Barret can’t even make up her mind which judicial philosophy she’s going to be pretending to follow. Is it textualism, or originalism? The two are very different, as I would expect anyone qualified to be a judge to know. Well, except in that they’re both philosophies Republicans pretend to follow to justify their partisanship.
When it comes to scheduling a vote, EVERYONE’S boss is the SML.
This logic doesn’t apply to ACB because she’s already made her positions on more controversial issues publicly known. She’s publicly declared her opposition to the ACA and Roe v. Wade. We all know these are cases she is almost certain to rule on. States pass abortion laws and activists intitiate lawsuits deliberately to try to get cases on Roe in front of the supreme court. And a case on the ACA has literally been tabled for the court to hear after she signs on.
The idea that an answer to a simple question on whether the president can delay an election that will (we can all hope) will never come up would prevent her from being able to do her job, but those public comments on actual hot-button topics wouldn’t is absurd.
How could she have done that? Or another way, why didn’t any individual Democratic senator force a vote on Merrick Garland?
Sorry there Prince Bothsides, you can look at the historical record and factually see what each side has done and said on this matter.
Nobody’s asking her to pre-judge a case. They asked her to (1) analyze cases that have already been judged, and (2) to talk about legal theories and doctrine that might guide her in certain hypothetical situations.
And, point 3, she has already opined thoroughly and in print that Roe v. Wade is “barbaric” and also that any decent Catholic should recuse from a death penalty case (and she makes a public show of being a “decent Catholic”.
So she gets to pre-judge all of this stuff that’s important to her, but she can’t answer a hypothetical, that isn’t even a case and may never become a case? Even though what she does or doesn’t do is shielded by a lifetime appointment? Sorry, this doesn’t have anything to do with judicial ethics, this is just being opaque to get a job for life.
“You have to pass her to see what’s in her”.
Eh, why bother…
Which of course she made before getting nominated. And just because she is against those, doesn’t mean she will automatically rule against them.
But it does make them positions to be rigorously explored as part of the confirmation process, to ensure that she is capable of ruling impartially on cases addressing those issues. Her sudden “oh gosh, I can’t possibly comment about my views about previous SC cases I have previously had no qualms about making strong public statements about” stance does not come across as credible.
Did she make any of those previous statements after she was appointed to the Circuit Court?
Surely senators should be as rigorous as possible, and I wish all nominees would just answer the questions too. But I started the thread to talk about the reaction to Murkowski, and not about what should or should not be off limits in the actual hearing. I’ve seen arguments for both sides, but don’t feel qualified to even offer an opinion on such. I just wanted to make the point that it seems to me, saying one thing as a part of simply exercising your right to free speech outside of a hearing, is different once you are in an actual hearing.
I believe “original meaning” is: “what a reasonable person would conclude the meaning of the law was, at the time it was ratified”
This can be different than actual lawmaker intent, which may be difficult to pin down, as you have 535 or so congress that may have voted on it, with varying justifications and interpretations.
for convenience, from the link:
Thanks for the reply. But the above makes it sound like it’s a perfectly reasonable thing for a founder to mean one thing and intend another. So to repeat myself, that sounds nonsensical! 
The meaning vs. intent discrepancy is what the actual words on the page indicate vs. what you think the person who wrote the words wanted.
Someone could write a law that bans 2-wheel vehicles on highways because they want bicycles to not be allowed on highways. The intent of the law would be to ban bicycles, but the meaning of the law also includes motorcycles.
Sure, but if the logic is that statements about a topic she might have to rule on could impact her impartiality, that would also apply to her previous statements about Roe and the ACA. The logic has to be the same across the board.
…and if the common language at the time made it clear that a “2-wheeled vehicle” referred to slow speed, human powered bicycles only (say motorcycles had not been invented yet), someone with a “originalist meaning” ideology may conclude that a “motorcycle” does not fit into the definition of a “2-wheeled vehicle”
Elena Kagan never sat on any court. Neither did John Marshall, William Rehnquist, Lewis Powell Jr., Abe Fortas, Earl Warren, William Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, or Louis Brandeis.
The idea that there is some minimum number of years required on a lower court to be qualified for the Supreme Court is a complete fiction.
Nor did John Jay, the first chief justice.
See, this is what I don’t know about. Seems an argument can be made that there are two different standards. Again, I’m not the one to ask about it, but thanks for the reply.