If state Y simply copies state X, then there is an effective transfer of power. The final behavior is exactly as if state X had all of the combined EVs and state Y had none.
And that is exactly the same sense that the NPVIC is a transfer of power. In a narrow sense, it’s just another weird version of EV apportionment. The agreement itself is superfluous: it’s just a convenient way of referring to the scheme. It could be done without any explicit agreement at all, just ordinary state law describing the EV apportionment rules.
But it’s nevertheless true that the NPVIC is functionally equivalent to a transfer of power, and so maybe that’s enough for Congress to get involved.
I indicated there were at least three Australian examples above but lowballed myself.
There have been 7 instances in Aust Federal elections where the party with the most popular votes didn’t form government (most were extremely close), about 15% of our national elections since Federation.
29 May 1954 election
9 December 1961 election
25 October 1969 election
11 July 1987 election
24 March 1990 election
3 October 1998 election
In none of these results was the government formed by a post election coalition.
To be honest, I don’t think we’re ever going to find out in our lifetimes. It’s an interesting intellectual exercise, but I can’t see how you get enough EC votes from enough states to make it work.
Set aside partisan politics and consider a hypothetical. One candidate gets 60% of the vote, the other 38%. A priori, which would you guess would be the “better” President, the one less likely to push stupid wars or stupid tax cuts? I guess the voters may be smarter than they often seem; the “good guy” probably got more votes. Maybe.
Now consider the same scenario, but the popular vote is almost a toss-up: 48.5% to 48.0%. This was the margin in 2000. Was that extra 0.5% because Gore was the better man? Bush would never have gotten 48.5% with Gore only 48% because from the noise of such a 48.5-48 score, the wisdom of the masses will surely shine through?
Or when the score is so close, is it more like a coin toss. Certainly there are many recent close non-Presidential elections where most of us would wish the loser had gotten a few more votes.
Is it far-fetched to imagine that Bush had won the 48.5 to 48 popular vote? And that Gore won the EC? If that were the case would you still support NPVIC so strongly? Do you really think the electoral college was the underlying reason the two elections failed, or was the EC vote just another coin-toss in a noisy process?
It may not be a coincidence that the GOP won these EC contests, but probably not for the reason often claimed. The GOP has a 5 to 3 advantage among the 3-vote states (the smallest states, the over-represented states), but the Democrats have a 4 to 1 advantage among the 4-vote states. This is just about a “wash.”
The real problem for Dems is the huge number of wasted Dem votes in NY and CA. But, IIRC, Nate Silver’s simulations indicate that a <popular GOP, electoral Dem> split wasn’t so unlikely in 2016. And if/when Texas wisens up, the NPVIC supporters may live to rue.
Thank you! A voice of reason. Other Dopers are also commenting on the several ways that litigation or unfaithful electors could cause trouble.
If Alabama signs the Compact and its votes turn out to be decisive, do any of you imagine they’d let the Democrat win, instead of finding grounds to annul the Compact in their state? If so, can I interest you in buying the Brooklyn Bridge?
Of the many bad arguments that the pro-EC crowd trot out, there is one legitimate one: we have never held a popular vote in the US. So all this 48.5/48% stuff is nonsense, really, because people vote strategically. Turnout is suppressed in non-swing states. Candidates bias their campaigning. And so on.
Don’t you think it would be nice to actually hold a popular vote to see if the EC is doing its job?
Maybe some elections are a coin toss. Fine. I’d still like to see the results of that coin toss without an extra layer of nonsense on top.
Good! If the NPVIC works, then so be it–it’s an effective end run around the EC. If it fails, then it throws into harsh light the utter failure of the EC, with all its flaws–flaws that exist even without the compact. Faithless electors can already throw the election. If this happened under the NPVIC, there would be that much additional motivation to do things properly, with a constitutional amendment (which would most likely look like the NPVIC anyway, since that’s the easiest retrofit).
Then it really has nothing to do with the believe that the popular vote winner should get the state’s EVs? Like I said, if a state felt strongly about it they would do it unilaterally.
Correct. The whole point of the compact is that the EVs of an individual state are (or should be) irrelevant–in fact, that’s the root of the anti-democracy in the current system.
A partial system would bias things even more than now, which is already bad.
But lumping a bundle of states together, and voting as a bloc, fixes this bias–it makes everyone’s vote equal, even for people outside the bloc.
Phrasing it as some sort of moral argument (“if they were serious”) misses the point. The goal is to have a system which behaves identically to a real popular vote. A partial implementation works against this goal.
There is no procedure for stopping it is why. You mention a court throwing it out, but which court and on what basis? Please be reminded that the Constitution explicitly provides for the states choosing their own electors. Against whom would an injunction be filed, what would it require, and who would have standing to file it? What bill could Congress enact to stop it? You got nothin’ but splutter.
Dr. Strangelove, I’d say that it becomes a compact (and thus requiring Congressional approval) at step 4 of your list: That’s where the states are coordinating their actions, rather than independently acting in a way that happens to be in concert.
And thus we reach the point in the debate in which ElvisL1ves adopts the well-worn NRA debating tactic of reading a single part of the Constitution that is convenient for the argument they wish to make, and denying that any other part of the Constitution even exists. Then, they accuse anyone who points out other clauses that contradict the one-sided argument of being silly, extreme, and unfairly aggravated with blood coming out of their… whatever.
The lack of anything resembling a factual answer there, even hidden inside all the splutter, should be enough to close the matter. But it probably won’t be, will it?
I really don’t understand. Why is a pact needed at all? Yes I realize that politically it’s hard to sell to a given state unless they know it will work, but functionally I don’t see how it matters.
If any state adopts the rule unilaterally that its EV go to the nationwide popular vote winner what happens? Assuming there are only two candidates getting any EVs, the change by one state cannot make it less likely that the popular vote winner wins enough EVs. If that’s the objective, no pact is needed at all.
Also I cannot construct any scenario in which a “pact” exists and some state defaults to give its EVs to the candidate who won that state’s popular vote that gives the EV victory to loser of the popular vote unless the current system also does.
Another thing to keep in mind: All the states that have signed up so far are strongly Democratic leaning (see my earlier analysis), and they might as well have an arrangement that says “all Electors will automatically be awarded to the Democratic Candidate”. If, by some chance, we had a Republican “win” the popular vote and a Democrat win the EV, those states would drop out of the compact faster than rats jumping off a sinking ship.