I am not aware of how to do, learn, teach, or exemplify mathematics without observation.
I want to blame anyone who has a concept of science that doesn’t entail what we actually do. For example: “This is not an inherent problem in science or in mathematics, only in the practice of these things.” Yes, good is possible, even though we are born with original sin. Or, knowledge of platonic universals is possible, even though we live in a world of tawdry impressions. Or… shall I go on?
Science doesn’t answer why the curtain flows in when I am taking a shower?
Oh, I agree we could… So long as we all agree to use this system.
HA! I am sorry, but this makes me grin from ear to ear. I can confidently say that I know human error exists, I have seen it, and it fits my conception of reality, the same way I know microwaves heat water, and the same way I know atoms exist, and so on and so forth. But I am not the one claiming that science doesn’t prove anything.
I see your misconcpetion of my phrasing, then. Of course, D[sub]x[/sub]x[sup]2[/sup] = 2x is as much of a calculation as 12 X 12. Which is to say, there is this procedure for this behavior, and so on.
Strange, that. Two questions. First, if it isn’t science, would you permit me to say that you know it? Second, if it isn’t science because of quantification, then we must start to reconsider taxonomy.
And at any rate, the example can easily be remedied to include quantification. Say, that the microwave set to this value of time will heat water some number of degrees. Whatever. I am not interested in the actual experiment demonstrated but rather in the notion of whether I may do science without the notion that science never proves anything.
Because, you know, it is damned irritating to hear people say that in one thread, a thread like this, and then to hear them in another thread demand a demonstration of some crackpot theory. Which is to say: what is that going to prove? I mean, why even ask?
For consider the once-thought-to-be-true proposition that the sun revolves around the earth. Now we say: the earth revolves around the sun. And I am to reject the former an accept the latter. But on what grounds? Of couse, if we can’t prove one proposition is true, then we can’t prove another proposition is false (else science would be proving things all the time, contrary to popular assertsions).
By any conception of “proof” that I have, someone out there has proven that the earth revolves around the sun, and I know that, given the same tools they had, that I would come to the same conclusion. By any conception of “proof” that I have, someone out there has proven that the cardinality of prime numbers is aleph-null, and I know that given the same practice with symbol-manipulation that I would come to the same conclusion (and, in this case, I really have).
…
So math is a deductive system. Let us suppose this is so (though I strenuously disagree). How do I learn how to operate with numbers without inductive experience? For example, consider the series:
1, 2, 3, 4, …
Of course, you may formalize this in sigma notation. But will you say you learned how to count from sigma notation, or from recognizing characteristic patterns among several (though not an infinite or in any sense “complete”) number of examples from teachers or parents? Or perhaps you might comment that you didn’t really know this series until the formal presentation of sigma notation after a torturous trip through the axiomatic foundations of math? Let us suppose the latter. Now, I never went through the axiomatic foundations for math (but, by hypothesis, you have). I begin to write the numbers
1, 2, 3, 4
down as you begin to write the numbers
1, 2, 3, 4
down.
Can anyone tell us to stop and declare which one of us knows the series? And what sort of judgement was that? A non-mathematical one? Then why, for instance, should I accept any proof by mathematical induction? Shouldn’t I demand to see the series continued through to infinity?
But of course, given our (only very probable) limited life span, demanding such a thing is impossible. So I am only very sure that the number representing the sequence of partial sums after 10001 is 10002? (the matter is further complicated by the fact that the nth term of the sequence of partial sums is also the answer! I mean, how aren’t we testing the same thing twice by asking someone to write out the sequence of partial sums here? And, even to use sigma notation, *don’t you already have to know how to count???)
On one hand, I can conceive of the possibility that our theories are wrong and thus am told to say that theories are never proven from incomplete induction. On the other hand, I clearly learn how to operate mathematically from incomplete induction, and am told that I can trust mathematics as a deductive system implicitly, barring human error (whatever that means, I don’t care to argue that point). Two cases of incomlete induction, and two entirely dissimilar results.
The matter is only complicated by the intricate link between math and science. And many consider, contrary to you of course, that math is a science. But perhaps not in the sense you propose here, which is still unclear to me.
We may mark our rulers in any way, but we must mark our rulers, and more importantly, we must agree on ruler-markings. And, of course, this means there must be a method for establishing agreement (which, by all rights, is quantifiable) (and though I am not entirely clear on whether all quantifiable concerns can be scientifically investigated, though I would say they may be).
But let this one man, this solitary stranger in a strange land, mark his ruler in some unique fashion, and develop a script in his head that only he can read. Furthermore, though he can speak and understand every language on earth, he refuses to speak in any of them, and will not teach you how to read his script. You seem to have an uncanny ability to tell science apart from non-science, so I am going to introduce you to this unique individual. Furthermore, you’ve mentioned that all this prescriptive behavior is not necessary. Can you describe what this man could do that would cause you to say, “There. He has done some real science there and is not just some crackpot.” Of course, such a comment cannot be a scientific one (to you) since there is no quantification. But still, you have, over this debate, given several particular examples of an ability to detect science from non-science, and you have asserted that the prescriptive qualities we so often find are not necessary for science. So here is our strange man you cannot communicate with because he refuses to do so.
From the top:
But not their creation?
Well, shall we say, “…beyond those small scientific endeavors after making a non-scientific decision to step away from the balance.”
Could we scientifically investigate, assign probability, as to when a person should step away from a balance to achieve a specific statistical tolerance for error? But doesn’t “error” require a standard on which to judge? And if those standards aren’t science, then science isn’t even axiomatic, arbitrary… it isn’t anything.
If science is a behavior, a method, then of course it doesn’t matter what I believe. And I feel comfortable believing that science proves things until it finds otherwise, in which case I believe that science has disproven the previous theory (or, proven that it was false to be perfectly clear). But then, couldn’t we all run around and say that science proved such-and-such? Well, imagine we all did say that, every last one of us. The entire human race: wrong. Of course this hypothetical human race has to be wrong, because science can’t prove anything, and that isn’t changed merely by saying otherwise.
So then, perhaps the question, “Then how do we know the opposite?” has meaning? by which I mean, “How do we know that science doesn’t prove anything?” Of course that can’t be a scientific observation. Which is to say, “Perhaps all of science is up for grabs, except this proposition [that science never proves anything].” But of course, the truth and falsity of a proposition isn’t a measurement along some quantifiable axis like a ruler or thermometer, so no surprise.
Can I infer from the modified microwave experiment above (where specific measurements are theorized and tested) that a microwave does, in fact (or is very likely to be a fact), heat water, but that science doesn’t allow this inference? Or is it that science doesn’t allow any inference? But that last question can’t be “yes” because you’ve said, “Science is induced from observation.” So there are rules for inference?