Spiritus, you are a great guy, but you are ultimately frustrating to debate with. There is no way in hell that I am going to develop a complete case for my passive existence. That you would even request such a thing is over-the-top. I can certainly point you to the readings I have which led me to this path, but for goodness’ sake people write entire books on the problem of universals and come to no conclusion. I certianly do not have the capacity to espouse a complete theory of passive existence here.
Understand the point of my postings above were to go from an intuitive and decidedly unspecific definition of “free will” (actually, will in particular) and try and find out just what will does. I have no qualms if you choose to feel that will is arbitrary; I would then level the same accusation of disusing the word as you have levelled to me. In fact, that is my whole point in saying that will, as it is commonly understood does not exist.
There are many places that the systems come from. Some come from our biological makeup. Others are imposed on us as we age. Still others are synthesized from existing systems upong the discovery (not active discovery, of course, but the mere “happening upon”) of other systems. Many of us on this message board hold logic as one such (complicated) system and use it as a tool when we encounter new systems. There are certainly atomic systems, but they are arbitrary and are a matter of environment, both literally (our surroundings), semi-figuratively (social envoronment), and completely figuratively (sudden “revelations” as they may or may not come).
Which systems should be used where is a matter of association that is not truly a part of the system at all but is also simply forced upon us in the manner similar to that outlined above. von Neumann’s game theory is one such example; all “creativity” is in fact the use of systems in manners which are not normally associated, but those associations are, as I’ve said, arbitrary. Thankfully, too, or analogies would be completely lost on us.
The specific problem I have with compatibilism isn’t that they try to merge free will with determinism, but simply where the hell they put the will. Frankly, in any discussion of free will, even if one were to completely deny causality, I wonder where they put the will. Reflecting on my decision making process demonstrated to me that, in fact, I never really intend to do anything that I do. I feel uncompelled, and for good reason, too, since all the data I have to go off of is encapsulated in my idea of self. If I’m not doing it, then who is? Of course, I am doing things, I just don’t will it to happen. I am who I am. I am the result of a whole slew of arbitrariness. I observe what is going on around me. I am doing these things! I simply am not willing it to happen: there is no room for will, IMO. It falls apart in my hands like a sand castle, and has as much substance.
The central readings that have made the case for me (literally, if I am correct ;)) are taken in part from and also synthesized from the following books: Godel Escher Bach, The Emperor’s New Mind, and Consciousness Explained, by Hofstader, Penrose, and Dennett rspectively. GEB deals with two things specifically of interest to me: recursion (and the corresponding halting problem) and reductionism. Most importantly, I think, is the notion that ants don’t mean to make anthills, but they always do (that is, you can’t point to an ant and say, “He knows how to make an anthill”). From Penrose’s work I took some more ideas about basic computability, and specifically some notions about what consciousness and will must do with regards to scientific studies (he ends on a note that consciousness might hae something to do with accumulated quantum effects, but that just seems a lot like reaching to me). From Dennett’s work I took the case he develops about non-centralized consciousness, and the idea that the brain handles tasks in a manner that is not immediately available for reflective observation due largely to problems inherent in doubting perception.
I have no doubt that I am conscious; I am not certain what I mean by that. I have no doubt I am the one doing the actions; I am not certain that I intend to do any actions (will). I have no doubt that causality, in some form, operates on the universe at large and my constituent parts; I am fairly certain that whatever form of causality exists leaves me little quarter to have a will that is not, itself, a result of causality. So yes, in effect, I am stating that consciousness is really just an epiphenomenon, and were it not for the notion of self it would be even more apparent.
For some specific responses:
Simply ridiculous 
The answer is, in effect, no. You cannot go back in time; or rather, until you can go back in time and relive the past exactly as you did then and remake a decision you won’t have a choice. You ate turkey for thanksgiving. You have no choice in that. You cannot undo that. It is now a matter of fact. To say you could have avoided eating turkey is the subtle mapping of a thought experiment onto remembered parts of your past, and saying that you had a choice is false; to say you would have a choice if you were in such a situation again is true, I won’t disagree. But what is done is done, there are no choices about it. You might even tell me, forcefully, that “Hey, I remember having the choice to eat or to not eat turkey.” That’s fine. Be my guest.
Your first post to this thread mentions that you find neither an unbreakable chain leaving no quarter for free will nor a point where you can certainly find it. Your second post then offers some alternatives for me to tackle (that you don’t necessarily hold true) and your most recent then requests that I address them directly.
No argument. There never was, IMO. I am not sure what you are trying to read into my statements. I would address this later by querying what, exactly, “wishes” was meant to imply. I have not said that it mattered whether or not there were other choices available to the agent in question. so long as there was one choice (which is actually impossible, as the evaluation is always “to or not to”) it was possible, at the point we are discussing, to exercize will.
Perhaps you feel I am, at my core here, a compatibilist in that the wishes represent the weighted systems. I would not have a specific quarrel with that. I simply feel that any definition of “free will” which relies on arbitrariness and no source of motivation apart from the arbitrariness to be contrary to what is commonly understood by the term “Free Will”. Free will is commonly understood to be a conscious agent meaning to make and then making choices, and I reject that, and so I reject the notion of free will. I have no beef with compatibilism otherwise, except that it certainly leaves the impression of activity. Hell, some compatibilists might even demand activity. I merely argue that it seems like we are active agents only because all our data, and the systems themselves, are understood to be part of the self. This is not a huge quandry, it is simply, IMO, misleading to assume that because our weighing is internal that it is somehow consciously active. If I am effectively agreeing 100% with compatibilism then so be it.
Another statement of free will you made was as follows: Free will, as I understand it in this context, is the proposition that operations of consciousness can play a determining role in future actions. I thought I addressed this previously, but I can do so again. I don’t think there is any doubt whatsoever that anyone who uses the term “free will,” including myself, has ever for a moment thought otherwise. What you offer is indeed a very intuitive definition of free will. It is also a fairly empty one, which is what led me down this path in the first place to even ramble on about the topic. Hence the following comment:
[li]But don’t think that there must be free will. I’ve never seen the determinism/free will debate be anything other than a series of assertations.[/li]
I did intend to develop my point; I did not intend to be able to do so without making assertations. I certianly could not do so without stating something more clearly than “Free will is something that does stuff.”
You simply cannot be satisfied, LOL. If i define a term explicitly you get upset because that is not the common use; if I redefine terms throughout the development of a point as “new information” comes to light you also get perturbed. Allow me, then, to simply make one big assertation/definition. You may reread the thread at your liesure to determine where you are misusing the definitions, and where I am misusing them (on purpose).
There is no such thing as free will. There are only interactive systems whose purpose is to place relative weights on data gathered through passive observance. At any particular decision point, our consciousness is aware of a certian number of possible options (it may be that we are aware of all of them, it may be that we are aware of some which aren’t viable). These options of which we are aware are choices. The choices are weighed according to the systems. Action is carried out based on the weighings, or actions are not carried out based on indeterminate weighings (or conflicting systems, or non-halting decisions, or or or). It seems as if we have a will as it is commonly understood because we are also aware of at least some of the systems. All systems are arbitrarily obtained since there is no initial “willing” agent to deliberately obtain them. Their sources include, but are not limited to, our parents, our teachers, and systems applied to themselves (analyzing religious beliefs with logical foundations). No system is required to weigh any particular data: this association is loose and as arbitrarily imposed as the systems themselves.
More comments:
There is no one to design such a system other than evolutionary habit. Modes of thought which are infinitely recursive are especially detrimental to life and would have died with those who held them. Apart from that, the appeal to a first mover is unbecoming (hey, if you can say I abuse logic, I can say you appeal to a first mover:p). Unless you are willing, of course, to say that someone must have designed DNA. I mean, how does it know when to stop replicating? 
I’m not sure how to make this any more clear. I started with unfettered will, which is not required of any system whatsoever as far as I know. I stated that “unfettered” is obviously wrong. I stongly implied physical limitations on action. Since the topic of the entire thread is “the chemistry of free will” I thought it was at least partially obvious that causality was part of “physical limitations.” If we disregard unfettered and just leave uncompelled will, I’m not sure what else is left other than compatibilism: the idea that conscious will is possible even in the scope of physical reality, namely, chemistry and its corresponding causality, predictability, and entirely deterministic outlook. Do you still have a problem with this?
I have repeatedly addressed it. The systems weigh the choices of which we are passivley aware, however many that is. I do not see a problem with evaluation systems being able to handle more than one choice at a time. Why do you?
This problem is the central theme, almost, of Dennett’s “Consciousness Explained.” He goes into great detail about neurological research and what it implies for consciousness. I cannot repeat such an endeavor on a message board. If I could I would, believe me. This topic fascinates me to no end. The author does not attempt to mechanize consciousness and will as much as I have, though; he simply makes the case that it is not in any way centralized, that it deliberately misleads itself, and makes very pointed suggestions that it is a very vivid illusion but never quite comes out to say that it is, in fact, a vivid illusion.
