The Lies of Richard Dawkins, Episode 6: Saint Thomas Aquinas

[Rolken]

@Stratocaster

How so?

Well, someone concerned with proximate cause (the direct impetus for an event) can construct a mental model in which everything has a proximate cause and yet time has no particular beginning. Newtonian physics is a pretty good example of this - since it’s deterministic, every consequence follows naturally from predictable (postdictable?) prior events, and in theory you can take a particular situation with perfect knowledge and wind it backwards as far as you like without necessarily ever running into a First Event before which nothing happens.

edit: though “real” physics is at minimum much stranger than Newtonian models so it’s only a philosophical point.

[whorfin]

@Stratocaster

I think that misunderstands what is inherent in the proofs’ conclusions. “No entity can exist in our physical world that is an unmoved mover, and such an entity is required for our world to exist” is not contradicted by “Therefore, since we exist, a prime mover must exist unconstrained and outside of our physical world.”

I think it accurately states what the proofs’ conclusions elide–that the argument is either invalid (if the premise contends this is how the world works), or turns on an arbitrary and limited definition of the rules of the physical world that excludes some things that make the world work, so that it can conclude that they are outside the way the world works. (just like Half Man Half Wit has been arguing)

Also, I’ve reread what Acquinas argues (which I’ve reposted below). His use of the physical world is to show that some things are in motion, not to contend that the rule that “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” is a rule limited to the physical world. In fact, he’s arguing “god” is the “unmoving mover” of a real-world thing (those things that he starts by pointing out to be moving)–an entity that acts in the physical world, is not subject to its rules. That’s even inconsistent with the premise that all things in the physical world need a “moving mover”

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

[The_Hamster_King]

@Stratocaster

But nothing in our universe exists without a cause.

That seems like a pretty bold statement considering that Aquinas has proven that uncaused entities are a logical necessity.

[whorfin]

@Stratocaster

I don’t see this as analogous. We needn’t add or subtract. We don’t ever have to “get to two.” Numbers are an abstratct representation. But nothing in our universe exists without a cause.

But that’s just arguing that there isn’t a number line–sure, if we close our eyes to the concept of a number line’s existence by refusing to add or subtract, we never get to two–but that doesn’t refute that “two” is an example of something that has a cause (1+1) without having a “start.” (since I can always subtract one to get “before” the start)

[Stratocaster]

@Rolken

Well, someone concerned with proximate cause (the direct impetus for an event) can construct a mental model in which everything has a proximate cause and yet time has no particular beginning. Newtonian physics is a pretty good example of this - since it’s deterministic, every consequence follows naturally from predictable (postdictable?) prior events, and in theory you can take a particular situation with perfect knowledge and wind it backwards as far as you like without necessarily ever running into a First Event before which nothing happens.

It only works as a thought experiment, though. If everything in Newtonian physics requires a trigger, an infinite regression is a non sequitur. If our powers of discernment were perfect, we could trace everything back to some starting point. “What if there isn’t one?” is answered by, “Then how did this chain of events begin, since everything in the chain requires a triggering cause.”

[Stratocaster]

@whorfin

But that’s just arguing that there isn’t a number line–sure, if we close our eyes to the concept of a number line’s existence by refusing to add or subtract, we never get to two–but that doesn’t refute that “two” is an example of something that has a cause (1+1) without having a “start.” (since I can always subtract one to get “before” the start)

I’ll give it some thought, but it seems like a weak analogy to me. It’s akin to saying because we can abstractly consider the concept of infinity (and a number line is an example of such an abstraction), then the infinite regress is possible too. Not seeing that leap as logical–the infinite regress has a few real-world variables that throw a monkey wrench into the abstract concept.

[Stratocaster]

@Pochacco

That seems like a pretty bold statement considering that Aquinas has proven that uncaused entities are a logical necessity.

You probably don’t want to extract a single sentence out of context; if you can avoid that, it will seem much less bold to you.

[whorfin]

@Stratocaster

I’ll give it some thought, but it seems like a weak analogy to me. It’s akin to saying because we can abstractly consider the concept of infinity (and a number line is an example of such an abstraction), then the infinite regress is possible too. Not seeing that leap as logical–the infinite regress has a few real-world variables that throw a monkey wrench into the abstract concept.

Let me put it another way. The infinite regress we’re talking about is "X ‘moved’ (whatever that means) Y, which ‘moved’ Z, and so on up to the present day. What moved X?

Acquinas says there has to be a “prime mover” somewhere to move X.

But for any point on the chain where we say ‘the prime mover goes here’ (such that PM ‘moved’ X, that started the whole thing going) I can respond by saying “nope, Q ‘moved’ X.” What moved Q? R. An infinite regression only troubles us if we agree there had to be a “start.”

At least using nothing but logic (remember, acquinas is trying to prove God through logic, not through “real-world variables”–if you want to bring them in, I’m bringing vacuum fluctuations with no “cause”), and thinking on the scale acquinas is talking about (including the entire universe, etc, etc), I have no problem with saying “as far as we see from here, there’s a regression–and if we look from way back on the chain, as far as we can see is a regression–and so on, and so forth”–it always was that way–or in other words, infinite.

[Stratocaster]

@whorfin

I think it accurately states what the proofs’ conclusions elide–that the argument is either invalid (if the premise contends this is how the world works), or turns on an arbitrary and limited definition of the rules of the physical world that excludes some things that make the world work, so that it can conclude that they are outside the way the world works. (just like Half Man Half Wit has been arguing)

What about how the real world works has been ignored though?

Also, I’ve reread what Acquinas argues (which I’ve reposted below). His use of the physical world is to show that some things are in motion, not to contend that the rule that “whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” is a rule limited to the physical world. In fact, he’s arguing “god” is the “unmoving mover” of a real-world thing (those things that he starts by pointing out to be moving)–an entity that acts in the physical world, is not subject to its rules. That’s even inconsistent with the premise that all things in the physical world need a “moving mover”

I get that. There’s no point in the unmoved mover proof if it doesn’t conclude that this was the first cause of our universe. If I’m paraphrasing clumsily, forgive me. But ISTM the point is the same–our physical universe both requires and does not permit an unmoved mover. What are we to conclude from that? Aquinas says that there is a prime mover–he calls the mover “God”–whose very existence means he is not subject to the constraints of the physical universe.

[Rolken]

@Stratocaster

It only works as a thought experiment, though. If everything in Newtonian physics requires a trigger, an infinite regression is a non sequitur. If our powers of discernment were perfect, we could trace everything back to some starting point. “What if there isn’t one?” is answered by, “Then how did this chain of events begin, since everything in the chain requires a triggering cause.”

You can specifically design systems that go on indefinitely in both directions. At its most basic, a system that consists purely of two spheres will result in them banging against each other indefinitely due to gravity. But there’s no restriction to prevent that from generalizing to more complicated systems - stick a hundred balls in a void and you can trace them forward or back as you like as well and they’ll happily provide chaotic behavior. You can definitely hypothesize a starting point with the bouncing balls scenario, but it isn’t logically necessary for them to impact.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Stratocaster

HMHW, thanks for the examples, and I am really outside of my element here. Can you clarify why this doesn’t signify randomness as opposed to “no cause is required”?

Random events don’t require a cause, do they? So I don’t think there’s a difference between the two (or rather, random events are part of the uncaused events).

The last part of your explanation in particular suggests that “pinning your rest frame” (no idea what that means) influences the outcome–i.e., is a “mover” relative to what occurs.

All motion is relative to some reference frame – to you, the people on the train move, to them, you, along with the platform, are moving. Both descriptions are equally valid, and there is in fact no way to prefer one over the other. For a single particle, now, you can chose your reference frame to be one in which the particle is at rest, or one in which it is moving – the two are equivalent descriptions of the same physical circumstances, which is why people have been pointing to Newton’s first axiom, which essentially says that rest and inertial motion (motion with constant velocity, i.e. speed and direction) aren’t different things.

And radioactive decay–is that really uncaused or simply not fully understood.

For it to have a cause, you’d need something like a so-called ‘hidden variables’-theory, which basically holds that the quantum world only appears ‘weird’ to us because we don’t know all the details. However, according to Bell’s theorem, such theories cannot exist (going much deeper into this would be beyond the scope of this thread, I’m afraid).

@Stratocaster

It only works as a thought experiment, though. If everything in Newtonian physics requires a trigger, an infinite regression is a non sequitur. If our powers of discernment were perfect, we could trace everything back to some starting point. “What if there isn’t one?” is answered by, “Then how did this chain of events begin, since everything in the chain requires a triggering cause.”

Nah, you can quite easily picture a system that you can backcalculate arbitrarily far without ever getting to some beginning point – just take on object in a stable orbit around another; every prior point in time just corresponds to a different point in the orbit.

[Stratocaster]

@whorfin

Let me put it another way. The infinite regress we’re talking about is "X ‘moved’ (whatever that means) Y, which ‘moved’ Z, and so on up to the present day. What moved X?

Acquinas says there has to be a “prime mover” somewhere to move X.

But for any point on the chain where we say ‘the prime mover goes here’ (such that PM ‘moved’ X, that started the whole thing going) I can respond by saying “nope, Q ‘moved’ X.” What moved Q? R. An infinite regression only troubles us if we agree there had to be a “start.”

At least using nothing but logic (remember, acquinas is trying to prove God through logic, not through “real-world variables”–if you want to bring them in, I’m bringing vacuum fluctuations with no “cause”), and thinking on the scale acquinas is talking about (including the entire universe, etc, etc), I have no problem with saying “as far as we see from here, there’s a regression–and if we look from way back on the chain, as far as we can see is a regression–and so on, and so forth”–it always was that way–or in other words, infinite.

I’ll have to sleep on a way to explain myself better. A causal chain cannot be infinite in origin. It’s the very nature of a causal chain, which Aquinas argues our universe is.

[whorfin]

@Stratocaster

But ISTM the point is the same–**according to the way acquinas formulates the rules of our physical universe,**our physical universe both requires and does not permit an unmoved mover. What are we to conclude from that? Aquinas says that there is a prime mover–he calls the mover “God”–whose very existence means he is not subject to the constraints of the physical universe.

Bolded material added by me. This is what acquinas ignores-the equally possible, and much more plausible conclusion that his premise is incorrect-that the fact that his proposed ‘rules’ imply that the universe cannot exist means there is error with his ‘rules’, rather than a proof of something outside those rules.

Also, as I note, Acquinas’ ‘rules’ are not just applied to the ‘physical universe’–so that “god” not only can’t exist in the physical universe, but violates the basic understanding acquinas offers of how things work.

I would argue (1) the proof is incomplete. If we’re arguing that we can define the basic rules, there has to be some formulation that includes the rules that govern ‘god.’

(2), either (1) is true (and these aren’t the complete rules), or there are entities that don’t obey the rules-for whom there are no rules.

Either way, this suggests that there are some situations in which the rules of the ‘universe’ in the premise are invalid. And if that is true, then what validity does the “proof” have? None-it operates on false premises.

So why do I argue that Acquinas is fudging these points?

There’s no point in the unmoved mover proof if it doesn’t conclude that this was the first cause of our universe.

[whorfin]

@Stratocaster

I’ll have to sleep on a way to explain myself better. A causal chain cannot be infinite in origin. It’s the very nature of a causal chain, which Aquinas argues our universe is.

Firstly, I simply disagree. As a matter of logic, anywhere you can put X, I can say Y moved X. Just like a number line, I can contend that as far back as you go, there was some prior mover.

So to argue there was a ‘start’ is just definitional–saying “assuming we’re on a causal chain that had to have a beginning, then there is a prime mover”

But if a causal chain doesn’t go on forever, there is something that can start it. And the proof of a prime mover’s existence is premised on the fact that such a thing cannot exist. The existence of a prime mover invalidates the reasoning that proves the ‘world’ consists of a linear causal chain that can be traced back to a single source (because no thing can “cause” without “being caused”)

[Diogenes_the_Cynic]

@Stratocaster

I’ll have to sleep on a way to explain myself better. A causal chain cannot be infinite in origin.

This seems to be the sticking point for you in this whole thing. This statement has simply not been demonstrated to be true. If you disagree, could you please show anything in either Newtonian or Quantum physics which would prevent it?

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

Aargh! The problem with being in the wrong time zone and having a different work week from everyone else is I come to work on Sunday and I’m hopelessly behind in the threads I find interesting. Alas.

[Half_Man_Half_Wit]

@Sophistry_and_Illusion

Aargh! The problem with being in the wrong time zone and having a different work week from everyone else is I come to work on Sunday and I’m hopelessly behind in the threads I find interesting. Alas.

Good thing if it’s only that what’s been keeping you away, though, I was afraid I’d offended you with my somewhat needlessly confrontational (late night, after bowling & beer!) reply two pages back… It wasn’t meant quite that aggressively.

[Sophistry_and_Illusion]

@Half_Man_Half_Wit

Good thing if it’s only that what’s been keeping you away, though, I was afraid I’d offended you with my somewhat needlessly confrontational (late night, after bowling & beer!) reply two pages back… It wasn’t meant quite that aggressively.

Not at all. By the time people are logging on on Thursday, I’m leaving work; and the weekend here is Friday-Saturday. And of course, work is the only place to Dope!

[Revenant_Threshold]

@Stratocaster

I think that misunderstands what is inherent in the proofs’ conclusions. “No entity can exist in our physical world that is an unmoved mover, and such an entity is required for our world to exist” is not contradicted by “Therefore, since we exist, a prime mover must exist unconstrained and outside of our physical world.”

I don’t think, phrased that way, the two are contradictory, but by accepting the second we change the nature of the first. The second accepts the idea that there are things outside of our physical world, which essentially makes everything in the first suspect.

Imagine physical reality as a room. Since (discounting quantum mechanics for a moment) things cannot go uncaused, nor can be their own causers, we can say that all things in the room are movers of each other. The latter conclusion says that because a first mover is required, something comes from outside the room to start the whole thing off, and by its outside nature we are free to give it characteristics that are not possible of the objects in the room. The problem with this is that it brings the first conclusion into doubt; what if all objects have a part of themselves outside the room, and are not entirely subject to the room’s laws? What if several such objects came into the room? We can’t even say that the thing coming in is a designer, or even an entity. If we bring in a new idea, and accept it, then that idea must be accepted throughout our entire understanding, not on that one particular point. If we accept the second, then we have to go back and start again, essentially, and this is what Aquinas doesn’t do; he keeps moving forward but doesn’t apply the new understanding to his past points.

[Mijin]

Off-topic, but a few people in this thread have been a little disparaging about Compatibilism; seeing it as weasling a way for free will to exist.

I’m a Compatibilist and thought I’d explain my position, as it’s a pretty typical Compatibilist’s take on things.

First of all, I’m not religious and have no motive for there to be a real free will. If there were really no such thing, I wouldn’t care.

But the argument often used is that there can be no free will because our universe is deterministic. However, I fail to see how there can be free will – as most people define the term – in a non-deterministic universe either. Determinancy is a red herring.

For starters, our universe is not deterministic, as far as we know. To this, the no-free-willers simply say “Yeah, but quantum indeterminancy can hardly be called free will…”.
So what would give free will? Souls? Souls by definition have free will, but no-one actually understands how. I mean, do souls start out the same and get shaped by experiences, or do we start out with different “kinds” of soul? Either answer would seem to preclude souls from having free will (or at least, of having the kind of free will that religions require).

And so, it occurs to me, that if we can’t think of any kind of reality where free will would exist, we have to question whether the concept itself makes any sense.
And I don’t believe it does. The concept of free will as being like a “bolt from the blue” but nonetheless a willful, informed action seems self-contradictory to me.

But I think it is possible to redefine free will sensibly.
When I’ve finished writing this post, I’m going to make myself a cup of tea. To me, it’s perfectly reasonable to call this a “free” action. Even though, obviously, it’s based on my past experiences and the kind of guy I am (and the fact that I have tea available as an option). To me, this is the only kind of meaningful sense in which we can even have a choice. My life is on rails but those rails are me.

However; I do think this is a complicated and interesting philosophical subject, once we start to think about more interesting examples. But that’s the essence of my (and others’) position.