What went wrong there?
When it started, I thought that if anyone was against helping Somalis, you could call them “anti-Hamitic.” But the moment passed.
Yet another US foreign policy bungle, this time brought to you by the Clinton Adminstration. We make mistakes so you don’t have to!
I’m surprised that nobody had any insight on this… You could start by reading Blackhawk Down. I can’t say I recall all the details (I read it over a year ago), but let’s just say you know your military operation could be in trouble when the answers to the questions “What goals do we want to accomplish here?” and “How will we achieve those goals?” are moving targets.
I don’t think the failure of US involvement can be separated from the overall problems faced in Somalia. I’ve listed some of the major problems below, based loosely on the UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II documents at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ site (link here).
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Changing mandates / The mandate for UN involvement was constantly shifting – from humanitarian aid, to political reconciliation, to capturing a specific warlord – with little explanation why to the member states or the players in Somalia. As a result, military planning and resourcing could never be accurately matched to the mission.
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Poor planning / Insufficient research was undertaken into Somalia’s political situation. A peacekeeping operation was assumed to be the best solution.
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Poor co-ordination / The lack of an overall co-ordinated plan led to confusion between contributing member states. The civilian and military chain of command was unclear. The units of the member states had little or no experience of working together, and this led to distrust. Financial constraints on operations were left unaddressed until the “last minute”.
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Rebuilding difficulties / The lack of any identifiable government or institutions foiled attempts to rebuild a unitary state that, basically, didn’t exist. Multiple groups with their own likes and dislikes led to a constantly shifting political situation with no clear “leader”. The UN misjudged the role and agenda of many groups and individuals in Somalia as a result.
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Humanitarian issues / Humanitarian organisations resisted integration as they were often unhappy at the military nature of UN involvement. Additionally, the many disparate groups did not always work well together or make for a coherent humanitarian effort.
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Lack of military control / Not all units were placed under UNOSOM control. Many units responded to their own national agendas and command structure and ignored UN commands. Rules of engagement were also constantly changing.
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Failed logistics / Staffing, especially civilian, was inadequate. Member states often promised staff or supplies but failed to deliver on schedule, preventing effective planning. There was a lack of critical materiel – especially vehicles, communications equipment and engineering equipment. The differences in training and experience in staff from member states damaged effective planning (a lack of standardisation).
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Lack of UN accountability / Without an independent “ombudsman”, the UN was perceived by many in Somalia to be “above the law”. Credibility was further damaged by the lack of transparency in the UN’s own political structure and decision-making.
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Poor media relations / The UN did not respond to media involvement fast enough. A lack of understanding of Somalia’s situation allowed the media to define what was happening rather than the UN. The “excitement” of military operations grabbed the media spotlight (removing the focus from humanitarian successes and shifting it onto millitary failures). Inconsistent information supplied to the media fed rumours and ill will towards the UN.
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Failed intelligence gathering / Information was gathered badly, interpreted incorrectly and not shared equally among contributing member states.
I hope this information is what you’re looking after.
One thing I forgot: Somalia was not a peacekeeping mission. It was a peace enforcement mission. Peacekeeping operations usually take place with the consent of the parties involved, and are generally based more around “prevention” than “cure” – for example, ensuring that a diplomatic solution is successfully implemented.
Peace enforcement missions do not generally have the consent of the parties involved, and often involve troops being used to separate warring sides. This obviously greatly reduces the chances of success. The UN has only rarely been involved in peace enforcement, and usually with comparatively little success – the best solution in these scenarios is for a single state or military body (e.g. NATO) with coherent command, control and logistics, and with the will to see the job through, to work under a UN resolution.
Good points, matt. Thanks for the clarification. Of course, our government, not the UN, is (and should be) held responsible when it commits our own troops in unwise situations…
The UN and the US did not enjoy good relations in the 1990s. The US was unhappy about the financial contribution it was expected to make, and threatened to withhold monies. The UN was livid, especially as this jeopardised many current operations.
While I have no cite, I’m sure this national-political agenda vs international-NGO agenda argument affected the US’ involvement. I wouldn’t be surprised if US units leaned more towards orders from their national chain of command rather than from the UN.
The whole thing can be summed up as “we chose to intervene in a civil war”. This itself is a prelude to disaster.
The Army rangers were sent out ina daylight mission (which negated their capacity for surprise), and were ambushed. There was NO BACKUP PLAN! To extricate these troops, we had to rely on the Maylasian UN contingent (who were the only force posessing armored vehicles). The Maylasian C-in-C hadn’t been advised of the US mission, so he was naturally reluctant to put his people at risk. In the end, 18 brave US soldiers died for NOTHING. Clinton should have been hung for this.Instead, his Sec. of Defense was sacrificed. In retrospect, the US should have been more cautious-2 weeks before, a contingent of Pakistani UN trops were surrounded and massacred-their bodies were chopped to bits. this was a warning-one that the US commanders unfortunately ignored.
egkelly is certainly correct, we intervened in a civil war which is about as dicey as police intervening in a domestic dispute.
But one other thing: although the Somalis don’t always seem to get along with each other, they REALLY hate outsiders butting in.
(I’ve been told by people who have spent time living and working with Somalis that although they are, in general, perfectly polite, they really, deep down, do not, in general, have much use for non-Somalis.)
The same kind of political-military bungling could be seen throughout the war in Kosovo, too. Originally, the intent was to get Yugoslavia to let peacekeeping troops into Kosovo. Guess what? Milosevic was willing to let peacekeepers in right at the beginning! But after an agreement was reached, the US government changed the demands. Now they wanted Milosevic ousted and all of Yugoslavia turned over to NATO control. Milosevic naturally said “F*ck You” and the bombing campaign began. Most insiders say that our Sec’t of State Madeline Albright was behind this move, basically because she is a bitter old woman who hates Eastern Europeans. To add to the problems, Clinton tried to mico-manage the US troops to minimize casualties. The result was that NATO bombing was mostly ineffective. That’s right, INEFFECTIVE. The claims of 50% of tanks lost, 80% of oil production cut off, etc, was simply wartime propaganda. Only a small percentage of Serb military equipment was destroyed, and the loss of oil production was more like 30%. They were effective at creating a large stream of refugees, however. After two months of bombing, and with no end in sight, the US agreed to go back to the original agreement, and a ceasefire was promptly worked out. NATO presented this as a great victory, when in fact the whole exercise was a needless loss of life and property that can be laid directly at the feet of Clinton and his incompetent aides.
Actually, it was brought to us by the Bush Administration. Which is something a lot of people forgot about when they criticized Clinton’s role in the bungle. Another issue often overlooked is bin Laden’s role in the affair. It’s amazing that he causes so many problems in so many countries, and yet no one can seem to get rid of him.
Um… I don’t think so. IIRC, didn’t the particular operation happen in '93, after Bush left office? I think it’s true that Bush made the commitment to help the Somalis, but Clinton had the honor of the losing the troops (and could have backed out prior to that). According to the previously mentioned book, the raid described therein took place even though Clinton had already decided to make a deal with the warlords and get out. If true, it was inexcusable to risk (and lose) those soldiers lives. Not that Republican Presidents have been anything but honorable, either…
Actually, I’m right. It was Bush, not Clinton who sent the troops in.
You can read about it at:
You failed to read your own link.
This was the result of “Operation Restore Hope”, initiated by Bush.
Thereafter, in June '93, the UN started going after Aidid, leading, ultimately, to dead American soldiers being dragged in the streets of Mogadishu. True, Bush got us in, but his policy was successful. The UN mutation of his program caused the disaster; you can’t pin the blame on him. Clinton, on the other hand… he can point the finger at the UN all he wants, but it’s just like JFK pointing his finger at the Joint Chiefs for the Bay of Pigs. The buck stops in the Oval Office. And, as pointed out before, if he OK’d the continuation of raids against Aidid when he had no intention of pursuing a military objective, he is FULLY to blame for the deaths occurring on Oct 3-4, 1993.
In all fairness, I went back and looked for the quote (about the timing of the decision to negotiate and the fateful battle) in Blackhawk Down and couldn’t find it. It does mention an incident where some of the dead soldiers parents sharply berated Clinton but does not go into details. I know I read or saw somewhere that they questioned him specifically on this and he couldn’t give a reasonable answer. It could have been from the Frontline documentary or a newspaper article, but unfortunately I don’t have a definite cite.
I beleive what you are refering to is the excellent Frontline documentary “Shootout in Mogadishu” I believe it was called.
In it the parent of one of the dead soldiers talks about asking Clinton why the battle took place after the decision to negotiate with Aidid had already been made, and he says Clinton pointed to the National Security Advisor and said “That’s what I asked him”.
Actually many of the operations were undertaken by Delta Force personnel but the DOD said that they were Rangers. Similar things happened in Central America where the soldiers were identified as Green Berets or Rangers who were doing training of indigenous troops.
Here’s your answer:
http://www.philly.com/packages/somalia/nov16/default16.asp
I won’t even sum it up for you. I guarantee if you start reading this, you won’t stop. It will answer ALL of your questions. If not I believe the author of this wrote a book going into MUCH further detail.
And for those who don’t want to read all of the previous link, this sums it up pretty well.
Thanks voltaire. This must be the original series of articles that Bowden combined and expanded on to write Blackhawk Down. There apparently was some interest in making a movie out of it, but I don’t know if that’s gone anywhere.
Curwin’s link is valuable as a reference for the political situation involved, strategies of the Somalia operations, and the causes of the disaster. I found the link to the pdf entitled “Critical Analysis on the Defeat of Task Force Ranger” especially interesting.