiomatic based on the meaning of “moral framework”. You can name “a standard” without preferring, but you cannot name “THE standard” without preferring. If you do not prefer it, it is not “THE standard”.

If two dogs run a race is the winner morally superior to the loser? He is the winner objectively observable, but is he morally superior? Picking a winner is not in and of itself an exclusively moral act. This is the falacy of moral relativism.

The winner is only morally superior if your framework prefers winners. This is not a fallacy of relativism, it is a fallacy wrt the meaning of “moral”. Picking a winner is not a moral act; preferring a winner is a moral act. If you prefer losers, this has no impact on the objective process of “picking a winner”. The determination of the winner is not where the moralizing is happening.

This is also untrue (the second part). Frameworks can be judged from within other frameworks. Nowhere in relativism does it say one cannot judge a framework from outside of that framework. IT merely says that such judgements themselves have to made within frameworks.

I must have phrased that badly. I cannot believe God when he says he is God unless I already find his statement “preferable” to someone else’s claim that He is not God. The only way I can do this objectively is if God proves to me that He is God. Until that time, my preference for believing He is God is “arbitrary”. You seem to be trying to deduce God with no objective evidence.

Unless you mean this business about moral systems only being able to be judged from within themselves. I don’t think this is even a part of relativistic morality.

No, I don’t mean that. The God situation is kind of unique. Otherwise I can prefer any morality using any morality (the same one or different ones). The proven existence of God creates an absolute preferrer. The unproven existence of God is “just another framework”.

Does this clear it up any? For the moment, I am in agreement with the poster who said that you are using a different definition of “morality” than relativists use.

To me it tends to be a lot of wandering in circles until you start talking about different “preferrers”. Each person tends to have a personal “absolute” standard, but different people have different ones, and relativism makes deciding who is right (preferring one) damn nigh impossible–which is why I say it pulls the rug out from under those religious folks, short of one of them being able to objectively prove God exists and what God prefers.

Nonetheless, your search for The Standard is interesting; I just want to make sure I am following in case you find it.

-VM