Weak, fucking weak. You can do better than that!
Domestically, the only boycott I know of that might have influenced change was the grape boycott in support of the United Farm Workers back in the 60’s and 70’s. But the general politics and the support of other unions probably played a larger role than the boycott itself. I don’t know of any international boycotts that have played a role in changing an unjust situation. I think one of the most interesting forms of economic pressure right now is sort of a boycott–it’s the effort to prevent companies and institutions from using sweatshops to produce their products. Universities and celebrities are absolutely terrified of being connected with sweatshops, and are willing to go to great lengths to avoid it. Students going to the boards of universities and threatening to publicize the sweatshop production of T-shirts, sweatshirts and caps licensed by them, for instance, has led the universities themselves to organize a way of preventing the practice (though students and others are aware enough to know they have to keep an eye on things).
Internationally, Mswas is right, nation-to-nation economic sanctions seem to be the policy of choice. I was professionally involved in the debate about sanctions against South Africa, and there are a variety of lessons to be learned from it, and comparing it to others.
First, Villa is correct that you don’t do it unless you are convinced that the folks most likely to be initially hurt by it ask you to do it anyway. And second, you only do it when the issue at hand has an obvious solution. One can’t, for instance, expect that all Jamaicans will change their views of homosexuals, but one could easily see that while racism wouldn’t necessarily end in South Africa, a change in law could change the legal status of millions of people and provide them with great hope and opportunity. And, when the US finally imposed economic sanctions, things moved rather rapidly for change in South Africa. However, in retrospect, while the sanctions were important, Nelson Mandela and the South African government were also in talks at the time, so the political situation was much more fluid than most people knew. Nonetheless, the fact of sanctions affected the white South African populous more strikingly than people expected, in my view, and played a singular role in the South African government’s impetus for change.
And there’s the third lesson. Economic sanctions against South Africa are the poster boy for sanctions as a policy tool. But it’s about the only one that’s ever shown any serious positive outcome. There’s a huge list of ineffective or counter-productive sanctions. What’s the difference?
I think it’s that the average white South African aspired to be an ally of the US, and saw the US as something of a role model. I think this aspect has been neglected in evaluating the utility of sanctions, to our detriment. Sanctions only work against potential friends, I think, not against adversaries or enemies. For instance, Ayatollah Khameini and the Iranian people don’t see the US as an attractive nation but rather as an historic adversary, so the “rebuke” of economic sanctions isn’t effective. Indeed, it tends to stiffen the policy at issue. Cuba, of course, is the classic case.
The best example of a boycott working that I know of is the Montgomery bus boycott.
Yep, you’re right, and I should have known it.
It does lend the spotlight to another part of the equation, however. How important to the success of a boycott (or any other political endeavor) is the leadership and the times? It strikes me that political context is really important as well.