I know that this has gone round many times, but that is exactly why I would like to discuss the interpretation of a certain mathematician’s version of the problem, now that we’ve hashed out everything:
"Consider now some randomly selected family of four which is known to have at least one daughter. Say Myrtle is her name. Given this, what is the conditional probability that Myrtle’s sibling is a brother? Given that Myrtle has a younger sibling, what is the conditional possibility that her sibling is a brother? The answers are, respectively, 2/3 and 1/2.
"In general, there are four equally likely possibilities for a family with two children–BB, BG, GB, GG, where the order of the letters B (boy) and G (girl) indicates birth order. In the first case, the possibility BB is ruled out by assumption, and in two of the three other equally likely possibilities, there is a boy, Myrtle’s brother. In the second case, the possibilities BB and BG are ruled out since Myrtle, a girl, is the older sibling, and in one of the remaining two equally likely possibilities, there is a boy, Myrtle’s brother. In the second case, we know more, accounting for the differing probabilities.
John Allen Paulos, Innumeracy, p. 86
My claim is that Paulos has not formed the first question in such a way that the answer is 2/3. I have no dispute with the second question.
I already affirm (in the well-formed formulation of the question) that the conditional probability that there is exactly one girl and exactly one boy, given that at least one child is a girl, is 2/3. My dispute, of course, concerns Paulos’s phrasing. Either the answer is 1/2, or else the question is ambiguous and cannot be answered unless we add other important assumptions. (Paulos has not told us that in GG families both girls may be named Myrtle, so I assume the opposite – the most natural and obvious assumption.)
Generally, probability questions use names to mark out and identify a unique individual. Identifying a daughter as “Myrtle” or identifying a daughter as “the older sibling” each has have the same effect. As soon as one child is specified, the remaining child has a probability of 1/2 boy and 1/2 girl.
Does anyone think otherwise? Paulos is writing for the public, and he is attempting to combat mathematical ignorance and “illiteracy.” I find it disappointing, then, that he would make this mistake.
The most recent thread on this topic seems to be