Good point. There’s actually two definitions of determinism: 1) the theory that all events are causually determined and thus with enough information one could predict the outcome of all events and 2) the belief that things are “predestined.” Given this thread’s argument for absolute cause and effect and the possibility for absolute predicative ability, I assumed we were talking about #1 (it’s also the one I most commonly encounter). #2 is a possibility, but I tend to be frugal in my philosophies; if we can get by without assuming that what appears to be random is not actually predetermined, I’ll tend to chose random chance. No way to prove or disprove either, but chance and probability seem to me to require less assumptions than a belief that all things are somehow “set” from all time.
You’ll have to explain the problem to me more thoroughly, here.
Hm, I may be rather puzzling since I can easily absorb other worldviews and argue from them, rather that insist on adhering to my own. Logic is different from reality; reality is, logic must be, due to its pre-defined rules. I can cheerfully argue that if all apples are green, then any one apple must be green, without actually believing in the “real world” that all apples are green. I will argue against a belief that neither has a basis in logic or reality, and in the end reality trumps logic. It may be logical that if women prefer comfort they thus logically would buy more Buicks; but if you look at the stats and women do not do so, logic doesn’t have a leg to stand on. If something happens in the “real world” without any logical reason for it to have happened, it has still happened.
ok, I think I see what you’re saying, but it seems to be that logic adheres to one set of rules, and the universe adheres to another. What is logic, if not a subset of the universe itself?
Logic is a tool, the universe is. I use logic since it has proven useful in the past and because it is the framework we generally agree to work within; however, in a conflict, which do you go with, the evidence before you or logic? (Either is actually acceptable and equally unprovable since we are reaching waaay back to original axioms here; I prefer to rely on empiricism (the evidence we have of the universe) rather than rationalism (our logical mental constructs).) In my viewpoint, A does not equal A because A must logically equal A; A equals A because all our experience has shown that A equals A. Should A ever not equal A, I shall promptly revise my viewpoint; whereas a rationalist would insist that A must equal A, always. If you want more elucidation on my wack views, check this out: Laws of Nature | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and view me as a regularist. In my viewpoint, logic is true only if it is true in the “real world”; the “real world” does not depend on logic and if it does not in fact follow logic, so be it.
And it is very late to be philosophising, so forgive me for any misstatements.
Er, well, if the universe is all-that-is, logic is indeed a subset of it…and so is illogic! So I’m not sure exactly what you intend to prove by claiming that logic is a subset of the universe.
If logic has proven useful and illogic has not, I will go with logic as more reliable. My judgments are based primarily on empiricism, and if there is no empirical evidence, I tend to assign a default negative belief (though a logical extrapolation from empirical evidence may be provisionally be accepted as well).
If your judgments leave the “real world”, what are you basing them on?
G: You begin with a function of two independent variable. This by definition (as a function) creates a single deterministic output for any set of inputs. Within a certain range of one variable (the gradient s) the function maps as a chaotic attractor, creating butterfly efects and other interesting stuff.
Now, this set your mind to thinking "what if this function is analagous to the Universe"? If so, it means the future is predetermined from any particular point in time, but that multiple pasts might converge in a single future.
Um, duh. If the Universe is analagous to a function (with the future being the “result” for a set of inputs) then the future is determined, but the past need not be. If the Universe is analagous to your particular function, then the past is not determined, since the functin cannot be “reverse-engineered”.
So, it sems to me that the only area for speculation in this OP is: is your function a fit analogy for the time as a function of the state of the Universe?
But then you say:
Said things are, of course, one of the tests for whether the analogy is apt. So I am left wondering what exactly is left to talk about?
Gaudere, you are wrong: logic cannot be mistaken. If women don’t buy buicks, then it is not the logic that is wrong, but your initial postulate. If you had started with correct assumptions, the logic would be inescapable. That is the problem: finding correct base postulates. And, to make matters worse, sometimes they are unknowable. But if you have correct postulates, the logical conclusion is inevitable. If all apples are green, and I give you and apple, it must be green. Period. No question about it. If I hand you a red apple, then the initial postulate was wrong, not the logic.
Postulates can be wrong, humans can make mistakes in logic, but the logic itself is infallable.
Well, my examples were not the best, I agree. Logic is infalliable because we have defined it as so within its parameters. A=A will never fail in logic because it is axiomatic in logic that A=A. Axioms cannot be disproven (if used correctly), therefore they are infalliable within their own “world”. Now, I’m not arguing that logic is falliable; certainly I’ve never seen it fail. But I am not arguing that it must be infalliable at accurately dictating what the “real world” must be like, either. However, I am not a philosopher and may be explaining badly. If I could, I’d toss it to Spiritus :), since I believe I’m trying to explain his statement, “we have no epistemologically valid means of determining the ‘truthfulness’ of any epistemological set where truthfulness is an expression of correspondence to a determinable internal or external universe.” You can create an undisprovable epistemology without logic; it’s not terribly useful, IMHO, but it is no more falliable within its parameters than logic is.
Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable.
What might have been is an abstraction
Remaining a perpetual possibility
Only in a world of speculation.
What might have been and what has been
Point to one end, which is always present.
Sorry, had to head out of town so no internet during lunch for the quick response.
OK.
That is, the Standard model, based on quantum physics, to you seems to dash determinism because at its core it shows, with the highest degree of accuracy of any scientific theory yet, that stuff is unpredictable.
Now, the problem comes in to what we really mean by “unpredictable.” At what level of abstraction, if any, are you willing to concede that quantum physics does predict behavior and is thus a useful system to study?
The transistor, for example, was designed due to the study of QM–specifically, the “tunneling” effect. Transisors are very predictable.
I’m not really trying to play the game where we try and draw a line about predictability, I’m just pointing out that the same system which tells us that stuff can’t be predicted ends up predicting behavior.
I agree with your seperation of determinsims, of course. The first is pretty much what we were discussing, I thought too. I agree, then, that we cannot devise a system which can give us insight into accurate determinism on all levels. But as a caveat, I still feel that things are deterministic, even if we can’t calculate it.
Maybe that’s a discussion for another time, though
I’m not saying we cannot make useful predictions in certain cases (and cannot predict at all in others), just that in the empirical world things can’t be predicted absolutely perfectly due to the inherent apparent randomness of quantum behavior. And tiny variations can cascade into bigger ones. Many things are very very very reliable, but I do not think they can be 100% predictable, as, say, 2+2 will always equal 4 if you define 4 as 2+2. So that little wiggle room allows us to predict things without having absolute determinism. Just as you might with a high degree of accuracy predict that I will go to work today even though it is not absolutely 100% certain that I will do so. We don’t need certainty to make useful predictions, just a high degree of reliability.
Regarding determinism #2, we both have irreconcilable beliefs that can neither be proven or disproven. It’s likely based on our differeing philosophies; you appear to lean towards rationalism and I towards empiricism. I don’t see the sense in believing that an electron’s emission of a photon was somehow preordained from all time, but given rationalism’s strong tendency to have things “must be”, I can see why you do.
Still leaving me wondering a bit here… what could we possibly be realiable about? I mean, this is sort of metaphysical implications of empirical data we’re discussing now. If there is no relyability at the fundamental level then how do we metaphyscially get to a picture of statistical reliablility? It seems that this precludes that there is an underlying structure, even if the universe isn’t keen on revealing it. To me, anyway. I agree we won’t convince the other to switch sides, however great of a sig that would make for me. “My argumentative choices showed gaudere that determinism is true!” lol. Anyway.
Is it not absolutely certain you will go to work or is it not absolutely predictable? Again, is random really so random? Where are you willing to allow a pattern predict behavior? Consider, for example, the sequential decimal expansion of pi. It is statistically pretty random (with the exception of 7’s in one particular length of numbers, but anyway…I guess that just proves its not just random, but it’s more random than we thought! :p), and yet there is a completely deterministic way to get that value. There are explicite formulas which converge rapidly on pi, which give nth hex digits of pi, etc. Plain as day. So can we still say pi is random? Of course. Can we say that pi is also non-deterministic? I don’t see how.
You see what I mean? Of course, we are nowhere close to having the explicit formula for the universe or something like that, the pi example is just illustrative of randomness being compatible with determinism (as I see it).
There is probability, not utter perfect reliability (certainty). We can assert that occurance X is highly likely without having to believe that it must always happen. I am perfectly content to rely on various levels of certainty, and save absolute eternal surety for logic and math and religion. Math can be absolutely deterministic, AFAIK (which is all that your pi example is). 2+2 will always equal four because it is inherent in the definition of 4 and so cannot be affected by any quantum randomness. And certain mathematical formulas have proven useful to model empirical reality, though not with absolute certainty–they are tools, not perfect descriptions of reality, so far as it seems. Quantum behavior does appear to be random and based on probabilities, not certainties, though for you the apparent randomness was preordained for all time. You can believe if you like that the quantum world is determinstic and we just haven’t found the “key” to it yet, but since we’ve been looking for a while and have yet to find such, I will not believe that quantum behavior is deterministic and perfectly predictable by any method until I see some evidence that it is so. I am much more concerned with the way-the-world-is rather than trying to force the empirical evidence of the world into a way-the-world-must-be.
It is a set value. The converging formulas which arl mentions converge to the value. They generate the digits. The digits are not random, either. It is the distribution of digits in the sequence of digits representing the value of pi that shows randomness.
Also, Quantum Mechanics is a highly successful predictive tool, which advocates of determinism often bring up. Quantum Mechanics also implies a significant number of truly random events (such as virtual particle creation), which opponents of determinism often bring up. My question: don’t you think it might be important to talk about what QM predicts so successfully if we are going to use it as evidence for the dterminism/randomness?
