As I understand it, all biological processes are, at some level, chemical. In the case of thought, I believe its through the means of the Sodium/Potassium (sp) pump that messages are sent over a neuron, from the terminal branches of the neuron, it’s then translated into neurotransmitters and the impulse is sent to the next neuron. If this is so, how do we have freewill if it’s all just a set of chemical reactions? How do humans start the impulse at their leisure?
Note: (This is the best way I think of can convey my question, but if it’s unclear, just let me know.)
We’re holistic beings. That is, we are greater than the sum of our parts.
If you suffocate to death what has changed? All of the ‘stuff’ that is you is still there. I could take a bucket and add a bunch of water, some carbon and some other miscellaneous junk such that I have all of the components that make-up your body but I don’t have a living human.
Maybe I’m missing your question but just because neurons firing is a mere chemical reaction doesn’t mean that the ways in which they fire aren’t important. That computer in your skull in uniquely you even though at the most fundamental level the same thing is happening there as what is happening in my head yet we are different. You might decide to go right and I might choose left at the next street…free will.
First of all, let me say that if you’re really into this, you may enjoy reading ‘Godel Escher Bach’ by Douglas Hofstadter, which explores this theme (and many others) in a fascinating and enjoyable way.
To re-state your question, if ‘thought’ is a set of chemical processes, and if chemical processes are deterministic, how can thought not be deterministic?
It’s a good question. Chemistry IS deterministic, in the sense that a bit of this and a bit of that will always produce a bit of something else. Replicate the conditions exactly, and you will always get the same outcome. (Some people would argue that this is not necessarily true, and certainly not at a quantum level. But that’s a separate chat for another day.)
So where does that leave thought? First of all, it is one thing to say that ‘thinking’ involves chemical process, and quite another to say thinking simply IS chemical process and no more. Some people think ‘something else’ is involved. The ‘something else’ has many names, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ being just two examples of many. Arthur Koestler coined the memorable term ‘the ghost in the machine’ to summarise this kind of attitude.
Secondly, suppose we agree that the chemical processes involved in thinking are so complex that we can never analyse or predict them with any kind of accuracy. In this case, one can say that while thought may be deterministic at a sufficiently low level, at the much higher level (the level at which we can analyse what’s going on) it is non-deterministic to all practical intents and purposes. Put more simply, it is impossible (with our level of understanding and analysis) to posit a starting position and from that predict how a human being will behave, think and feel. This being so, to all practical intents and purposes, we will have to inter-act with the person as if he had free will.
Thirdly, the notion of ‘free will’ is a very elusive one when you try to get philosophical and really pin down what you mean by it. Some would say that it is a term much more applicable to spiritual discussions than psychological ones.
If you DO bother to go through all the fine analysis, and to read what philosophers and other great minds have written about this (Wittgenstein is a good one to try, and so is Hobbes), what you end up with is while it is possible to believe man has free will, it is impossible ever to prove that he has it - since for any thought or action one can always postulate that in fact his actions were the ‘mechanical’ consequence of factors present at the start of the period of observation (even if we have to concede we cannot know what these were or predict their outcome).
This is a problem for anyone concerned with morality, since IF a person does not have free will THEN the question arises: how just is it to hold him to account for his actions?
The prevailing consensus is that whether we have free will or not, we have to act on the basis that we have, and we don’t know how to contruct a rule-based society (with notions of right and wrong, reward and punishment) on any other basis.
Do I get a bun or something for being able to write all this out from memory? Or does Struuter want to come by and give me another little peck on the cheek?
The brain is very complex (obviously) and many of the circuits cannot be reduced into such a simplistic aspect. To give an example, it would not be unusual for one neuron to have several hundred dendritic connections (upstream input) and several hundred axonal connections (downstream output). Some have many more. Repeat this process several trillion times and you have an idea of what you may be dealing with. Nothing in the brain works in isolation. Add to this that each synaptic connection may be weighted in a certain way, some neurons fire without stimulus, there are automatic programs of firing constantly at work throughout our cortex, and that many of the connections have a wide latitude for rewiring throughout life.
On a fundamental level, though, your OP may have some merit. Neurotransmitters, which mediate interneural communication, are the lifeblood of our behavior and thought. In very general terms, broad ranges of behavior and behavioral alterations may be attributed to neurotransmitter response. For instance, dopamine and seratonin levels are grossly related to things such as mood, perception, and cognition. Addiction is also thought to be tied in part to the dopaminergic system. Dopamine misregulation may cause Parkinsonism or schizophrenia. Seratonin misregulation may cause depression or perhaps eating disorders and obsessive/compulsive disorders. One can hypothesize that things like drug addiction are a basic brain reflex in order to compensate for a neurotransmitter imbalance. One may choose an easy route of neural “dopamine satisfaction” by inhaling cocaine rather than going through the ways that nature intended.
Our free choice to stay late rather than go home from work may similarly be a choice as to which one will give us more “neurotransmitter satisfaction.” For instance, you can stay at work and get paid more and get your work done and make life easier, or you can go home and watch TV. Through a process of learning, your brain is able to estimate which one will give more “neurotransmitter satisfaction,” and this is what will determine your choice. It doesn’t take free will out of the picture, of course, but it does make much of it dependent on your subconcious mind’s ability to estimate which will be more satisfying, which is in turn based on previous experience and other more primal factors.
Godel Escher Bach has a suprising amount of number theory in it. You might also like Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained which involves an approach he feels is analogous to Wittgenstein’s (though I’ve never read Philosohpical Investigations so I cannot confirm anything other than that the author has several citations and references to it) and draws heavily on a modified version of phenomenology.
But don’t think that there must be free will. I’ve never seen the determinism/free will debate be anything other than a series of assertations. Apart from that, if your looking at chemistry, don’t be too suprised when you only find chemical reactions, eh?
We don’t start any impulse. We don’t have free-will. But we aren’t contrived by these processes, either. We are these processes. Our “choices” are determined by interactions, by chemical reactions,etc… but **we are these “choices” **.
Ianzin: Gilbert Ryle coined the phrase ‘Ghost in the Machine’ in ‘The Concept of Mind.’
Aside from that…
I find that it’s generally possible to trace thought trains back to an external stimulus. I am considering what to write in this post because I spotted the title post and thought ‘hmm, that one sounds interesting,’ and I came across the post because I was sitting bored in the common room and thought ‘hmm, now what can I do to ease my boredom this depressingly unsunny day?’ Sometimes I question this and think ‘but surely I can think about what I want’ and then I find myself trying to find a new subject - it’s usually something I was doing the other day or a question raised in class that morning. All external stimuli or my own moods, which in turn are caused by chemical stimuli.
With such a complex system, it’s probably possible that an illusion of free will and random thought could arise, but is it a real thing or just an illusion? Try using a rationlist technique:
The brain is a physical entity. (yes)
All physical objects obey the same physical laws. (yes)
These laws are deterministic. (ouch - if yes, continue)
Therefore the brain follows these deterministic laws.
So in that case, no we don’t have ‘free will.’ Oh dear.
Free will, IMO, does indeed require that one brushes aside perfect causality and randomness and that one adopts some sort of spiritual view, be that the Ghost in the Machine view or something less precise.
I have always had problems with trying to understand how philosophers could, in one breath, spout out causality and “cause and effect” and then, in the next, discuss free will.
I, for one, am not very troubled by imposing moral judgements in a deterministic framework. After all, if the actor didn’t have any choice, neither does the one who does the evaluation
But here is where modern physics and math gets you. These laws of physics are not deterministic. Apart from the system being complex beyond reductionism, the individual events of thought (synaptic vesicle release, action potentials, cell/cell adhesion, pathfinding), are at such a small scale that you very readily get into quantum effects. We are talking about tiny shifts in gradients of ions, we are talking about thermal energy affecting the amount of vesicles released, we are talking about billions of tiny events occuring every second.
There is a lot of “noise” inherent in the system. While I am not attributing free will to this quantum noise, I will say that there is enough randomness around that when presented with two exact situations twice, there is no guarantee that the result will be the same. While this is not the same as free will, it takes away the scary Calvinist concept that every time we twinge, it is preordained by God. And for all intents and purposes (saying that every move cannot be predicted no matter what), that is as good as free will in my book.
Check out the several recent determinism threads for more on this.
Actually, I think the best book from (both of ) these authors on this topic is The Mind’s I. Great stories excerpted from various authors, followed by discussion of each one.
IMO, the chemical/electrical description and psycological/spiritual description are on different levels. As an analogy, picture an ice cube that is melting, and imagine a single atom at the edge between the ice and the water. Is it part of the ice, or part of the water? The problem is that “ice” and “water” are words that have meaning at a higher level of description but don’t work at the atomic level. A single atom is described in terms of its position and it’s velocity. A collection of atoms is described in terms of the relations of the atoms to each other - bulk properties that don’t apply to individual atoms.
Same thing for thoughts. Individual neurons are doing their own thing according the chemical/electrical signals they receive. At a higher level of description, thoughts are being generated that relate to what the individual neurons are doing, but aren’t amenable to a description entirely in terms of individual neurons.
Whether this saves us from the Frankenstein monster of determinism I don’t know. Maybe quantum mechanics helps?
Well, this is where lazy use of precise words always gets me into trouble. I certainly do not believe in “Free Will” at all because I don’t believe in true choice which is pretty much required for Free Will. A perfect choice would be one in which the decision was made free of any previous state of the universe, local surroundings, etc. I think this is quite obviously false. Secondly, even a “limited free will” or the so-called “compatibilism” form (where I am not perfectly free because of natural limitations but nonetheless retain an ability to choose from within the set of all possible natural actions) strikes me as both contrived and also impossible, mainly because decision processes involve choosing actions based on previous experience, current situation, etc etc. So that even limits our “perfect choice” ability even more.
Unless, of course, we choose to act completely at random all the time. A sort of chaotic compatibilism: you base each decision process on nothing whatsoever other than what you cannot physically do. Anything else further ruinates the perfect choice.
I am not aware, actually, of how different philosophers in particular have handled the free will debate. I understand that Locke and Hume have leveled some pointed commentaries about the topic, and though I am currently deep into Hume I have yet to approach this topic in his writings (hey, I’m an armchair philosopher and these things take time to read without teachers helping you along:D). These are my personal commentaries and so if I happen to use a word incorrectly I apologize and will attempt to clarify what I mean (though compatibilism is rather clear, for certain).
So anyway, it certainly seems that without random decisions the free will debate should not, IMO, center around the ability to choose because choice itself is rather weakly defined or weakly implemented. Apart from that, as I have mentioned previously, any completely materialistic explanation of the brain which accepts causality pretty much decimates free will.
Note that the above does not imply determinism! We cannot predict the future, we just know that whatever the outcome is, it wasn’t really consciously directed as the Free Will camp would have us believe.
I see three (at least) issues for debate:
[ul][li]Are the physical interactions of neurons deterministic in all elements.[/li][li]Do the physical interactions of neurons suffice to completely deliniate “consciousness”. (1-to-1 relationship)[/li][li]Is consciousness an epiphenomenon of the brain.[/li][/ul]
For the first quesiton, I think the answer lies in the previously mentioned “quantum noise”. Does the magnitude of cumulative quantum uncertainties have a measurable effect on actions/interactions of neurons? I don’t know that this question can be answered authoritatively. My “gut feeling” is that quantum effects cannot be wholly discounted at that scale.
For the second, I would say yes, though I believe the “causality” of the relationship is complex rather than simple. As in most complex adaptive systems feedback loops, nonlinear relationships, etc. play a significant part in the behavior of the system.
For the third, I think “yes–but”. Yes, I think consciousness arose as an epiphenomenon of phyical processes within the brain. But, it is an “illusion” built of the same materials as the “reality”. As such, “operations of consciousness” (for lack of a better term) are in fact operations on neurons. “Thoughts” might well be reflections of a neural state, but they also affect that neural state.
What are the repurcussions of the above for Free Will v. Determinism? For me, nothing concrete. I cannot point to any link in the chain and say, “here is free will”, but neither can I point to the chain as a whole and say, “it is unbreakable–there is no place for free will to arise”. In the absence of strong argument one way or the other it pleases me to operate under the presumption that I have free will. Or, I feel that way because that is how my neurons are arranged.
I really do not understand this, erl. Are you tying free will to an idea of absolutely unfettered opportunity? I fail to see how limiting the potential options in any situation eliminates free will, until, of course, you reduce “options” to “outcome”. If there is only one, there is no choice. If there are less than infinite, it is still a choice. Free will, as I understand it in this context, is the proposition that operations of consciousness can play a determining role in future actions. I don’t see how lack of omnipotence has implications to that question. Do you mean something else by “free will”? If not, can you explain the implication in more detail?
OK, in a (hopefully not vain) attempt to actually address all your questions instead of rambling on and answering none of them (my modus operandi) here we go…
Well, honestly, I attatch different significance to “outcome” and “options” depending on the context of the question. When we are discussing the question, “Did I have a choice?” in reference to a past action the answer is, in effect “no,” because—for whatever reason—I performed a specific action. Though I could have done others (options) I can only perform one (outcome). However, to look at things from a different angle…
Absolutely unfettered opportunity as free will? Quite simply: yes. Free has no meaning apart from “unfettered” in my opinion. Will is exercized opportunity with recognition of something related to that opportunity (be that the opportunity itself, some effect of the opportunity, etc). This is, I believe, what is commonly referred to as a choice. We are: one, not physically limited to one specific option; and, two, in some way aware that we are not physically limited to one specific option. If I didn’t know I had more than one option then I can’t really say I did, even in hindsight, because it quite simply never presented itself to me. I was, in fact, effectively limited there.
So, in the directly preceding paragraph we present that there are such things as “choices” which are options of which we are aware (unless we decide that awareness requires free will, which I don’t think follows because I don’t think physical properties must exibit will to occupy states, and if we are attacking this debate from a materialist perspective then consciousness, being a physical state, does not require a will automatically). Performing a specific action which is one option of which we are aware is exercizing our will.
Free, again, means unfettered (I’m not sure how else we would use the term, actually).
So do we have a will? I think so: yes. Is it free? Obviously not. It is simply relegated to compatibilism? I do not believe so. Why not? (I will return to this question in just a moment)
This literally begs the question in a materialist perspective. Rephrased, “Free Will, as I understand it in this context [erl note: which context?-- mine? The thread’s? Compatibilism?], is the proposition that [a physical system] can play a role in determining future actions.” Well, obviously, if we accept cauality or even a weak causality like quantum probability. See what I mean?
In a degenerate case it does. If I don’t know I have any options I have no choices. Would you agree?
Now, back to why I still feel we have simply reduced ourselves to compatibilism, and even that won’t save us.
First, I find that the choices we have are strictly dependent on two things. One thing is our physical bodies, and the other is our physical surroundings. Both of which, when taken into account, create the world often described in compatibilism. I add to that in order to account for my perceptions of what I am able to do. Even if I really could do a thing, but I never considered it because I didn’t think I could, I cannot be said to have that action available as an option, and hence I am not aware of it, and hence it is not a choice. “Viable-ness” doesn’t even come into play here. I am simply not aware of such an option, and so my choices (perceived options) are limited.
Now, as my last sentence mentions, viability of a choice plays a role in the exercizing of our will. That is, not only do I find myself physically incapable of some options, and not only am I unaware of some options, what choices are left are then evaluated by some standard. Here is the “tricky” part. No choice is necessarily perfect in that it fulfills all of our standard’s criteria (some may be, but we cannot generally say than any system will, in fact, always present us with a perfectly viable choice). So we are left with a list, so to speak, of choices, which are weighted in whatever manner our system demands (based on expected outcome, based on the morality of the act, the morality of our desires, etc etc whatever the system uses to ascribe value). That system will then result in the following scenarios (I have chosen two choices here for display, but it should be extendable to any number of choices):
[ul][li]One choice is weighted more than the other.[/li][li]One choice is equal to the other.[/ul][/li]In the first case I see that the system I have in place to delineate my choices determines which choice I act on. In the second scenario my system in no way determines what choice to follow.
In the first case we are left, then, with Will not determining actions prima facie but determining the system itself under which the choices are valued. I will come back to this.
I find the second case to be mostly an oddity required for comlpeteness, but I must at least consider the fact that there can possibly be a scenario where even the most degenerate case (to act on the only available option or to not act (also, strictly speaking, an option)) requires that something still be done. My awareness does not aid me in the decision process. By virtue of the case we are dealing with my system of values does not aid me. What then? I can only say: random. Literally, flip a coin. Roll a die. Roll ten dice. Play with magic eight balls. It doesn’t matter anyway because I cannot exercize my will. I am at the mercy of something external to me, even as if I didn’t have a choice. This is the literal Erisian Solution. Whatever option is finally performed I cannot say “I chose that.”
The first case is more interesting, and in my opinion infintely more likely. I am now resolved to act on an option because of my method of valuation. The method of valuation made the choice, but did I chose the method of valuation?
sigh this is getting extremely complex for a single post, but I will go on.
This pretty much returns us to the series of debates we’ve had in the past, Spiritus. RToT styled epistemology? Where do we place moral evaluations? Is there a morally correct way to morally evaluate something? And I fear I cannot comprehensively argue this point. I will, however, attempt a heuristic argument for it and see what say ye.
You and I, at least, agree that the basis for any system is necessarily arbitrary. To have a deliberate basis for one system requires an arbitrary basis in another, and so on, and so on, until we finally are fed up with arbitrariness and simply pick one. What does the preceeding sound like? Well, it sounds like my analysis of the strange case (outlined for completeness) where two choices were equally valued in our weighted list of options of which we are aware. And what was my conclusion there? The Erisian Solution, aka: “whatever.” Chaos. Random. Arbitrary.
So, did I vanquish Free Will? I believe I certianly vanquished “free.” I think that is an extremely obvious thing to eliminate right out. I developed Compatible Will from compatibilism. I then attempted to demonstrate that even compatibility is not enough to offer us intuitive choice, and that any final analysis of choice and Will require the Erisian Solution. This means that any reasonable definition of Free Will to me must be random action. The other option is complete determinism, and then the issue becomes whether or not we can predict the future even if we are technically required to live it (fate). That is also an interesting topic (the difference between free will and non-computable fate by appearance) that I am not sure we’ll ever get to in this thread, because the above post is likely to be ripped apart, piece by piece, ground into fine meal, and spoon fed to me. And I will relish it! (without relish, of course; I don’t like pickles)
The distinction I was attempting to illustrate is that: If there is more than one, they are options. If there is only one, it is the outcome. No other context is necessary to draw that distincion.
This is an abuse of logic. It is like saying that when I flipped the coin the odds were 1 to 0 that it would land heads because it did land heads. The odds were 50/50 (assuming a fair coin) before the flip was completed. The odds are 1/0 now that the coin did land heads. You may or may not have had a choice before your action was taken. It is now determined what your action was.
Must we delve into the semantics of “absolute” again? You argue that no choice is free if taken within the context of the physical universe. This would certainly simplify some discussions. free speech is obviously impossible since nobody can speak directly to all people in all languages at the same time. Freedom from coercion is impossible within a physical context so all discussions of Libertarianism can be dismissed as impossible.
Or, we could understand that words gain meaning from context. “Free” doesn’t mean the same thing when modifying “will” that it does when modifying “lunch” or “radical” or “base”.
Why not? Well, how about because in the statement “obviously not” you have rejected the very heart of compibilism. Compatibilism associates “free will” not with “unfettered” but with “uncompelled”. A compatibilist would say your lack of ability to make some choices has no bearing on your free will. Only a compulsion against (or for) specific choices has a bearing on free will.
Now, I am not personally a compatibilist, but to present the idea that acknowledging that the physical universe restricts possibilities of choice somehow leads to compatibilism is simply wrong.
Compatibilism, in a simplified nushell, is the proposition that free will and determinism are not mutually exclusive. It is not a “limited free will” and it does not rely upon “ability to choose from within the set of all possible natural actions”. In fact, the latter notion is more closely related to incompatibilism, since it can be seen as implying that natural actions are not restricted to a single outcome given a specific scenario. One way of describing the difference is “voluntary” versus “original”.
[li]A choice is free if it is in accordance with the wishes (will) of the agent regardless of whether any other choice was possible – compatibilism.[/li][li]A choice is free only if given the identical set of circumstances the agent can originate or not originate the action based upon its own wishes (will) – incompatibilism.[/li]
Begs the question? How exactly do you imagine that the statement I made is an argument which assumes as a premise that which it sets out to prove?
Which context? The context “a philosophical discussion of free will”. If you look closely at my definition, you will see that it is not at all compatible with compatibilism. If you wish to set forth another definition feel free to do so. If you wish to disagree with my definition please make your objections clear.
As to materialism–I do not think it is by any means obvious. Among other things, one would need to demonstrate that consciousness as an active principle was a valid material entity. It is quite possible that consciousness is an entirely post-facto material epiphenomenon and thus has no determinative capacity whatsoever. Francis Crick, I believe, has espoused this view. It is also possible that consciousness as a material phenomenon would have a determinative capacity for other material phenomenon but not for its own “actions”.
Yes. But neither your argument nor my statement demand the degenerative case. Would you care to answer this for the general case?
why erl feels we are reduced to compatibilism
Possible (or viable) choice is limited by context. Ayep.
The world has no obligation to arrange itself to our desires. Ayep.
The “excluded middle” holds for choices. Ayep.
Ah–nope. You exercise your will in deciding not to value one choice above the others. You exercise your will in ultimately deciding whether to accept the guidance of “chance”. Not caring about a choice is not the same as not making the choice.
Nope. A balance demonstrates relative wieghts. A spectroscope demonstrates physical composition. I decide whether I want to buy the heavy ring or the gold one.
Prima facie?
I’m not certain I understand the issue you are raising, but I see will (in your example) as both the ultimate and proximate determinant of action. Will chooses the system of evaluation, and an act of will is present after the system is applied in either accepting or rejecting the choice “favored by” the system.
It didn’t. You did. (At least, you said so back in the “prima facie” sentence.)
I can see how you might want to revisit the question, though, since there is nothing inherently unique about choosing a system for evaluating choices.
I think you are conflating alternative meanings of “arbitrary”. The “ur point” of any epistimelogical set is arbitrary in that it cannot be supported by reason, logic, or sound method. It is not (necessarily) randomly chosen.
I think it also bears mentioning that when discussing a material consciousness certain “seed points” pre-exist: sensory pleasure, for instance. “A feels better than B” was certainly an evaluative system long before human consciousness arose to question which evaluative system(s) to use.
I believe you defined it away. It isn’t the same thing. (Some might even call it begging the question. ;))
Yes, but the attempt has not (yet) been successful.
Not at all. Even if your argument held, it would not have that implication.
Besides, by your defintition that wouldn’t be free. Wait–does that imply your definitoin is unreasonable?
Sorry, I’m out of spoons. Here comes the pixel train[sup]choo choo[/sup].
Abuse of logic? That’s a little harsh. The odds are based on an action yet to happen. Once the action has happened odss are meaningless. If we could go back and repeat the action, we would return to the 50/50 odds, and then we perform it, and he odds break down. Once something happened, it happend.
I flip a perfect coin. It comes up heads. “Yeah,” you say, “but it could have come up tails.” But it didn’t. “But it could have.” But it didn’t. I’m not sure what else to say about that, lol.
Yes, actually, because my problem with Free Will is that it is often weakly defined in these contexts. So I start with the simplest definition of Free and remove it to obtain what I felt was a more concise terminology.
I have rejected “unfettered.” I have not rejected “uncompelled.” You say, “but to present the idea that acknowledging that the physical universe restricts possibilities of choice somehow leads to compatibilism is simply wrong.” Actually, I’m not sure how else to say it. We start with unfettered will, impose physical constraints, and are left with uncompelled will. What did you think I was saying? As well, I thought your definition begged the question because of course physical systems are linked through cause and effect. The presence of a physical system affects other physical systems in a specific manner, even if that manner cannot be finitely or completely enumerated. I will take your objections with a keen eye, however, and think on it, but I fear any consciousness definitions which skirt away from strict materialism create a ghost in the machine, and then that brings us to the sorry state of explaining how immaterial phenomena can affect material phenomena without themselves being affected so we can keep some semblance of free will (however ew choose to define free, since you aren’t very pleased with me setting it as unfettered).
As far as the degenerate case of omnipotence goes, I felt I covered the general case later in my post; that is, through the definition of choice as an option of which we are aware. The non-degenerate case is merely an extension of the degenerate case by adding options of which we are aware (choices). The implications are the same: we are not just limited by physiological conditions of our limbs, for example, or the gravity of Earth, but by what we are aware of. Our level and capability of awareness (on a scale from oblivious-to-all to omnipotence) has a direct and immediate effect on the exercizing of our will.
Ok, here is where things start getting messy as opposed to just a little shabby.
Well, what more can I say other than I disagree? My system of evaluation picked the choices for me. From there a new decision tree starts, most likely with the choices “Follow or not to follow my system.” But this, again, will be evaluated in some other system. Whole new choice, and a whole new process where we don’t exercize our will, but the evaluation systems do. We will evaluate and evaluate until one choice presents itself or no choices present themselves, at each step not exercizing will but observing our systems weighing values according to their style.
This is why I felt that we were left not exercizing will at the level of the choice, but at the level of the system. Which system? Well, this system, because etc (weights ascribed). So given our passive observance of situations we have systems which weigh systems. Plug and play, really.
Based on what? Nothing, or based on systems which are based on nothing?
Right… but the choice of “to follow evaluation or not to follow evaluation” is itself a new decision process. Here is where you say we are “really” exercizing our will. I am saying that that set of choices is no different than any other; it must be evaluated according to a system, and we will either act accordingly or evaluate the meta-evaluation. The choice to buy or not to buy is weighted according to a system (or, really, a system of systems). Then we have an entirely new choice: whether or not to follow that valuation, and these choices will again be evaluated according to a system.
The halting problem will creep up to bite me in the ass here, but I doubt that is very high on your list of objections.
This is why I say that the Will does not determine actions on their face, but rather the systems which evaluate the actions. Then I try to demonstrate that because systems are arbitrary that we really never had a will. “Unfettered” was relegated to “physically limited.” “Physically limited” was relegated to “awareness.” “Awareness” was elegated to “systems.” Systems are the last place left for will, and systems are arbitrary; there is no final system for evaluating systems, and so there was no will in obtaining or using them. They simply happen. True, random is not quite the word I want, I am more bent on chaotic than random (hence the Erisian Solution).
Well, I must indeed bite the bullet on “random,” but I hope I have been more clear above. The sticker of “arbitrary” is that “there is no system which can stand as the ultimate arbiter,” and so where does that leave will? Vanished. Really, it was never there.
I hope you don’t still feel that way. I’ve really been pushing myself to clearly state what I mean, even with the random faux pax, and to develop the point rather than simply assert it.
And before Achilles can catch the tortoise he must move half way to the tortoise . . . I think I may have to start calling you Xenolover.
Seriously–it appears that you have simply asserted that no decision can be made except through reliance upon a system of decision-making. Well, what about the “atomic” decision. Is there such a thing in your conception? If so, how is it made? You recognize the halting problem, and I will raise it as an issue because, like Xeno, your model argues paralysis by infinite recursion.
a few details
Yeah–I was posting at the end of a very long and unpleasant day. Sorry.
But it is an abuse of logic. :eek:
You have declared that no action in the past could have been free simply because those actions are in the past. This reasoning is analagous to declaring that it was, in the time before each particular event happened, an absolute certainty that all events in the past occur exactly as they did. The fact that a coin landed heads does not mean there was no chance it could have landed tails. The fact that I flipped the coin does not mean I had no choice but to flip the coin.
Unless, of course, you accept rigid determinism axiomatically.
Yes–and that fact has no implications on either free will or probability before the fact.
Well, I started out with a definition which you have yet to address other than asking “which context”? I can’t see much use in declaring, “well I have eliminated free” when discussing free will, though. I am all for establishing definitions. It seems more useful, though, to be able to discuss “free speech” without spending time arguing that “free” speech is obviously impossible due to the physical constraints of humanity.
If it makes you happier, I freely admit that will, if it exists, is constrained by the physical limitation of the universe(s) in which it is manifest. Can we agree that categorizing “existing” as “limited” doesn’t really add much to our understanding of the issues involved?
You said, Is it free? Obviously not. This is a direct rejection of compatibilism, since compatibilism argues that free will can exist in a determined universe. Again, this goes back to your (unhelpful, IMO) absolutist rejection of the adjective “free” to describe anything manifest in a physical universe. If “uncompelled will” is “free will” as the compatibilists argue, then “obviously not” is obviously wrong.
I think you are the first person I have seen who argues that will is fettered because human beings are not omnipotent. “Your choice to eat strawberries was not free because you can’t transmit information faster than c,” doesn’t strike me as particularly compelling. I prefer to examine the question, “can a being choose freely among available options”. It seems more relevant to human existence.
I disagree. The difference between one and many is the difference between outcome and option. So long as more than one option exists, there is a place for will to be exercised. The degenerate case negates the exercise of will. The general case does not. The degenerate case of a circle is a point. That does not imply that circles have no area.
So you are assuming that will cannot be arbitrary?
I do see that. Unfortunately, I still see that you are defining it away (in the case of “free”==unfettered) or alternatively “defining a void” and saying that’s where free will would have to be (in the case of your “decision systems”).
Some interesting replies. Thanksgiving was, well, as empty as can be, actually. But nothing bad happened (I don’t like holidays, so empty is not a bad thing)
Onward and upward!
Yes, in fact, I was just discussing this issue with another friend and realized that the halting problem is a serious issue, but not necessarily a crippling one.
There are a few ways the ahlting problem can be solved. Firt off, it is possible that the systems we have simply terminate on their own by design; note it isn’t often that we actually ponder, “Well, I know which choice is best: do I follow it?” Such a meta-choice is, in my opinion, pretty rare. This isn’t necessarily because of interaction of the systems, but simply because some systems aren’t meant for reevaluation. Our brains’ abilities are finite, and so there are a finite number of systems that can be applied. Note that really difficult decisions sometimes don’t get made… the choice to “not act” was never made, but excessive deliberation sort of implied that choice anyway. We never “halted” but there came a time when we could no longer make that decision. Our indecisiveness, in effect, made it for us. Halting problem solved.
But even if they were not solved, systems can join and unjoin at leisure. I postulated one scenario (to my friend) where there was a “halting system” that was always part of the evaluation. It functioned in the following manner: given a properly weighted choice (a determined by prior evaluation) it simply halted meta-evaluation. However, if the weighting were slippery, ambiguous, or equal, there would be subsequent meta-evaluations until things became unslippery, or until another decision came along. As you can see, this explaination is somewhat similar to the above, but the above doesn’t require a halting system (and I don’t really think one exists on its own). Not that I don’t think there aren’t systems which can halt the recursion and say, “hey, fucking do it!” It is simply that their valuation does this, they are otherwise indistinguishable from other valuating systems.
Now, for a quick digression…
Heck no, simply that the past is the past, and to hypothesize about what may have happened is ultimately not-fruitful apart from being a simple mind experiment. It really is meaningless to say, “I could have chose to not flip the coin.” Really?
We’re never going to agree here, I think.
Oh, bother. I simply chose a specific definition and showed it wasn’t correct. I abolished “unfettered” and then, instead of redifing “free” every time we hit a stop I simply chose better words as I went.
As well, rejecting “unfettered” free is not meant to disable compatibilism! I can’t stress that enough. The rejection of will is what ultimately ends compatibilism. I would normally say that I am a fan of compatibilism, except that messy problem of will.
Gah! That’s why I specifically said free meant what it meant.
It certainly does; I am simply stating that the will is limited by a number of various factors. I could continue to use “free” and redefine it as I go, but I found that to be cumbersome to read.
Actually, the will is arbitrary. That’s the whole point! It is as arbitrary as anything else. It is not a privileged system. It has no foundation. It is not open for examination with the word “free” (however we define it) because there is no will to exercize. Will, in my mind here, is simply the passive observance of systemic analysis. We are aware of the evaluations; we are aware those evaluations come from us; but we are not making those evaluations! See how changing the definition of will midstream is clumsy as hell? I couldn’t avoid it, though. I could avoid it for “free”
It seems we have a will because we have a notion of self, and our systems are a part of that. It seems like we are active agents because they are our systems doing the evaluation. But at no point does the self do anything other than observe! Being aware of the systems creates a plausible will, until examination reveals no such thing. IMO
Well, i’m not quite sure. Do you feel that my “system model” is somehow false? Or do you feel that I haven’t adequtely supported my conclusion? All deduction is “defining things away” so to speak.
This is not an escape. How does one decide to design a system in a certain way? How does one decide to adopt a system with a “built-in” halt? Under your model, each of these are decision points that become infinitely recursive.
More to the point, the halting problem under your “systemic analysis” model would seem a much more serious problem at the beginning than at the end. The problem isn’t how many iterations to recurse once you’ve reached the seed, it’s how to find the seed.
Again, how is this halting system developed? How is this halting system “chosen” as a decision making system.
Then stop saying things like, "When we are discussing the question, “Did I have a choice?” in reference to a past action the answer is, in effect "no,"
Not so long as you make untenable assertions.
I only asked for it to be defined once in a context that was meaningful to this discussion. You may find it more meaningful to speak of “limited will”, but since the limitation is not on will, but I find it misleading for a couple of reasons: it is a misplaced modifier, and it violates centuries of philosophical use and convention.
I offered a definition for “free will” in this context. I have even offered an alternative compatibilist conception. Would it really be so hard to address these directly?
Of course not–I have explicitely stated more than once that compatibilism does not require unfettered will. But if you want to discuss an established philosophical view you should do so in appropriate terms. Compatibilists argue that free will is not violated by determinism. If you continue to say that will is obviously not free, then I will continue to point out that you are not addressing compatibilism.
If you define it once, it should not be necessary to do so repeatedly. More to the point, will is not limited by the factors you mention. I might (and in fact have) will any number of things which are not possible. In my (admitedly sporadic) readings of philosophy I have never encountered anyone else who argues that will is fettered because humans are not omnipotent.
And in several back-and-forth exchanges you have yet to address the general case in which alternatives are finite yet several. How do you abolish freedom from that choice?
And you base this conclusion on what? Will is not a privileged system? When have you established that will was a system at all? What would be a privileged system when discussing the application of will?
There is no will!
Now we have a true begging of the question. No free will exists because free cannot be aplied to anything manifest in reality and because will does not exist. Wait–if wil doesn’t exist then it might be free, since no propery of reality precludes that adjective.
Changing any definition in mid-stream is cumbersome. It is easily avoided, however, by establishing definitions first. Apparently I should have asked for a definition of “will” as well as “free will”. Then again, considering my success with the first request . . .
I am trying to puzzle out the model of consciousness you are proposing in which “we” have identity and phenomenology but do not possess intention and are not active participants in the evaluations of “our” internal systems. Are you arguing for consciousness as illusion? Pureafter-the-fact epiphenomenon?
Again, if you set as axiomatic that either freedom or will are non-existent, then “do we have free will” is a question looking for alms.
It is not examination which has revealed “no such thing”, it is assumption. You have asserted that “systems just are” and that active consciousness is an illusion. If some examination lay behind those claims you have yet to share it. (It is not a unique position, though, and Francis Crick puts forth a similar position and the examinations that lead him to it in The Astonishing Hypothesis)
Stating that decisions are made by “systems of evaluation”, though, is a flimsy support for the conclusion, “active consciousness does not exist”.
Yes, or at least incomplete. You have yet to address how systems are created, perpetuated, modified, rejected, weighted, selected, etc. More importantly, to me, you have yet to provide any reason why your model of “systems without will” should be considered an accurate picture of human consciousness. Just because you can imagine a decision making simulacrum does not mean that you are one.
Yes.
No. Deduction based upon axioms which negate the question is “defining things away”. Other deductions are “defining things”.
(I don’t like holidays, so empty is not a bad thing)
It is simply that their valuation does this, they are otherwise indistinguishable from other valuating systems.