Avoiding as much as I can the simple fer-it-or-agin-it debates that pretty much seem moot right now, I’d like to see some debate about the apparent tactics and strategies used by both coalition and Iraqi forces.
One thing that I think surprised coalition forces was Saddam’s positioning of Fedayeen and Republican Guard operatives in southern and south central Iraq for the purpose of forcing those citizens to fight or at least appear to fight. As a tactic, it has forced the coalition to endure significant small-arms ambushes as it pushes its way north. And as a strategy, it has succeeded at least somewhat in giving the impression that Iraqi citizens do not welcome coalition forces, since the presence of Saddam’s vicious secret police and elite guards are fairly effective disincentive against dissent.
However, it also seems that it might have been both a tactical and strategic mistake. For one thing, it is doomed to fail tactically since it amounts to little more than a nuisance factor. The small arms and primitive mortars are no match for heavily armored coaltion marine and infantry divisions. In fact, they’ve already crossed bridges near Nasiriyah, and are advancing in full force. Strategically, it might have been a mistake to “condition” the coalition soldiers in such a manner that by the time they face the much anticipated stiff resistance near Baghdad, they will be more aware and vigilant than had they been lured through a cakewalk and then suddenly blindsided by force the likes of which they hadn’t encountered before.
Do you disagree with me? What are some of the tactics and strategies that you have perceived? And what are the good-news/bad-news aspects of them?
I’m no military expert. However, I have yet to see any Iraqi strategy. There’s plenty of speculation about whatt they are going to do, but that’s all. So far, the allied forces seem to have been able to do pretty much what they wanted to. It’s not clear how much central leadership and coordination the Iraqis have.
The regular army war – that’s the one we like and win. Lots of bombing positions in open desert, etc and people waving white flags as we proceed to the next objective.
The irregular army war – that’s the one we can’t win. The one where the enemy plays to his strengths by going urban and without uniform.
The media war – that’s the one where idiots are wanking themselves stupid and ejaculating all over your screens. “Another victory !” Opps, no it isn’t” “Opps, yes it is now! Hurah !! ” “Opps, there’s still a little resistance … ”
Which one has been most successful and which worst judged ?
Looks to me (a non teevee person) as if the ‘embedded’ reporters’ deal is a master stroke of anti-objective reporting - give 'em ‘quality’ so you occupy the screen but control the output … best tactics of the war so far, IMHO. I’d recommend the radio …
I think that lauching the ground war immediately was a mistake. Probably a much better tactic to pull the same stunt we did during the first Gulf war and pound them from the air until they come to realize that it just ain’t gonna be a winnable fight.
Instead we’ve put our forces on the ground, in hostile territory, and are moving so far and so fast that simply reorganizing after a push becomes problematic.
As for the actual fighting in Bhagdad, that will be a mess, especially if soldiers continue dressing as civilians. Occupation is something that I don’t think Bush or his advisors have hashed out very well, and I think it’ll wind up a nightmare.
That’s true for the most part in pitched battle in open country (which will never happen). But if those US infantry soldiers ever plan to get out of their armored vehicles and actually occupy the country to effect a regime change instead of merely parking their armored vehicles over here, and then over here, and then over there… An armed and motivated militia with small arms and an ability to “blend in” can really make life difficult for an occupying force, especially one subject to jittery public opinion at home fanned by moronic media outlets and stock markets which go up one day and down the next trying to predict the outcome of the war, and one with stretched supply lines vunlerable to attack.
A US strategy I wonder about is attacking with ground troops before sufficient air prep. Now, when it first started happening, I thought it was a stroke of genius since it was entirely different from Gulf War I strategy and from what everyone expected, but I assumed they would do it right–e.g., with a near 3-1 advantage in attacking vs. defending forces. But now I’m worried that we are attacking deep into enemy territory, far away from bases of operation, with stretched and not very well defended supply lines, with only one primary Army division against multiple Republican Guard divisions defending their home city. I’d feel a bit better if the 4th Infantry were alongside them.
Anyone know where the 4th Ivy and the 1st Cavalry are? On ships going through the Suez Canal??? How long till they arrive and are fit for battle? Inquiring minds want to know.
Libertarian, from my perspective, what we have seen with the Fedayeen may be a very reasonable tactic, that might go something like this:
Let the invaders run through the desert unopposed. Leave some Iraqi regulars (probably Shia conscripts) to put up whatever resistance they might. Allow the US forces to move quickly and gain confidence. Blend into the local populations, wave at the strike troops as they go by. Let the first few divisions cross the Euphrates unopposed.
Then use the irregular (guerilla) tactics to cut the supply and reinforcement lines. Destroy the bridges to make retreat impossible and reinforcement more difficult. Allow the Medina division to engage the Marines.
While I don’t see a method for the Iraqis to repel the invaders, if this were their tactic, it seems a reasonable one. I’m not sure, other than dropping back into Baghdad, of any tactic that would be more effective.
I think the decision to go straight to Baghdad was the hope to cut the head off the beast. Only time will tell if that strategy will pay dividends. I think it is a risky bet.
Personally, I’m a bit surprised the US has taken a quite direct route to Baghdad. I predicted that some armor divisions would race along the Saudi border, and gain control of western Iraq first. There isn’t much there to capture, except for some airstrips (useful for forward bases), and the road from Amman, which could be useful for delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Then send more armor to northern Iraq, from western Iraq, avoiding Baghdad. Allow these divisions to relieve paratroopers dropped in to hook up with Kurdish resistance forces. Secure an airstrip in northern Iraq, and begin flying in light armor. Slowly, begin to surround Baghdad and lay seige to the city. Before going to street fighting, focus on pysch ops and special ops to create the best possible atmosphere RG surrenders.
The problem with that is, with most of the Iraqi opposition taking place in villages and cities, and with Iraqi forces being interspersed amongst human shields and civilians you’d have to indiscriminately pound the villages and cities. This would lead to unacceptable civilian losses.
I agree with il Topo in that we’re way deep in Iraq and our supply lines appear to be vulnerable. I don’t know how vulnerable they are in reality, though.
What’s most vexing about the U.S. strategy is that, while it accomplishes one of our most important goals - causing as little undue hardship on innocent Iraqis as is possible - it conversely works against our cause in another way.
Iraqi leaders appear to be using the fact that we’ve bypassed certain of their troops in the south, left the lights on in Baghdad, refused to hit some key military targets because the collateral cost is deemed too high, etc. Those leaders are saying things like they are hanging tough, withstanding the best the U.S. and U.K. have to give. It wouldn’t surprise me if that message does encourage some to keep fighting.
This is a very complicated war, obviously. Remember all the talk about the “Powell Doctrine” after the First Gulf War? How effective it had been and how it was likely to be the course we’d take in the future, to avoid Vietnams? That doctrine seemed to center around this tenet: If you decide to go to war, go all-out. Fight to win, period. Annihilate your enemy.
That is not what we are doing now. And I understand all the reasons why. Still, it concerns me.
Do any of you know what is can if one reports an illegal immigrnat?Besides the INS who else can one contact.Because with the terror alert on ORANGE we should help as a community.
So the initial ‘plan’ (we invade and they surrender) seems to be failing.
A rapid capture of Baghdad? That only looks possible through commiting to street fighting. This would involve heavy losses on coalition side. Not a nice prospect.
A siege of Baghdad? With long supply lines that are anything but secure. Not a nice prospect.
Bomb the crap out of Baghdad? A real Shock and Awe with inevitable civilian casualties. Not a nice prospect.
But the last option can at least be sold to the public, with the necessarry spin doctering.
No northern front. Insufficient battlefield preparation. Inadequate force structure. Everyting Milossarian said about strategy. Moreover, do the Iraqis even need intelligence with embedded reporters in all the main combat units? Where is the big surprise envelopment manuver that would have put troops on Baghdad so fast it truly would have been shocking? Tommy Franks is no Alexander the Great.
Did it seem like I’m nervous and unable to form a coherent thought? Sorry.
Rumsfeld, Myers, Franks and all the other military brass seem to have gotten caught up in all the oohing and ahhing that the imbedded reporters and 24-hour news anchors are giving the war.
We talked up “Shock and Awe” so much. “Just you wait,” they said. “It will be unlike anything you’ve ever seen,” they said. As if all Iraqi combatants would surrender to the first TV crew that came along after it was done.
It sure did look impressive on TV.
But it also left the Iraqi military higher-ups the opportunity to say, “We’re still here, and we’re still fighting.” And that has, no doubt, rallied our enemy.
I had no illusions this would be easier than the first Gulf War. That was designed around repelling Iraq from another country they’d invaded. This is their home turf. They are imbedded. They can play up the “You’re fighting for Mother Iraq against the invading foreign hordes” angle to keep Iraqis fighting to the death, regardless of any misgivings they may have about Saddam Hussein.
And not a likely one. After all, I heard it reported several times this past weekend that coalition troops won’t enter Basra “because it is still too dangerous to enter the city.” I about fell out of my chair.
I am in complete agreement with the posters above who have identified the lack of a punishing air campaign prior to the land invasion as a big mistake. Want to know why al those Iraqi soldiers surrendered at the first opportunity in Gulf War I? It’s because we bombed the shit out of them for five or six weeks before they saw anyone they could have surrendered to.
The message of the air campaign in Gulf War I was unmistakable: Surrender at the first opportunity or you will die.
In Dubya Dubya II, the message is also unmistakable: Surrender or we will go around you and allow you to take easy shots at us with no real consequences.
My hope is that before there is any assault on Baghdad itself, the city will be encircled in overwhelming force from a comfortable distance away, the supply lines and rear will be secured, and the forces defending the city will be bombed around the clock for at least a week and preferably two.
I posted this in the other TACTICS thread, but it seems to have stalled, so I’ll put here also:
I have a question regarding our tactic with regard to “taking” small villages along the way to Baghdad. As I understand it, we aren’t “taking” the villages, but simply blowing past and taking out only those who are actually shooting at us. But the other day, didn’t our supply line get ambushed because we didn’t secure these little villages along the way? I thought it was Combat 101 to make sure you don’t leave adversaries behind you. Anyone out there know about this stuff? My husband is a Vietnam combat Marine and is totally confused as to why we would be ignoring a tried and true tactic.
