It’s actually Scaled Composites (if you are referring to Burt Rutan’s operation), and for the most part design work isn’t done by NASA but by contractors and subcontracters, and merely managed or overseen by NASA. FWIW, Boeing is really trying to get out of the business of building space hardware and into being just a Prime Contractor; ditto for Northrop Grumman, and less so for Lockheed. Your actual fabricators and integrators these days are companies like Scaled Composites and Orbital Sciences, but they don’t have the political might or wherewithall to obtain a prime contract and run a major program themselves.
Chronos pretty much hits the nail on the head with regard to the Shuttle, but a couple of extra points to consider:
Everybody knew that the Shuttle was a compromise. NASA was forced to kill Apollo specifically to prevent a translunar human travel program that would have been very costly, and didn’t have the budget to develop both a new heavy lift booster AND a personnel transport, so they combined two into one. There was much grumbling, particularly among the advocates of an SSTO (single stage to orbit) reusable rocket as a people mover, but in the end it was decided that the Shuttle, warts and all, was better than nothing.
It’s a bit precipitous to refer to the Shuttle as a failure. Although the failure rate is higher than we’d like to accept, it has actually safely put more bodies in space than any other mode of transport. The failures–the SRB O-rings on Challenger and the insulation failure on Columbia–were as much a failure of the “Can Do!/No Problems Here!” culture that NASA has developed. People are afraid to criticize, as it as seen as a “risk” to career. Back in the good old days (according to people I work with who worked on Apollo) they took a lot of physical risks, but one could skirt around the chain of command and expose a problem with little fear of reprecussion if justified. Today, the attitude is reversed; they want an assessment zero physical risks, even if it means ignoring potential problems. Linda Ham, in all of her teary-eyed evasions, was exactly the sort of manager NASA has cultivated–risk adverse, head up arse, domineering and bombastic.
The Shuttle is essentially a test platform put into service. Unlike Apollo, which was a direct evolution from the earlier Redstone and Titan-based rockets of Mercury and Gemini, the Shuttle was a brand-new platform with all sorts of new, untested engineering solutions. No one, not even the Soviets, had or have since used solid rocket boosters for man-rated propulsion. The combination of the Shuttle main engines and the SRBs have very odd, offset dynamics that are difficult to compensate for, unlike the inline enginees of the older rocket-stack platforms or the much simpler Russian Buran Shuttle. The use of heat-absorbing tiles instead of an ablative shield was unique and untried. The Shuttle itself is seriously complex, and at the same time, antiqudated in its computer and flight control systems before it ever left the ground. (It has since been upgraded.) Given the conditions under which the Shuttle evolved and has operated, it’s actually kind of surprising that there haven’t been more failures.
As The Master points out in this column, the Shuttle, the ISS, and the manned space program have all become a kind of incestuous tautological justification for each other. I don’t fully agree with Cecil that manned spaceflight is unnecessary, but the justification should be the furtherence of manned spaceflight beyond Low Earth Orbit, not some public relations voodoo about spin-offs and vital research that could be done by trained monkeys. The ISS is a giant boondoggle that exists more of the sake of appearances of international cooperation than any scientific merit. A Moonbase is only slightly more justifiable, and a manned Mars mission is nonsense at this point.
A better goal would be the capture and exploitation of a near Earth asteroid for resources. Although the cost of such a venture would be enormous, the payoff (in terms of resources returned–all downhill) would be tremendous. The problem with that is, if you bring a 100 tonne lump of platinum back to Earth, you are going to drop the bottom out of the platinum market…making your resource “worthless” in economic terms (but valuable as an absolute resource). Space exploration really doesn’t sell as a profit enterprize; it’s too long term, too risky of a return, and many variables on what the return will actually be worth, hence the need for a government funded space program. So, you’re left with a sword that is nice and sharp on both sides; the need for nonprofit (i.e. government) funding and motivation on one edge, and political grandstanding and policy making on the other.
The Shuttle always had a limited lifespan, in terms of obsolescence, and we should have had something five years ago to replace it, or at least be beyond the concept stage. Instead, NASA cancelled the X programs (after running it into the ground by insisting that the programs develop not just conceptual test articles but actual flight-worthy or scaled designs), and is now scrambling to come up with an Apollo-like vehicle, the CEV, which is even more of a step backward, IMHO. And they continue to gut unmanned space programs that do good returns on science knowledge for fractions of a percent of what manned programs cost. :rolleyes:
And don’t believe for a minute that this Administration has any interest in putting a man on Mars, or indeed has any desire to find life on Mars at all. The ulterior motives aren’t hard to spot, and they all point to another competition with the new bear. Meanwhile, Hubble prepares to plunge to destruction, despite all of the backlog of valuable work it could continue to do for the forseeable future if maintained.
Stranger