This begs the question, as I’m sure you know, but insist upon ignoring.
By denominating the person who obtains fewer votes nationwide as the “loser”, you ignore the fact that there is no nationwide contest. Thus, the person is not the “loser”. :smack:
No state’s electoral votes would be rendered irrelevant by the NPVIC. If the NPVIC were implemented, then it would be the case that some states’ EVs would be irrelevant, but that’s because those states’ EVs are already irrelevant. The problem is with the Electoral Vote system itself, not with the compact.
Not that I can think of. Did you have any in mind?
Nonsense. That would only weaken California’s influence from it’s already dismal state.
The only way it makes any sense at all is all-or-nothing. The intermediate steps are worse than either of the endpoints.
This is just basic game theory–not too far off from the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in fact, where neither one has any interest in cooperating alone but if both can agree they end up better off. The solution to the dilemma is to close off the partial solutions.
I wasn’t asking you.
All you’re doing is pointing out another anachronism that the First World does not share.
Please. It doesn’t feel like democracy* because it fucking isn’t*. :rolleyes:
If you don’t consider Democracy Is Good to be a fundamental principle, you’re really not serving much use in this discussion. If you’d rather be a subject than a citizen, there are numerous options open to you.
I agree. There is no hypocrisy in staying with the current system if you would be the only one to change. If you goal is to eventually change the whole system, a partial change for CA alone would make the larger change more difficult.
And I don’t care. You don’t get to pick who answers your questions in this forum.
Yes, and because the intention is to make impossible the situation where there is one winner of he popular vote and a different winner of the electoral college, it is by definition altering the power among states.
We know this because the fundamental problem with the electoral college is that it overvalues votes in small state and undervalues votes in large states. Let me be clear: this imbalance should be corrected. But in correcting it, it is a stone-cold fact that we would be altering the power among states. For a good reason, sure, but the power balance is being changed.
I’m contending that since the power balance is being changed, one cannot argue that the compact is, more or less, so insignificant that Congress can just ignore the issue.
I don’t really understand this response. The question was: why doesn’t Article 1, section 10 do all the work here?
And the answer is that the Supreme Court has interpreted the provision not to apply to all compacts and agreements. And that isn’t really an issue of one sentence, it’s the point of the whole discussion.
And it’s also rather obviously correct, for the reasons the Court says. The provision can’t really mean that every time Virginia wants to buy surplus office supplies from Maryland, it needs congressional approval. So what types of agreements are we talking about? The Court proposed one answer.
You’re right, of course, that there will be lawsuits (with high priced lawyers!), but I’d be willing to wager heavily that the core proposition of the 120-year old case won’t change (i.e., that “agreements” doesn’t mean all agreements). I’d even wager heavily that the rule set forth therein won’t change.
None of that answers the question of whether or not the NPVIC is constitutional. Is it the type of agreement that falls within the provision? Reasonable minds can disagree. But it remains that case, that spelling out the words in of Article 1, section 10 doesn’t get you an answer, both under the law of the United States as it presently exists and under common sense. I don’t think that’s a “simplistic” point at all.
Note first that the boundary in Tennessee v. Virginia was approved by Congress. So the fact that something is approved doesn’t mean that it needs to be approved. For example, here is a Pennsylvania case concluding that the Driver License Compact doesn’t require approval and noting that “the fact that Congress enacted legislation approving compacts of this sort does not mandate the conclusion that such approval was constitutionally necessary.” I’m ambivalent on TRPA (because of the federal regulatory issues and the fact that the President gets to appoint a member of the agency), but I could be persuaded.
But I’m not arguing that the NPVIC is constitutional under the relevant authority. (In truth, I think I agree with you). My only point is that the fact that two (or more) states enter into an agreement hasn’t been viewed as necessarily within the ambit of Article 1. I’m simply answering the question “What explanation is needed beyond quoting Article 1, section 10?”
What would you have Congress do to stop it? What *can *they do within the confines of the Constitution?
Those of you spluttering about unconstitutionality need an answer for that.
Which is why I’m not bothering with yours. See how this works yet?
Yes, all the parliamentary systems can.
The Australian system has on at least 3 occasions given the prime ministership to the leader of the party which didn’t win the popular vote (either on primary or two-party preferred basis). Not that the popular vote has any relevance to the determination of PM.
There are examples of straight popular elections where the guy who got the most votes ended up in chockey, exile or shot, so I reckon history will say they lost.
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Yes, I see exactly how it works when you’re unable to answer.
That’s one of a few fundamental problems. Another is that it encourages states to apportion their EVs on an all-or-nothing basis, which means that candidates ignore non-swing states. Another is that it’s quantized, so even if they wanted to, states could not apportion their votes proportionally.
I don’t necessarily disagree with you about Congress, but suppose a state just threw up their hands and said elections are too expensive; we’ll just give our votes to whoever state X selects. No compact or anything needed, just one state picking a (weird) means of apportioning their EVs. It’s a transfer of power in the same way as the NPVIC, but it also doesn’t seem like something that would require Congressional involvement.
Here’s a pat on the head. Run along now, lad.
Got it. But that’s only when no party won an outright majority in Commons, right? Yes, funny things can happen in coalition negotiations, but that doesn’t mean the loser won. Are there countries you can point to where the head of government is directly elected, and can still win despite losing?
Personally, I think that the NPVIC probably would require Congressional approval… but I also don’t think that would be all that big of a deal. Presumably, the legislators from the states that have passed the Compact would be on board with their states’ plans, which would already get us most of the way towards approval. It’s an additional requirement, true, but it’s one highly correlated with the requirement we’re already dealing with.
EDIT:
Oh, and it would be possible, in a parliamentary system, for one party to receive over 50% of the popular vote, but for another party to end up controlling over 50% of the seats and hence the government, for much the same reasons that the equivalent is possible under our system. I don’t know if it’s ever actually happened, but if it hasn’t, it’s mostly just because parliamentary systems tend to have many parties, and hence it’s uncommon for a single party to get over 50% of anything.
Actually, you need an answer for why this scheme has any chance of surviving the compact clause. If states spend all this time enacting this compact, and it a court throws it out, we have a potentially very fucked up presidential election on our hands, with the chance that two people have equal claims to the presidency. That isn’t a good thing.
I don’t see how a state deciding that it’s EVs in an arbitrary, non-democratic manner affects the powers of other states. It’s a matter of the residents of that state losing the franchise.
It should be noted that in the last election, neither Trump nor Clinton won the (meaningless) “popular vote”.
I think the more plausible scenario, since more states would not be in agreement with it, is that Congress could take action to disapprove and then let the states that want it take it to the SCOTUS and see what happens.