Texas Tech and Going For It On 4th Down

For awhile now, blogger Matt Yglesias has been harping on (PDF) the statistical case against punting. In yesterday’s U.Va. - Texas Tech game, I got to see how it worked out in practice, because Tech went for it in all five of their fourth-down situations in the second half.

So how did it work? Damned well, actually. While Tech only succeeded on three out of five 4th-down conversions, those three successes led to two Texas Tech TDs, while turning the ball over on downs twice led to zero U.Va. scores. They did pass up a sure FG, but it was when they were down 14 with just over 8 minutes left in the game, and a FG would have left them still needing two scores.

Since U.Va. led 21-7 at the half, and scored one more TD later on, it’s hard to envision that Tech would have come from behind (which they did, winning 31-28) if they’d handled fourth downs as a normal team would.

Here’s the situations where they went for it on fourth down:

  1. Down 21-7, 4th and 5 on the U.Va. 41. They picked up the first, and the drive ended in a TD.

  2. Down 21-14, 4th and 4 on the U.Va. 36. They didn’t make it, turning the ball over on downs. U.Va’s subsequent possession ended in a punt.

  3. Down 28-14, 4th and 4 on their own 32. They picked up the first, and drove all the way to the U.Va. 1.

  4. Down 28-14, 4th and goal on the U.Va. 1. (Later that same drive.) Went for it, didn’t make the TD, turned the ball over on downs. U.Va’s subsequent possession ended in a punt.

  5. Down 28-14, 4th and 3 on the U.Va. 34. Picked up the first, and ended the drive with a TD.

U.Va. should have still won, but if Texas Tech hadn’t played like that, U.Va. wouldn’t have even been given the opportunity to blow it.

As entertainment, it was great. As strategy, I think it makes a lot of sense when you’re behind and don’t have a lot to lose. And it’s always made sense in that part of the field where your punter’s likely to put it in the end zone, but you’re too far out for your FG kicker.

What’s weird about the latter situation is that on occasion, a coach will clearly realize this - on fourth down. But he seemingly won’t have realized on third down that he’s in 2-down territory, as evidenced by his calling a pass play for the first-down yards, rather than using third down on the running play that the defense is completely not expecting, that will still get stopped short of the first down 75% of the time, but has an excellent chance of getting most of the first-down yardage. If you’re going to go for it on fourth, it’s important to know that at least one play ahead.

Anyway, it was such fun to see a coach try that approach that I didn’t mind seeing my team lose as a result. :slight_smile:

There are similarities between T. Tech’s offense and the Patriots offense.

They both score an insane amount of points, and they probably go for it on 4th more than any other other teams in college/pros.

And, they both pass much more than any other offense. You need the personnel, but I think you’ll be seeing those types of systems more in the future. T.Tech passes 60+ times every game, it seems. Give them a little defense (like they might have next year) and they’re going to be a very good football team. 19 of 22 starters coming back, I think they said.

A couple years ago Michael Lewis (of Moneyball fame) wrote an article for NYTimes Magazine about Mike Leach’s offense. . .the timing, the adjustments, the formations. He has used even wider spreads than they used yesterday.

Gregg Easterbrook (TMQ) is a big fan of going for it on 4th, and he thinks that some day there will be a coach who never punts.

This is one of those reasons that I think the game looks like it has passed by Billick. He’s still coaching as if he had Trent Dilfer at QB, and a defense that couldn’t be moved on. Punting a lot works for the 2001 Ravens. He has failed to make adjustments, and it’s clear now that not only is he not an offensive genius, but he might be an offensive retard.

Parcells was also a guy who went for it much more than other coaches.

Easterbrook and others make a good case for going for it on 4th down. I wouldn’t say it’d be a good idea to do it every time (4th and 20 on your own 1 wouldn’t be a particularly good idea), but in the other team’s territory, less than 5 yeards, outside of FG range, and, especially, if you’re down by more than a touchdown, it should be standard strategy.

The problem is that if you go for it and it doesn’t work, you get flak for it. It’s not a sure thing, and most fans and commentators think it’s a risky play. As Esterbrook points out, if you punt, no one will criticize you, but if you go for it, you’d better succeed (even if succeeding 3 out of 5 times would be better in the long run.

I’d like to see far fewer punts. If nothing else, it will liven up a game.

A huge part of the reluctance to go for it seems to be that coaches overweight how bad it is to give the other team the ball on their own 45 compared to punting and giving them the ball on the 20.

But also, coaches fail to plan for 4th on 3rd. For instance. . .3rd and 9 on 50, you should be thinking “2 down territory”.

Too many teams think, “gotta get the 9 yards” and it makes your offense completely one-dimensional. Belichick will use his full completment of 3rd down plays in that situation (screens, runs, draws, etc) knowing that he’s going for it on 4th & 4 or less.

I like the idea of going for it more often, but time and score should be taken into account. Like when you can go up by two scores with, say, six minutes left, kick a field goal.

That’s what I heard them saying, too. If they’re as good as they ought to be next year, that offense will have a very high profile. If one coach does something different, and it works, then other coaches try it too.

I think the announcers said that Texas Tech averages 57 passes per game. Just feels like more. :slight_smile:

Actually, Easterbrook says it’s already happened at the high school level: that Pulaski HS in Arkansas doesn’t punt - ever.

I’m not convinced that completely abandoning the punt is a good idea. In Easterbrook’s piece, the Pulaski coach gives an example of punting from his own 5, saying the ball will end up on his 35 where the opponent will have an 80% chance of scoring.

In the NFL, of course, the typical net would be closer to 40 yards on the punt, and from 45 yards out, the opponent has probably more like 65% chance of scoring, iwith that scoring tilted towards the FG. Give up the ball on downs, and the opponent is at your 10, say, with 98% chance of scoring, and maybe a 65% chance of a TD. In terms of expected values, your opponent’s expected scoring goes from ~3 points to (~5.5 points) x (chance of failing to get the first down). So you need nearly a 50-50 chance of converting to make it work. And once it stops being a surprise that you’re going for it, you won’t get that sort of success rate.

But the first team in any conference that adopts an approach of only punting from fairly deep in one’s own territory, is going to reap huge benefits. It’ll not only be strategically more advantageous, but the players will have that “we don’t need no steenkin’ punt!” swagger to them, and when they have to take unusual chances in order to win, it won’t seem like that big a deal to them: they’ll already believe in themselves as risk-takers.

Once the element of surprise is gone, I think the strategy becomes less viable.

We’re not talking about fake punts or fake field goal attempts. If a team is going for it with their regular personel, the other team knows it.

Being a Tech alumnus and a Lubbock resident, I’ve watched a lot of Tech football this year, along with all the associated coverage in the papers and on television. What the rest of the country doesn’t get to see as much as we do around here is the arrogance of Mike Leach. Yes, he’s a good coach who is winning games in a big way, but what keeps him going for it on 4th down is his massive set of brass-plated gonards and his need to swing 'em.

Anyway, I’m glad we pulled it off, especially considering that we had to play against not only a nationally ranked Virginia team, but also against the officiating staff. What the hell. That was excessive celebration? And am I the only one who noticed Virginia get away with not one, but two play clock violations? Apparently, when the Cavaliers have the ball, “Delay Of Game” is just a figure of speech…

But is it working? I obviously haven’t been watching all season, but it was sure effective the other day.

I saw one of the delay-of-game noncalls, and I was surprised too. The ball was snapped by the Cav center at least a half-second after the play clock went to zero. It definitely should have been called.

But if you’re talking about the other call I think you are, my initial reaction was the same as yours, but then they showed a second angle where the Tech player was clearly using both hands to mime the action of throwing a guy to the ground. It wasn’t just an exultant pumped fist, which is how it looked from the view in real time.

And in that characteristic he differs from 99.9% of big-time coaches (such as the basketball coach there at Texas Tech) how, exactly? :smiley:

For years now I have been of the opinion that unless you have a lights-out punter who can hit the coffin corner every time, you’re MUCH better off going for it on fourth down when you’re between the other team’s 40 and 30 yard lines. As someone said already, the best idea is to keep that in mind on third down as well, so you can adjust your playcalling accordingly.

I’m surprised coaches ever go for a FG in a 4th and goal situation, except in certain circumstances. Down by two points with ten seconds left? Yeah, go for a FG. The score is zero to zero with ten minutes left in the first quarter? Go for a fucking TD! Stop being such pansies!

A lot of what I’ve heard here makes sense. I wonder if twenty years from now, the punt goes the way of the quick kick, especially if the “don’t punt” strategy pays noticeable dividends.

ETA: You’ll still see the quick kick occasionally as a surprise play. For instance, it’s fourth and two and the offense seems to be going for it. Quarterback flips the ball to the half back, boom, no return. At least theoretically.

Nitpick.

He’s actually NOT “still coaching.”

Thank God. :slight_smile:

To me it’s a purely statistical question. Figure out an approximation of the chances of getting the first down based on the average number of yards you gain in similar situations and the average number of yards the defence gives up in similar situations. Figure out the expected number of points that you’ll score should you succeed and the expected number of points your opposition will score should fail. Finally, figure out the expected starting position of your opposition should you punt and the expected number of points they’ll score starting from that point of the field.

If the net expected number of points you score going for it on 4th down is larger than the expected number of points the opposition will score if you punt, you should try on a 4th down.

Now, obviously you need to consider the situation, as well: down by several touchdowns in the 4th quarter? Go for it. Up by a touchdown with a minute to go in the game? Punt.

The problem with adaptation is that the punt now becomes a strategic decision. And that opens the coach to second-guessing (especially by commentators who are so used to punting on 4th down that any attempt to go for it is considered inherently risky). If the strategy fails, the coach gets blamed; if it costs them a playoff game, you can be sure that other coaches will note and refused to go for it.

There are a lot of factors that have to be considered: distance for a first down, the score, the yard line you’re on, how well your offense is moving the ball, etc. I’d like to see fewer punts, but I also think it unlikely any coach will be brave enough to go for it regularly.