It should be even easier. There would only be one footprint to follow, and when there becomes two prints, well there’s an important clue right there. Start looking around real careful like.
Ask if he’s got health insurance.
Regards,
Shodan
I thought that was the after effect of legalized abortion, not stricter punishment.
From the Wikipedia:
“The Hippocratic Oath includes the promise “to abstain from doing harm” (Greek: ἐπὶ δηλήσει δὲ καὶ ἀδικίῃ εἴρξειν) but not the precise phrase.”
So it seems the idea does go back as far as the Greeks, even if the phrasing doesn’t.
The full phrase seems to be: “I will prescribe regimens for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone.”
I do not think those graphs mean what you think they mean, sage rat
And quick as a flash, you dropped the part that IMHO makes it an interesting question: the first person to respond asked you whether she could ask the hostage, and you promptly shot that down. I’d figured it was the aspect that was doing most of the heavy lifting in my hypothetical; I’m guessing it’s a factor Lady wanted to consider likewise; you eliminated it from your scenario.
Why?
I shot it down because I wanted people to make their decision based on their own sense of right and wrong, not with someone else’s opinion.
I said something else that I’m still not sure I should have – that the “homeowner” has reason to believe that the hostage is genuinely evil. I said it because I wanted to make it closer to the actual case where a court found the Saudi guy guilty of a crime, i.e., a relative authoritative voice reassuring that the guy to be maimed actually deserves it. But based on some of the comments some posters made, it seems instead to relieved them of a moral choice. “Oh, if I do nothing, this evil guy will be executed. No problem.” So probably I shouldn’t have added that detail.
But what if one’s sense of right and wrong hinges on the other guy’s opinion?
“I’d like to do no harm in this situation; the question is, would I be harming this man? Well, in my opinion, no. But that’s no good; what if, in his opinion, it is harm? Then again, what if I refrain from something I see as harmful while he fervently wishes for the alternative he sees as less harmful? It comes to this: if the man before me explains that he’d prefer to die, then I’ll figure that performing the operation on him would constitute harm – and if he instead tells me he’d prefer the operation over death, then I’ll figure that it’s not harm in his case.”