relativism vs. objective morality

[pervert]

@Lilairen

That’s a neat trick; I was flatly contradicting you.

No, you were stating the same thing I did from another perspective. You were certainly contradicting my characterization of the facts. But not what I said in its full context. Let me put it to you this way.

I made a statement that moral relativism seeks to destroy any standard by which moral systems can be judged.

You countered that no, relativism simply acknowledges that no such system exists.

If you assume that such a system exists then my characterization is correct. If you assume that no such system exists then yours is correct. But the primary fact that relativism stands opposed to any such system we agree on. We both said the same thing but characterized it differently based on our assumptions.

You have chosen an additional set of axioms and are considering those to be a part of a statement that does not include them; this is leading you to some perplexing conclusions.

Can you point out where I have done this. Honestly I would be very grateful.

Well, if there’s no evidence that a thing exists, it’s a reasonable position to take that it does not exist, right?

Well, yes, but there is very good evidence that religions exist. I’m not talking about the myths used to propogate religions, but the religions themselves surely exist.

You’re taking an absolutist position on religion, too, by the way; why posit the existence of a “correct religion” in the first place?

Whoa nelly! I have never once in my life (Ok maybe once) proposed that any true religion exists. I am certain that I have not done so in here. No who is taking axioms not in existance and making arguments (or accusations) based on them?

And there’s an example of your inserting other axioms, by the way; “there is no universal religion” is only equivalent to “no religion exists” with the addition of other axioms.

True enough. What you wrote was “It strikes me as about as sensical as claiming that someone who notes that there is no universal agreement on what gods exist and how to worship them is trying to destroy religion”. What I was trying to explain is that moral relativism seems more like someone who suggests not merely that people do not agree on which gods exist if any, it actually proposes that there is no way to rank religions at all. The only way to condemn a morality (according to relativism) is to accept another one. But before accepting one there is no way to decide which one to accept.

Here is a lovely Wikipedia article on moral relativism. Please note this paragraph:

“Some philosophers (e.g., Michael E. Berumen and R. M. Hare) argue that moral propositions are subject to logical rules, therefore, notwithstanding the absence of any factual content, they remain subject to the universal standards of formal reasoning. Thus, for example, one can meaningfully state that one cannot hold contradictory ethical judgments to be valid. This at least allows for moral discourse with preferred standards, which relativism otherwise denies.”

“There is no universal morality” only equates to “no morality exists” if one presumes that the only genuine morality is a universal one.

I agree with this. I don’t think I have ever said that relativism claims that no morality exists. I have only said that it claims no framework exists which can be used to rank moralities which is itself (the super moral framework) not subject to a relativist critique.

We’re not going to get anywhere until you stop holding that that’s a claim of relativism, by the way; it’s not true.

Take this up with relativists. Or provide a definition of moral relativism which does not include it. You are correct that I forgot to add something. I meant to say “*I am simply claiming that moral relativism’s claim that moral systems cannot be ranked in an absolute way because there is no absolute standard by which to do so is untrue. *”

“Utility” seems to be the one you favor, though you don’t seem to recognise that people’s goals differ.

I’m sorry, but this is a profound misunderstanding of what I have been saying. I have never said that people’s goals don’t differ. All I have said is that people’s goals have to be people’s goals. And, I have only said this in the most broad way I know how. What I mean is that moral systems based (not merely containing mind you, but based) on ideals which are not appropriate to people are demonstrably inferior to systems not so based.

I make this claim not by the random adoption of some standard, but simply by recognizing certain implied truths in the words we are using to discuss the issue. You seem to think this is adding axioms not in evidence. But if the definitions of the words we use are not part of the statements we make then we are not speaking.

You can choose which one of these is best – but first you have to define “good”. There’s no way of bowing out of the responsibility of defining “good” by pointing to some Goodness Rubric that exists in Platonic Ideals Space.

But there may be some framework which you have not considered, which is itself inherent in the definition of “moral system” and “moral actor”. If so, and if such a framework obeys certain limitations (laid out by erislover above) then perhaps such a framework is indeed a means to judge moral systems without adopting a moral system.

Personally, while I’m willing, as I said in my original post, to be convinced that such a The Standard exists, I have seen no evidence for it, much against it, and cannot see a way that it can logically exist given the obvious pattern of recursion of choice.

Forgive me, but that is because you are looking for it in the wrong places. Absolute objective morality cannot be found by examining various moralities to determine which one fits. Ask yourself first, “What is morality?” “Who needs it?” If the answers to those questions do nothing else, they will provide a framework to rank moral systems which is not itself moral.

Further, such a The Standard would have to counter my gut feeling that its existence would be, in and of itself, something that promotes immorality (or is itself immoral), by providing a means by which actions could be justified without being open to challenge by reason and rational questioning.

This is exactly the feeling I get when considering moral relativism. If moral systems cannot be judged from outside morality, then how are we to decide? Relativism has no answer. In fact, moral relativism says there is not answer, the we are effectively screwed.

[pervert]

@Smartass

In your search for a non-moral framework for evaluation, you are basically trying to prefer without preferring.

You keep saying this. It is not true. I am proposing that a framework for evaluation (of moral systems) may be inherent in the definition of “morality” and “moral agent”.

Based on the word “morality” as it is being used here, this is axiomatic: Any method for preferring is a morality. You are complaing that a “method for preferring must be a morality” which, based on the axiom, is equivalent to complaing that “a method for preferring must be a method for preferring”. When we try to determine an absolute morality objectively, we are trying to “prefer a method for preferring without using a method of preferring”.

I doubt seriously if “method for prefering” is exactly synonymous with “morality”. But it seems a good aproximation. If you look very closely at the text you quoted and responded to with this, you will not that I am not asking for a way to prefer or even choose one morality over another. I am merely suggesting that the definitions of the words (what I have called reality) might suggest a framework from which to rank moralities. Are you saying that there are no ways to rank moralities except moralitites? You should talk to Lilairen. She does not believe relativism claims this.

If reality “determines” a preference, we would have to be able to discern its preferences. Unfortunately, reality, as we understand it, does not prefer any more than my board did. It just is.

This is exactly my point (partly anyway). If an absolute system for ranking moralities exists, it just is. It is not itself a moral system and not a “preferer”.

They can be evaluated, but they cannot be preferred without using a “method to prefer”, i.e. a morality.

But what if they are evaluated right out of contention as moral systems? Does this not imply a preference?

The moral relativists are basically concluding that either there is no absolute method of preferring because there is no “authoritative preferrer” or if there is an authoritative preferrer, we cannot discern His preferences. They are not saying that preferring is impossible, they are saying one act of preferring cannot be shown to be preferable to another without, um, preferring.

Right. But they are effectively saying that no preference can be made in regard to prefering systems. That is, they are saying that reason is not applicable to prefering a preference system. Again, this is the failing of relativism IMHO.

To say that a thing is better than another thing is to prefer and is therefore to use a moral framework.

No, I disagree. If I show you two systems. One of which could be used as a moral system and one which cannot. Am I prefering either by noticing this difference? I think not.

This is not a conclusion; it is axiomatic based on the meaning of “moral framework”.

You are going to have to provide a definition if you keep saying this. Can you define “moral system”?

The winner is only morally superior if your framework prefers winners.

Careful. I’m sure you meant to say “moral framework” there. The winner is still the winner even if my moral framework decries him as imoral. My only point was that simplifications like *“picking a winner” is, in and of itself, a moral act * are not very useful here. Picking a winner is not in and of itself a moral act. As you yourself stated

“Picking a winner is not a moral act; preferring a winner is a moral act. If you prefer losers, this has no impact on the objective process of “picking a winner”. The determination of the winner is not where the moralizing is happening.”

Imagine, for a moment (I really hat analogies, but you seem to thrive on them) that we have a race consisting of all the possible moral systems. We or reality, if you prefer (;)), is not “prefering” the winner over the loser. We are simply noting which one came in first second, etc. More importantly for this thread, I am not even doing that. I am simply noting that the first several systems accross the finish line crossed before the last several. I’m not claiming that I can rank each and every moral system. I am simply claiming that they can be ranked. I am not claiming that the top ranked system is preferable either. More completely, I am claiming that such a race is inherent in the meaning of “moral system” and “moral actor”. That is “What is morality” and “Who needs it”.

I must have phrased that badly. I cannot believe God when he says he is God unless I already find his statement “preferable” to someone else’s claim that He is not God. The only way I can do this objectively is if God proves to me that He is God. Until that time, my preference for believing He is God is “arbitrary”.

Or if you find such proof yourself, or if such proof is inherent in some way in the question. Yes, this is phrased better.

You seem to be trying to deduce God with no objective evidence.

I would never characterize my arguments this way. I have never said that the system I propose would not be subject to providing objective evidence.

No, I don’t mean that. The God situation is kind of unique. Otherwise I can prefer any morality using any morality (the same one or different ones). The proven existence of God creates an absolute preferrer. The unproven existence of God is “just another framework”.

Does this clear it up any?

Yes. I thought I was misunderstanding you.

For the moment, I am in agreement with the poster who said that you are using a different definition of “morality” than relativists use.

That is very possible. Care to provide a more relativist definition of morality? The one I started with I got from an online encyclopedia.

To me it tends to be a lot of wandering in circles until you start talking about different “preferrers”. Each person tends to have a personal “absolute” standard, but different people have different ones, and relativism makes deciding who is right (preferring one) damn nigh impossible–which is why I say it pulls the rug out from under those religious folks, short of one of them being able to objectively prove God exists and what God prefers.

Yes, this is a pretty good summary. Note, that I am proposing that reality itself, the inherent characteristics of “morality” and “moral actors” dictates a ranking (I still do not think it is a preference) system.

Nonetheless, your search for The Standard is interesting; I just want to make sure I am following in case you find it.

Let me be absolutely clear. I am not searching (in this thread) for any absolute morality. I am searching for an absolute method of ranking moral systems, and more limitedly, I am searching for a good critique of the relativist ideas amounting to claims that no such system exists. I am not proposing nor hinting at any standard of behavior which everyone must adopt. I’ve been willing to give a few opinions of my own on the subject, but only as illustrations of the sort of moral framework I mean.

The Wikipedia page I linked to in the last post contains a good jibe.

“One might also say, as Berumen has, if relativism were true, then in some sense it hoists itself by its own petard, for there is no reason to prefer it over any other theory.”

Forgive me for the needed humorous interlude.

[Smartass]

@pervert

I doubt seriously if “method for prefering” is exactly synonymous with “morality”. But it seems a good aproximation. If you look very closely at the text you quoted and responded to with this, you will not that I am not asking for a way to prefer or even choose one morality over another.

From what I can tell, you are assuming one.

I am merely suggesting that the definitions of the words (what I have called reality) might suggest a framework from which to rank moralities. Are you saying that there are no ways to rank moralities except moralitites?

The ability to rank is not the issue. I don’t think you will invalidate the relativist argument merely by achieving a ranking. It is when you place significance on which end of the ranking a morality is closest to that you get in trouble.

This is exactly my point (partly anyway). If an absolute system for ranking moralities exists, it just is. It is not itself a moral system and not a “preferer”.

To me, this is trivial. You can already rank them by, say, verbosity, age (when was it formulated?), focus on the individual, focus on society, etc. But for the ranking to matter, somewhere you have to “prefer”: You have to say older is better, focus on the individual is better, “appropriateness” for the real world is better, etc. By ranking them, you have done no more than if you arranged boards in order by length. It’s when you starting assuming that longer boards are better than shorter ones that you get in trouble.

But what if they are evaluated right out of contention as moral systems? Does this not imply a preference?

It assumes that you (or some other preferrer) prefer moral systems that are “in contention”, does it not?

That is, they are saying that reason is not applicable to prefering a preference system.

Not exactly. They are saying that, if you keep “unwinding” the logic chain, you will eventually find an arbitrary preference, such as a preference for moral systems that are “in contention”. Claiming that “reality” prefers them by making them possible doesn’t help. Why do I care what reality prefers?

No, I disagree. If I show you two systems. One of which could be used as a moral system and one which cannot. Am I prefering either by noticing this difference? I think not.

I agree. Noting the difference is not the same as preferring.

You are going to have to provide a definition if you keep saying this. Can you define “moral system”?

I don’t know–I never tried. Is the “prefer” simplification not working?

Imagine, for a moment (I really hat analogies, but you seem to thrive on them)

An apt description. I get dizzy when you guys start with sets of functions inside of various squiggly lines. I’m not convinced y’all are paying me enough to try to sort through it all.

…that we have a race consisting of all the possible moral systems…I am simply claiming that they can be ranked. I am not claiming that the top ranked system is preferable either.

How is this less (or more) trivial than ranking them by “the number of words it takes to describe them”?

More completely, I am claiming that such a race is inherent in the meaning of “moral system” and “moral actor”.

So far, I don’t think you have made a claim that challenges relatavism–it just restates some of the ideas.

That is “What is morality” and “Who needs it”.

I would say that anything that makes choices uses a morality. I’m not sure that “need” is a good word for the relationship, though. It is like saying “talking” needs “sound”. If there were no sound, “talking” would not be looking around for a replacement. You cannot define “talking” without sound.

I would never characterize my arguments this way. I have never said that the system I propose would not be subject to providing objective evidence.

It is not objective evidence that is the issue. It is objective preferring.

That is very possible. Care to provide a more relativist definition of morality?

I kind of like the “method of preferring” deal–is it limiting you unreasonably?

Yes, this is a pretty good summary. Note, that I am proposing that reality itself, the inherent characteristics of “morality” and “moral actors” dictates a ranking (I still do not think it is a preference) system.

Again, how is ranking without preference not trivial?

“One might also say, as Berumen has, if relativism were true, then in some sense it hoists itself by its own petard, for there is no reason to prefer it over any other theory.”

If only it were that easy. There are loads of reasons to prefer it–they just all require you to do an initial arbitrary act of preferring.

Forgive me for the needed humorous interlude.

Why would you apologize for that? Isn’t this SUPPOSED to be fun?

-VM

[Lilairen]

@pervert

No, you were stating the same thing I did from another perspective. You were certainly contradicting my characterization of the facts. But not what I said in its full context. Let me put it to you this way.

I made a statement that moral relativism seeks to destroy any standard by which moral systems can be judged.

You countered that no, relativism simply acknowledges that no such system exists.

If you assume that such a system exists then my characterization is correct. If you assume that no such system exists then yours is correct. But the primary fact that relativism stands opposed to any such system we agree on. We both said the same thing but characterized it differently based on our assumptions.

Explain how you can get from a belief that no such system exists to an attempt to destroy systematisations without adding other axioms. Please.

No “These are the axioms of my perspective so I get to add them in without being called on interjecting stuff that isn’t actually a part of what I’m claiming to be arguing with.” That’s called “straw man”.

Whoa nelly! I have never once in my life (Ok maybe once) proposed that any true religion exists. I am certain that I have not done so in here. No who is taking axioms not in existance and making arguments (or accusations) based on them?

You took my comment about a variety of religions existing and turned it into a claim that there is no religion; this only makes sense if you are arguing that the only true religion is univeral. If you didn’t mean to do this, then you were spouting complete non sequiturs and should be assigned a ten yard penalty for blithering.

The existence of multiple moral systems is exactly parallel to the existence of multiple religions; it is evidence for a lack of a One True Anything. To claim that diversity is nonexistence is to claim that there’s only one real one, and if it were present on the field, it would have quashed all opposition (or that any opposition is in direct opposition to the fundamental truth of The Standard).

My lack of belief in a One True Morality is exactly akin to my lack of belief in a One True Religion.

I agree with this. I don’t think I have ever said that relativism claims that no morality exists. I have only said that it claims no framework exists which can be used to rank moralities which is itself (the super moral framework) not subject to a relativist critique.

Correct. This means that all the discussions have to be subject to rational debate, because there’s no way of saying, “Well, God (or The Standard) said it, that settles it,” which is fundamentally arational. When irrationalities and subjectivities exist, such as “This is my personal preference”, they have to be admitted to rather than being concealed behind an appeal to the authority of The Standard.

You suggest that there is some means by which a The Standard might develop in the structure of the nature of moral systems. Is there any way you can demonstrate that this The Standard goes beyond, “You gotta make a choice somewhere.”?

[pervert]

I’m just going to pick a couple things.

@Smartass

From what I can tell, you are assuming one.

Then you need to point it out. I have said over and over again that I am not. Your only answer seems to be that my evaluation is a preference or implies one. It may, but I am not arguing that it necessarily does.

The ability to rank is not the issue. I don’t think you will invalidate the relativist argument merely by achieving a ranking. It is when you place significance on which end of the ranking a morality is closest to that you get in trouble.

I think this assumes that the ranking is arbitrary, of as you say, trivial. If the ranking in question is a necessary consequence of moral systems in general, I think it ceases to be trivial.

It assumes that you (or some other preferrer) prefer moral systems that are “in contention”, does it not?

No. Re read the passage. The only thing it assumes is that a moral system is a moral system.

Not exactly. They are saying that, if you keep “unwinding” the logic chain, you will eventually find an arbitrary preference, such as a preference for moral systems that are “in contention”. Claiming that “reality” prefers them by making them possible doesn’t help. Why do I care what reality prefers?

This, to me, is your essential failing. If you do not care what reality prefers (whatever that means), then you are free to choose any morality you want. This is why I said at the begining that I was limiting my discussion to humans living on earth. There are constraints inherent in that limitation. I am proposing that such constraints provide a basis for forming an objective “absolute” framework for evaluating moral systems. Now, you can say that choosing to evaluate moral systems from the framework of those suitable for humans living on earth is an arbitrary or trivial choice. If so, I do not know how to help you see that it is not. It seems self evident to me that a moral system which is not a moral system, or which is only applicable to insectivoids on Martan VII is not anything more than an intellectual exercise. YMMV

I don’t know–I never tried. Is the “prefer” simplification not working?

Yes, it is not working for the same reason the “winning” simplification did not work. I can prefer chocolate to vanilla. Does that mean that Chocolate is more moral than vanilla in some moral system I have adopted? I don’t think so. Preference is not equal to morality. It is a useful simplification, I agree. But it does not provide a more robust definitiion.

An apt description. I get dizzy when you guys start with sets of functions inside of various squiggly lines. I’m not convinced y’all are paying me enough to try to sort through it all.

Don’t feel bad about that. erislover has spent far more time thinking and writing on these subjects than I have. I still think his equations have gone over my head.

So far, I don’t think you have made a claim that challenges relatavism–it just restates some of the ideas.

Not relativism qua relativism perhaps. But moral relativism I certainly have.

I would say that anything that makes choices uses a morality.

This also is needlessly vague. Do bugs searching for food use morality?

I’m not sure that “need” is a good word for the relationship, though.

What relationship? I asked simply “who needs morality?” I think this askes the questions “Who uses morality and for what purpose”. The answer to this, and the definition of morality, to me suggests a framework from which moralities can be judged. In some sense this coule be considered a moral framework, but I think this is an oversimplification.

[pervert]

@Lilairen

Explain how you can get from a belief that no such system exists to an attempt to destroy systematisations without adding other axioms. Please.

I’m not at all sure where the difficulty is here.

As you said, “The purpose of relativism, if any, is to recognise that there exists no discernable The Standard.”

There are two possibilities here. Either such a standard exists or it does not. If it does not, then the claim that it does not is simply a recognition of this fact. If it does exist, however, then the claim that it does not is an attempt to remove it from reality.

I agreed that this was my characterization and not yours. I tried to acknowledge, however, that we agreed moral relativism does not give any weight to anything which is claimed is “The Standard”. I do not understand why you are arguing this point.

You took my comment about a variety of religions existing and turned it into a claim that there is no religion; this only makes sense if you are arguing that the only true religion is univeral.

No, I did not. I changed the analogy with religion you offered o make it fir more closely with the way I am using certain words. I am sorry if it took us on a tangent.

I’m going to take this slowly to avoid such a problem in the future.

The existence of multiple moral systems is exactly parallel to the existence of multiple religions;

Agreed. One can certainly draw parallel between the plethora of religions and moral systems which are practiced or have ever been practiced.

it is evidence for a lack of a One True Anything.

Whoops! This seems to be a slip up. The fact that multiple interpretations of a fact exists is not evidence that this fact itself does not exist. Just because many people believe different religions is not in and of itself evidence that no religion (perhaps even one which does not yet exist) is the one true religion. Just because many people beleive and practice different moral systems is not evidence in and of itself that no objective morality exists. They could all simply be incorrect.

To claim that diversity is nonexistence is to claim that there’s only one real one,

No, to this I can agree. Anyone who claims that there is no diversity in religion and yet that religion exists must mean that there is only one religion.

and if it were present on the field, it would have quashed all opposition

I have no idea what you mean by this. You seem to be saying that any proposed One True Religion or absolute morality cannot be such unless it suplanted all other religions or moralities. This seems to be a characteristic of an absolute morality that you made up. I’m not sure why you added it in here. Can you explain why this has to be true? Why is it necessary that a One True Religion simply fell out of favor? Why is it not possible that an absolute morality simply has not been discovered yet?

(or that any opposition is in direct opposition to the fundamental truth of The Standard).

Now, this qualification clarifies matters a bit. But it still goes too far. Why would any moral system which is not an absolute system have to be in “direct opposition” to an absolute system.

My lack of belief in a One True Morality is exactly akin to my lack of belief in a One True Religion.

Yes, but based on entirely different metaphysical beliefs. What does it mean to be exactly akin? Isn’t that like equivilantly similar?

Correct. This means that all the discussions have to be subject to rational debate,

Oops, again. No, it doesn’t. The moral relativist claim is that no framework can be constructed which is preferable to any other. Why then does this mean that reason is such a framework? I agree that reason is such a framework, but I disagree that relativism makes it so.

because there’s no way of saying, “Well, God (or The Standard) said it, that settles it,” which is fundamentally arational.

I’m not sure how this is “fundementally” irrational. Can you elaborate on this?

When irrationalities and subjectivities exist, such as “This is my personal preference”, they have to be admitted to rather than being concealed behind an appeal to the authority of The Standard.

Again, this is a good rule to follow in such discussions. I fail to see, however, how this can be derived from relativism. I understand the value of such a rule, but it does not appear to be an axiom of moral relativism. Again, I really think it is you who are making things up.

This last bit is the crux of the issue. Everything else is not nearly as important.

You suggest that there is some means by which a The Standard might develop in the structure of the nature of moral systems. Is there any way you can demonstrate that this The Standard goes beyond, “You gotta make a choice somewhere.”?

Yes. Because the fact that “You gotta make a choice somewhere” means that You have to make choices. I know that’s a bit circular, but bear with me for a second.

“You” have certain characteristics and “choices” have certain characteristics which puts a limit on the possible systems which qualify under this framework. I could propose a moral system based on the ideal that every action has to include a trip to the center of the earth. However, since “you” can’t go there at all, much less as part of every action you take, I think the fact that “You gotta make choices” means (partly anyway) that this morality is unsuitable.

More specifically, “you” has to be a living thinking (chioce making) entity. An entity which has to make choices (from the possible actions) in order to go on being a living thinking being. Morality defined as a set of rules for making choices has to include the life of the individual as one of its top values or it is not suitable for someone who “Gotta make choices”. At least it is much more suitable than a moral system which puts the life of the individual at the bottom of its set of values. Specifically if an individual were to primarily make choices against his own life, he would not long be a living thinking entity.

Please notice a couple things about the argument that last paragraph contains. First, I am not claiming that a morality which does not put the life of the near the top is imoral. I’m simply saying that it does not fit the criteria of a moral system for a person as well as one which does put the life of the individual near the top. The only reason I point out this distinction is that I am trying to make a judgement outside of moral systems about moral systems. Secondly, it is very abreviated. I’m simplifying arguments that have gone on for several pages now. Third, again, I am not talking about the biological life of the individual only.

[erislover]

@pervert

Your talking about a function of some kind which allows us to manipulate concepts (or actions in the case of a moral system) without ambiguity between us. Right?

Right.

Much of this goes over my head. I think I understand it though. This is the part of my definition which read “determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong” greatly expanded upon.

Yes.

Is that a typo in the set “(amoral, most imoral]”? Did you mean “(amoral, most moral]”?

Yes, and yes. Whoops! :o

Are you trying to say that an absolute moral system should never assign any of the values “moral” to another moral system? If so, I think this might be too strenuous.

I paraphrase it later by suggesting that an absolute system must be absolutely right, if it is anything. Your counter-example asks the values of particular moral tenets or “theorems”… a no-no.

At least below the tope few values of the system, and certainly for our purposes here. A moral system which is identical in every way to this hypothetical absolute system except it changes the value of wearing hats, say from mostly mostly mostly mostly amoral to mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly mostly amoral, should never get a value of any sort of “moral” in the hypthetical system?

I don’t believe that if it did so it would be an absolute system. But let me think some more on that. I might be willing to budge on the matter.

That seems too strict. As always, however I am willing to believe that I have simply misunderstood.

You have understood. I just mean that the system should be absolutely right, if it is anything, and if it is the standard of rightness, shouldn’t any other view be wrong? But again, “less ‘right’” might just be the order of the day here.

Right. So a proposed absolute moral system has to absolute and unambiguous without reference to itself. Right?

I believe that would be the qualities an absolute system would have, yes.

I think talking in terms of values and morals are somewhat interchangeable. Values have the added benifit of being more easily seen as relative to each other. But then, you are arguing that morals are exactly the same in that respect, no?

Indeed.

I’ve been trying very hard not to propose such a system for the simple reason that I cannot expect to complete it in this sort of forum if at all.

I would never ask such a thing if I did not feel I could do it myself in my own way, and I most assuredly cannot. The motivation here, for me, is to give either of us food for thought.

What I am saying is that if we formulate a system whereby moral systems can be ranked as more or less suitable for particular, or sets of, moral agents, then I think we have already violated relativism as it relates to moral systems.

I don’t believe this is the case if your value assignment is also relative; for why couldn’t I then adopt a value system which did not rank moral systems so?

Forgive me. I tend to take this sort of thing for granted. Very dangerous in these waters.

Heh. True.

Given - A framework from within which moral systems can be “privileged” violates the second tenet of relativism with regard to morality if it:
is not itself a moral system;
is unavoidable (objective and unique)
is knowable by the moral actor(s) in question

I would rephrase the second one to suggest “is unavoidable, objective, and unique,” rather than suggesting that “objective and unique” are the criteria for “unavoidableness”. We might relax objectivity as need be, given different philosophical views as to what, exactly, objectivity consists of, and uniqueness can also have some wiggle-room if the value system in question gives sufficient criteria of identity. For example, we have two moral systems which seem different; our value system, however, analyzes the consequences of holding moral views, and from this it can be shown that the consequences of each system are in fact identical. Here we can say that they are the “same system”. (Though there may be other ways.)

[pervert]

@erislover

You have understood. I just mean that the system should be absolutely right, if it is anything, and if it is the standard of rightness, shouldn’t any other view be wrong? But again, “less ‘right’” might just be the order of the day here.

That sounds better to me.

I would never ask such a thing if I did not feel I could do it myself in my own way, and I most assuredly cannot. The motivation here, for me, is to give either of us food for thought.

Agreed.

@pervert

What I am saying is that if we formulate a system whereby moral systems can be ranked as more or less suitable for particular, or sets of, moral agents, then I think we have already violated relativism as it relates to moral systems.

I don’t believe this is the case if your value assignment is also relative; for why couldn’t I then adopt a value system which did not rank moral systems so?

I left out the other atributes of such a system. Specifically that it would have to follow necessarily from the objective characteristics of the moral agents and the definition of “moral system” itself. I guess what I mean is that if the meaning of “moral agent” and “moral system” themselves demand a particular system for ranking moral systems, then moral relativism is proven false. Does that sound better?

What I was trying to add with my talk about particular moral agents, is that I agree with moral relativism if we remove all qualities from said agents. If moral agents are simply entities which use, or not, moral systems then moral relativism must be true. If, however, moral agents use moral systems for some purpose intrinsic to their existence, then that purpose can be used to rank moral systems in an absolute and objective way.

Heh. True.

I do understand some things.

I would rephrase the second one to suggest “is unavoidable, objective, and unique,” rather than suggesting that “objective and unique” are the criteria for “unavoidableness”.

Fair enough. I agree.

We might relax objectivity as need be, given different philosophical views as to what, exactly, objectivity consists of, and uniqueness can also have some wiggle-room if the value system in question gives sufficient criteria of identity. For example, we have two moral systems which seem different; our value system, however, analyzes the consequences of holding moral views, and from this it can be shown that the consequences of each system are in fact identical. Here we can say that they are the “same system”. (Though there may be other ways.)

Yes. That was my concern with not allowing different moral systems to be slightly moral. If the two systems differed only in phrasing, for instance, they would be different, but not sufficiently so to make a difference. That has to be the worst phrased sentence I have ever written.

In short, I agree with your formulation. I have to reserve the right to say “Whoa, I didn’t understand that part!” But otherwise I agree.

[pervert]

[QUOTE=pervert]
If moral agents are simply entities which use, or not, moral systems then moral relativism must be true. If, however, moral agents use moral systems for some purpose intrinsic to their existence, then that purpose can be used to rank moral systems in an absolute and objective way.
This leads me toward another critique of moral relativism. If there is no way to morally judge moral systems except from other moral systems, then is not no morals at all just as valid (from outside morality) a moral system?

What does it mean for a person to be without a moral system? Is a person who makes decisions, takes actions, without reference to any values at all a moral actor? If not, does this not violate the tenets of moral relativism? Since such a contradiction seems to indicate that any moral system must be suitable for a moral actor?

I think I am formulating the opposite of what you posted, erislover when you said a moral system must assign from the spectrum "[most immoral, less immoral, …, amoral, moral, more moral, …, most moral]. "

Wouldn’t a system which assigned only amoral to all actions be a viable moral system under moral relativism? But wouldn’s such a system also be useless to a moral agent?

I’m not sure this is a productive angle. It just struck me and I needed to babble a little.

[Ramanujan]

@pervert

What I was trying to add with my talk about particular moral agents, is that I agree with moral relativism if we remove all qualities from said agents. If moral agents are simply entities which use, or not, moral systems then moral relativism must be true. If, however, moral agents use moral systems for some purpose intrinsic to their existence, then that purpose can be used to rank moral systems in an absolute and objective way.

any absolute and objective system can be used to rank things in an absolute and objective way. however, when we say that one system is not privileged over others, we don’t mean we can’t rank them: we mean we have no non-arbitrary method to use to prefer one over the other.

if you believe that the system you have developed (“If, however, moral agents use moral systems for some purpose intrinsic to their existence, then that purpose can be used to rank moral systems in an absolute and objective way.”) gives an absolute and objective method for preferring one system over the other, you are incorrect. in order for that to be the case, you would have to use some system to prefer suitability over unsuitability.

i have tried to argue before that this itself might get you out of moral relativism. you might move the decision “up the chain”, as Smartass put it, if you believe this preference is not itself a moral preference. however, it is still subject to the relativistic critique.

so, to summarize: to defeat the second tenet of relativism that erl posted, you must not only come up with an objective ranking, but demonstrate that this ranking is objectively preferable. in addition, i can see no objective way to prefer suitability to unsuitability for a task. thus, you have not defeated the second tenet of relativism, though you may have moved yourself out of the realm of moral relativism.

[pervert]

@Ramanujan

so, to summarize: to defeat the second tenet of relativism that erl posted, you must not only come up with an objective ranking, but demonstrate that this ranking is objectively preferable. in addition, i can see no objective way to prefer suitability to unsuitability for a task. thus, you have not defeated the second tenet of relativism, though you may have moved yourself out of the realm of moral relativism.

Quite. The objective way to prefer suitability to unsuitability is that unsuitability no longer qualifies as an option under the definition.

If you wish to divorce morality and moral agents from all qualities and relationships thereof, as I told Smartass I cannot stop you and I see no way to convince you otherwise. However, a morality which is unsuitable for moral agents does not seem to be much of a morality to me.

in addition, i can see no objective way to prefer suitability to unsuitability for a task.

This is the part that I have trouble understanding. What does it mean to have a method for performing a task which is unsuitable for that task? What does that mean? Based on this criteria I can propose the following moral system and relativism has nothing to say about it.

fjkspfqwngfoeanuawerncioe cufwenucinacnaweuicnero;cvnzsdilcvuasdrobnuierncinuierncuiernvuiebl.

This may seem like a perfectly suitable choice to you, but it seem quite clearly not a morality to me.

[pervert]

One more bit.

@Ramanujan

any absolute and objective system can be used to rank things in an absolute and objective way. however, when we say that one system is not privileged over others, we don’t mean we can’t rank them: we mean we have no non-arbitrary method to use to prefer one over the other.

We covered this in the begining, but I think this does mean we have no way to rank moralities. If we have no way to choose a method for ranking moralities, then how do we choose such a method? I’m afraid this doctrine allows reason, randomness, and even divine inspiration exactly the same weight.

I can see an argument made that within certain contexts they may be indistinguishable, but it seems silly to me to suggest that for people, living in the real world, these methods have no differences with regards to choosing a moral code to live by. If this is true, then why not simply choose no moral code at all? Or even a nonsensical one like I posted above. If there is no way to rank them without first choosing one, then there should be no problems choosing none, or a nonsensical one.

As I said before, if you believe that the relationship between moral agents and morality is arbitrary, then the suggestions in the last paragraph may make sense. But I would need a new definition of moral agent morality before I could be convinced that such was the case.

[Ramanujan]

@pervert

This is the part that I have trouble understanding. What does it mean to have a method for performing a task which is unsuitable for that task? What does that mean? Based on this criteria I can propose the following moral system and relativism has nothing to say about it.

fjkspfqwngfoeanuawerncioe cufwenucinacnaweuicnero;cvnzsdilcvuasdrobnuierncinuierncuiernvuiebl.

This may seem like a perfectly suitable choice to you, but it seem quite clearly not a morality to me.

i’m not sure what you don’t understand. first, why can’t i claim that a system unsuitable for performing a task is a better moral system than one that is suitable? what method do you use to claim the opposite? second, how is that an objective method?

i’m not sure what you mean when you say the method is inherent in the definitions. that the unsuitable morality might be preferred may seem silly to you, but why is that? could you demonstrate in a more in depth manner what you mean that it is inherent in the definitions, keeping in mind my two questions from the precedeing paragraph?

[pervert]

@Ramanujan

i’m not sure what you don’t understand. first, why can’t i claim that a system unsuitable for performing a task is a better moral system than one that is suitable? what method do you use to claim the opposite? second, how is that an objective method?

Because the task in question is “being a moral system”. What does it mean to postulate that a moral system which is unsuitable as a moral system is just as good as a moral system which is suitable as a moral system? Truthfully, I have no idea what this means.

i’m not sure what you mean when you say the method is inherent in the definitions. that the unsuitable morality might be preferred may seem silly to you, but why is that? could you demonstrate in a more in depth manner what you mean that it is inherent in the definitions, keeping in mind my two questions from the precedeing paragraph?

I might be able to. Can you answer my questions first? I think we may be talking past each other.

[Ramanujan]

@pervert

What does it mean to postulate that a moral system which is unsuitable as a moral system is just as good as a moral system which is suitable as a moral system?

i’m not necessarily sure what it would mean (nor am i convinced that it’s relevant), but you would need some sort of measurement system to assign any value of “goodness”. we could pick an arbitrary system which says “unsuitability for a task is a good thing” or we could pick a system which says “suitability for a task is a good thing”. the point is, we need some way to assess these that passes the relativist critique. as far as i can tell, this critique goes on up the chain until some value assignment is arbitrary.

this will likely be my last post until at least sunday night, as i am leaving town for the rest of the week. i will try to check back while i’m away, though.

[pervert]

@Ramanujan

i’m not necessarily sure what it would mean (nor am i convinced that it’s relevant), but you would need some sort of measurement system to assign any value of “goodness”.

Yes, but the definition of the task imposes the system.

we could pick an arbitrary system …

Yes, I know that picking an arbitrary system does not violate the relativist credo. I’m suggesting that the problem itself suggests an evaluation system which is not arbitrary.

The reason why my question is relevant is that it states this non arbitrary system. If a moral system which is unsuitable for use as a moral system has meaning, then you have a point and suitability is simply an arbitrary framework. If, however, a moral system which is unsuitable as a moral system is nonsense, then suitability is an unavoidable, non-arbitrary framework for ranking moral systems.

the point is, we need some way to assess these that passes the relativist critique.

Or breaks it.

as far as i can tell, this critique goes on up the chain until some value assignment is arbitrary.

Yes, partly. Relativism qua relativism does not care if the framework in question is a moral one or not. As you note, frameworks exist with which to rank moral systems. The question I am answering is “Does the definition of morality and moral agent demand a specific framework for this purpose?” My answer is that it does. Moral agents need moral systems for specific tasks. Not arbitrarily chosen tasks, but tasks inherent in the definition of “moral systems” and “moral agents”. Suitability for this task, in one sense, is what a moral system is.

Judging moral systems on the basis of this suitability is not an arbitrary framework. It is necessary for the words moral system to have meaning. Otherwise we are saying that whether a thing is or is not a moral system is itself an arbitrary distinction.

Again. What does it mean for a moral system to be unsuitable for use as a moral system? Unless you can answer that question, I think it demonstrates that moral relativism fails. I’m not asking for an example, or even for proof that such a thing exists. I’m only asking what the statement means.

this will likely be my last post until at least sunday night, as i am leaving town for the rest of the week. i will try to check back while i’m away, though.

Have a happy trip. Happy Thanksgiving.

[Teine]

Let me say first that I’ve been following this thread with great interest for quite a while now. There has been a lot of good discussion, even if it has been mightily confusing at times.

@pervert

Let me be absolutely clear. I am not searching (in this thread) for any absolute morality. I am searching for an absolute method of ranking moral systems, and more limitedly, I am searching for a good critique of the relativist ideas amounting to claims that no such system exists. I am not proposing nor hinting at any standard of behavior which everyone must adopt. I’ve been willing to give a few opinions of my own on the subject, but only as illustrations of the sort of moral framework I mean.

Part of the difficulty in this discussion, I think, stems from what I see as a contradiction in your second and third sentences of this paragraph. Can you explain how an absolute method of ranking moral systems would not logically lead to an absolute morality? Because I can’t see it.

@pervert

The reason why my question is relevant is that it states this non arbitrary system. If a moral system which is unsuitable for use as a moral system has meaning, then you have a point and suitability is simply an arbitrary framework. If, however, a moral system which is unsuitable as a moral system is nonsense, then suitability is an unavoidable, non-arbitrary framework for ranking moral systems.

I’m also really vague on what you see as the purpose to this ranking system that you’re thinking of. From your talk about suitability and the constraints inherent in limiting the discussion to humans on earth, I get the impression that what you’re trying to do is construct a way of identifying moral systems that work from moral systems that don’t work. But is the ranking system supposed to distinguish between different workable moral systems? As far as I can tell, there have been millions of workable moral systems in human history. Are you really proposing a ranking system that would sort and distinguish between all of them, or merely one that would identify those moral systems which don’t work in a realistic environment?

If I give you 3 moral systems, “I will act in ways that make me feel good”, “I will act in ways that make my family feel good”, and “I will act in ways that make a certain person B feel good”, how would your hypothetical ranking system distinguish between them? As far as I can tell, all three are equally valid, from an analytical point of view, moral systems through which to make choices. None of them requires impossible choices, and they all allow the moral agent to weigh outcomes with respect to any given choice.

[Lilairen]

@pervert

There are two possibilities here. Either such a standard exists or it does not. If it does not, then the claim that it does not is simply a recognition of this fact. If it does exist, however, then the claim that it does not is an attempt to remove it from reality.

I don’t claim that atheists are trying to “remove god from reality”; I would consider those people who would make that argument to be looney.

Is there any reason the equivalent argument about moral systems is less looney?

I agreed that this was my characterization and not yours. I tried to acknowledge, however, that we agreed moral relativism does not give any weight to anything which is claimed is “The Standard”. I do not understand why you are arguing this point.

Because I’m not going to waste my time arguing with your strawman. If I come to the conclusion that you are not willing to drop the strawman argument, I will just stop bothering to post, because I have better things to do with my time than waste it arguing with a figment of your imagination.

Whoops! This seems to be a slip up. The fact that multiple interpretations of a fact exists is not evidence that this fact itself does not exist.

If there were a One True Religion, it would meet the needs of all people, as one of the reasons people choose different religions is that the one they first found (or were raised in) does not meet their needs.

Observation of people demonstrates that they have different needs and are promoted to health by a number of different structures. (For example, a person who considers themself excessively selfish might adopt a religion that promotes selflessness; a person who considers themself excessively self-sacrificing might adopt a religious structure that aids them in self-determination. These are highly unlikely to be the same structures.) I do not believe that there potentially exists a single entity that can encompass all of the different needs someone might look to a religion to address or structures that are necessary or preferable to individual people.

Now, this qualification clarifies matters a bit. But it still goes too far. Why would any moral system which is not an absolute system have to be in “direct opposition” to an absolute system.

Many absolutists of whatever stripe take those people who are not in agreement with their goals as being allies of whatever their opposition is – see Christian absolutists who argue that all who disagree with them are either in league with or deluded by Satan, aesthetic absolutists who claim that different artistic movements are about destroying beauty, or moral absolutists who claim that relativists are trying to destroy moral judgement.

I’m not sure how this is “fundementally” irrational. Can you elaborate on this?

I said “arational”. I meant arational.

“The Standard says this, so I follow The Standard” is not an argument supported by evidence or logical argumentation. It does not respond to challenges or requests for justification; it self-defines as correct and avoids dispute. It suffers from both the fallacy of appeal to authority and the fallacy of begging the question.

[pervert]

@Lilairen

I don’t claim that atheists are trying to “remove god from reality”; I would consider those people who would make that argument to be looney.

Well, perhaps you prefer the phrase “denying god”?

Because I’m not going to waste my time arguing with your strawman. If I come to the conclusion that you are not willing to drop the strawman argument, I will just stop bothering to post, because I have better things to do with my time than waste it arguing with a figment of your imagination.

Oh for crying out loud. I am not making a strawman argument. Please point out where I have done so. I agreed in my first response to you that my characterization of “destroying a standard measure of moral systems” was my characterization and not yours. I will state now, for your benifit, that I am willing to believe that it is not anyone elses. I will go further and state that I place no nefarious motives on any relativist whatsoever. Does that help?

If there were a One True Religion, it would meet the needs of all people, as one of the reasons people choose different religions is that the one they first found (or were raised in) does not meet their needs.

Read this sentence of yours again and notice that you are confusing the reason people choose religions with properties of religions. Consider the possibility that a true religion exists. Consider the possiblity that it does not meet the needs of any people anywhere. It simply is. The fact that many people practice religions other than this one true one has no bearing whatsoever on whether or not one true religion exists.

Many absolutists of whatever stripe take those people who are not in agreement with their goals as being allies of whatever their opposition is – see Christian absolutists who argue that all who disagree with them are either in league with or deluded by Satan, aesthetic absolutists who claim that different artistic movements are about destroying beauty, or moral absolutists who claim that relativists are trying to destroy moral judgement.

Again, you are taking the motives or statements of adherents of a praticular practice as necessary charcteristics of that practice. This seems like an error of association.

Also, you might note that no one has claimed that relativists are trying to destroy moral judgement. In case you’d like to avoid using straw men yourself, that is.

I said “arational”. I meant arational.

Que?

“The Standard says this, so I follow The Standard” is not an argument supported by evidence or logical argumentation. It does not respond to challenges or requests for justification; it self-defines as correct and avoids dispute. It suffers from both the fallacy of appeal to authority and the fallacy of begging the question.

I suppose. Maybe. I don’t think you’ve shown that such a stance is a necessary characteristic of adopting an absolutist postition in this debate. I’m certain that you have not shown anyone here using the sort of argument you are describing.

I offer myself as evidence that your characterization is false. I happen to be an absolutist when it comes to morality. I beleive that some things are right and some wrong. However, I don’t think you can show that I have used the sort of argument that you have described. Seriously, please try.

Since I am an absolutist and I do not use the argument you laid out, such an argument is not a necessary consequence of absolutism.

If you are arguing, instead, (as I think you are) that some absolutists argue this way, then I agree. But this point is not relevant to our discussion. As a relativist, you must believe that I cannot merely claim the existence of a The Standard. But you should also recognize that you canno simply dismiss it. If you do, are you not simply quoting relativism itself as The Standard?

[pervert]

@Teine

Let me say first that I’ve been following this thread with great interest for quite a while now. There has been a lot of good discussion, even if it has been mightily confusing at times.

Cool a new participant! I really have learned a lot just by responding to all of you.

Part of the difficulty in this discussion, I think, stems from what I see as a contradiction in your second and third sentences of this paragraph. Can you explain how an absolute method of ranking moral systems would not logically lead to an absolute morality? Because I can’t see it.

No, not really. I suspect that it would. However, I am not prepared to propose such a system sufficient to define fully such an absolute morality. I have been equivocating in this regard because I do not want to get bogged down in the minutia of actually defining an absolute morality. As I said, I am only interested in a framework from which to rank moral systems. And even then, only enough of a framework to dispute moral relativism. Does that clear it up?

I’m also really vague on what you see as the purpose to this ranking system that you’re thinking of. From your talk about suitability and the constraints inherent in limiting the discussion to humans on earth, I get the impression that what you’re trying to do is construct a way of identifying moral systems that work from moral systems that don’t work.

No, not really. I am proposing that a system which ranks systems which work against those which don’t is a non arbitrary framework from which moral systems can be ranked. I am not (in this thread) trying to propose any “moral systems which work”. I’m not even looking for such a thing. I’m really trying to limit my debate to the proposal that moral relativism is false.

I do have lots of ideas about what sort of moral system is actually The Absolute Moral system. But they are outside the bounds of this thread. IMHO

But is the ranking system supposed to distinguish between different workable moral systems?

For my purposes here, no. One of the reasons I’ve been leary of erislover’s insitence on uniqueness is that I have wanted to limit the usefullness of my moral system evaluation framework to make it simpler. Again, I am only attacking the relativist claim that frameworks cannot be privileged.

Again, I think a framework can be constructed such that moral systems can be arranged on a scale of most workable to unworkable. But such a system is beyond the scope of this thread.

As far as I can tell, there have been millions of workable moral systems in human history. Are you really proposing a ranking system that would sort and distinguish between all of them, or merely one that would identify those moral systems which don’t work in a realistic environment?

Here I am only proposing that such a system is not only possible, it is unavoidable. And that the unavoidableness of it makes the moral relativist’s claims moot.

If I give you 3 moral systems, “I will act in ways that make me feel good”, “I will act in ways that make my family feel good”, and “I will act in ways that make a certain person B feel good”, how would your hypothetical ranking system distinguish between them? As far as I can tell, all three are equally valid, from an analytical point of view, moral systems through which to make choices. None of them requires impossible choices, and they all allow the moral agent to weigh outcomes with respect to any given choice.

Agreed. As I said, I have been working on a somewhat simplified framework for brevities sake. Allow me to illustrate.

Lets add to your 3 another 3. “I will only act to bring harm to myself.”, “I will only act to bring harm to my family”, and “I will only act to bring harm to person B”. Relativism says that we cannot choose non arbitrarily between these 6 moral systems. I say that simply limiting our moral agents to humans living on earth means that we can objectively (in fact we must) choose between these 6 systems.

I am not claiming this to promote any of these 6 moral systems. I am not claiming this in order to prove a complete framework from which to evaluate moral systems. I am only claiming this in order to disprove moral relativism (not necessarily relativism qua relativism).

I hope this helps.