I started this in it’s own thread because, while I have seen it referenced in other threads it did not seem to be a primary concern of any ongoing discussion.
First, let me set some starting markers.
[ol][li]While it is still unclear as to who originated the strategic plan for operation “Iraqi Freedom”, and while no person in the administration has claimed “official ownership” of same, it does seem clear that Mr. Rumsfeld has had a strong voince in both crafting the plan and advocationg for it within the administration.[/li][li]Full details of the plan are obviously not yet available. That does not mean we cannot discuss, conjecture, criticize, etc. those elements which are evident through execution.[/li][li]Any plan should be measured against its goals. The administrations advertised goals are to: change the ruling structure of Iraq, remove the threat that Iraq might proliferate WMD, liberate/grant self-determination to the Iraqi peolpe, minimize casualties among Iraqi civilians, minimize casualties among coalition forces, minimize damage to teh Iraqi infrastructure… If anyone wants to infer other goals based upon th einformation at hand, then I think those are also fair game for debate (to the extent the inference can be suported and impacts upon the war strategy, of course).[/ol][/li]
What is evident about the stratey so far:
[ul][li]It called for a minimal “pre-attack” bombing campaign.[/li][li]It emphasized lighlty armored and rapidly maneuvering forces in the south.[/li][li]The orignal plan appears to have called for a more hevily armored northern force, but diplomatic failures in Turkey altered that element.[/li][li]It relies very heavily on precision missiles and bombs over “dumb ordinance”.[/li][li]It called for a very rapid advance towards Baghdad, bypassing southern concentrations of resistance without securing a solid rear.[/li][li]It utilized solely US forces in the advance, with other coalition forces (i.e. British) working to secure areas passed over in the advance.[/li][li]It calls for both the distribution of anti-regime propoganda and humanitarian supplies to areas outside of Baghdad.[/li][li]It expected the attackers position to be assisted by either significant defections from Iraqi troops, significant uprisings from Iraqi citizenry, or both.[/li][li]After the Turkish option was closed, it has relied upon the ability to secure Iraqi air fields with light assault troops in order to provide bases from which to open a northern front.[/ul][/li]
What I think:
We are failing in both the propoganda effort and the humanitarian effort:
The first of these was predictable and quite possibly unavoidable. No war is 100% “clean”. There will always be civilian casualties and collateral damage which the current regime can play up to effect. We also were beginning under the triple handicap of: deep suspicion of the US throughout the Arab nations, a target population that has had heavily restricted access to information for more than a decade, and a target population that remembers quite clearly that teh US abandoned them the last time we had an army in teh region and asked them to rise up against Hussein.
The second is a side-effect of the strategic plan. Because we did not move more slowly and secure our logistic paths, we are left in a position where we claim to be “in control” of much territory yet are unable to move supplies through that territory. We have yet to even truly secure a primary port-of-entry.
The “pre-attack” bombing campaign has not weakened the resolve of Iraqi troops, but may have succeeded in damaging control structures.
This appears to be in line with the strategic expectation. The campaign was too brief to have any realistic expectation that it would route the Republican Guard, but the targetted strikes may have caused injury or even death to key members of the IRaqi regime.
The expectation of a general uprising was never realistic:
For the same reasons that we are hadicapped in the propoganda effort. To teh extent that the strategy depended upon a general uprising, it was a flawed plan.
The “stall” before attacking Baghdad is a molehill playing Matterhorn:
Given the extended lgoistical paths through unsecured territory, it would be foolish to rush all the way to Baghdad and then engage a determined defending force before regrouping, reorganizing, and resupplying. While one hope of the plan might have been to march directly into Baghdad against light opposition, it would have been a poor plan indeed if it put all of its eggs in that single basket.
The bombing campaign is both well designed and well executed.
While there will always be “misses”, it is imperative to the long term goal of Iraqi self-determination that we make every effort to minimize both civilian casualties and infrastructure damage. As a whole, our campaign has been very effective at keeping those to goals in mind while inflicting damage to military and governmental targets.
I do think that we are not doing a good job on the information front by always playing up th eaccuracy of our armaments while downplaying any reports of collateral damage. Even if our positions are factual, we are giving the appearance of dodging responsibility. Again, this is a propoganda failure.
It was a good idea to segreagate the tasks for international forces:
Largely, this is a side effect of the lmiited nature/capabilities of our “coalition partners”. Essdentially, this is a joint US/British enterprise, with the British supplying primarily light infantry and commando troops. Because of this, the additional “power at the front” that could be obtained by a more integrated army would not offest the difficulties of coordinating the forces under tight combat and maneuver conditions. Also, it has been a good idea to have the British troops working to secure rear areas. While they do not have a great reputation in the area, they are viewed with less suspicion than the US. They also have more experience in operating as an “occupying force” in the eyes of many residents (N. Ireland). Both of these make them the better troops to handle many of the “first encounter” situations with the Iraqis.
The northern front will never be more than a nuisance for the attack on Baghdad.
It will tak too long to funnel troops and heavy equipment through captured northern airfields. The feints in that direction are designed to: occupy Iraqi troops/reserves, keep Turkey honest about the Kurdish situation, prepare for/head off potential Kurdish resistance to whatever new regime we install in Iraq.
The initial gambit for a “quick solution” has failed.
BUT it was still a good gamble to take. While I think that it was wildly overoptimistic to expect a general uprising/troop defection, there was at least a small chance that the “road to Baghdad” would have laid wide open to a very rapid assault. The upside of that would have been huge (minimized infrastruicure damage, minimized civilian casualties, propoganda coup, minimized coalition casualties, minimized “ripple effects” in other Arabian nations). Even in “failure” this thrust managed to: rapidly secure the southern oil fields with minimal Iraqi saboutage, gain vital river crossing before they could be secured/destroyed, pin Iraqi armor into a closed theatre in which manueverability is constrained (increasing vulnerability to our unquestioned air superiority).
For teh record, I was against this war and remain convinced that it was a stupid thing to start. That’s a whole separate thread (many of them, actually.)
