Um, we seem to be having a problem with the definition of “choice” here. I offer up this paradox for Pitizens’ delectation: Both PRR and Tom are right, even though they appear to be saying precisely the opposite of each other.
One’s religious beliefs, and using that term generally enough to include atheism, agnosticism, impersonal panetheism, non-theistic humanism, etc., within it, are one’s reactions to the world as one perceives it. The atheist perceives a world in which there is no convincing evidence for the existence of a God, and reasonable inference that such evidence as does exist is either self-delusion by theists or credulous acceptance of myth and legend. He therefore reacts to the world by adopting an atheistic worldview. The theist is confronted with the looming reality of a deity that not only exists and is omni-powerful but which takes a special interest in him/her and indeed in every human being. And hence places a different weight on the testimony of others claiming to have encountered such a deity and on the quasi-historical quasi-legendary data regarding said deity.
If God appeared sitting atop PRR’s printer alongside his computer, surrounded by the Heavenly Host singing the Gloria from Bach’s B Minor Mass, and said to him, “Well, betcha you believe in Me now!” PRR is not so irrational as to reject the evidence of his senses – to the complete contrary. However, clearly God has not vouchsafed any knowledge of Himself sufficient to persuade PRR of His existence, and PRR hence makes the claim that by Occam’s Razor, it is a safe bet that He does not in fact exist. All the phenomena to which theists point in support of their belief, PRR can reasonably dismiss as erroneously understood.
Bottom line: the atheist has no choice, or more accurately a prescribed one: to found his worldview on what he reasonably understands to be superstitious claptrap, or to create a rational worldview that does not incorporate a deity he believes to be mythical. He reasonably chooses the latter.
But faced with the same choice, the theist, confronted with what he perceives as irrefutable evidence of the reality and personal interest of a deity, cannot dismiss the evidence the atheist considers superstition – or he is denying his own rationality. To fail to believe in an okapi when it’s the stuff of native legend is only reasonable; to fail to believe in one when it is brought to a zoological garden, exhibited, photographed, learned monographs prepared about its biology, is refusal to accept the evidence of one’s senses.
Neither is, properly speaking, a choice in any free-choice sense. It’s a choice mandated to a rational by the evidence at hand, and hence no real “choice” at all. Like Hobson’s customers, there is only one real option to select – the one that accords with the evidence one is working with.