Okay, seriously? Did you just pull this directly out of your arse, or do you have a single bit of substantiation for these claims other than second-rate military techno-porn airport novels?
First of all, it’s the Soviet Air Force (and specifically the 46th Air Army Long Range Aviation Foirces), not the “Red Air Force”. The 46th, at the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union, had somewhere in the range of ~65 Tu-16 ‘Badgers’, ~100 Tu-22K ‘Blinder-B’ or -22R ‘Blinder-C’, ~500 turboprop Tu-95 ‘Bear’, ~150 Tu-22M ‘Backfire’, and 35 Tu-160 ‘Blackjack’ strategic bombers. In comparison, the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command had ~250 B-52G/H ‘Stratofortress’, 100 B-1B ‘Lancer’, 20 B2 ‘Spirit’, and over hundred FB-111/F-111G bombers. (All of these numbers are available from multiple sources, including Janes Intelligence Group publications, fas.org, et cetera. Some of these are reconnaissance versions, but even most of those remained weapon-capable.) While there is a numerical disparity, one also has to look at the capabilities; the Tu-22Ks were roughly the same capabilities as the F-111 (that is, medium range strategic bombers), and while the Tu-22M and Tu-160s were more comparable to the B1-B, the Tu-95 ‘Bear’ was a turboprop plane that, while long range, lacked evasive or concealment abilities of even the elderly B-52s (nor did it have the speed). The Tu-16s were also old planes better suited to second rate air forces (to whom they were eventually sold) and the Soviet Union at the time of its breakup had nothing comparable to the B-2 in stealth penetration capability. One also has to realize that the Soviets had many targets almost at their front door in Central and Western Europe, while the distance to targets from the continental United States is measured in many thousands of miles making bombers a far more questionable prospect in terms of deterrence. (Indeed, the arguments for maintaining the “strategic bomber” leg of the American nuclear triad had more to do with politics and internal empires than practical utility.)
Soviet liquid-fuel SLBMs were highly capable, far more solid propellant American boosters of the same era. It is true that the fuels are caustic, but only the first couple of designs required fueling at sea; later systems were designed to be fueled at port using storable liquids and sealed from the sub. Given the often questionable quality control in Soviet industry they actually had very few known problems with liquid fueled SLBMs. They actually had more problems with the submarines themselves, and in particular the nuclear power plants, which was probably less an artifact of poor design than of the lack of a dogmatic, practically fascist adherence to maintenance and safety imposed by the overbearing Admiral Hyman Rickover, whose policies (including the dreaded ORSE) and willingness to destroy an officer’s career over a single mistake instituted a pseudo-religious fevor for safety in the US ‘Nuclear Navy’. The Soviets did eventually go to high performance solid boosters for SLBMs for the same reason we did, i.e ease of maintenance. Because they did not focus on solid propellant rockets earlier (which are very different from liquids in design and manufacture) they were slower to adopt the technology, but that doesn’t make liquids less effective; indeed, the Soviets enjoyed greater range and higher payload ‘throw-weight’ than American designs of the same era.
I have absolutely no idea where you get your “>50%” estimate from, but the fact is that surplus Soviet/Russian ICBM and SLBM boosters are being used today for targets and space launch with a remarkable degree of effectiveness and reliability, including the cantankerous but capable R-36M (NATO reporting name SS-18 ‘Satan’) storable two stage booster. It is true that weapons inspectors during the early to mid ‘Nineties found weapons in silos that had not been properly maintained and were not serviceable, but this is because Russia stopped paying their techs who then proceeded to stop working. (One inspector told me that he actually found a silo with the door open to the sky and all manner of creatures living in the silo, which also had 6-8’ of water in it.) It is safe to say that said weapons were not maintained in their condition when the Soviet Union was on high alert. It is worth noting that the USAF had no small amount of difficulty maintaining the storable liquid fueled Titan II boosters which were only kept because they were the only vehicle with sufficient throw weight to deliver the 9MT W-53 warhead.
There is the implicit assumption in your claims that American systems enjoyed very high reliability throughout their deployment. Perhaps you should do a bit of reading and see if that claim is justified. Or you can just continue to pull claims from unmentionable locations without any fact-checking or citation at all.