The Pirates are becoming famous for their reliance on statistical studies as a basis for improving their on field performance. For example, they may be the the major league team that makes the most defensive infield shifts in all of baseball. This year for example they are playing their outfielders nearly 15 feet closer to the infield than last year and while many baseballs seem to have eluded their fielders when retreating the team says that overall the results have been extremely positive. I would be curious to know if there are any studies on or any teams that have actually abandoned or at least reduced the role of the closer in handling their relief pitchers. I personally hate the idea of the closer for many reasons but of course I have no statistical evidence to back up my opinion. Is there any?
It’s pretty well documented that the Red Sox closer-by-committee strategy of 2003 was a bust. Grady Little declared he’d put in the right pitcher at the right time. The problem is that I think Little was the beginning and end of the brains of the operation. I don’t recall him applying any deep statistical analysis. Little was infamous for mismanaging the pitching staff that year, especially in the playoffs.
The Sox fired Grady, signed Keith Foulke as full time closer for the 2004 season and proceeded to win the World Series.
There have been a few teams that tried it for parts of the seasons since the Red Sox in '03, including the Rays during the playoffs in '08, the Tigers in '14, and the Cubs last year. The problem with any statistical evaluation of its success is that it has always been implemented out of necessity because the team had challenges at the pitcher position. So it’s not surprising when a bunch of mediocre pitchers do worse than a single good pitcher.
Given the small sample size of managers willing to go with a non-closer strategy and the huge number of variables in assessing its success, I think a statistical analysis will be tough.
Just so. For a meaningful test of a “no closer” strategy, you have to have a clear-cut “best relief pitcher” (BRP), but then not use that BRP as the closer. You would bring in your BRP the first time in the game that you really, really need bullpen outs, even if it’s the sixth, seventh, or eighth inning. Then you would bring in some lesser pitcher to pitch the ninth.
That is one of the things I am talking about. Other times you might follow the example of some very successful managers and take advantage of lefty/righty matchups which have become a thing of the past. There are a number of ways to approach the various situations that might arise when a relief pitcher becomes necessary. It just seems foolish to manipulate the entire bullpen in such a way as to always have your closer available when you want him. Is the difference between your best and second/third best that significant?