I think Metaphysics pretty much covers it.
Yeah… I suppose the question “Is ‘what is real’ the same as ‘the nature of reality’?” is in itself metaphysical. 
It’s more difficult to articulate these days than it used to be because of the entrenchment of existentialism. Before Sartre, and to some degree before Kant, it was assumed that existence emerged like any other property from essence. Thankfully, the tide is turning back a bit since the 1970s, but especially in the last ten years. Existence is being examined predicately, as it should be, signified by “bounds” — e.g., Sartre’s existence is differentiated from Socrates’ existence by virture of their unique experiences, just as if one was more or less wise than the other. Kant’s dogma is being re-examined, and things are looking bright for essentialism. (Note that what I’ve said is not without controversy. Dogmatic existentialists still, um, exist.)
I’m an atheist, but there’s a field of philosophy called theology which deals with some things I don’t believe exist. I’d prefer if it was called atheology, but I realise that will never catch on.
I’m a physicalist, but there’s a field of philosophy called metaphysics which deals with some things I don’t believe exist. I’d prefer if it was called physics, but I realise that will never catch on.
“Things” and “exist” are rather loaded words in this discussion, but I’d be interested to hear some examples of “metaphysical things” that you don’t believe “exist”. Are you saying that all metaphysical questions can be reduced to physics questions, or that some metaphysical questions (or terms, or concepts, or however you’d like to express it) are meaningless, because they’re not reducible to the language of physics, and it’s therefore useless to discuss them?
Would you say, rather than the statement CJJ* attributes to you, something like “There shouldn’t be any such thing as metaphysics”, in the same way you’d (presumably) say “There shouldn’t be any such thing as religion”?
OK, let’s try “essence”, or maybe “qualia” (although if things get tricky we could always return to fairies or the lapis philosophorum or something). Now, I cannot deny that I have memories formed from many different sensory inputs since childhood. Neither can I deny that I have been taught how to label sets and subsets of those memories using language. If these sensory inputs, memories and labels are what is meant by “essence” or “qualia”, I have no problem with their “existence” (this being another label, you understand).
But many people propose that essence and qualia are not just the sensory memory labelled by language, but something else in addition, “out there” in some Platonist sense. It is this which I deny, just as I would deny the “God” in “the universe is a subset of God”.
Some questions clearly are category errors (do colourless green ideas sleep furiously, or not?) - just because one can ask a question doesn’t mean there’s a sensible answer to it. I consider many metaphysical questions are category errors. But I don;t simply declare that physics is the only useful language: I start from the position that there are physical entities and see how far we can get with them using Ockham’s Razor. I consider that cognitive science explains enough to make the metapysical unnecessary. We can explain so much on a physical basis like, say, memory, that physical entities are all we need. That is not to say that cognitive science is complete any more than any other science is - if so, we could shut down university departments worldwide for there woudl be no more science to do. But we don’t propose some non-physical emelent of, say, the weather or the amoeba (unless you’re a 19th century vitalist, of course.)
Hey, I’m the most libertarian guy here in terms of what people “should” be allowed to do. Yes, I think the world would be a better place if there was less religion, but that’s really a reflection of those particular religions. If belief in God or the metaphysical brings some neuropsychological output a person calls “significance”, “joy” or “love”, I would encourage them to crank out those outputs like the proverbial motherfucker.
I think I understand - there are certain things which arise from metaphysics, rather than from a study of the real world (let’s not get into “real” at this point - I think you and I agree what it means here), and which therefore aren’t as worthy of the label “existence” as physical things are - if a concept, such as “essence”, is entirely metaphysical, then it doesn’t exist?
However, you’re still practicing ontology by making this point, and are therefore still being metaphysical.
I’ve never liked that sentence - it implies that there’s no such thing as metaphor, which is obviously untrue - but that’s a digression.
Would I be right in characterizing this as “There’s nothing meaningful that metaphysics can explain which isn’t explicable by science”?
Of course - I didn’t mean to imply anything different. Perhaps “In an ideal world, there would be no metaphysics”, in the same way that I might say “In an ideal world, there would be no politics”?
But would a world with no philosophical or political disagreements be ideal? “If everyone in the country thought the same as me - if everyone in the country was me - well, it’d be a bloomin’ strange telephone directory, for starters!”
Anyway, thanks again for another very informative explanation of your position.
Well, that’s why I consider ontology to be something of a useless bunch of hooey, rather like learning Klingon. As I point out in this summary of the MOAPGE, anything that can be known epistemically (ie. by our senses), such as a rock, atom or synaptic discharge is ontologically irrelevant: Ontology only deals with the transcendental - that which is solely intuitive. But you’re right, “ontology is hooey” is still talking about ontology, so I suppose I can’t escape from its death spiral if I wish to set forth my position at all.
Hmm, I’ll go along with that for now - if any problems arise therefrom I’ll be sure to let you know. (And note that science and physicalism are not identical - the former is the philosophical position which IMO embraces the conclusions and methodology of the latter most closely.) I’d also suggest that metaphysics doesn;t really explain, it only describes.
I’m still not really that interested in other people’s beliefs, so long as their consequences aren’t unduly negative - vive la difference.
No problem. I’m away for a few days as from one hour’s time, so apologies for any non-response.
Erratum: And note that science and physicalism are not identical - the latter is the philosophical position which IMO embraces the conclusions and methodology of the former most closely.
We’re all embiggened that you dropped in, if only for a brief spell. If I didn’t know better, I’d swear I have a schoolgirl crush on you, Sentient. 
I saw your name on the thread listing, and my heart lept. I couldn’t wait to see what you’d written. I know of no man with whom I disagree so fundamentally on such critical issues, and yet whose opinions I respect and seek out more. Hurry back!
giggles and runs away
Cute. Anyway, for the record, regarding explanation versus description, it is important to point out that the difference between them might not help your case because with respect to the cause and effect relata — which is what science studies as events or tropes or something similar — if the relata are facts, then they are necessarily transcendent (as opposed to immanent). The Uncertainty Principle, for example, is a fact, and science can do nothing more than test its effects. Therefore, the usage of “only” with describes is rather queer, since description is entirely appropriate with facts.
What about metaphysics? My quizical friend Joan was very interested in the subject, and studied them nightly. That was before the unpleasantness.
I think you’ll find that’s pataphysics.
Pataphysical science, to be precise, which she studied with a test tube. I don’t know how that’s possible but the test tube might just be a pataphor. 
As several posters have already mentioned, Metaphysics is simply the philosophical investigation of the ultimate nature of reality. It does not require any supernatural entities. One can be an atheist or agnostic and still be interested in metaphysical questions. And metaphysics in the proper philosophical sense has no relation to the new-age books you can find in the “metaphysical studies” sections of your local bookstores.
Under this definition physicalism isn’t a refutation of metaphysics, it’s simply one metaphysical position among many.
I can’t be a physicalist because it seems to me that the physicalists assume too much. A scientist might say “phenomenon X can be explained by the theory of Y, and under theory Y phenomenon X can be reduced to more simple compnents.” For instance, the Giraffes long neck can be attributted to natural selection, which can be linked to heredity, which can be linked to DNA molecules, which can ultimately be linked to the interactions of various subatomic particles. It seems to me that physicalists want to go beyond these humbly specific scientific explanations to make a grand statement that everything in the Universe must be reducible to matter and energy in this fashion. That’s too bold for me. I’m a metaphysical agnostic. Any idea of the ultimate nature of reality must take into account well corroborated scientific theories in order to be credible, but it need not be limited by them.
The problem with metaphysics is that it doesn’t have any method of testing theories, and indeed, from what I can tell, it’s very difficult to even pose metaphysical questions clearly. This problem was mocked by Douglas Adams. We know that the ultimate answer is 42, we just don’t know what the ultimate question is. But this difficulty doesn’t mean that metaphysical curiosity is going away. It’s our nature to ponder reality, and I find it difficult to believe that reality doesn’t have some ultimate nature, however inaccessable it may be.
Also, it seems to me that there are phenomena that are still pretty mysterious. I don’t think we have a real understanding of consciouness yet. Even more mysterious is the phenomenon of self-consciousness, qualia, personal identity, or whatever you want to call it. It is entirely possible that these phenomena will prove irreducible.
The real enemies of metaphysics aren’t physicalists, let alone scientists, but the positivists and analysts. Wittgenstein and Russell were the most prominent members of this school, with Ayer serving as the popularizer. The claim is that all metaphysical statements, including physicalist statements, are meaningless. I’ve always been confused by this. Metaphysical problems may be insoluble, but they are surely not meaningless. The question “Is there a God?” is pretty clear, as a re the answers “Yes, there is” and “No there isn’t.” (I realize I’m not doing Logical Positivism justice, but it does seem to me a silly doctrine.)
just my $0.02.
Worth far more than that, Larry. It’s hard to tell with Wittgenstein. I think he ended up feeling like Tractatus was the philosophical equivalent of an embarrassing bowel movement, the emergence of logical positivism notwithstanding.
Many points in Larry’s excellent post come up so frequently that I’ll answer them here, and probably refer back here in future, too.
It seems to Larry that “physicalists assume too much”. I think this is a widespread, erroneous, but entirely forgivable view, and it’s up to me and other physicalists to correct it. As I have said many times, I do not simply declare that everything is physical and dust off my hands at a job well done. I start with what we agree is physical, such as atoms, cells or computers, and ask what could (in principle if not yet in practise) be explained using only these entities.
At any point, one may call “Halt! I cannot accept that such and such a step is even possible”, and after a few rounds of clarification I would probably simply agree to disagree. All I would ask is that cognitive science be treated like any other science (physics, chemistry, biology or whatever), none of which have every single explanatory gap mapped out in full either. Again, I say not that (as Larry puts it) “the universe must be reducible to matter and energy” (to which I’d add forces and spacetime, incidentally), but only that it could be explained by such.
So why my apparently pedantic picking of Larry’s “reducible” nit? Well, this is an important philosophical word, even in real life: after all, one of the central columns of the Intelligent Design dogma rightly banned from US science classes is the concept of irreducible complexity. People like Michael Behe say that the tiny “propeller” called the flagellum simply could not have evolved, and must therefore have been designed. But, of course, the flagellum isn’t “irreducible” in this way: evolutionary biology provides and explanation of how flagella could have arisen from simpler elements.
But can we build a flagellum out of these elements in a lab? No. Have we got direct, irrefutable evidence demonstrating not just that they could have evolved, but that they actually did? No. Do we even fully understand the molecular and genetic engineering behind how they actually work and get built at all? No. How, then, can we say that the flagellum is reducible to matter, energy and whatnot?
That is why the word “reduce” is so ambiguous, and why I would say that very little in science can truly be “reduced” to the simpler elements comprising it (while still being explained by reference to them). Let us take even as simple an example as an atom. A single electron’s entire state can be reduced to a simple equation which is easily solved for the electron on its own. But introduce more electrons, and the equation and its solution becomes more difficult. Further introducing the quarks which comprise protons and neutrons makes things get pretty horrendous, even for something as simple as a helium atom, and by the time you’re up to carbon or oxygen, you’re truly screwed. As for molecules and the rules of valency and what have you, forget it. You could literally not solve the equations even with a computer comprising the entire universe. We can’t even “reduce” molecules to atoms, or atoms to sub-atoms, so what hope is there for doing the same for, say, thoughts and neurons?!
The point is that all kinds of systems evade “reduction” in this way. Seth Lloyd of MIT estimates that the total computational limit of the entire universe to date is 10[sup]120[/sup] flops (PDF), the so-called “Lloyd limit”. So if “reducing” something to simpler elements requires information capacity in excess of the whole universe, it is an impossible task. From atoms to the different possible configurations of subatoms (a mere 400 entangled electrons becomes theoretically impossible), or from … [ul][li]molecules to the different possible configurations of atoms[/li][li]DNA molecules to the different possible configurations of protein molecules[/li][li]storms to the different possible configurations of clouds[/li][li]passwords the different possible configurations of cryptographic keys[/li][li]patterns of neural activity to the different possible configurations of neurons,[/li][/ul] … time and again we run up against systems whose “reduction” to simpler systems hits the Lloyd limit like a brick wall. That’s why I’m not a reductionist.
But do we therefore introduce a non-physical element to atoms, or molecules, or DNA, or the weather, or computer programs? Of course not. We recognise that physics, chemistry and biology are not by any means complete, but that they explain so much that no further entities are necessary in an Ockham’s Razor sense. They are based on induction, not reduction. The physicalist merely holds the same position for cognitive science as for any other science.
Hi SentientMeat! Hope you had a fun/profitable/sucessful weekend.
Thanks again for the explanation - your position is therefore, as I understand it, “It’s not necessary to use anything beyond the physical to explain any phenomenon”, rather than the simple “There is nothing beyond the physical”?
I’m sure there is something we disagree on out there, but finding it is proving difficult.
You’re quite right - I suspect I’ll struggle to keep my syntax clear here, no matter how hard I try! My point, which I suspect you might find rather circular, was that metaphysics does not IMO provide any falsifiable predictions from which to construct “laws”, statistical regularities, causal mechanisms or any other central requirement of what I’d call an explanation. (Of course, that’s a large part of the reason it’s called metaphysics rather than physics in the first place.)