Sunni and Shiia sects of Islam. Differences?

If this has been covered, would someone give me the link?

Based on a thread I started some time ago about England and the IRA that gave me a ton of helpful insights, and now the recent one on Judaiism, I’m hoping to learn from everyone the differences, large and small, between the 2 main (are there more?) sects of Islam.

Considering many of the wars and animosity in the ME are between the two main factions of the faith, what are the fundamental differences that raise such anger? Or are they minor in the sense that they’re only an excuse for two sides to fight?

The only comparison I can think of is Catholics/Protestants. But being Catholic I know what the differences are between those two. I don’t know the apparent split in Islam, if that’s what it was. Are they roughly the same kind of thing?

I could google this and try to wade through a billion or so pages not knowing what is fact and what is opinion paraded as fact, so to get the SD on it, I’ll leave it to you, as always, to give me a straighforward approach to explaining it.

Thanks.

You probably should have posted this in GQ.

As a minor factual correction, it’s not just these two factions/sects/denominations; the Kurds have also been on the receiving end of sectarian violence.

The Sunni-Shi’a schism goes back to a dispute over who succeeded, or should have succeeded, Muhammed as leader of the Islamic community. From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Islam:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ali_Ben_Abu_Talib:

But one thing I’ve never heard explained adequately is why the Sunni and Shi’a of today still think they have something to fight over, considering that there is no Caliph of Islam any more and no serious prospect of one. (Nobody has even claimed the title since the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished after WWI.) Maybe Tamerlane can help us out here.

My stock background, reposted from a couple of earlier threads:

Although I think this has already been covered in part, I’ll take a stab at the question of the Shi’a/Sunni split. It was not really a doctrinaire religious split like the Catholic/Protestant rift, nor was it really a geographic split ( though there were very limited elements of that ). Rather, despite some definite religious overtones from the beginning, it was primarily a political fissure.

The central issue was the succession to Muhammed. Muhammed was none to clear on just what was to happen after he died in 632 C.E. ( in part it may be that death crept up on him sooner than he expected ). There are some ( disputed by Sunni scholars ) indications that he favored his family, personified in his son-in-law and cousin, Ali ( who was also the first male convert to Islam, though not the first male adult convert ). It seems pretty clear that Ali himself was of this opinion. However Ali was a polarizing figure with limited backing and the Islamic state was in a fragile position. In particular the situation in Mecca, just recently converted, was unstable, but it was there that the bulk of the Islamic state’s resources were concentrated ( to oversimplify vastly, Ali drew his support more from Medina, his opponents from Mecca ). Some of Muhammed’s most important Companions, led by Umar, seized the bull by the reins and quickly convened a council and had Abu Bakr, an extremely clever man and skilled politician with strong support from the all-important Quraysh tribe of Mecca, elected to the post of Caliph. The explanation given was that this was a traditional Arab way of deciding the succession of a community ( Sunnah=tradition, hence "Sunni ). This was then presented as a fait accompli to Ali, who was caught by surprise and NOT happy about it. After some resistance he acquiesced with poor grace. This began the split.

After Abu Bakr died, Umar engineered his own election and sought some rapproachement with the disgruntled Ali, with some, but not complete success. After Umar was killed by a slave, Uthman of the Banu Umayya beat out Ali ( still with only limited support ) in a further election. However his twelve-year reign proved tempestuous and was marred by a certain dictatorial bent and rampant nepotism. He also ( in contrast to Umar ) pursued a policy of centralization. All of this stirred tremendous resistance and led to armed rebellions. One of these rebel parties, proceeding from Egypt, murdered Uthman in Medina in 656. The various rebel factions that now dominated Medina proceeded to place their backing behind Ali, who though he had argued against violence, was tainted by being supported by Uthman’s murderers. Further though he considered himself Caliph by legitimate descent, he was not elected by a Shura ( council of senior Muslim leaders ) as Umar had stipulated should be done and lacked the backing of the Quraysh, which Abu Bakr had proclaimed as the ruling class in Muslim society. He was thus immediately challenged by Mu’awiya, the powerful governor of Syria and Uthman’s closing living relative.

This triggered the first ( of four ) fitna , or Islamic civil war. At first Ali was successfu, winning an advantage at the battle of Siffin. But he then made a horrible political blunder by agreeing to an arbitration with his opponents that made significant concessions. Since he had been waging this war as a struggle against un-Islamic rebels that had earlier been declared unfit to hold office, this arbitration was considered heretical backsliding by a minority of the heterogenous factions that made up the early Shi’a movement. One group ( who were largely desert Bedouin with definite anti-centralizing and egalitarian tendencies ) seceded and declared a general war on both Ali and Mu’awiya. These became the Kharijites, the third great division in Islam ( now represented mostly by the Ibadis of Oman and parts of North Africa ).

The Kharijites considered their allegiance to not be bound to a particular person, but rather to the Koran and the Sunna of Abu Bakr and Umar ( they conveniently overlooked or ignored those two Caliph’s elevation of the Quraysh, to which they were fiercely opposed ). They were critical of Ali’s claim to the Caliphate based on his early merits and kinship with Muhammed. In their eyes early merit could ( and in this case was ) be lost by an infraction of divine law ( as they considered Uthman and Mu’awiya to have lost it ) and kinship with the Prophet was irrelevant.

Weakened by the aftermath of the arbitration at Siffin, Ali’s position eroded as he now faced a multi-front struggle. In 661 he was assainated by Kharijites and his son and successor al-Hasan surrendered to Mu’awiya who inaugurated the Umayyad dynasty.

At this point Shi’ism was still more a political force, but it was beginning to gather religious differentiation. Ali’s second son, Husayn, died in an abortive revolt attempt at Karbala in 680 and became a martyr to the Shi’ite cause. A son of the fourth Imam, Zayd, died in a rebellion against the Umayyads, causing his followers to split off as the militant Zaydi Shi’ites ( “fivers” ), who recognized the first four Imams, before breaking off under a fifth, Zayd ( a non-designated son ) - To the Zaydis, designation of successors ( accepted by other Shi’ite factions ) was unimportant, it was only those that struggled against oppressors that were worthy of the Imamate. The Zaydis today dominate northern Yemen.

By the 740’s resistance to the Umayyads, who were extremely Arabo-centric and plagued by some poor rulers ( only Umar II is uniformly praised by Sunni biographers ), began to intensify. The Abbasids, a family that was descended from the Prophet’s uncle, Abbas, began to gather steam in Khurasan in the east, drawing particular support from some Shi’ites and the mawali ( Persian converts to Islam slighted by Umayyad policy ). After being badly weakened by a serious of disastrous military defeats ( to the Khazars, the Byzantines, and North African Kharijites ) and a fratricidal succesion struggle, the Umayyads were swept from power by the Abbasids in 749.

This occasioned a further split in the Shi’ite community. Those that were content that members of the Banu Hashim ( Muhammed’s family, essentially ) were now in power, in the form of the Abbasids, merged into the Sunni mainstream. Those that contended that only Ali’s direct descendants should rule, remained as Shi’ites. From this point, that definition of Shi’ism became codified.

The true development of Shi’ism as an entirely different religious sect, with significant differences in jurisprudence and doctrine from mainstream Sunnism, solidified under the sixth designated Imam ( in direct descent from Ali ), Ja’far al-Sadiq ( who worked under the protection of the Abbasid Caliphs ). From this point forward, though there were many elaborations and one further split after Ja’far’s death into the Isma’ili/Sevener and Imami/Twelver sects ( the Imami’s are the “mainstream” sect that one finds in Iran, southern Lebanon, and southern Iraq today ), one can consider Sunnism and Shi’ism as different religious movements in the fullest sense.

addendum: Less I was unclear, the fourth Imam, the son of Husayn, wasn’t named Zayd ( it was Ali Zayn al-'Abidin ), rather that was his son’s name. The fourth Imam’s designated heir, who is accepted by both Isma’ili and Imami Shi’ites as the legitimate fifth Imam, was Muhammed al-Baqir. He predeceased his younger brother Zayd in 731. So at the time Zayd died a martyr in 740 and the Zaydi split happened, the other Shi’a factions were already under the authority of their sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sadiq ( who died in 765 ), whose authority the Zaydis rejected. Hope that’s not too confusing.

  • Tamerlane

Well, by this point it isn’t really about the Caliphate anymore. Shi’a and Sunni have different jurisprudence and different religious doctrines. For example these days ( and this is not an ancient tradition, but rather the result of the last couple of centuries of religious evolution in Shi’ism ) virtually all Inthna’asheri ( Imami ) Shi’a ( i.e. the bulk of Shi’a in Iraq and Iran ) are supposed to follow a marja e-taqhlid or “source of emulation”. These are the Grand Ayatollahs, men so learned and pious they act as the ( usually somewhat informal ) source of religious inspiration. Sistani is the most influential in Iraq, Fadlallah in Lebanon, etc.

This is a concept quite foreign to Sunnism, where religious hiearchy is far less recognizable, except when imposed as a state-mandated structure as in Saudi Arabia or in terms of the more limited and rarefied examples like Sufi masters. ( found in both Shi’a and Sunni flavors ).

  • Tamerlane

Tamerlane, a wonderful history of the split. Thank you for taking the time. If you, or anyone else, cares to expand on further modern differences, trends, rituals, etc I’d appreciate those as well.

If this belongs in GQ, please move it. I put it here because, as with many discussions on religious differences, opinion has a high probability of entering it. Opinion would be welcome as well as long as it isn’t of the “This is why we’re better than them” nature.

So, in very, very approximate terms, Shi’a = Catholics, Sunni = Protestants?

Very, very approximate, I suppose. Maybe very, very, very ;).

[QUOTE=duffer If you, or anyone else, cares to expand on further modern differences, trends, rituals, etc I’d appreciate those as well.[/QUOTE]

Hmmm…well I’m not sure where you would start. There are quite a few differences and I’m not really qualified to speak to all the ritual variations.

I forgot to mention it in the post above but Shi’a= “partisan”, from *Shi’at Ali/i] = “partisans of Ali”.

In general Shi’ism ( again speaking about the majority, Itna’asheri version, not the Zaydi, Isma’ili or smaller denominations like the Ahl e-Haqq or the rather borderline Alawites ) is more hiearchical than Sunnism, as I said. There is a general trajectory in Ithnas’asheri Shi’ism that follows rank in religious learning ( that include a necessary volume of scholarly publications/commentary ) from Hojjatoislam ( kind of a seminary grad student level - this is really where Iran’s current supreme leader should be ranked ) to Ayatollah ( ~Ph.D ) to Grand Ayatollah ( Nobel laureate ). Sunnism has little that is comparable - titles like Mufti are altogether more vaguely applied and acquired and dson’t have quite the same force of societal influence.

In addition there are the sayyids, lineal descendants of Ali that form almost a religious caste in Shi’a communities. Most Grand Ayatollahs have come from this group, like Khomeini, but not all - for example the late Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari ( an Azeri Turk who, among other things, rather famously issued a fatwa condemining Khomeini’s Iranian constitution ) was not a sayyid. Not all sayyids go into religion and not all religious figures are sayyids, but the overlap is considerable. For example the automatic respect that their lineage engenders acted as a natural opening for sayyids to assume religious and adminstrative posts in fragmenting tribal groups in 19th century Iraq, probably significantly facilitating the large-scale conversions to Shi’ism that occurred in that period.

The veneration of Imams is of course a major difference. Some Sufi Sunnis might venerate Sufi saints, but in general Shi’sm seems much more prone to this. The death of Husayn in particular has inspired an annual passion play around his martyrdom on 'Ashura’, the tenth day of the month of Muharram - these are the public spectacles, including plays ( shabih ) about the battle of Karbala and in some cases public self-flagellation, face-slapping and blood-letting as expressions of reverent grief ( much criticized as irreligious cultural accretions by many religious authorities through the years and recently banned outright in Iran ), that you see played out in Iraq on TV around the shrine cities ( Najaf and Karbala most prominently ).

Other thoughts later, maybe, as they occur to me.

  • Tamerlane

Just as a clarification of this. The problem with the Kurds isn’t a sectarian problem. Most Kurds are Sunni, except for some in Iran, who are Shi’ite. The reason for all the conflict with the Kurds is ethnic…they’re a seperate ethnic group with their own language (Indo-European, related to Baluchi), and their own sense of national identity.

The Shi’ites have always been a minority everywhere except for Iraq and Persia. The most important point to keep in mind in studying the history of relations between the two sects is that almost all Shi’a communities have been governed by Sunni leaders for many centuries. Typically wealth and power have flowed to Sunnis disproportionate to their share of the population, and as you would expect this has led to long and severe resentment from the Shi’ites.

In most cases groups that view themselves as oppressed and victimized are the ones most prone to radical or violent thinking, and the Muslim world is no exception. Since the start of the Arab Awakening in the late nineteenth century, the Sunnis have in general been better disposed towards working and living alongside westerners, and accepting western influences, than the Shi’ites have.

There are actually still some Shi’a Kurds in Iraq, the Faili Kurds. In Iraq, after some dithering, at least one section decided to throw there lot in with the UIA and will now field a few seats in the new assembly under the UIA umbrella.

Also in Iraq the Sunni Kurds tend to follow a different madhab than the Arabs ( Shaf’i rather than Hanafi ) and are much more inclined to Sufism. However it’s true these aren’t huge differences.

Where they were a minority until the 19th century.

Where they were a minority until the 16th century.

Excluding Persia since the 16th century.

Hmmm…I’m not entirely sure I agree with that. It’s an arguable point to be sure, butfor example Iran at least has had plenty of contact with the west since the 17th century ( not all of it happy, of course ) and it doesn’t appear today that the Iranian populace as a whole is any more anti-Western than elsewhere in the ME/NA. Perhaps rather less so in some cases ( the Iranian theocrats perhaps excepted ).

  • Tamerlane

Excuse me, Shafa’i.

Old Irish joke: “If only we were heathen so we could all live together like good Christians!”

Another question I thought of.

With Mecca and Medina being the two holiest cities, does each sect make the hajj to the respective city of origin, or do they all pretty much have Mecca at the top of the list?

If the real issue was about who should have succeeded Muhammad, the divison between Sunni and Shi’a would be pretty moot by now. The modern division is more about the heirarchy of the Islamic faith. Sunnis believe in a fairly direct connection between the Koran and the faithful; Shi’a believe more in the need for a special class of holy men to interpret the Koran and guide the faithful. So in this sense, the Sunni are equivalent to the Protestants and the Shi’a are equivalent to the Catholics.

Not really. Apart from the fact that majority Shi’ism is a comparatively recent development in these areas, as pointed out by Tamerlane, the Shi’a have been more powerful than the Sunni in different areas in the past. In fact, for a while at the beginning of the last millenium, the Shi’a were perhaps more dominant.

One major political dynasty was the Fatimid dynasty, rulers of an empire roughly stretching Algeria-Syria, from ~900AD to ~1180AD. They were adherents of the Ismaili branch of Shi’a Islam (also called Seveners to separate them from the Twelvers who dominate in modern Iran and the Zaidi / Fivers mentioned by Tamerlane), but believed they were descended from a mahdi, a messiah-like figure. The tottering dynasty was eventually removed by Saladin, nemesis of the Crusaders. Saladin was also a Sunni, and is perhaps, in certain circles, revered for his defeat of the Shi’a empire more than for his defeat of the Crusaders.

Another major political grouping was the Nizari, the so-called ‘assassins’, who loosely ruled minor areas in what is now Syria and Iraq at the time of the Crusader kingdoms (ie from about the time that the influence of the Fatimids in this area was removed). They split off from Ismaili Shi’a. I understand that Saladin (a Sunni) reduced their influence greatly, but that they were not wholly removed from political power until the coming of the Mongols. They have reappeared on the political scene in the last hundred years or so in Iran and India, led by the Aga Khan.

Modern religio-political groups influenced by or stemming from Shi’a Islam, though not really Shi’a themselves include:

  • The Druze of Lebanon (split from Ismaili Shi’a round the time of the Fatimids, now have a mystery religion - ie are prevented from discussing it with outsiders)
  • The Alevis of Turkey (know very little about them)
  • The Alawis of Syria (A smallish minority, but the current President of Syria is one, as was his father. They claim to be Twelver Shiites (ie like the Iranians), but most Twelvers reject this claim.)

Another example are the Buyids, the Shi’ite dynasty that was the real power behind the later Abbasid Caliphate for about a century, from the mid-10th to mid-11th.

However strictly speaking they were a minority. Neither the Fatimids nor the Buyids went in for large-scale conversion and most of their subjects were Sunni.

Also the Baha’i, the Nusayris, and the Sufi-origined Ahl-e Haqq.

As far the the Alawi are concerned, I believe most Shi’a at least accept them as Muslims, while many Sunni do not.

  • Tamerlane

I think I may have inadvertently confused you. The Shi’a didn’t originate in Medina and the Sunni in Mecca. That geographic split was a very, very loose one and only really relevant to the period it occurred in - Medina was the smaller town to which Muhammed fled, Mecca was the larger town eventually conquered/converted late in his life. It is Mecca that was the important center, both politically and religiously. Medina is indeed important as holy site, but equally for Shi’a and Sunni. Mecca is the more important of the two and the obligation of the Hajj is to Mecca ( Medina, where Muhammed’s tomb is situated, is usually added as a last step in the Hajj, so usually both are hit, but I don’t believe it is considered obligatory ) and again this applies equally to Shi’a and Sunni.

  • Tamerlane

Thanks again, Tamerlane.