I’m not sure I am disagreeing with you–or that what I say is inconsistent with your point–I was trying to focus on a deeper problem with the argument. I was trying to show that we shouldn’t just argue with the ‘supernatural sticker’ on a prime mover, but with the overall argument that we need some kind of a “prime mover” at all (which was what acquinas was really trying to show). My argument is just a subset of yours–that not only is it not supernatural to have things that need no mover (or that move themselves), but that their existence shows that there need not be one, solitary prime mover.
To analogize to “greenness”, I saw you as emphasizing one problem with the argument–asking “is green really supernatural?” (a valid point), while I was going beyond that by suggesting that the more important question was to challenge whether the conclusion that “green things (which can’t exist under the way I propose the world works) are necessary to make the world work” isn’t a proof that supernatural green things exist as much as a reductio ad absurdum of an argument that uses the premise that green things can’t exist to show that green things are necessary to make the world work.
Actually, my main aim was to show that, where the argument merely amounts to an arbitrary definition of the supernatural, it isn’t a very interesting one to make, thus, when the argument is made, it is presumably in the stronger form of asserting that no existing thing, i.e. nothing within the totality of being, can be its own cause. Of course, then it creates a contradiction in asserting that god can be its own cause/uncaused/unmoved mover, what have you, because that is essentially tantamount to saying that something exists that is its own cause, and we get the whole ‘A and not A, thus x’, where x is any given statement. I’ve merely gotten a little tangled up into the whole natural/supernatural thing, I really only meant to mention it to discount the cases where the argument is essentially question-begging off hand, but that seemed to be not quite as obvious as it appeared to me.
I’ll try once more for clarity:
If there are things within the totality of existence that can be their own causes, calling those things supernatural is merely an arbitrary definition, and defines supernatural things as things that can be their own causes, and nothing else.
Thus, I take Aquinas’ argument to assert that there are no things within the totality of existence that can be their own causes (which I don’t believe – obviously – but can accept for arguments sake). The fact that things do exist, then, is somewhat puzzling. On the face of it, this seems to imply that there must be at least one thing that is its own cause – however, this either means that the premise of there not being anything within the totality, yadda yadda, is false, or that we are simultaneously asserting that there are no things that are their own causes, and that there is at least one thing that is its own cause. If the premise is false, then, of course, the argument is moot; if we are truly faced with a contradiction, then we can of course conclude that god exists, however we can just as well conclude that he doesn’t, and all other statements we can think of and their opposites, because via the principle of explosion, everything follows from a contradiction.
It proves an Unmoved Mover, whom he calls God. His work as a whole is an argument and explanation for God. The part in question, the one that Dawkins engages, is a section of it, and in it, the entity needn’t be called God at all–the proof works (or doesn’t) regardless, even if it focuses only on some unnamed cause.
We’re focusing on the section of the Summa that is the proof for God’s existence (not his nature). It’s the second question of the first part. If you want an example of where he covers the nature of God, there’s question 6 of the first part, which focuses on God’s goodness. And you’re really missing my point, which is the argument for a Prime Mover stands on its own (or not). Nothing else about the Prime Mover’s nature is necessary in this proof except what is covered.
Yes, it’s certainly been mentioned. I’m not been adversarial, I’m curious. What’s an example of a quantum event that has no trigger?
An object must be put in motion first. Newton’s First Law does not suggest otherwise. If anything, it’s supportive of Aquinas. Nothing motionless moves, unless something puts it in motion.
Yes, that would be valid, if such entities existed. That would refute the proof.
Interesting-you’re making me think (which is always fun)-and I hope I’m seeing your point (well, I didn’t quite–but your second post makes it very clear.–thanks!)
I think we effectively agree-except that I might be more charitable about the possibility of acquinas holding a genuine belief that that was how the world works–but we agree that the real unreasonablness is to avoid the logical contradiction by ignoring the possibility that his ‘rules of nature’ were incorrect, rather than accepting the conclusion of a god-shaped hole in the natural world (and hence, of the supernatural)
If the only “things” that exist are things that must have a cause–there are no other things that require no cause–an infinite regress is self-contradictory. The universe would be populated by things that would necessarily have to be traced to a start, which can’t exist.
I think you’re inferring “supernatural” to mean something other than “unexplained by what we know about our physical universe.” It’s not by fiat; it’s the natural conclusion of the syllogism.
I’m not sure how else to explain it. “Supernatural” in this context means something that must necessarily exist unbounded and outside of our physical universe, since our physical universe does not appear to permit it. The proof may or may not hold water, but I’m still missing your point as to how this is an arbitrary classification in this particular proof. If the premise is true, it’s the only logical conclusion. “Everything green is supernatural” is indeed arbitrary.
But that’s what infinite means–that it always was that way. No start. There’s no start to the number line, even though I can get to any number by going up or down a certain number of units.
That’s an odd definition of the supernatural–it seems overbroad in that it includes things that people believe to have a perfectly mundane explanation–that they don’t understand, or that science can’t then explain–rather than things beyond the laws of nature (which I see as what Acquinas was getting at).
My definition sounds like the one you use in your next post,
-not "beyond our universe till we understand how it fits in–but necessarily outside it
I think you’re mashing together the concepts of proximate cause and ultimate cause. There’s not necessarily a tracing to a start implied by the former, and no contradiction.
I find nothing wrong with your logic, and I think you got what I was offering. Your conclusion is the same as that of my best friend (an atheist)–if the known laws of physics don’t seem to permit unmoved movers in our universe, and our universe requires them, than we just don’t understand fully the laws of physics. I commend him on his faith in this notion whenever we revisit this. 
Depending on what exactly you’re after, radioactive decay might fit the bill – it’s purely probabilistic, i.e. for a given atom, there is a given probability of decay at each point in time, but no way to tell when exactly it will decay; nothing causes it to decay. Incidentally, this also supplies us with a nice ‘unmoved mover’ example: if you only consider an isolated atom, it can’t really be said to be moving or not, since you can always pin your rest frame to it, or have it move at some fixed speed relative to it; however, once the atom decays, conservation of momentum means that there now is no inertial frame where both fragments are at rest – if you stay in the frame where the atom was at rest originally, both parts will move in such a way that their respective momentums are oppositely equal; if you pin your rest frame on either of the parts, the other will move relative to it. Thus, we now have uncaused movement from a situation where there was none, and god was on his lunchbreak while all of this happened.
How so?
Missing your point. I understand “infinite.” The numbers in an infinite chain don’t “cause” each other, right? That’s the element that makes the regress illogical.
Another way of putting that is that the ‘proof’ is only as strong as its premise, that no entity can exist that is an “unmoved mover”
However, the ‘proof’ concludes that such entities do exist. That is commonly described as a a reductio ad absurdum, not a proof–an argument whose conclusion contradicts its premise, and is therefore absurd.
Just as arbitrary as ‘everything that may be its own cause’.
HMHW, thanks for the examples, and I am really outside of my element here. Can you clarify why this doesn’t signify randomness as opposed to “no cause is required”? The last part of your explanation in particular suggests that “pinning your rest frame” (no idea what that means) influences the outcome–i.e., is a “mover” relative to what occurs. And radioactive decay–is that really uncaused or simply not fully understood. Per wiki:
This doesn’t sound (to a confused layman) like an uncaused event.
That was my point of showing (or defining) that we get from one number to the other by adding or subtracting.
One “causes” two in that our definition of two is “add one to one”, and our definition of three is “add one to two”–each defines the number after it, and before it (by subtraction) (one could also say it as, “one” defines all of them–as any number is just a positive or negative sum of ones, which reaches the same result, as we “define” three by adding another 1 to 1+1)–either way, the start point is arbitrary, and the number line is equally infinite whether “zero” is defined at place A, or at place B on the line (which we get to by adding +10,000). The “starting place” does not define the number line–the relationships between numbers define it.
I think that misunderstands what is inherent in the proofs’ conclusions. “No entity can exist in our physical world that is an unmoved mover, and such an entity is required for our world to exist” is not contradicted by “Therefore, since we exist, a prime mover must exist unconstrained and outside of our physical world.”
I don’t see this as analogous. We needn’t add or subtract. We don’t ever have to “get to two.” Numbers are an abstratct representation. But nothing in our universe exists without a cause.