breaths a great sigh of relief as his neurons are having epileptic fits from contemplating the uncontemplatable(epistemology)
I just wanted to mention that this thread is a welcome change from most of the other threads I’ve read. Wow, you guys actually managed to have an adult, educated discussion without resorting to “Im right and you’re wrong just because! Nah nah nah”
Ive read about epistemology before and it fried my brain then as it is now (although I think I have a basic understanding of it).
Oh well, I will post when I’ve had a chance to recover-er-think about all this and perhaps discuss it with some of my co-workers. (You’d be surprised how philisophical dead-body-haulers can be)
-Fox
“Minds are like parachutes: They only function when open.”
“I can’t explain myself,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see.” -Alice’s Adventure Under Ground
Wasn’t trying to ignore you, aynrandlover, I just lost track of this over the holidays.
Well, I think perhaps I might have misled you. It is true that RToT was designed to express ideas about group constructs (sets, classes, teenagers, etc.) in a manner that avoids paradox. This is not really the same as saying that we “rephrase things to [stay] away from self-reference”. Let me try to be more clear.
Classical set theory, RToT, and English are all languages which allow us to say things about groups. Under each language, different syntactically correct statements about groups can be made. Of those statements, some will be semantically meaningful and some will not be semantically meaningful. Under Classical set theory and English, we can create semantic paradoxes. The semantic value of these syntactically correct statements is indeterminable. Under RToT, those statements are either syntactically incorrect or semantically meaningless.
One way of looking at this is to say that English and CST allow nonsensical statements (paradoxes) to appear meaningful, while RToT prevents this illusion of semantic content.
Another way of looking at it is to say that RToT avoids paradox by limiting its scope, while English and CST attempt a broader scope and thus cannot avoid paradox.
Well – that view presupposes that paradox is meaningful. An alternative position would be: There are no turtles, it’s just a trick of your language.
Consider the phrase “bluer than blue”. It is syntactically correct. Is it semantically meaningful? If so, why? If not, why not?
foxfyre
Thanks and welcome aboard.
Next stop, insanity. [sub]what do you mean that was last stop?[/sub]
Well, by “avoiding the turtles” perhaps I spoke to literally.
If we accept Theory of Types we find Godel knocking on our door showing that there are statements which are not able to be shown true nor false (though they may be true or false). To me, you see, this is a dressed up (or rather, dressed down) paradox. In one case the statement must be accepted as unproven and in the latter the statement says nothing.
In either case we find the statements to lie out of reach whether or not we can ascribe meaning to them.
I am a pretty big fan of paradoxes. I find them to be, in some vaguely zen way I’m sure, an inherent part of life, thought, and so on.
Now I’ve got a question about Godel’s work. From what I know he proved that any system that is “powerful” enough to describe itself falls into his trap…how did Russel not avoid this? As well, there are false things and true things not able to be proven true or false…but can we then say that “this is true but I can’t prove it?” If not, if not, does this not make atheism a completely moot point?
Ugh, I didn’t want to bring higher powers into this, but unprovable “truths” always seem to end up there…
Not really. First, you must show that Godl’s Theorem holds for RToT. Even then, you are left simply with the position that RToT is either unsound or incomplete. This is hardly a paradox.
Actually, in one case we have statements out of reach, in the other case we have false statements proven valid. Personally, I find the first case far preferable to the second. I very much prefer sound and incomplete to unsound.
I like paradoxes, too. I find them interesting, entertaining, sometimes even profound. But I remain open to the idea that paradoxes say more about the way we think and express our thoughts than about the nature of reality.
Well – here is where I think you are running into trouble. The construction of a Godel statement requires some very specific properties. Often, the breakdown is given as computable/noncomputable systems, probably because Godel’s Theorem does not hold for the most well-known noncomputable system (complete arithmetic). I have seen, though, arguments that Godel’s Theorem holds for noncomputable systems as well so long as they are capable of a closed operation mapable to substitution, negation, and the construction of a “theoremhood predicate”. Lob, I believe, even extended the result to consistency (rather than soundness) by placing some restrictions on the form of the “theoremhood predicate”.
Tarski, in effect, demonstrated that there is no theoremhood predicate for true arithmetic. (There is no formula P(x) in the language of arithmetic expressing the fact that x is a code for a true statement of arithmetic.) Now, in Classical Set Theory (Cantorian/ZFC), ir is possible to construct a theoremhood predicate and Godel holds. Likewise it holds for arithmetics derived from Peano’s axioms. It does not hold for geometry, or for an arithmetic of natural numbers that contains only + or only *.
He didn’t. In Principia Mathematica he walked right into it by attempting to derive PA from RToT. This is a remarkable and influential work, but it is not airtight. In fact, in order to derive PA Russell had to incorporate some additional concepts into RToT.
Had Russell truly shown that PA could be derived from RToT then we would know that Godel’s Theorem would apply to RToT (as it does to PA). But, since Russell was forced to introduce outside concepts (particularly for Peano’s 5[sup]th[/sup] axiom, IIRC) we cannot use the Incompleteness of PA to decide the incompleteness of RToT.
I am not saying that it is necessarily impossible o construct a Godel statement within RToT, but I spent a few minutes playing with it and could find no simple way to do so.
No. In systems under which Godel holds we can say: X is provable, X is provably false, X is unproveable, or X is unproven. (Actually, I believe some proponents of Godel do claim that a Godel statement is demonstrably true but unproveable, but I have yet to see a proof of that position that remains rigorous to the system under which the Godel statement was constructed.)
Atheism has always been a moot point, in the original sense of the word. Godel’s Theorem, if it could be demonstrated to hold for all theological systems, would simply argue that atheism would always remain moot. Now, if “God exists” could be demonstrated to be a Godel statement, then it would make strong atheism an unreasonable position. It would have no effect on weak atheism or theism (except for theisms purportedly based upon “proofs” of God’s existence).
As I understand it, a Godel String, Statement, whatever, is one in which we use a new interpretation of existing symbology and, from the mathematically allowed operations, manipulate strings to the extent that what is created is both semantically and mathematically correct, but which itself is interpreted as a statement (symantically) of the number theory in question.
Now I can easily see how run-of-the-mill set theory falls into this trap because one can, almost without any trouble, create paradoxical sets that both contain themselves and don’t. But for a theory of types this does, admittedly, become more problematic.
As well, from what I understand, Part of Godel’s work demonstrated that any system that could create any Godel statement was permanently incomplete…that is, to patch any hole with a new axiom would only change the Godel statements available, not eliminate them.
But you do have more insight into the matter than I, so please fill this in for me if you could.
Anyway, to continue on, I wasn’t aware the Russell ended up working more assumptions in later in the game in an attempt to come up with Peano’s theorems…hmmm.
Also, if Russell came up with the infamous proof for 1 + 1 = 2 then don’t we have arithmatic as a part of his theory of types? Doesn’t that, then, bring Godel into even simple arithmatic? Or was it that a Godel statement has never successfully been made of RToT? Little hazy here…
You seem to have it. If GIT holds for any system, then it holds for any superset of that system. Patching won’t work. As to the Godel statement itself, there are various formulation which have been shown to be functionally equivalent in demonstrating GIT. But, regardless of the form a degree of self-referentialism is reguired. Indeed, Godel’s original formuslation was principally involved in demonstrating a means of encoding a self-referential statement in a very general mathematical language.
In some respects, he did this as a direct response to Russell & Whitehead’s work. In particular, he set out to refute the idea that an algebra could be developed that was sufficiently tight for “true” and “proveable” to be treated as synonyms. To an extent, he succeeded, though the application of GIT is, as we have seen, incomplete. Certainly, Godel’s result does hold in the arithmatic Russell and Whitehead developed.
This article gives a decent, if a bit stilted, introduction to some of the issues.
Well, Russell thought so when he published Principia Mathematica, but a good argument can be made that he needed more than RToT to develop his arithmetic.
As I noted, GIT holds for arithmetics derived from Peano’s axiomization. It is easy to get confused by labels, here. Often, you will see statements that GIT holds for “arithmetic” and thus any system powerful enough to generate/including arithmetic. “Arithmetic”, in those cases, should really be read “simple arithmetic + number theory (or a concept of natural numbers)”. “Simple/true arithmetic”, in the sense I have used it above, does not involve in concept of an (potentially) infinite succession of counting/natural numbers. It can be formalized in various ways, e.g., an infinite Abelian group with +/* as the composition function, but there is no successor function.
If you are interested in such things, I am fairly certain that GIT holds for Sorites Arithmetic, which is “simpler” than PA. (I believe it omits Peano’s induction axiom, but I honestly do not recall for sure.)
I have not seen an argument that GIT holds for RToT, and I cannot come up with a Godel Statement under RToT myself. Of course, that is true only if you agree that Russell was not airtight in Principia Mathematica. If he was, then GIT would hold since RToT is sufficient to derive PA. [sub]sorry – I have grown tired of writing these all out. If the abreviations are confusing, say so and I will revert to English.[/sub] So, basically what I am saying is that Godel’s work might have implications for our treatment of epistemology under RToT, but someone has to demonstrate that a Godel statement can be formed under RToT first. Sure took me a long time to get there, eh?
Interesting article. Luckily I had a brief introduction to constructionist and realist arguments toward mathematics or I would have been done for! It came from a great book about the history of math: The Mathematical Experience by Davis and Hersh.
This leads me to some other problems I have with philosophy in general.
Firstly, it is largely reflective in nature. That is, we are using collected experience, thoughts, semantics, etc, to postulate existence, knowledge, etc. That is, at best we must start IMO from solipsism. I see no other way around it apart from absolute hypothesisizing. The problem I have with absolute hypothesizing is that it would be an attempt to define being. The question always remains, then…where did the hypothesis come from? That is, is it possible to postulate non-existence at all?
The troubles we’ve found here in this very thread is the “simple” definition of self which is “naturally” assumed throughout pre-philosophic existence (that is, before we sit down and have a personal whack at philosophy) is not derivable.
Argh.
As well, science plagues modern thinkers (at least all the ones I know) and philosophy IMO is always a step behind it. Quantum Mysticism, Relativistic twistings of math, and so on.
That is…Russell (in that article) had serious problems with existential matters. Logic itself (as I posed earlier) cannot create but can only reveal. The very essence of ontology is completely divorced from epistemology in the sense that one cannot epistemologically derive ontology. To do so will cause, like I did in the beginning, assumptions on a whole number of different levels which are not justifiable.
But this leads me to what can only be a tautology of sorts…we want to decide on some particular ontology, but how do we do that? Apart from mere definition we want to be able to reason about it…but that requires logic…obviously an epistemology. But we’ve already come to the conclusion (not necessarily you and I in this very thread, though we have) that epistemology alone cannot derive ontology.
So now my question becomes…where do we allow the greatest flaw? In our ontology or our epistemology? Both will surely be flawed to some extent, but we make choose (it seems) to screw one up wors than another. Which would it be?
If we choose epistemology and let ontology go two sheets to the wind then we at least allow some quantum interpretation to be correct…that is, there is no “boundry” of an “event.” In a real zen way, everything is one. As well we let relativity’s ever-reaching gravity shape all existence into a single mold, so to speak. If we, on the other hand, let epistemology take the fall, we are in a state of shambles always unable to make any claim with even a mediocre grain of certainty.
Well, solipsism is by no means a universl starting point. You need to hypothesize to get there, too. Most philosophies, though, explicitely erject solipsism. Are they justified in doing so? That all depends upon how we determine justification.
Hmmmm, I am not sure I follow you. I see no problem with defining being. We have to define any term we wish to use. I see the question (essentially unanswerable) as one of verification/reliability. Nihlism certainly purports to postulate nonexistence. Do you find nihliism essentially flawed? (If I had to gues, I would say that you attack it from the “implied subject”, but perhaps you have another tack.)
I have to disagree, here. I think that any but the most minimally conceived ontology is very much dependent upon epistemology, though as I said earlier that epistemology may be entirely implicit. Certainly, it is possible to derive an ontology from an epistemelogical basis. What we cannot do is epistemelogically derive a basis for epistemology.
Well, first I would quibble that it is not necessary that either be flawed It is simply not possible to determine that our basis for either is reliable.
That said, since I argue that unreliability is unavoidable in epistemology I would argue that we should therefore derive our ontology explicitely from whatever epistemological basis we decide upon. That way, our combined system suffers only from the single factor of unreliability, rather than a compounded factor. But I could be wrong.
Nihilism, in my understanding, defeats not existence per se but purpose, consciousness, and other aspects we ascribe to “being” but not “existence.”
I would indeed tackle it from an “implied subject” point of view. I find it impossible to argue non-existence. True, we may define being, but any such definition is a tautology. It has to be! Let me see if I can rephrase this mess.
We start with absolutely nothing. Wrong. There is no beginning to philosophy. It is tautological in nature, not by definition but because it is, if you’ll allow me to elaborate, like classical set theory.
Philosophy is us postulating, proving, etc, our own existence, what this existence means, so we can see how things either are, should be, or both. This is completely self-referential…any Russell-based epistemology cannot derive existence of itself! Ontology must lie outside of a RToT-based epistemic system.
Again, if it didn’t, here’s what would loosely follow. Epistemology defines knowledge. Ontology is derived from additional postulations and epistemic reasoning. We thus “know” about existence. But we cannot use this to reason about ourselves…this would be syntacticly incorrect as I see it, because it would create self-reference, a tautology, it “creates” (I use that loosely) the entity which created the epistemology!
Clearly not the result we are hoping to achive. I don’t see a way around it, either, from what I understand about the ramified theory of types, ordered sets, etc.
This is why I postulate solipsism as a mandatory starting point…sort of, if you’ll allow the analogy, a First Person Shooter life (in video-gaming, yeah?), or what might be called Quantum Solipsism. That is, only I exist, and what I see right in front of me right now this instant is true. In a FPS game whatever is offscreen doesn’t “exist”…it hasn’t been drawn, the enemies aren’t there, etc (if any FPS gamers are there this is not the tightest analogy, but still). I don’t see that anything can be reduced below, to use a Rand Favorite ™, “existence exists.” That was her favorite axiom, and I have never been able to see past it.
If we start before existence we lost…I mean, “existence exists” has got to be the most irrefutable axiom of all time. To deny it involves using it to defeat itself…clearly accepting it, you see. I dunno, you see a way around that?
When you say something like, “Quantum Solipsism” I think you are turning two well-defined terms into an ill-defined muddle. Solipsism as a starting position leads exactly one place – solipsism. “Only I exist” is a room without a view. “I exist, and what I perceive exists” is something else. Actually, it might be any of a few something elses depending upon how we define/extend perception. Idealism? Materialism? 3 Volumes of Meditations? I think you need to pull back from the grand consequences for a moment and clear up the details.
At least, you do if you want me to follow your argument.
Now, since I have admitted not understanding exactly what you are saying, allow me to stay in character by criticizing it anyway.
Well, we could get into a whole new debate upon the finer points of nihilistic philosophies. Setting aside for the moment questions about the difference between “being” and “existing”, let me just say that in it’s most extreme form nihlism denies reality in toto. Remember, our reliance upon concepts like causality rest upon nothing but convenience. It is not impossible to cast all of “reality” as an halucination without cause. It is difficult, however, to express such a concept in a language that carries an inherent basis of causality.
“The Universe is a dream without a dreamer. Nirvana is waking up to nothingness.”
I dont think this is syntactically incorrect. The key to remember is that once we have defined our epistemology all that derives from it carries the implicit condition: given our epistemology. Thus, once I define, in whatever manner, EP[0] and use it to develop {EP[sub]ur[/sub]} I am able to derive whatever is concistent with that set/class.
If my epistemology allows me to derive results about myself, those results are valid under the condition that my epistemology is valid.
The circle you fear does exist, but it does not apply to the question “Is my ontology of identity/subject valid”. It applies to the question, "Did the ‘I’ resulting from my epistemological derivation creeate/determine my epistemology". Even then, I think you to much importance upon it. If our epistemology disallows circular reasoning, that simply means the statement given is not a valid result under said epistemology. It is not syntactically invalid, it is just an invalid conclusion.
Well, if you want to end at objectivism (or materialism) it seems a reasonable axiom. Not sufficient, though, and I would probably rephrase it to make it clear whether it is really one axiom or two. (Or an axiom and a corallary, if you prefer–though to have it a corallary you must already have an epistemology.)
The class “things that exist” is not empty. The property “existence” is an element of the class “things that exist”. [sub]Actually, did she mean “existence” the property or “existence” a perceived external reality. The statement can be read both ways.[/sub]
As for “seeing past it”. Well, I guess that depends on how Rand meant “existence” to be read. In either case, absolute nihilism is always an option. It is not really a “practical” philosophy, though.
I’m not sure I follow you. It probably depends upon how one defines the “class of things which exist”. And how one defines classes, of course.
I will attempt to clarify this so-called Quantum Solipsism. That is, yes…only I exist. But this hardly makes it a room without a view. But what I am viewing need not exist in its own right, that is, independent from me. This is the quantum nature of this solipsism…there is no boundry between perceiver and percieved. Indeed, perception itself, as you might note, doesn’t even exist in this world. There is no “event horizon”, I guess you might say. Pretty zen, yes. Yuck. But that does not mean I may not consider something as seperate anyway, for whatever reason I may come up with at the time. In fact…can solipsism create seperate entities? That is, if only I exist, and I convince myself that something else exists in its own right, does not that thing exist? sigh
But, now, what you call the invalid conclusion, that the epistemology derives the “I” which made that epistemology, only furthers my point that self cannot be epistemically derived. It is a non-sensical statement.
What we have, say, are type0 definitions, type 1 propositions about type0 things, and type 2 reasoning about type1 props. If at any level we derive an “I” which made the epistemology in the first place we have created a serious problem. How is this not important?
The conclusion we would need to come to in order to allow such a blatant tautology is not that the “I” defined created the epistemology but that the epistemology was already there in some platonic way. Otherwise we have spontaneous knowledge and self-creation (in a metaphysical way).
Either that or it seems to me that anything’s existence but “I” may be determined to be valid…that is, Spiritus could prove arl exists but never himself.
Let me put it this way…nothing ever can be said of the epistemology’s existence from within the epistemology. As well, we may not create a seperate epistemology to handle such a thing. Our epistemology is not only conditionally valid, it cannot exist!
Even dual epistemologies which provide knowledge about different things would run into the problem of snakes eating their own tail…as one tried to probe the other to see if it exists the other probes the first to see that it exists…but each one only exists on the condition that the other exists, or equivalently, it only exists if it exists.
I mean, shit. What good is a non-existent epistemology? Can a non-existent epistemology show that something does exist???
I have no idea how she “meant it,” really, because her ideas about universals were flimsy and it would seem that “existence” as a property is a universal matter, or rather, a matter of universals
I wouldn’t hesitate to say that she would find your seperation of the phrase to be entirely impossible. I find it distasteful as well for reasons above Don’t get me going on Rand again, I’ve been doing so well!!
She was fond of saying something to this effect: “Existence exists. That implies a corallary, that there is a consciousness percieving this something which also exists.” Tautology of multiple steps indeed. But no worse, in my opinion, that having a non-existence make existence as a strictly Russell epist. would seem to do.
You say something like “absolute nihilism” is always an option but again, I can’t reconcile this at all. I can disregard causality and still be smiling, but ask me to postulate non-existence and I come screeching to a halt. In a solipsistic (?) view, the phrase “You do not exist” (fave line from 1984) has meaning that is explainable if not “airtight”, so to speak. However, the same comment may be uttered in a nihilistic view and be meaningless. Nihilism is the one philosophy that can’t say anything. Any attempt to do anything which explains the benefits, evidence (or whatever it would be, haha), etc, of nihilism defeats itself from word one by assuming there is something there to talk to and assuming you are even there to talk. I see it as impossible to reconcile. Incidentally, at that page you linked before I went to some of the other article and found one on Neitze (fuck I can never remember how to spell his name!) and that brand of nihilism. Finially, something I can get good and worked up over besides capitalism!!
The best nihilist, when presented with a philosophical question, should pretend like it was never asked (what do I mean pretend, it never was asked! Wait, nothing is there to ask…ask has no meaning…uhh…uhhh hahah) Good ol’ F.N. saw this, but he wasn’t an absolute nihilist anyway…he still stuck with some weak phenomenalism it seems.
It seems a mangling of terms to me. Quantum effects might, according to several theories, make the act of observation inescapably impactive upon quantum objects. That is hardly the same thing as implying that quantum objects are a part of the observer.
If only “I” exist, how is “I” defined? Are my perceptions a part of “I”? If so, then they exist but are not separate. The same applies to thoughts and any material existence “I” might have. The “view” is the room.
True. But that consideration remains a part of “I”. Considering a thing separate does not make it separate.
Nope. Unless you add an axiom to require everything that “you” are convinced of to be true.
I think you have misunderstood what I wrote. The circle closes upon the statement the “I” derived my epistemology is the “I” that created/determined my epistemology. This is not a nonsensical statement. In fact, under an epistemology which allows circular reasoning it might even be valid. It is not valid, however, under epistemologies which do not allow circular reasoning.
The only consequence of this is that I cannot securely create an identity between “myself” and the “I” which decided upon my epistemelogical set. Basically, this is just another aspect of our inability to securely determine the first element of our Epistemology, since the “I” is implied by the action “determine”.
Nothing stops us from deriving a “self” should our epistemology contain a base from which to do so. That “self”, like everything else we know, is valid under the epistemology from which we derive it. “I” is no more special in that regard than any other conclusion.
I didn’t say it was unimportant. I said it did not have the consequence you think it does. In particular, if at any point we derive an “I” which made the epistemology then we have proven that our epistemology allows circular reasoning. So – not exactly trivial, but not worldview-shaking, either.
Well, not necesarily in a platonic way, but I get your gist. Really, though, I think you are getting hung up on something that is a relatively minor side effect of our inability to securely begin any epistemology. Under {EP[sub]1[/sub]} “self” has certain qualities. Under {EP[sub]2[/sub]} “self” has certain qualities. If “circular reasoning” in not an element of {EP[sub][12][/sub]} then it is not valid to say that the “I” who determines which epistemology to use corresponds to either self[sub]1[/sub] or self[sub]2[/sub]. Nevertheless, self[sub]1[/sub] is valid under {EP[sub]1[/sub]}.
The uncertainty involved remains rooted in our selection of epistemology, not in our derivation of an ontological “I”.
I disagree. But every proof is subject to the uncertainty of its epistemology.
1 True under RToT, though not English or ZST. 2 Assuming RToT, such statements belong to a separate class, true. But nothing prevents us from creating that class. 3 I’m afraid I see no reason to draw this conclusion from the premises, even if both were unconditionally true. The inability to rigorously prove the existence of an object does not imply that it cannot exist. If that reasoning held, then I would be a strong nihilist.
Setting Rand aside, why would you find my analysis distasteful/impossible? It seems fairly straightforward to me. And how would you define “existence” in that axiom?
I am not at all sure Russell would support that position, though I confess that my readings in logical positivism were few and long ago. Regardless, if causality is inescapable it seems inevitable that at some point existence sprang from non-existence (if it exists, of course. ;)). If causality is escapable, I see no reason to favor tautology over “existence without a cause”.
Well, once you postulate non-existence there is nowhere to go. I did not say it was a “productive” philosophy. I simply point out that it can be developed with rigor and validity equal to those of any other philosophy.
Well, I would add the adverb “really”.
Well, it seems you are assuming both a need for “usefulness” and the necessity for a medium to carry illusion/hallucination.
The hallucination following nihilism upon encountering the illusion of a question should ignore the apparent distraction. But even that sentence contains numerous implied “realities”. English is a poor language for nihlism. So are all the rest, AFAIK.
I never did read much Nietzsche, but your take seems likely. For true nihilism you need religion.
Now, the basis for validity is an epistemology, and it is not REALLY suprising to consider a case where an epistemology could determine its own validity. If this epistemology could determine my existence that would be great.
Now, you feel that though existence cannot be rigorously proved that does not make it in absence. Well, that wasn’t exactly what I was arguing.
Under an RToTE(pistemology) all things that are true are conditionally true…that is, assuming the RToTE in question. However, an RToTE cannot postulate its own existence, none the less comment on itself. It is not a question of validity (since epistemology itself in not able to be validated) but of actual existence.
That s, assuming the RToTE we know what we know. But not only can we not show the validity of the RToTE but we can’t even be sure of its existence, even assuming it is true! That has got to be the mother of all paradox! And that is assuming we can actually derive our own existence which I still feel lies outside any RToTE.
Well, it was what your posted argument concluded: Our epistemology is not only conditionally valid, it cannot exist!
This is not correct, though it is very close to correct. An epistemology of which RToT is an element cannot postulate its own existence. An RToT structured epistemological class which does not contain RToT might be able to postulate its own existence. Of course, in that case the RToT structure itself would not be “valid”. In fact, I strongly suspect that any such formulation would lead inevitably to paradox.
The phenomenon is not specific to RToT, though. It is a simple issue of circularity. No epistemology which denies circularity can validly comment upon itself (or postulate its own existence). What RToT does is generate a structural clarity which makes the circle syntactically invalid.
Again, you make the jump from not justifiable within a rigorous framework to existence. I see no justification for making such a leap. A non-circular epistemology cannot validate its own existence. That does not mean a non-circular epistemology cannot exist.
Correct. But general to any non-circular epistemology. We can, however, choose to rely upon a meta-epistemolgy (one step up in the class heirarchy) which assumes the existence and conent of our epistemology. That reliance, of course, cannot be justified epistemologically.
It is not a paradox.
It is, however, a result which seems to make many people uncomfortable.
Why? What is there about RToT (or is it general to non-circular epistemologies) that leads you to believe existence cannot be derived? “Self” is neither an epistemology nor a statement about epistemologies.
“We can, however, choose to rely upon a meta-epistemolgy (one step up in the class heirarchy) which assumes the existence and conent of our epistemology. That reliance, of course, cannot be justified epistemologically.”
Exactly my point: existence is not derivable from an epistemology. It must either be defined or axiomized (both, I guess). That isn’t to say any one thing’s existence must be an axiom, it is possible after existence itself is defined and axiomized as well as a few other things that more existents might be derivable, but we do agree, at least, that to make a syntactically meaningful RToTE it can’t say anything about itself.
Now if we make a meta-epistemology which can incorporate our base epistemology we still run into the same problem. That is, we say “Assuming our meta-epist we find that…” to which some student calmly replies, “Assuming what, Mr. Mundi?” That kid always was a wet blanket, though.
This leads to an infinite regression of epistemologies which:
have arbitrary starting points and
have a non-existent starting point at the highest formal level.
in a post long ago i said it would be nice to have multiple words for KNOW. to distinguish knowledge thru personal experience vs knowledge accepted from sources regarded as highly reliable.
i would distinguish 2+2=4 from seeing airplanes fly. pure math can be a trusted, understood intellectual experience. maybe you were tricked and the planes are held up by magnetism. LOL!
you’ll just have to SUSPECT 2nd hand info and try to assign probabilities. TRUST NOONE! the truth is out there but THEY are hiding it.
I don’t think the point you are making is identical to the point I have been making.
That is not what I said. I said that the existence of an epistemology cannot be derived from that epistemology in a noncircular manner.
Well, all concepts must be defined before they can be discussed meaningfully. Once existence is defined, however, the question of whether any particular “thing” exists is open to epistemological investigation. In some cases, such as the existence of the epistemology under which we function, that investigation can be conclusive only by employing circularity.
You need to make a much tighter argument if you want to say something universal about existence.
Also, I think maybe we really do need to go back and define “existence” if you want to shift the focus of our thread to this question. Let me repeat my earlier query: Setting Rand aside, why would you find my analysis distasteful/impossible? It seems fairly straightforward to me. And how would you define “existence” in “existence exists”?
Yes, but I am concerned about your continued focus on RToTE with respect to this question. the general statement about circularity is more powerful than the specific statement about RToTE.
Problem? It is a problem only if you begin by trying to find a reliable, absolute basis for an epistemology. Since I have argued from the beginning that htis cannot be done, I do not see this as a problem.
Not quite correct. Only the “first turtle” suffers from that problem. All subsequent turtles rest securely upon its back.
Of course, under RToT the turtles underneath epistemology are not epistemologies. Again, I think this can be an aid to clarity. It points out that when we seek a “ground” for our epistemology we cannot rely upon epistemology, and whatever we find to support our epistemology cannot be evaluated under the same rules as the epistemology itself.
I have seen many decent definitions of existence and yet they all elude me at this moment, mainly because they took a few pages to develop and I surely don’t have the time for that. At work, anyway. And at home I find my ISP constantly logging me off due to inactivity when I type up longish replies which ALWAYS pisses me off.
I think we should tackle what would be, then, the basis of an RToTE. Not in a completely rigourous way as we are lacking in symbology but in a less-than-intuitive manner.
Our first definitions?–what would they be? I would pose that knowledge must be defined, epistemology must be defined. However, that these two are linked already presents me with some problems. For example, I would like to say that “knowledge” is any result or results obtained from or anything asserted by an epistemology. How to define epistemology, then? A system of thought which posits axioms and definitions and which then attemts to use the definitions and axioms to derive conclusions in a perscribed manner.
Is this too vague?
Existence: the state or quality of being observable.
Observation: description of utilizing sensory data directly or indirectly.
Now, what have I already assumed to be true in these definitions? I have at least assumed cause and effect because of “observation,” yes? Any ideas here? As well, haven’t I already assumed an existent in that definition? I can’t quickly ascertain a good definition here. Not only that, but for “observation” to exist it itself must be observable…circularity squared.
Anyway, comment away. I still want a SDMBRToTE. haha…if you think even an outline of one is possible…
