Speedy trial entitlement. Just what does that mean?

[aldiboronti]

The question is prompted by the upcoming trial of Sopranos actor Lillo Brancato for the murder of an off-duty New York police officer. The incident took place in September 2005. That’s three years to get to trial!

Is this par for the course for places like New York? Couldn’t his lawyer argue that he’s not getting his constitutional right to a speedy trial? Just what exactly does a ‘speedy trial’ mean in constitutional terms anyway?

[Gfactor]

No length of time is per se too longto pass scrutiny under this guarantee, 22 but on the other hand neither does the defendant have to show actual prejudice by delay. 23 The Court rather has adopted an ad hoc balancing approach. ‘‘We can do little more than identify some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.’’ 24 The fact of delay triggers an inquiry and is dependent on the circumstances of the case. Reasons for delay will vary. A deliberate delay for advantage will weigh heavily, whereas the absence of a witness would justify an appropriate delay, and such factors as crowded dockets and negligence will fall between these other factors. 25 It is the duty of the prosecution to bring a defendant to trial, and the failure of the defendant to demand the right is not to be construed as a waiver of the right; 26 yet, the defendant’s acquiescence in delay when it works to his advantage should be considered against his later assertion that he was denied the guarantee, and the defendant’s responsibility for the delay would be conclusive. Finally, a court should look to the possible prejudices and disadvantages suffered by a defendant during a delay. 27

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/024.pdf
Most jurisdictions have statutes that clarify speedy trial rights. Here is New York’s:

§ 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision three, a motion made
pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section 170.30 or
paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
the people are not ready for trial within:
(a) six months of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
felony;
(b) ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three
months and none of which is a felony;
(c) sixty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than
three months and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
imprisonment of more than three months;
(d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
violation and none of which is a crime.
2. Except as provided in subdivision three, where a defendant has been
committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he must be
released on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such conditions as may
be just and reasonable, if the people are not ready for trial in that
criminal action within:
(a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
(b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable
by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of
which is a felony;
(c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the
custody of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is
accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor
punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months
and none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of
more than three months;
(d) five days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and none of
which is a crime.
3. (a) Subdivisions one and two do not apply to a criminal action
wherein the defendant is accused of an offense defined in sections
125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25 and 125.27 of the penal law.
(b) A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of the
specified period and their present unreadiness is due to some
exceptional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to, the
sudden unavailability of evidence material to the people’s case, when
the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such
evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence
will become available in a reasonable period.
(c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
(i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of imprisonment for
another offense;
(ii) require the release from custody of any defendant who is also
being held in custody pending trial of another criminal charge as to
which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
(iii) prevent the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
who, after being released from custody pursuant to this section or
otherwise, is charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial
proceeding at which his presence is required or otherwise.
4. In computing the time within which the people must be ready for
trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two, the following periods must
be excluded:
(a) a reasonable period of delay resulting from other proceedings
concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings for
the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
incompetent to stand trial; demand to produce; request for a bill of
particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
period during which such matters are under consideration by the court;
or
(b) the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his
counsel. The court must grant such a continuance only if it is
satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice, taking into
account the public interest in the prompt dispositions of criminal
charges. A defendant without counsel must not be deemed to have
consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by the court of
his rights under these rules and the effect of his consent; or
(c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or
unavailability of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent
whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid
apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due
diligence. A defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his
location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due
diligence; or
(ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
another matter, the period extending from the day the court issues a
bench warrant pursuant to section 530.70 because of the defendant’s
failure to appear in court when required, to the day the defendant
subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or
voluntarily or otherwise; or
(d) a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
section has not run and good cause is not shown for granting a
severance; or
(e) the period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in
another jurisdiction provided the district attorney is aware of such
detention and has been diligent and has made reasonable efforts to
obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
(f) the period during which the defendant is without counsel through
no fault of the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his
own attorney with the permission of the court; or
(g) other periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances,
including but not limited to, the period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted at the request of a district attorney if (i) the
continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence
material to the people’s case, when the district attorney has exercised
due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds
to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable
period; or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district
attorney additional time to prepare the people’s case and additional
time is justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case.
(h) the period during which an action has been adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and
215.10 of this chapter.
(i) The period prior to the defendant’s actual appearance for
arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been directed to
appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10.
(j) the period during which a family offense is before a family court
until such time as an accusatory instrument or indictment is filed
against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
5. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
following a mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or
collateral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to the custody
of the sheriff, if any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
withdrawal of the plea of guilty or the date the order occasioning a
retrial becomes final;
(b) where a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
defendant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the
ticket;
(c) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an
information, prosecutor’s information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant
to article 180 or a prosecutor’s information is filed pursuant to
section 190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision
one must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new
accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of the filing of the
felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the charges in
the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
(d) where a criminal action is commenced by the filing of a felony
complaint, and thereafter, in the course of the same criminal action
either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an
information, prosecutor’s information or misdemeanor complaint pursuant
to article 180 or a prosecutor’s information is filed pursuant to
section 190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision
two must be the period applicable to the charges in the new accusatory
instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such new
accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four, already elapsed from the date of the filing of the
felony complaint to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
(e) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a
misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor’s
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision one of
this section must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable to the charges in
the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed;
(f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a
misdemeanor or petty offense and a reduced indictment or a prosecutor’s
information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
210.20, the period applicable for the purposes of subdivision two of
this section must be the period applicable to the charges in the new
accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the filing of such
new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
such period and the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
subdivision four of this section, already elapsed from the date of the
filing of the indictment to the date of the filing of the new accusatory
instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the new
accusatory instrument had not been filed.
6. The procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through seven
of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss an indictment are
also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.

New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 30.30 - Speedy trial; time...

[smiling_bandit]

First off, the date of the actual crime is irrelevant, except as far as statute of limitations provisions apply. The relevant time is usually date of arrest. Second, as a practical matter the defense team often requests extensive delays, during which the defendant is usually out on bail.

[Gfactor]

@smiling_bandit

First off, the date of the actual crime is irrelevant, except as far as statute of limitations provisions apply. The relevant time is usually date of arrest. Second, as a practical matter the defense team often requests extensive delays, during which the defendant is usually out on bail.

I’m with you right until that last clause. Most defendants are not out on bail, at least in murder cases. *See * http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5552004.pdf

In state court cases from 2004, for example, only 9% of those defendants charged with murder were released with financial condtions pending trial. 3% were released without financial conditions. *Id. *

[Billdo]

I’m a New York lawyer, but I avoid criminal practice as much as possible, so I can’t give you a specific answer. However I’ve run across enough New York cases involving speedy trial issues that I can give you some idea.

Gfactor has posted the main New York statute on speedy trial. The key element of the statute is that the prosecution may be dismissed where “the people [i.e. the prosecution] are not ready for trial within” the specified time limits.

What happens is that when faced with a speedy trial motion is that the court goes day by day through each of the delays caused since the beginning of the case and charges them to either the prosecution or the defense (or sometimes to the court, for delays not chargable to either side). Whether a particular delay is chargable to one or another party is controlled by the statute (see subsection 4, which lists delays not chargable to the prosecution, including when the defendant is absent and cannot be found, time to determine the defendant’s competency or for other motions, and a host of other reasons) and by court interpretations.

After the court counts up the days chargable to the parties, sometimes having to make fine factual determinations as to who is charged with particular periods, it determines whether the prosecution has used more or less than the time allowable.

I have no idea why the particular trial the OP is discussing took so long, but I’m sure there was extensive motion practice (and possibly some appeals), which can delay a trial for years. Also, if the defense requests adjournments of the trial (for whatever reason) and the court grants them, those are not chargeable against the prosecution’s speedy trial time. Particularly for a serious charge like murder, where the defendant is out on bail and represented by aggressive counsel, it isn’t shocking to have the trial a few years after the incident.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

Would it be fair to assume that New York murder trials usually take that long because the defendant waives speedy trial protections, then, or do NY prosecutors just get an awfully long time to build a case?

[Carnacki]

@Really_Not_All_That_Bright

Would it be fair to assume that New York murder trials usually take that long because the defendant waives speedy trial protections, then, or do NY prosecutors just get an awfully long time to build a case?

I’m not a lawyer, although several of my law school classes were taught by practicing DA’s and public defenders (not in NY, however). But as a very general statement, it’s my understanding that a delayed trial generally favors the defendant, insofar as memories fade and witnesses might become unavailable. My guess would be that this defendant probably waived his right to a speedy trial (or failed to invoke it, not sure which is more correct in NY, I kind of skimmed the statute). Again very generally, I think whatever the prosecution’s benefit would be in extra time to build a case would be small compared to the defendant’s advantage.

[Gfactor]

The reality is that it’s tough to predict who will benefit from a delay. On the one hand, memories fade, and the prosecution has the burden of proof. On the other hand, alibi witnesses die and new evidence is discovered as time passes. That said, it’s usually the defense that asks for the continuances, files motions, appeals adverse rulings, or escapes custody. Those delays all get excluded from the speedy trial time.

[smiling_bandit]

@Gfactor

I’m with you right until that last clause. Most defendants are not out on bail, at least in murder cases. *See * http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5552004.pdf

In state court cases from 2004, for example, only 9% of those defendants charged with murder were released with financial condtions pending trial. 3% were released without financial conditions. *Id. *

Ok, maybe not murder cases, but a lot of other crimes. I could be wrong, but AFAIK, the considerable majority go off on bail in non-violent crimes, which are the majority of crimes anyway.

[IAmNotSpartacus]

No intent to hijack.

A buddy of mine was arrested in Georgia and booked for a felony. He posted bond and was released the next day. Apparently, one of the conditions of his release was that he waived his right to a speedy trial. To this day and to the best of my knowledge, he has not been formally arraigned.

Can anyone explain the mechanism here?

Does the SOL clock start ticking when he’s charged? If he had stayed in County would the People have been forced to bring charges forward within 45 days?

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

@IAmNotSpartacus

Does the SOL clock start ticking when he’s charged? If he had stayed in County would the People have been forced to bring charges forward within 45 days?

In Georgia, the SOL clock starts ticking when he’s identified as a suspect, and stops ticking when he’s charged. If the charges were dropped when he was released, then the statute (four years for non-capital felonies) has been ticking away since then.

However, as long as the charges are pending, they don’t have to bring him to trial within the statute period. The statute doesn’t protect you once charges have been filed, unless the state drops the charges with the intent to refile- if the charges are dropped at any point beyond the SOL, he’s free and clear.

IANAL, IANHL, this is all wrong, etc.

[Gfactor]

§ 17-7-170. Demand for speedy trial; service; discharge and acquittal for lack of prosecution; expiration; reversal on direct appeal; mistrial and retrial
(a) Any defendant against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not affecting the defendant’s life may enter a demand for speedy trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter; or, by special permission of the court, the defendant may at any subsequent court term thereafter demand a speedy trial. In either case, the demand for speedy trial shall be filed with the clerk of court and served upon the prosecutor and upon the judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the case is not assigned, upon the chief judge of the court in which the case is pending. A demand for speedy trial filed pursuant to this Code section shall be filed as a separate, distinct, and individual document and shall not be a part of any other pleading or document. Such demand shall clearly be titled “Demand for Speedy Trial”; reference this Code section within the pleading; and identify the indictment number or accusation number for which such demand is being made. The demand for speedy trial shall be binding only in the court in which the demand for speedy trial is filed, except where the case is transferred from one court to another without a request from the defendant.

(b) If the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment or accusation. For purposes of computing the term at which a misdemeanor must be tried under this Code section, there shall be excluded any civil term of court in a county in which civil and criminal terms of court are designated; and for purposes of this Code section it shall be as if such civil term was not held.

© Any demand for speedy trial filed pursuant to this Code section shall expire at the conclusion of the trial or upon the defendant entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(d) If a case in which a demand for speedy trial has been filed, as provided in this Code section, is reversed on direct appeal, a new demand for speedy trial shall be filed within the term of court in which the remittitur from the appellate court is received by the clerk of court or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter.

(e) If the case in which a demand for speedy trial has been filed as provided in this Code section results in a mistrial, the case shall be tried at the next succeeding regular term of court.

There’s a slightly different scheme for capital offenses. This is Georgia’s speedy trial statute, but the Georgia courts have recognized that the statute isn’t coterminous with federal constitutional speedy trial rights.

Unlike the statutory protections conferred by O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 that attach with a formal indictment or accusation, a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial right attaches upon arrest and can be asserted thereafter; likewise, the procedural bar created by the specific time deadlines found in the speedy trial statute do not apply to constitutional claims.

Nusser v. State, 275 Ga. App. 896, 622 S.E.2d 105 (2005).

Statutes of Limitation are different from either of these concepts. The SOL starts to run when the offense is committed.

§ 17-3-1. Limitation on prosecutions – Generally
(a) A prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time.

(b) Prosecution for other crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment must be commenced within seven years after the commission of the crime except as provided by subsection (c.1) of this Code section; provided, however, that prosecution for the crime of forcible rape must be commenced within 15 years after the commission of the crime.

© Prosecution for felonies other than those specified in subsections (a), (b), and (c.1) of this Code section must be commenced within four years after the commission of the crime, provided that prosecution for felonies committed against victims who are at the time of the commission of the offense under the age of 18 years must be commenced within seven years after the commission of the crime.

(c.1) A prosecution for the following offenses may be commenced at any time when deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence is used to establish the identity of the accused:

(1) Armed robbery, as defined in Code Section 16-8-41;

(2) Kidnapping, as defined in Code Section 16-5-40;

(3) Rape, as defined in Code Section 16-6-1;

(4) Aggravated child molestation, as defined in Code Section 16-6-4;

(5) Aggravated sodomy, as defined in Code Section 16-6-2; or

(6) Aggravated sexual battery, as defined in Code Section 16-6-22.2;

provided, however, that a sufficient portion of the physical evidence tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused and provided, further, that, if the DNA evidence does not establish the identity of the accused, the limitation on prosecution shall be as provided in subsections (b) and © of this Code section.

(d) Prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

@Gfactor

Statutes of Limitation are different from either of these concepts. The SOL starts to run when the offense is committed.

Not necessarily, hence my assertion that the SOL starts to run when the suspect is identified (my bolding):

@Georgia Code

§ 17-3-2. Limitation on prosecutions – Periods excluded

The period within which a prosecution must be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 or other applicable statute does not include any period in which:

(1) The accused is not usually and publicly a resident within this state;

(2) The person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is unknown;

<snip>

[Gfactor]

@Really_Not_All_That_Bright

Not necessarily, hence my assertion that the SOL starts to run when the suspect is identified (my bolding):

Ah, crap, you’re right.

[Really_Not_All_That_Bright]

@Gfactor

Ah, crap, you’re right.

I won’t make a habit of it.

Georgia’s SOL statute is pretty unusual in that respect.

[Gfactor]

@smiling_bandit

Ok, maybe not murder cases, but a lot of other crimes. I could be wrong, but AFAIK, the considerable majority go off on bail in non-violent crimes, which are the majority of crimes anyway.

That’s true, although overall 43% of defendants were detained until case disposition and non-violent offenses include drug offense, in which 40% of defendants were detained until case disposition. Embezzlers, forgers, swindlers, and those charged with driving offenses fared a bit better. But those offenses are a small proportion of those charged. http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t551.pdf

Nevertheless, I think we agree that more than half of all offenders were on bail pending trial. And that many of those who were on bail were charged with non-violent offenses.

[BrotherCadfael]

In Vermont, the state Supreme Court recently freed a defendant on speedy trial grounds. This has caused a LOT of controversy here, because the reason the trial has been delayed has been that the defendant has fired six of his court-appointed attorneys, whose replacement then has to take months to get up to speed. Any reasonable observer would say that the delay is the defendant’s fault, and is thus not grounds for a speedy trial argument.

Since this ruling, at least three other high-profile defendants have fired their lawyers, clearly for strategic purposes.

Because the court found for the defendant on federal constitutional grounds, an appeal to the federal courts is pending.

[Gadarene]

As a former law clerk for a federal district court judge, I can say that in our district, anyway, criminal defendants routinely waived their rights to speedy trials.

My sense is that this was most often because (1) the two sides were engaged in working out a plea agreement, which in drug trafficking or gang-related cases generally involved the defendant testifying against others, and didn’t want to feel rushed by a narrow timeframe; (2) the two sides felt they needed a longer period of time to adequately prepare their case, and so the defense lawyer convinced the defendant that it would be in his best interests to waive (if the defendant wasn’t convinced, the speedy trial time would be tolled statutorily upon motion, assuming the case was sufficiently complex); or (3) the defendant was out on bond, and thus the need for a speedy trial was less pressing for everyone concerned.

[Gfactor]

@BrotherCadfael

In Vermont, the state Supreme Court recently freed a defendant on speedy trial grounds. This has caused a LOT of controversy here, because the reason the trial has been delayed has been that the defendant has fired six of his court-appointed attorneys, whose replacement then has to take months to get up to speed. Any reasonable observer would say that the delay is the defendant’s fault, and is thus not grounds for a speedy trial argument.

Since this ruling, at least three other high-profile defendants have fired their lawyers, clearly for strategic purposes.

Because the court found for the defendant on federal constitutional grounds, an appeal to the federal courts is pending.

In arriving at this decision, we acknowledge that much of the delay in prosecuting defendant resulted from the inaction of several of the assigned counsel who represented defendant during the three years he awaited trial. As we discuss in detail below, however, the inaction of assigned counsel does not relieve the state[1] of its duty, through implementation of the criminal justice system, to provide defendant with a constitutionally guaranteed speedy trial. Indeed, the defender general’s office is part of the criminal justice system and an arm of the state. When, as in this case, a defendant presses for, but is denied, a speedy trial because of the inaction of assigned counsel or a breakdown in the public defender system, the failure of the system to provide the defendant a constitutionally guaranteed speedy trial is attributable to the prosecution, and not defendant. See People v. Johnson, 606 P.2d 738, 747 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) (stating that the purpose of the right to a speedy trial is to protect defendants against delay caused by the willful oppression or neglect of the state or its officers, including “not only the prosecution, but the judiciary and those whom the judges assign to represent indigent defendants”).

http://dol.state.vt.us/sites/libraries/files/supct/current/op2005-167.html

Here’s the order granting cert: http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/08-00088qp.pdf

[BrotherCadfael]

Thanks, Gfactor!

The case was in the news quite a bit up here. Based on news reports, here’s the sequence of events:

The defendant will ask for a new attorney. The judges, especially after the first couple of times, are reluctant to allow another change, so they tell the lawyer and the defendant to quit playing around and work together. The defendant then accuses the lawyers of various acts of malfeasance, mopery, dopery, etc. Eventually the lawyer gets justifiably fed up and tells the judge that he is unable to represent the defendant due to “irreconcilable differences” or whatever the legal equivalent is, and the judge reluctantly goes along.

It’s hard to see the state’s hand at work in causing a delay in the trial, here.