My bad a reading typo on my part. Allow me to try this again.
You posted:
To which I posted:
I should have said: I’m not sure how this is “fundementally” arational. Can you elaborate on this?
Does that help?
I think so, yes.
Ah. As far as I can tell, all you’re doing here is providing an additional requirement for the definition of moral system. The limitation of the discussion only to systems that meet certain criteria is not a ranking system and provides no basis for actually comparing or judging between moral systems. It merely helps define what a moral system actually is for purposes of the discussion. It is also a fairly arbitrary qualifier.
Um, why? As far as I can see, each of those additional 3 moral systems is also completely workable. Yes, they are likely to lead to the premature death/incarceration/exile of the moral agent choosing to operate through them, but they are certainly actionable moral systems. Yes, they are diametrically opposed to the ones that I supplied, but that doesn’t mean anything. Person A could operate by one of my 3, and Person B could operate by one of your three. As long as they acted consistently according to the moral system they chose, they would both be acting “morally”, according to those systems.
What basis are you postulating that would distinguish between your 3 and my 3?
No, not really.
If a posited god exists, then nothing a person believes about its existence has any effect on that.
If a posited god does not exist, then nothing a person believes about its existence has any effect on that.
If a posited god exists and a person believes that they don’t, they are factually incorrect, and this has nothing to do with trying to wipe that god out of existence.
If a posited god does not exist and a person believes they don’t, that person is factually correct, and their lack of belief did nothing to cause the facts to change.
If a posited god exists as a subjective entity, then to the believer it exists, to the non-believer it does not, but nothing the non-believer can believe will change the existence value in the mind of the believer.
Under no circumstances is the lack of belief of the atheist causal of anything other than the actions of that atheist.
“Denying god” presumes that, first, the entity posited exists, and second, that a person’s motivation for not having belief in that entity is one of negation rather than neutrality, indifference, or counter-evidence.
Moral relativism may be factually incorrect or subjectively invalid to a particular point of view; this, like the beliefs of the atheist, says nothing about morality, choice, or anything much else beyond perceptions and interpretations of the world.
I did. I called you on making false statements about relativism and what relativists believed. Once you told me I was agreeing with you; other times you have seemed to ignore the differences.
Religions are human creations and used by humans; if a religion does not meet the needs of any people, it does not function.
Moralities are human creations and used by humans; if a morality does not meet the needs of any people, it does not function.
What purpose does a The Standard serve other than to serve as a referent in moral distinctions?
If a The Standard is absolute, it is the final word on moral distinctions, an ultimate authority. Thus, it is not subject to rational challenge on the basis that it is incorrect or that alternate standards are viable or indeed superior; it has already been defined as the ultimate and justified by whatever means are deemed sufficient to establish such. Does this correspond to your understanding of an absolute standard?
If a The Standard is not to be used for moral distinctions, why is it so important to have one in the first place?
I note that I have not done so, and have explicitly stated otherwise several times. I am waiting for convincing evidence for your counterproposition.
Do you realise you’re sounding like an evangelising theist trying to convince a soft atheist that mere lack of evidence is insufficient for disbelief?
I’m off (once I catch up on the other threads I’m reading) to handle my preparations for contributions to tomorrow’s feast. Good holiday, to those folks who’re celebrating tomorrow.
Okay, now your quest is causing me to lie awake in my bed. I may have had an epiphany about what you are trying to do. I now suspect that you are trying to step “outside” of the moralities and, rather than do any actual preferring only observe it. I don’t have any freaking clue what effect this might have on relativist arguments, but at least I think I get it. I think I can give you an example of an objective absolute of the type you describe–that is, it is absolute for humans only.
So, get out your moral agents, functions, and squiggles and let me know if this is along the lines of what you are after:
When options are present, humans choose the option they most prefer.
Humans determine preferences using “moralities”.
Humans rank or evaluate moralities according to “fairness”.
Humans always prefer moralities that are more “fair”.
Watcha think? Can I go to sleep now?
-VM
I think, SmartAss, that pervert is attempting to lay the groundwork for a kind of natural examination, such as requiring “survival” for ranking moral systems, the thought being that since reality is objective and unique and generally absolutely all there is, there ought to be an absolute morality that fits this reality.
erislover, we have been going on and on for 3 pages now. How in the heck do you summarize my position so accurately in so small a space! 
I’m not sure “survival” is exactly the right word, but it is closer than “life” with the associated asterics.
Yes, that is what I am trying to do. The difference, Smartass, as I see it, is that “fair” fails the unique or non arbitrary test. You yourself pointed out that there are other ways to rank or evaluate moralities. What I am proposing is that there is one such method which is inherent in the definition of morality and moral agents for doing so. I’m not sure I’m smart enough to prove that such a method is really unique. But I think non arbitrary is not beyond me.
And yes, get some sleep.
No, not quite. I’m proposing that the definition of “moral system” and “moral agent” provides a framework to evaluate moral systems. You can think of them as both additional restrictions on what a moral system is and a way to rank “possible” moral systems. My point is that only one system should qualify as The Moral System. The absolute morality we spoke of. Again, of course, I am not proposing that I know what this absolute morality is. I’m merely trying to reduce one rhetorical barrier to discussing it.
I don’t agree. If a framework inherent, that is necessary for understanding, in the definitions of “moral system” is not arbitrary, then I don’t know what arbitrary means.
Yes, but only if you remove from the evaluation the purpose of a morality. If a morality is a decision engine with no purpose, then those extra 3 moralities are perfectly good examples. But as soon as we notice that a morality is supposed to provide humans living on earth with a method for making decisions necessary to carry out the actions to sustain their lives, my 3 become much less appropriate.
What I am suggesting is that moralities are not merely programs to be input into some decision making machine for no purpose. That it is implicit in the definition of “moral agent” that he needs a morality for a purpose. In the case of humans living on earth, this purpose is living life*on earth.
With this I agree. I did not mean that such opposition to mean much. I merely wanted to choose 3 moralities at the other end of the “survival” scale for illustration. I altered your examples out of ease and so that they would be recognizable. I almost put 3 entirely different moralities in there. I thought of mentioning kangaroos.
Yes. Exactly. But viewed from outside I think we can some up with a non trivial, non arbitrary non moral method of evaluating thier behavior. At least to the point of deciding which one we would like to emulate.
On the suitability for making decisions to sustain the life of the moral agent. Without such life, he is no longer a moral agent.
*Again, I note that I do not mean life in the mere biological sense. Perhaps the phrase should be “living a human life on earth”.
You should see how low I used to score on “reading comprehension” in standardized testing in my high school days. If only they gave me something interesting to read! 
(Generally I’d score in the 98th or 99th percentile for all subjects except that one, where I would score around the high thirties, low forties. How, as I ask you, is that actually possible?!)
I meant to use “survival” as an example. My ability to see where you’re coming from is based on my previous association with Ayn Rand who would argue just such a position, and the previous discussions I’ve had on this very topic which suggest “evolutionary morality” as a counter (albeit an ineffective one, given our usual definition of “morality”) to moral relativism, or even relativism in general.
Just for fun, I found this little article while searching for a definition of “moral agent”. He suggests that the moral agents need to choose can be used as a justification for evaluating moral systems based on freedom of choice. He specifcally criticizes my Objectivist choice of the life of the moral agent as unecessarily requiring assumptions about the “essential” nature of human beings.
"*I propose an approach that treats morality itself rather than self-fulfillment as the goal. … In my approach, it isn’t necessary to reach agreement on the “essential” nature of man. Since the subject is morality, the relevant aspect of human nature is the fact that people are moral agents, that is, we are creatures who develop moral principles of right and wrong and take these principles into account when we make decisions to act and when we evaluate the actions of others.
Since a moral agent must be able to understand abstract moral principles and be able to apply them in making decisions, a moral agent must be a living creature with self-consciousness, memory, moral principles, other values, and the reasoning faculty, which allows him to devise plans for achieving his objectives, to weigh alternatives, and so on. Secondly, to weigh his options morally he must attach a positive value to acts that conform to his moral principles and a positive value to some of the results that he can achieve by violating his moral principles. (If someone is never in a situation where there is a conflict between his moral principles and his other values, he never has to make moral decisions and he can’t be a moral agent.) This means that to be a moral agent you must live in a world of scarcity rather than paradise. (If all your values could be attained instantly, without effort and without sacrifices and trade-offs, you wouldn’t have to choose between your moral goals and your nonmoral goals, and you couldn’t exercise your moral agency.)
To be the kind of moral agent who makes decisions about justice and takes action based on those decisions, you have to live in a society with others whom you deem to have moral rights. If you live alone or with only creatures that have no rights, then you can’t make decisions to respect or to violate anyone’s rights, so you can’t be just or unjust.
Finally, to exercise your moral faculty meaningfully, you must be free to act. If you are enchained or paralyzed to the point that you cannot act, you cannot have moral responsibility*"
He is more interested in developing or defending a morality which favors Libertarianism. And his article shows this. However, he does propose another standard besides the life of the moral agent as a possible standard.
Right. I read the thread you linked to above. It seemed to me that the evolutionary moralist in there was on to something, but did not quite hit it. He still allowed for too many different types of creatures to practice morality. Also, he did not seem to allow that morality was a construct of conscious beings rather than an an inhereted trait. I only skimmed the thread, though.
But, and this is a sort of sidetrack comment, you’re coming at it from the other side there. The phrase I quote is a descriptive analysis of morality, using such symbols as ‘moral system’ to characterize pre-existing behavior. Relativism is generally compatible with this simply by the observation of multiple “solutions” to the problem of human decisions, though most people would not even think in terms of relativism or absolutism when taking a descriptive approach. (We do not generally make inferences during description, as you might imagine.) We may think of this as the positive approach.
What we are usually after with relativism v absolutism is the other angle, the normative approach, which is the construction of morality or moral systems in an attempt to guide human behavior through some measure of a priori analysis, or at least some measure of analysis which does not consist of pure description. That is, we are devising an explanatory model at least, or generally laying down rules in the more extreme cases (which, I believe, characterize this thread).
Yes, and yes. But relativism has made no claims of “usefulness” as characterizing any system. Logical inference without the law of the excluded middle is sometimes less useful than one that includes it, though that does not mean it is not a system for it.
I disagree. The only problem with “fairness” is that it is difficult to measure. Try this for a first cut at fairness:
Fairness is proportional to the evenness that the authority/freedom to prefer is distributed among humans.
You asked why we “need” a morality. The answer is we need a morality because of our desire for fairness. The next question would be why we would want fairness, and the answer is that this desire is a survival mechanism–a dispute avoidance system.
And I know you have been working on this “survival” bit. Does the fact of survival indicate a preference by reality? I don’ know. Is existence an indication of preference? Does the fact that we have survived this long mean that we are preferred or merely that we survive? Does the fact that dinosaurs are gone mean they are less preferred?
-VM
Good, we can agree on this.
Correct again. I meant “destroy such a standard” in more of a rhetorical sense rather than in a metaphysical sense. That is, regardless whether or not a posited god exists, any person who argues strongly that he does not is trying to remove such a god as a valid point of debate. Not destroy in the metaphysical sense, but destroy in the rhetorical sense.
I think you go too far here. Non believers change the minds of believers (and visa versa) all the time.
Correct.
No it does not. Denying god is a phrase which means that the person so denying is “declaring untrue; contradicting; refusing to accept or believe; refusing to recognize or acknowledge” god. I don’t think there is any assignment of motive in that phrase at all. There certainly are moral values attached to it. but those depend entirely on ones moral framework.
I see in this your attempt to bring the god metaphore above back to the OP. I’m not following your point, however. Are you saying that any critique of relativism is not relavant to relativism truth? That doesn’t seem likely.
Except that your “false statements” were, as I acknowledged, merely my characterization of the position everyone else seems to think relativist do believe. I did not mean in any way to assign a moral value to the relativist argument. I did not mean in any way to assign motives to all relativists which I would have no way of knowing anyway. I said as much in my first response to your objection.
Perhaps. But this is hardly the definition of religion.
Ah, here we see a glimmer of hope. Would you be willing to admit that ranking moralities by their abiltiy to “meet the needs of any people” would be a starting point for developing a standard way to rank moralities in a non arbitrary way?
You see, I am no longer sure we mean the same things with this phrase “The Standard”. You seem to be using it as some sort of derogatory term meaning “an absolute and not rational moral system”. If it is any kind of moral system at all, it is not what I have been discussion in this thread.
No. You are making the assumption that the “whatever means are deemed sufficient to establish” is something else besides rational challenge. If you assume that reason is the means used to determine that a proposed standard is indeed The Standard, it seems silly to say that The Standard is beyond rational challenges. I for one have never offered nor have I ever assumed any other means.
Again, you are talking about a moral system. Ask yourself instead why it is important to have any moral system at all. The answer, I think, will point you towards The Standard.
Well, we sort of got off on a tangent. I feel like this is because you took offense at some characterization of mine regarding the “purpose” or relativism. Please note that I did say originally “(if it has any)”. This was meant to mean that I was not trying to assign moral judgement or even motivation to any relativist. If however, this post and all of the others of mine has not been sufficient to assuage you, allow me now to appologize for any offense I may have offered.
I have been doing so all along. However the thread has gotten long and the argument has drifted. Allow me to repost and alter what I wrote in post #107.
This is the theory which is mine, by me, ahem.
Given - “Morality is a complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs by which an individual determines whether his or her actions are right or wrong.”
Given - A framework from within which moral systems can be “privileged” violates the second tenet of relativism with regard to morality if it:
is not itself a moral system;
is unavoidable, objective and, unique
is knowable but not necessarily known.
I am proposing that the nature of the “individual” in the definition provides just such a framework.
There are some necessary truths about this “individual”. The definition of morality assumes that such a being is capable of actions and determinations among other things (the capability to deal with a hierarchy of concepts and abstractions stikes me as one further assumption, but it is not necessary for this thread). This limits our set of possible existants to living beings at least (It limits us even further, but living beings is good enough for now). Without an individual who conforms to these truths, morality has no meaning. Therefore, a morality which does not put the life of this “individual” pretty high up in the “complex of concepts and philosophical beliefs”, risks becoming meaningless.
This suggests that moral systems may be privileged according to the relative position within them of the life of the individual. The only frame of reference necessary to do so is this definition of morality. In fact, this frame of reference is the only one suitable for such a task since it is implicit in the definiton of morality.
This framework is unavoidable (suggested by the definition of morality itself), unique (the only one suggested by the definition of morality), objective (relying only on the characteristic of the individual), knowable (we can certainly know the definition of morality and that moral agents are alive) and therefore absolute. Additionally it is not itself a moral system so it does not violate Relativism qua Relativism while at the same time violating relativsm as it relates to morality.
Happy Thanksgiving!
Let me try that again: We don’t strive for fairness for the PURPOSE of achieving survival. We survive because we happen to strive for fairness.
See what I mean?
-VM
Why do they become less appropriate? What is it about “living a human life on earth” that factors in here? Just because in some cases the life of someone following such a morality would be shorter? I think you need to define “living a human life on earth”, because I think I view it differently than you do.
I disagree with you on the purpose of moral systems. I think your definition of purpose as living life on earth is insufficient and entirely too limiting. Many moral systems constructed by humans do have this as a goal, but I do not believe that all moral systems constructed by humans must have this as a goal. In addition, there are different types of survival/living. The moral system of an evil dictator, who attempts to survive/live by suppressing all resistance, is very different from the moral system of a saint, who attempts to survive/live by doing good deeds and relying on the charity of others. I think you are letting what you consider to be the best way of living life on earth to affect your analysis. If the evil dictator lives 50 years, spending most of his life happy and productive, and the saint lives two years, spending most of his time unhappy and unsuccessful, which is the better moral system?
From where I sit, the suitability for making decisions to sustain the life of the moral agent is an arbitrary and moral method of evaluating behavior. How long the moral agent remains a moral agent does not, to me, have any bearing on the suitability of a moral system. Many moral systems that exist hold other ideals as more important than the life of the moral agent. What about moral systems that lead to the death of the moral agent so that people they love can survive? Or moral systems that hold the best way to live is to constantly be risking death?
Heck, the logical conclusion to holding the survival of the moral agent as the purpose of moral systems means that the “best” moral system is the most selfish one. “I will do whatever it takes to survive.”
By the way, I also disagree with Smartass that “fairness” is why we need morality. Again, to me, that is one possible reason for needing a morality, but not the only one, nor even necessarily the best one. Humans need morality for many different reasons and I do not believe that any one of them is more important than another.
I think your linked article above, pervert, should indicate to you the problem with attempting to pick a standard for evaluating moral systems. Depending on the person, and what they view to be important, they will pick different standards by which to judge moral systems. You picked survival/suitability for life on earth. The guy you linked to picked freedom of choice. A hedonist might pick potential for worldly pleasure. There is nothing in the definition of moral agent that requires that one standard be picked for measuring.
Now, there’s nothing wrong with you deciding to use suitability for life on earth as your basis for choosing a morality. What relativism seeks to point out is that while you might choose this as your basis, someone else might choose a completely different basis, and that both of you are correct, as long as your morality meets the standard you choose.
Yea. I recognize that. I had a bit of a brain fart and needed to vent it. I appreciate your comments.
Correct again.
This to me is where relativism does not pass the smell test. It is not a very useful critique on my part. But this is where I think relativism fails us. I agree entirely with the relativist position that multiple solutions to the problem of morality may exist. I simply disagree that none of them can be privileged.
As I said, I had a quick thought and needed some feedback. Ok, I was bored trolling through MPSIMS.
I agree, that fairness belongs in an absolute morality somewhere. But as you point out here, fairness is desireable because it enhances survival. This to me suggests that survival is a more productive angle to try and define a non arbitrary framework for evaluating moral systems. I’m open to other suggestions, though. The article I linked to suggested, to me, that freedom of choice might be a productive angle.
What does it mean to be a moral agent not living a life on earth? It factors in because it is implicit in the definition of morality and moral agent.
No, length of time is not sufficient. Again, I am not talking about life in the purely bilogical sense.
I agree, and I understand that this term is somewhat vague. Let me think about it some more and see if I can propose a good definition.
Cool. Can you give me another option?
Yes, but only if you are limiting my words to the bilogical meaning of life.
Quite. But I am proposing that some of those can be judged outside of moral systems as unsuitable candidates.
Exactly.
I would suggest that the dictator may not be as happy and productive as you suspect. Being rich is not the same thing as being productive. Additinally, a moral system which only applies to one particular moral agent does not seem to me to be a very useful moral system. When I say life on earth, I am not talking about the biological life of one particular human. I am talking about the life (physical, mental, and even spiritual ) or humans in general.
I think I would have the same complaints about the saint’s moral system. To me both the systems you proposed put too much emphasis on the use of others as the moral good. The first to provide material wealth, and the second to provide a means of measuring moral fitness. They both IMO do not focus highly enough on the life of the individual practitioner.
This seems odd to me. What does it mean for a moral system to require that a moral agent no longer be a moral agent? Seriously, I asked Ramanujan, but I’ll ask you as well. What does morality mean if it does not include a moral agent?
Again, I am not talking about merely the biological component of life. I will have to think some more about how to define this better. Perhaps with a belly full of turkey!
Well, yes, in a way. This is outside the scope of this thread, but I happen to beleive that selfishness is a virtue. But then, you have to see the word selfishness differently (without the moral baggage) to understand I think.
I’m not sure he was proposing fairness as The One and Only reason we need a morality. He was proposing that it might be a possibility. But I’ll let him answer that.
But this is not true. Humans need morality in order to make decisions about possible actions. And they only need to take actions in order to survive. I agree that there are many other types of actions that humans can take. Including, even, actions directly opposed to survival. However, the only reason humans need to take actions is that they have to sustain thier lives.
Can you propose a purpose for morality which does not include this assumption?
Quite. That’s why I found it interesting.
Absolutely. I agree entirely that this is a substantial danger. I agree with what I percieve to be the motivations of most relativists. Namely the recognition that other opinions (about these matters) have merit. I simply feel that moral relativism goes too far.
This last part is where I disagree. I can see the life of the moral agent as part of the assumption being made abou that moral agent. I can also see that such an agent’s ability to choose and act as being necessary for him to be a moral agent. However, I am not at all sure how worldly pleasure might be derived from the definition of moral system or moral agent without first deriving either the agents life or ability to choose.
Exactly. And this is moral relativim’s failing IMHO. We are not both correct if one of us has choosen a morality which does not fit the definition (or purpose) or morality better than the other.
It is useful to distinguish the different perspectives the second condition of relativism comes from (i.e. the ‘privilege’ comment). It has been mentioned already, but repeating it cannot hurt.
One would be the ontological summary, which is a substantive denial of “privilege” (as we understand the term) as it applied to moral systems. I would generally find that agent’s relativism would probably take this approach, where “agent’s relativism” is roughly the doctrine that whatever the agent felt was right was right (why the agent felt this way is a complicated question, leaving the door open for cultural relativism for example). I find no particular way to understand AgR without an ontological appeal. I find it completely impossible to justify. As mentioned, I am for appraiser’s relativism, which is roughly the doctrine that the person judging determines what is right (again, why the appraiser feels this way is a broad question).
I feel ApR is supported by understanding the “privilege” comment as an epistemic statement; i.e., we cannot know whether there are privileged systems. This, of course, is not meant to deny any particular measure of privilege. Indeed, you will hear me argue time and again for a “proper” way to view actions, morals, and so on. I simply cannot suggest that I know my reasons are absolute. I do not feel that recognizing a limit on my ability to know things is a weakness.
When people suggest relativism means all views are equally valid, I think they view relativism as an ontological position about value systems, and additionally misuse the word ‘valid’. I attempt to rectify that to the best of my ability. But since my own claim is an epistemic one, it is open to “attack” by analysis, and I welcome such discussion… I could hardly do otherwise and claim an epistemic approach.
Actually, I think that is what makes it very useful, because it essentially requires that, in discussing value we reference the value system, and in discussing value systems we recognize that our preferences do not begin with any privilege. For the purposes of discussion, of course, you and I might come to terms with various value systems and their merit based on criteria we both find acceptable. The broader our analysis, the more general our criteria. We simply should not tell ourselves that we have some oracle guiding us as to the True Nature of Things, whatever that means.
That we may adopt various value systems does not grant those systems any privilege. (The “Standard Meter”, for example.) It is precisely the opposite behavior which I find to be mistaking a custom for a description. Without appreciating relativism, I believe it is easy to make such a mistake.
That’s fair, erislover. As I said, I agree with relativism in that proposing a The Standard from thin air is undesireable. I simply disagree with moral relativim’s suggestion that all standards are equal. Simply because irrational standards are desireable does not mean that perfectly rational ones are equally unuseable, for instance.
I agree with you on the last bit, however, that understanding relativism is very useful indeed. I avoided your last thread on relativism because I found the first several posts to bo above my head. I have found this thread very profitable indeed.
As a matter of course, I do hold that we should use such things as “what the human animal is” to help us choose or create substantive moral frameworks. What a good law is, for example, is a question that we face the need of answering and which we need a value system in place to answer. However, our views on morality in general would also help us answer the question of how a government should be organized. For example, why have any kind of democracy under moral absolutism? (Meant to be a rhetorical question, as are those that follow.) If there is a unique and absolute methodology available, wouldn’t a council of wise elders serve us better? Plato’s republic, or a benevolent dictator? Democratic governments seem, implicitly, to accept that there is, generally, not one right way of looking at things. But that is not to say that we cannot, or do not, choose one way. And government organization in general and voting systems in particular seem to focus on this aspect. It is hard for me to see how to justify democracy without already admitting an inability to make or find such an absolute system.
Something to think about.