Derleth, thanks for going into that. I am actually familiar with most of your arguments, and indeed with the general tenor of libertarianism and some of its key thinkers. The problem i have is with the rather useless definition of property that seems to animate much libertarian thought.
If everything from my mind, my soul and my body through to my worldly material possessions is the “property” from which my rights derive, then it seems to me that the category of property itself is serving very little purpose as a definitional or explanatory framework.
What i’m saying is that, if you apply the definition of property equally to everything, from my soul and mind to my car and house, the term itself becomes largely meaningless. Furthermore, there seems to be a certain tautology to libertarian rights talk, which often comes out sounding something like, “my rights accrue to me from the things that i have a right to be secure in.”
I sometimes think the problem is the need to create a foundation whenever you are designing a system in which rights are important. If we have “rights,” then those rights must spring from something, otherwise they’re just arbitrary, right? For some religious people, the foundation for their rights lies in the tenets of their religion, ostensibly handed down from a deity or some other superior being.
In the American legal system, the foundation of one’s rights tends to be seen as the Constitution. Of course, a common argument is that the Constitution simply enumerates our “natural” rights, the rights we already have whether the government tells us so or not. But this often leaves out the question of what “natural” rights are, and from where they derive.
Essentially, my complaint is that much rights talk is a superstructure erected on a nonexistent base. Rather than conceding that our rights are, in themselves, social constructions, some people suggest that they are naturally-occurring phenomena, like gravity or oxygen, which were there before humans and will be there after we’ve gone.
Now, i should add now that, just because i make these points doesn’t mean i don’t believe in rights. I believe in an absolute right to free speech (and, please, no-one bring up the tired old “yelling-fire-in-a-crowded theatre” rule), freedom of religion and association, and a bunch of other things. But i also concede that my definition of these things as “rights” stems from a moral belief that has little foundation except my own convictions of what is good and proper. There is no more “natural” reason for me to believe this than there is for an authoritarian to believe that he has the right to stifle freedom of speech and religion.
I realize that plenty of people, most of them much smarter than i am, have addressed these issues, and i suppose i could start giving my reactions to thinkers ranging from John Locke and Wilhelm von Humboldt to F.A. Hayek and Ayn Rand. But, when it comes down to it, i have trouble with rights talk that implies an impersonal, objective moral order that is, or should be, equally obvious and equally accessible to all people.
I have no problem with arguing for certain rights, i just think that when we do, we should be conscious of the fact that subjectivity and inidividual moral preferences are important factors in the creation of what some people like to call “natural” rights. Those rights might be natural in that they are enumerated and recognized by human beings, but they don’t exist before we arrive, just to be plucked from the air and laid down as the foundation of our social system.
Of course, a religious person who believes that rights come from a deity or some other creator can make a claim to a pre-existing, absolute moral order. I might not agree with that person, but their claim is, at least, consistent. Even a relatively mildly religious, or even agnostic person, like the Deists that were so prominent among the Founding Fathers can claim that God hands down this moral order. But it seems to me that someone who adopts a secular, naturalistic approach to the world has very little foundation on which to lay an absolute moral order from which rights accrue.