Of course you do. At least, you do when it suits you. I mean, here you are expressing yours. If your ideas do not exist, then you’re going to an awful lot of trouble for — quite literally — nothing.
We can use that rather primitive definition, but it doesn’t help your case. Pain is also a side effect of chemical and electrical processes in our brains, but if you claim that pain doesn’t exist, then I question your veracity.
Well, no, but there were no planets either, no human beings, and no atoms for that matter. Do these things not exist?
No, but neither did the Statue of David. Is it a mere wraith?
And yet you speak of them as though they are real. Your whole post is bursting at the seams with references to metaphysical things — like existence, for example. Even the Big Bang itself is nothing but a metaphor (it was neither big nor a bang) for an event that you have not proved occurred. Even science and mathematics speaks of things, like singularities, whose states are undefined. A singularity, by definition, is the undefined solution set of an equation (such as y = 1/x, where x = 0). And in fact, you routinely make use of what you would call nonexistent numbers to quantify your scientific observations. There cannot be two apples if there is no “two”.
Right. Even straightforward analytic proof does not sway you. You do not accept it because of what it compels you to accept down the road. Speaking of circular argument, your conclusion and your premise are the same. You do not accept NE simply because you do not accept NE.
This is just too much. I find myself in the Twilight Zone, arguing with a man who is suspicious of the Identity Axiom, and yet who is attempting to use reason to make his points. How about this: your ideas do not exist; therefore, the words that represent them do not exist; therefore, your argument does not exist; therefore, I may save myself some time (which, or course, does not exist).
I’m quite disappointed in your response. We obviously can speak of things, that is put tags on things, that have no existence. For instance, we can speak of “a solution to the halting problem” though no such thing exists. You admit that there are no ideas without people. The Statue of David, having material existence, certainly can still exist after there are no more people. A human idea cannot. I don’t know if you really don’t get this, or refuse to admit you do.
“Two” is a property of physical things, which we describe and reason about. Even imaginary numbers, which I trust you won’t claim are “real” have this property, since many physical properties are best expressed as exponentials with i in the exponent. Do you think i is floating around in some metaphysical dimension?
I suggest you go to a big library and dig up Science and Sanity by Count Alfred Korzybski. It was published in the 1930s, and is rather long, and is a bit loony in places, but the important point he makes is that a tag for a thing is not the thing. We have tags for i, and 2, and god, but that does not mean they are real in any sense. (The tags are, of course.) It seems that you are more a physicalist than I am - while understanding these things are not physical in our universe (and I include process as physical) you invent a universe in which they are effectively physical. This is a fallacy we should find a name for.
You do notice I am not challenging the proof, but the premises, don’t you? Course you do. And I’m not even rejecting NE necessarily, just its application in this situation.
Why don’t you try responding to my arguments, not strawmen. Where did I say that ideas do not exist? I just said they don’t exist except as side effects of mental processes. Your attempt at misdirection is noted. Now try actually responding.
My apologies. I thought you had added me to the list of those who needed an education in first order logic.
I have not read Aristotle, and that ilk, but it would be interesting to study the arguments of the natural philosophers who proved all sorts of incorrect things. I’d like to list the places they went wrong. Proofs are fragile things indeed. 30 years ago there was a major thrust in proving programs correct. I assume it is still going on to some extent, but a classic paper by Alan Perlis, Lipton and de Millo (it’s been a while) showed that the proofs of trivial programs published in the peer review literature were full of holes. Philosophical “proofs” are even more suspect. When I was much younger I was fascinated by these, and read a lot of them, but gave it up in disgust. The difference in modern science is that the lab can quickly and finally disprove your contention. A “correct” program that gives the wrong output can also. I’m in testing because it is very satisfying to get the wrong answer.
That’s not quite accurate. What exists is a solution that is the empty set. That’s the only manner in which we may speak of it sensibly.
Or I do get it and I disagree, or find your view to be incomplete or incoherent. I am not bound by your dichotomies. If ideas do not exist after there are no more people, then the Statue of David will not exist after there is no more earth, as when the sun becomes a red giant or an asteriod hits Florence. It also might cease to exist if some nut simply blows it up. But aside from all that, the Statue of David IS an idea, on manifold levels. It was the idea of Michelangelo before it was even made, while today it is the object of perception for subject reference frames — everything from John Ashcroft, who finds it to be offensive, to me, who finds it to be beautiful. Far eastern philosophers long ago understood this concept. Read Fa-tsang’s Essay on the Gold Lion. There is a fundamental difference between a clump of gold and a figurine of gold shaped into a lion. The essence of the Gold Lion is neither gold nor lion, but the perception of man.
Floating? I think that what is disappointing to me is that we have begun to talk past each other again. I realize that you oppose me on the matter of the MOP, but you chose to assail aggressively the argument quite frankly without the proper ammunition. I think you’re writing now partly from hurt feelings, and I’m sorry I hurt your feelings. But even now, you’re talking about something — existence — as though you were uninformed. You bristled when you thought Sentient had implied your ignorance of logic, but I am implying your ignorance of philosophy altogether. Your approach here should be to ask questions, not make assertions. You’re attempting to impose a positivist actualist interpretation of existence as though only a fool would interpret something differently. It is a weak rendering of Fregean existentialism, but you lack the background to flesh it all out. “Two” is indeed a property of physical things, but “physical” is a property as well, and so is “thing”. Given enough rope, you’re going to run into the same problem Russell did — once you have emptied the language of its abstraction, your words no longer represent actuality. It all becomes what Nietzsche called “words about words”. As I said before, if you hold that ideas aren’t real, then neither is your argument. So why not just stop it? Existentialism is the most bizarre philosophy ever conceived. It is like a knife that cuts nothing but itself.
See, that’s what I mean. That is not Korzybski’s idea; it is Nietzsche’s.
Speaking of words and what they represent, I wouldn’t call that a “challenge”. Simply to say you disagree that it is possible that God exists is not a challenge. To challenge the premise, you must show why some induction might compel me to believe that the greatest possible being is not possible. NE exists in the context of the proof — a Euclidean modality relation — and that is all that is required to validate it. That’s the problem with modern materialists (with notable exceptions like Sentient and Spiritus); namely, that you people have no concept of appropriateness. You want to measure God with a meter, and apply an empirical observation to a metaphysical entity. You are no different than your counterparts on the religion side, who want to measure the universe with faith, and apply a revelatory observation to a physical entity.
Frankly, what you are saying is incoherent. If you agree that ideas exist, then what is your point?
You do get it. Now we just have to figure out how this in any way weakens my position. David is a physical object, and there are also a set of opinions, perceptions, etc. of David which are linked to the Bible, Michelangelo, Rennaissance art, etc. These ideas about the statue are exactly linked to the perception and memories and experiences of men. An alien race finding David after we were gone could reproduce the measurements of it, just as we could, but they could not reproduce the human ideas about it. These are linked to the physical existence of humans. There have been a lot of humorous stories about aliens or future beings finding and misunderstanding our artifacts. But the important point is that the idea of David is tied to the physical presence of people.
As you stated in the ghost discussion (which I haven’t been following) one cannot prove anything is real. However we can offer physicality as a tentative hypothesis, and look for ways in which it can be falsified. As I said before, and will keep saying, ideas are real, but tied to physical entities., in this case brains.
I can imagine many scenarios in which physicality is falsified, or at least severe doubt is cast upon the hypothesis. Our religions and fiction provide many examples of situations, if true, would do this. But none of them have been demonstrated. Even the shared idea of what constitutes goodness, which I thought your god provided, would do this, but it doesn’t seem to be an expected outcome of your theology.
I hardly imagine this concept was new even in the 19th century. The important point is that the tag is a function of intelligence. There were no “stars” before there was intelligence, there were just stars. From the your first comment, it seems you agree - therefore you cannot use the existence of “stars” as an argument against materialism or physicality.
Now when did I ever say I wanted to measure God? If God exists, he either does or does not have an impact on the material world, and by impact I mean something more subtle than a finger writing “mene mene …” If he does not, and is a deistic god, then his existence and nonexistence are equivalent. Some may get comfort in the existence of such a god, but they are getting comfort from the concept (“god”) not the actual god.
If he does have an impact, then this impact is in the realm of the physical and can be measured. How he has this impact may well be unknowable. It may be present day, it may be historical, it might be as blatant as parting the Red Sea, and it might be as subtle as appearing in the minds of those receptive and saying what is good.
I have no idea if a deistic god meets the criteria of a Supreme Being. If so, you claim to have proven the existence of something that is effectively nonexistent (as far as we can tell.) If a deistic god is not a supreme being (which would not be because the deistic god does not exist in all possible worlds) then you’ll need to define greatest, and need to show your Supreme Being is greater than the deistic god.
I think I may have found an interesting problem with your proof, but I need some sleep before I even attempt it.
Whyever would anyone claim that existent things are things that you can measure or weigh? Processes, exist, the flow of a program exists, concepts exist, evolution exists, the concept of evolution exists, the concept of the concept of evolution exists, and so on. You said that “ideas” somehow refute physicality - and I say they do no such thing. And I don’t feel like repeating myself again - surely the concept that an idea does not exist without any brains to have it can’t be that hard.
The link wouldn’t come up, but thanks anyway. From this, I think I can take on the proof.
This part here seems awful weak (in essence it is saying that if something might not exist then it does not exist), but I will leave it be and go after the previous line:
1.) G -> U if there is a god, then he/she/it created the universe;
2.) U -> <>G if there is a universe, then a god is possible but not necessary;
3.) (X -> U) ^ (X -> G -> U) either the universe arose from an unknown/undefined, or a god arose from an unknown/undefined and created the universe;
4.) X -> U the universe arose from an unknown or undefined (perhaps a singularity); application of Ockham’s Razor
Actually, what it says is: if it must be the case that God’s existence is not necessary, then it must be the case that God does not exist. That’s merely a modal modus tollens applied to the 2nd premise, which itself follows from the definition of God.
Leaving aside that you have not defined either G or U, that’s not what your symbology says. It says, “If God exists in actuality, then the universe exists necessarily”.
Close enough.
:eek: Um, I guess we assume that X represents the existence of something undefined. In that case, the first parenthesis of your symbology says, “If the actual existence of something undefined implies the actual existence of the universe”. That is then anded (not ored) with some nonsensical symbology. There is no rule allowing for contiguous implication.
Actually, that’s identical to the (somewhat) coherent portion of your number 3.
Following from what by what rule? In fact, you showed none of your inferences following from any others. I’m afraid your argument is not logically valid.
Don’t misunderstand. I’m not saying that your position (on this particular sub-issue) is weak necessarily, but that it holds no relevance. Think of it this way: there are lots of modalites, but the particular modality set invoked in the MOP is PAN — possibility, actuality, and necessity. All this business about existence of things in the past or the future is a different kind of modality, namely, temporal. There is indeed a temporal modal logic, but it’s not being used here.
Yes, fine, but that cannot be extrapolated into what you likely want it to be; i.e., that the idea of God is tied to the physical presence of people as well. I mean, it might be true of some God, G’, but not of G, Whose existence is necessary. It therefore is quite the other way around: the idea of people is tied to the metaphysical presence of God.
The person whom I was addressing made the same mistake. For her benefit, I repeated my assertion, and highlighted a key word. For you, I’ll highlight another as well: the existence of ghosts cannot be proved scientifically, and that’s because existence is a metaphysical claim.
Well, okay, but this is so far off-track that we may as well abandon our present discussion. The MOP is not at all about whether God exists physically. It suddenly occurs to me what might be the source of some confusion. Perhaps it is the case that you are equating modal actuality with emprical physicality. In other words, you are presuming that if God actually exists, then you ought to be able to detect His existence with scientific instruments. But that is not and cannot ever be the case. Let’s back up a bit and look at it in terms of your idea-brain thing, since that is something you’re pretty locked into. Let’s take the idea of beauty, something we both agree exists, but something we both agree is not physical and is tied to the brain. Beauty is a matter of perception. Now, consider the beauty of an olympic diver, and consider how a scientific test might be constructed to determine objectively how beautiful his dive is. Certainly, not every aspect of the dive is judged on beauty alone. There are technical issues of physical perfection, such as the verticality of the water entry, the amount of splash, and so forth. Clearly, these things can be measured by science such that one diver can be shown to be objectively superior to another. Let’s even say that you could attach scientific instruments to the heads of the judges and determine exactly what they consider to be beautiful by measuring activity in the prefrontal cortex. The unfortunate thing is that what you are measuring is not the beauty of the dive, but the perceptions of the judges. If beauty were an objective thing, then the prefrontal cortex activity of all judges would be identical, just like the needle on every verticality meter would point to the same spot for the same dive. Therefore, all you are testing is whether the judges are lying when they say whether they thought it was beautiful. Same same with Ramachandran’s experiments with temporal lobe activity and God. He (Ramachandran) understood that what he was measuring was not God, but a person’s perception of God. That’s why he went out of his way to explain that his experiments proved nothing about the existence of God — neither for nor against. In the MOP there is something of a double whammy. Not only is existence a metaphysical claim, but God is a metaphysical entity. Science is not the tool for judging either one. The tool is analytic reason: i.e., logic. These are analytic issues, not empirical issues.
It goes far beyond that, actually. Not only were there no “stars”, there was no “existence”. But, there was existence. And that is the whole point of ontological examination. In the MOP, it is understood that there is a symbol, “G”, that merely represents an entity, G. No perception or intelligence is required (because the proof is analytical) for there to be a G, but only for there to be a “G”. God’s necessary existence does not depend on observers; in fact, it is the other way around.
Nonsense. Again, you’re conflating existence and physicality.
If I were attacking (this particular version of) the proof, I would approach it this way:
(1) I do not accept the premise that it is possible that God exists. Rather, I offer the premise that it is possible that God does not exist. By that premise, and using the same rules and inferences, I derive the conclusion that God does not exist in actuality. Or, failing that…
(2) I do not accept the application of Becker’s Postulate to an adverbial premise. I will accept that it applies to the modality of existence in se, but not to the modality of a particular existence. Necessity obtains, but necessary entities do not necessarily. Or, failing that…
(3) I do not accept the principle of an excluded middle applied to modal states. Perhaps instead of God being either necessary or not, He is either necessary, possible, or actual.
The most tenuous of these is (3), and almost can be discarded out of hand. (2) is interesting, but the argument can easily be constructed without Becker’s Postulate. It can, in fact, be constructed with Brouwer’s Theorem in place of Becker’s Postulate, or even without either one. So, (1) is the best bet since the argument hinges over induction. I, for one, prefer to hold the position that the greatest possible being is indeed possible rather than the position that the greatest possible being might not be possible. The latter is rather like saying, “It is possible that these mashed potatoes might not be mashed.”
The 2nd premise states “It must be the case that if God exists, then He is the Supreme Being”. It’s as though you are saying that either a supreme being created the entire multiverse or didn’t create any of it, and then using that to rationalize why an unmeasured, empirically unobserved entity must by definition exist. Since we have no way to observe the existence or nonexistence of this entity in our own universe, let alone any other, the statement proves nothing.
Okay I’m obviously not going to get my point across using that dreadful <> syntax. The universe must exist if something created it, but just because it exists doesn’t mean something must have created it.
Son of a gun, ^ is and!? :eek: Okay, not quitting my day job here! Anyway you know what I mean… if god created the universe then who created god.
It’s the result of applying Ockham’s Razor to the point I so dismally failed to express in #3.
Yes I did, I showed #4 following via Ockham’s Razor from #3. #3 was supposed to read, “(from an unknown, undefined, or nothingness, arose spontaneously the universe) or (from an unknown, undefined, or nothingness, arose spontaneously a god which then created the universe).”
For centuries people have been reporting physical effects of ghosts - objects levitating, apparitions, sounds, temperature changes. All we need to prove the existence of ghosts is a cooperative spirit who would kindly affect an empirical experiment. That would constitute scientific evidence of ghosts (AFAIK you can never prove anything scientifically). It’s the same with god. Is not god simply a very powerful spirit?
Well, of course. He was defined as Supreme Being. It follows, then, that if He exists, then He must exist as what He is. It’s just like defining you as a person, and then saying that if you exist, it must be as a person.
Muddled nonsense. Nothing whatsoever is said in the proof about any creation or any “multiverse”.
You have yet to demonstrate that you even comprehend the statement.
The phrase you’re searching for is “affirmation of the consequent”. It is a logical fallacy of the form (A -> B) -> (B -> A).
Who created your obsession with creation? Do you find any reference whatsoever in the proof to creation of the universe?
I’m afraid not. First of all, Ockham’s Razor is not rule of logic. Second, you are misinterpreting it. You can’t just hack off a term because you wish it weren’t there. Suppose you’re given the equation y = 2x + 8. You can’t just simplify it by restating it as y = 2x or y = 8.
As we say in the South, bless your heart.
It would not prove the existence of ghosts; it would be evidence that ghosts behave in accordance with your hypothesis. When you drop a ball off a building, you aren’t proving the existence of gravity; you are producing evidence that gravity works in accordance with general relativity. The existence of gravity is a metaphysical question, and is addressed by the mathematical equations of relativity.
Doubtless, there are lots of ways you can define God — including the sort of quasi-material thing you call a “god”. But if you wish to address the proof given to you, then you must deal with its defintion of God as ontological perfection.
Frankly, what I would like to see proof of is that you are an honest man. You can give me that proof easily. I offered you logical proof of God’s existence, and you asked to see it. You could be gracious and acknowledge that I fulfilled my obligation. That would prove that you do not approach debate dishonestly, by moving the goalposts all around to avoid concession. Be a man. You got what you asked for. Live with it.
I know you didn’t say “multiverse”. I said “multiverse”. Does not the logic system you have been using speak of possible universes? (i.e. in all universes where a god exists, that god is a supreme being). Quantum physicists have advanced a theory in which all possible universes exist, that way an entangled particle (for example) can simultaneously exist in 2 or more states in parallel universes. By this theory, our ability to observe something is what allows us to determine which universe we’re living in (or perhaps it confines us to a set of universes that conform to the observation). Unless there is another way of interpreting the logic of possibility and necessity, this is the system I must use.
Then we agree on one thing.
Ah, yes. Thank you.
What obsession with creation? The whole idea of a god as I am familiar with it is that such an entity is said to have created the universe. Do you postulate that the universe arose without the help of a god, only to include a god from the very beginning?
No I am not misinterpreting it. Ockham’s Razor says not to postulate unnecessary entities to explain a phenomenon. When more than one explanation exists, the one that has fewer entities and/or relies less on unconfirmed or unobserved entities is more likely to be correct. Phenomenon: the universe exists. Explanation #1: god created it. Explanation #2: it arose spontaneously in a big bang. Implication from explanation #1: god must have come from somewhere. Conclusion: postulating god does not solve the question of how it all got started, therefore god is an unnecessary entity.
:dubious: Well I’m not from the South, so I probably misunderstood what you mean by that.
Define “metaphysical”.
Okay, now that the site you linked is working, I think I finally understand what is meant by a modal modus tollens. If A must exist, then A can exist; A cannot exist, therefore A is unnecessary. Right? You’re still losing me on point #7. Does not ~(~~A) mean A cannot exist? Does not ~G mean that by necessity, G is not required to exist? How does one make the leap from one to the other?
Yes, you fulfilled my request to see whatever “proof” you were claiming to have. But you are under no obligation to help me understand the “proof”. You may as well have given it to me in Bulgarian. :rolleyes: Had it been a proof that has substance, e.g. empirical observations, rather than dancing around and playing word games with the definition, then I would not be questioning the basis on which it is founded.
Metaphorically, I suppose. I mean, if you want it to speak of possible universes you can frame your tableau to speak of them. But I didn’t, so you were addressing a straw man.
Well, there are quite many modal logics, any of which you might be able to use for your purpose — everything from K to S5. A modal system is defined by its accessibility relation. Thus, a serial system would posit that A -> <>A, a reflexive system would posit that A -> A, a a symmetric system would posit that A -> <>A, a Euclidean system would posit that <>A -> <>A, and so on. If I knew what you were using it for I might could assist you. Perhaps if you stated your premises in plain terms, I could analyze them for you.
One thing you surely understand is the basic concept of scope. The argument I gave you deals specifically with ontology; that is, the nature of God’s existence — i.e., it is necessary. Other claims about goddom are outside the scope of the proof. I was asked to prove that God exists, not that He is Jehovah or Zarathustra or Zeus.
Well, more or less. “Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatum.” — William of Ockham. There is a dual implication here: (1) as you say, do not postulate more entities than necessary, but equally important is (2) do not discard entities that are necessary. Two things have been proved to you: (1) necessary existence is true, and (2) God qua necessary existence exists. It is a violation of Ockham’s Razor to discard these entities because they are definitively necessary. The misapplication of Ockham’s Razor can result in what is called an “ad logicam” fallacy. Take the expression 16/64. The simplest means to reduce it is to cancel out the 6s — 1/4. But that is not the correct means, and applied universally would result in errors.
That’s specious for two reasons: (1) the materialist explanation does not solve the question either, and (2) God is a metaphysical entity not bounded by temporality, and therefore eternal. It is not the case that God must have come from somewhere, and in fact, modern materialists hold that the universe itself is eternal (despite certain thermodynamic problems with their premise).
That is a huge demand. But in the context in which we are using it, it means “pertinent to the nature of reality” — in other words, being qua being. We have already mentioned gravity, for example. A physical statement about gravity would be something like, “Earth’s gravity holds the moon in orbit”, which describes the effect earth’s gravity well has on the moon. A metaphysical statement about gravity would be something like “ds[sup]2[/sup] = c[sup]2/supdt[sup]2[/sup] - dr[sup]2[/sup]/(1-2MG/c[sup]2[/sup]r) - r[sup]2/sup,” which describes the spacetime geometry surrounding a spherically symmetric object of mass M, situated at the spatial coordinate r = 0.
Let’s see, that would be A -> ~~A : ~(~~A ) :: ~A, so yes, that’s right.
It’s not a leap, it’s just a baby step. Step #8 in fact. I’ll color code it to make it easier to follow. Notice that it substitutes from 6 and 7. Note that #6 says that either G or ~G. #7 says that ~G -> ~G. Therefore, #8 says that either G or ~G.
I honestly don’t know how to respond to that sort of hubris. Accomplished materialist logicians like Pete Suber understand the validity of this argument, while proud and vain amateurs squawk about word games and magic — even while admitting they have no idea what is being said. It is like medieval alchemists watching modern scientists and declaring they are sorcerers because they do not understand how the machinery works. I would wager that you do not understand the mathematics of the quantum mechanics you’ve vaguely referenced, and yet you do not call it statistical games. (Although, ironically perhaps, it is closely related to game theory.) You place all your trust in empirical observations, which are notorious for producing optical illusions and logical red herrings. You belittle logic while it is not serving your own purpose, and yet you attempt to use logic to make points of your own. The whole of mathematics is based on the same rules of logic I’m using here, and mathematics is the very foundation of physics, but you have not called it infantile names to declare it invalid. You are rejecting the argument for no reason other than its conclusion. That is the height of intellectual recklessness.
If you mean, have I been in the classrooms gazing at chalkboards full of complex equations, no. However, I am not totally ignorant of quantum formulae (see here) and I have read enough to be confident about my understanding of the theoretical implications.
That’s news to me… if anything, I thought empirical observations solved optical illusions. What red herrings have empirical observations produced?
Let me make it real easy here. Reducing my entire objection to one single point. Where you say:
…that color coding shows me nothing that I didn’t already see on my own. My problem is with #7. Either I’m still misunderstanding the logic, or it’s a symbolic sleight-of-hand. Does not ~G mean it is necessary that god does not necessarily exist, i.e. god is not a required part of the universe? Does not ~G mean that it is necessary that no god exist, i.e. god cannot exist in the universe? I have asked you more than once why it follows that isn’t necessary → cannot exist. You have yet to show me why that is.
I was not addressing this issue. Back a ways someone agreed that the argument does not work for physicalists, but attacked physicalism with the idea strawman. You proof begins with the premise that God is possible. If God is not physical, (obviously true) and one doesn’t accept non-physical things, then one does not have to accept that premise.
[quote
For you, I’ll highlight another as well: the existence of ghosts cannot be proved scientifically, and that’s because existence is a metaphysical claim.
[/quote]
Nothing can be scientifically proven. The concept makes no sense. That was my point.
Not relevant. Beauty, as we both agree, has no objective existence. The Platonic concept of beauty has long been abandoned, right? A study of beauty as you suggest (which has been done for faces) is only a test of what people perceive as beautiful, in an attempt to see if there is some commonality that can be explained by evolution, say. It does not attempt to find a true measure of beauty, any more than that stupid joke survey found a true measure of what is funny.
Now, I think you have finally gotten that I am not claiming God has a physical, measurable premise. (You do above, but I’ll assume you hadn’t read this far.) If God is an actor, if the Platonic ideal of God corresponds to a real, non-physical God, then we should be able to study this. If God defines morals, we should be able to determine the morals he demands. (Some people say this.) Saying that God determines morality, that God wants us to be moral, but then saying that God never tells anyone in any way if an action is moral or not leads to a problem, the same problem you have with “goodness.” Fiction writers know that well drawn bad guys must commit evil acts for reasonable, to them, motives. If you asked Stalin if he was being good, he’d probably say yes, since convinced of the rightness of Communism he would feel he was trying to protect it. We’d be even surer the inquisitors would say this. If they told you that God spoke to them, and wanted them to do good, and was pleased that they were, how could you contradict them?
We can split the problem into two parts - the existence of a Necessary God, and then whether this necessary god has ever gotten around to visiting us. Proving the first does not prove the second, and vice versa - except if you are defining God as necessary, that is.
Huh? That’s what you were asking? The example you gave differed from the proof:
Your example
A -> ~~A : ~(~~A ) :: ~A
MOP
(A -> A): ~A :: ~A -> ~A
Number 7, ~G -> ~G, reads like this: If it must be the case that God’s existence is not necessary, then it must be the case that God does not exist. That’s because number 2 says that if God exists in actuality, then He must exist necessarily. In other words, if it is necessarily not the case that God exists as defined, then it is necessarily not the case that He exists in actuality.
Well, one doesn’t have to accept it anyway. One can just say, “I don’t like premises with three words.” But the question is whether one can reasonably reject it. I mean, think about what you are saying: that which exists in all possible worlds possibly does not exist. I don’t know how you can hold that view without holding the view that no world is possible.
Oh, okay. Then we agree on that.
If that is intended as an anded phrase — that is, God is not both physical and measurable, then I agree. If it is disjunctively ored — that is, God is neither physical nor measurable, then I disagree.
I couldn’t. I wouldn’t. You’re making the point that I’ve been making. Stalin’s reference frame was subjective. Your and my reference frames are subjective. There is no way for us to know whether Stalin acted morally or not. That’s the whole reason that Jesus warns us against making moral judgments about each other. Think of God — the Objective Frame — as a hub, and all the subjective frames as spokes coming out of the hub. The spokes are inviolately separated from one another (ablatively inaccessible) except through the hub. But the hub has access to every spoke, and every spoke to the hub. As I’ve said repeatedly, attempting to discern what it is that God values is a waste of time: it is an intellectual exercise in a moral context. It is not the case that you can approach God by this process: (1) determine what He values, (2) value that which He does, (3) be one with God. Morality is about choices, and as free moral agents, our choices are honored by God. It is only the errant notion that goodness is an ethic that demands punishment for “wrong” choices and rewards for “right” choices. Jesus teaches that God brings life-giving rain to good men and evil men alike. That metaphor is intended to convey that God is not a respector of person — that is, He is not the captain Who is choosing a team.
If God were an advertisement, everyone would read the ad differently. One might see, “For sale at high price: eternal joy”. Another might see, “Giving away free bliss”. Yet another might read the ad as, “Eternal misery guaranteed”. And someone else might see, “Everlasting sexual gratification available for free”. Still others might say, “Ad? What ad?”. It is not the case that we are engaged in a competition to see who can qualify for Goddom. Rather, we all already are gods, and those who happen to value what He values stay attached to Him because that is what they desire. If goodness is an aesthetic, then every man declares for himself what he believes is good.
I agree with that. Testimonial evidence is all that is required to verify it. Some say God has visited; others say He has not. Since our reference frames are subjective, it stands to reason that our experiences might differ.
Hmm, interesting. On the surface, this looks like circular reasoning (if exists then must exist, -> cannot not exist -> exists in actuality), but upon further reflection, that’s not the case. Numbers 2 and 7 of the argument effectively state that either god must exist, or god cannot exist, which translates to “in some possible universes, god exists in all possible universes; in all other possible universes, god does not exist in any possible universe.” A double-sided self contradiction. You’ve gone and defined something that results in a paradox.
Continuing this way, one could modify the proof to say that god does not exist as defined. But I’m not going to do that right now, in the interest of being a fair debater. My purpose is to examine the proof you provided to see if it stands up to scrutiny. In return, I hereby welcome feedback to tell me if my reasoning is completely off the wall.
This is just too much. I find myself in the Twilight Zone, arguing with a man who is suspicious of the Identity Axiom, and yet who is attempting to use reason to make his points. How about this: your ideas do not exist; therefore, the words that represent them do not exist; therefore, your argument does not exist; therefore, I may save myself some time (which, or course, does not exist). 
