Strange Opinion in History Channel, Battle of Fredericksburg

Just watched another vaguely educational History Channel piece from their (US) Civil War series. This one was on the Battle of Fredericksburg.

For those unfamiliar, a thumbnail synopsis of Fredericksburg: Union General Ambrose Burnsides tragically sent his right wing against heavily fortified Confederate positions at Marye’s Heights and was repeatedly repulsed, taking the most lopsided casualties of any major Civil War battle. But his left wing had actually temporarily broken into Jackson’s lines on Prospect Hill to the south…a success that went unreinforced, leading to retreat and failure on that wing. The doomed Union charges on the right, however, went on all afternoon; 15 times in all, the boys in blue marched up that hill and were slaughtered.

In the TV program, a historian/author named Frank A. O’Reilly (appearing in distinguished company near the bottom of this page I just Googled) made a claim that, if I understood what he was saying, astonished me. He said that after the Prospect Hill attack failed on the (Union’s) left, Burnsides had NO CHOICE but to continue attacking Marye’s Heights. Though the attacks were fruitless, losing many men and nearly destroying Union morale, Burnsides had to mask his weakness and keep up an appearance of strength (I presume he meant, “in order to deter Confederate counterattack.”)

Seeing as how Fredericksburg was the worst battle the Union fought (and that’s saying something), and how the Prospect Heights attack failed specifically because the extensive reserves available were not used (and this would have been available to deal with any theoretical counterattack), and how the entire rest of the war was probably better for the Union soldiers than that afternoon on Marye’s Heights, I don’t see how this can be true.

The decision to attack Marye’s Heights has universally been considered Burnsides’ second worst decision, second only to the decision to continue attacking there while being slaughtered. As the attack continued, Lee was grimly delighted: it was here that he made his famous comment, “It is well that war is so terrible, lest we grow too fond of it.” The moment the attack stopped, the Union army breathed a sigh of relief, and eventually began the process of recovering. And Lee didn’t attack them then, despite the fact that AFTER the charges the Union army was much weaker than if it had not attacked at all (although I’ll grant that darkness eventually did fall, but there was no counterattack the next day, either).

So maybe I misheard or misunderstood this historian? Obviously he’s sufficiently regarded to get quoted for TV, and I’m just an aficionado of history. But I ran the DVR back a few times and it looks like that’s what he said – that Burnsides had NO CHOICE but to essentially suicide his army to keep up appearances.

That can’t possibly be a sensible interpretation of the events, can it?

I used to live in Fredericksburg and have been to Marye’s Hill. It was absolutely insane to keep sending people up there, just completely incomprehensible. Of course this is now. Back then, life was short and brutal, anyway, so they probably didn’t think so much of it.

Of course Burnside had a choice. He could have withdrawn without ordering further attacks. It’s what he ended up doing anyway.

But once Prospect Hill was lost, Burnside’s only chance to win the battle would be to take Marye’s Heights. Generals still believed you could win battles by force of infantry, and he was subscribing to that belief. His options were to retreat (and be judged a defeat) or take the heights (and gain a victory).

Burnside wasn’t the North’s smartest general, but to avoid a sure loss by retreat, he went for the small chance that they take the Heights.

Right. Generals ( who were subordinate to some ruler, democratic or otherwise ) were in a tough spot. Retreating or failing to act aggressively enough could easily cost you your job. In extreme cases involving annoyed monarchs, it could cost you your life. Generals, even mediocre ones, hate losing and usually aren’t that fond of being disgraced and/or cashiered. And governments just often weren’t very sympathetic to military realities, especially as in pre-modern times it would be hard to judge said reality at a distance.

A better general would probably have never put himself in Burnside’s position to begin with. But once there I’m sure he felt stuck - simply falling back not only invited counter-attack, but much more importantly threatened his career. Even good generals have fallen prey to the insidious need to win, despite prospects looking poor.

The decision to have this beard is a pretty bad one too. And why can’t he button his coat?

The blame for the slaughter properly falls first on Lincoln.

Remember, Burnside had been appointed to the command to replace McClellan, who was dismissed for lack of aggression. The action at Fredericksburg was part of a planned advance to Richmond which Lincoln specifically endorsed, and may have written elements of.

And indeed, as it turned out, the Union fiasco at Fredericksburg was prosecuted with sufficient aggression that Burnside remained in command. His offer to resign was refused. Lincoln wanted commanders who fought, even if they fought badly and threw away their men’s lives by the thousands.

It should be noted that Burnside also had the opportunity to occupy both Fredericksburg and Marye’s Heights days before any Confederate forces were even on the scene, and failed to do so. For the position he was in, relative to the Lincoln administration, that was probably the error he had the most choice in.

McClellen was sacked for lack of *strategic *agression, which is a completely different thing than tactical agression. The problem is, I’m not sure that Burnside or Lincoln understood the difference (Lee did - his preferred strategy was always to advance his troops offensively, and then fight defenseively).

Hey, not many people get to have a hairstyle named after them.

But couldn’t he have thrown, say, two unengaged corps against Prospect Hill, where there had been success with a single division, instead of sending wave after wave against Marye’s Heights, where there had been decisive defeat? The military maxim “never reinforce failure” argues more strongly against battering Marye’s Heights than it does against restarting the Prospect Hill fight from scratch.

I don’t have anything to offer to the OP, but it reminds me of a similar question I asked some years ago about Mark Clark, who made his own bad decisions in WWII. But, as one of the posters mentions, basically, “Yeah, it was dumb, but he had his orders.”

That’s not what Lee did at Gettysburg.

I know. That’s one reason he lost.

The original plan for the invasion of Pennsylvania was to find a good spot on the road to DC, dig in and wait for the Union to attack. Gettysburg happened pretty much by accident.

Lees failures were in logistics which he was hopeless, and strategy where he was an ok general at a time when a master was needed. His brillianace at tactical engagements were not enough to compansate. Gettysburg was due to his short comings in all three areas, the first two were inherent problems and his tactical accumen abandoned him, but not for the assualt on the third day, he had really no choice but to do so.

Back to the OP, the breakthrough in Jackson’s lines (made by Meade’s division) would not have been the end of the battle, just a minor setback, as opposed to the assualt on Longstreets lines, IIRC Longstreet had 5 divisions to Jackson’s three and if needed could send reserves to Jackson, while not compromising his position one bit.

I’m no expert, but didn’t Lee call Pickett’s charge his greatest mistake?

It was his second-greatest. The biggest mistake Lee ever made was not listening to Longstreet on the second day of the battle. It is possible that had the Confederate Army swung wide to the right, they could have avoided Little Round Top and flanked the Union position. That would have also avoided the Devil’s Den and the Wheatfield.

That’s only if you believe Longstreet’s 20 years after the fact memoir. There are a fair number of historians who believe Ol’ Pete was misremembering what he said on July 2 to Lee about the flanking move.

Also remember that on July 2 Lee had no idea where Jeb Stuart was, and any move he made would’ve been without the benefit of a competent cavalry screen. Disengaging your army in the face of a superior enemy in hostile territory without adequate intelligence of said enemy’s positions was not something to undertake lightly. Remember that on July 1st, the main fighting was carried on by I Corps and XI Corps of the Army of the Potomac. That left II, III, V. VI, and XII Corps unaccounted for. Plus, Meade himself didn’t want to fight at Gettysburg. Meade wanted to draw the ANV onto Union defensive positions at Pipe Creek (in Maryland), a plan which didn’t survive first contact with the enemy.

Lee was outgeneraled by Meade at Gettysburg, but to claim the failure to move to the Union left to interpose between DC and Gettysburg was his worst mistake is to underestimate the situation as it exsisted on July 2. In my opinion, taking into account what the generals knew at the time the decisions were made, Pickett’s Charge was a much worse blunder than any failure to move betwwen the Army of the potomac and DC on July 2nd.

Well, just because you had success at one point of the battle doesn’t mean you’ll be able to repeat it. He probably knew that Lee would reinforce Prospect Hill (since it was already shown as a point of weakness). And assuming that, it also points to further attacks on Marye’s Heights, since that position might have been weakened as Lee moved troops to Prospect Hill.

And, of course, it’s easy to criticize 200 years later. It’s hard to know exactly how much Burnside knew about Prospect Hill when he ordered the additional attack.

I’m not really defending Burnside – he was a notably unimaginative commander and really didn’t think he should be commanding the army. I get the impression that he just liked to bull ahead and try to win by overwhelming force instead of using other tactics. But, given various reasonable assumptions – that Lee had weakened Marye’s Heights to reinforce Prospect Hill; that you could still overwhelm your enemy with a massed charge (well, if not reasonable, part of what commanders of the time believed – and it worked well as a tactic as recently as the Mexican War); that you could not afford to withdraw – I’d say it’s not surprising that Burnside ran the battle the way he did.