Things that we can't "know" directly

Great Debates
101

I really don’t think I’m up to/for that task. I think I have pretty well defended my assertion that any epistemology that includes noncircular reasoning must rest upon one or more unsupportable assertions. Given that, I see no reason to pretend that I can develop an epistemology which is in any sense superior to all others.

Many people compose their replies in a word processor and then paste them into the browser for this very reason. [sub]not me, of course, if I did that it might encourage me to proffread or spellcheck, destroying the essential nature of the conversational illusion I under which I post. But hey, that’s my issue. You might be rational enough to take advantage of a good idea.[/sub]

I don’t think there is any way to do this. To be non-intuitive, we must rely upon an epistemology. You might, perhaps, attempt a cyclical feedback model, but at some point you must “seed” the process.

Hmmm, how do these definitions account for hallucinations, ideas, virtual particles, dream imagery, and optical illusions?

Not necessarily. You might have observational effect without cause. That is one thing I was trying to determine with the questions above. I think it likely that you are relying upon cause and effect, but I base that more on your definition of existence, which asserts a quality based upon an effect.

102

Tsk tsk. Well, at least the conversation is still going.

“Hmmm, how do these definitions account for hallucinations, ideas, virtual particles, dream imagery, and optical illusions?”
They don’t. Why would they? These things are observable, they affect the senses. As far as the definition goes it would make of them equally “real”, but there isn’t even a self to dream yet.

Cause and Effect:
I can’t escape the bastard.

“I think I have pretty well defended my assertion that any epistemology that includes noncircular reasoning must rest upon one or more unsupportable assertions. Given that, I see no reason to pretend that I can develop an epistemology which is in any sense superior to all others.”
Superior? Harumph. It doesn’t need to be superior(how could it be?). :slight_smile:
Anyway, I still don’t like the lack of circularity. I don’t think it is a good way to think about epistemology because of the whole existence issue. You have made a case, to be sure, but if I had to choose between self-reference and infinite axioms (which is what would be necessary for the never-ending tower of epistemologies) I would definitely take the self-reference, if only on a limited basis.

For example…where did the paper come from that the Epistemology is written on? Self-reference, albeit obscure. It is true that we cannot validate an epistemology, but I think it is a tremendous flaw that we also cannot say anything valid about our epistemology. That is, even the statement “assuming our epistemology” is not viable because the epistemology does not exist in its own right; we do not know it exists. If we make a meta epistemology that postulates the existence of our original epistemology then again, we can “know” about where epistemology comes from.

sigh I’ve reverted to merely repeating myself.

103

I am not attempting to curtail conversation. I am simply saying that I am not prepared to explicitely develop a complete epistemological set for the SDMB.

Actually, they do not. At least, not all of them do.

Hallucinations ceate a false or distorted sensory effect. I asked about them to determine whether your existence was predicated to the sensory data or to a presumed cause of the sensory data. Does the table exist, or just my perception of the table.
Ideas have no sensory perception. They are not seen, heard, felt, or tasted (though some of them stink ;)).
Virtual particles cannot be perceived. Under extreme conditions, they can become real particles, and thus subject to detection.
Dream imagery is a similar case to hallucinations, but it also includes the element that there is no conscous perception of the image. Only later, after we wake, do we “remember” having had a perception.
Optical illusions do not afect the senses. They are a product of our inacurate interpretation of sensory data.

You don’t like the lack of circularity? shrug Okay. But if your epistemology explicitely allows circularity then you are forced to accept many troubling things. After all, circularity allows us to presume our conclusions. [sub]Actually, you can arbitrarily assert a cutoff point for your circularity, but since you object to an arbitrary beginning that would seem self defeating.[/sub]

Actually, the infinite regression is a non-starter, too. At some point, it is necessary to arbitrarily assert a beginning or to leave one’s epistemology empty. Do you prefer circularity to an arbitrary starting point? If so, then what do you feel is gained by self-reference (limited? Limited to what–the very basis of our epistemology?).

Well, it might be more precise to say that valid statements about our epistemology cannot be framed as members of our epistemology.

Under circular reasoning it is possible to say something valid about our epistemology only by presuming that our statement is valid. I hardly see this as an improvement.

This is not correct. The existence of our epistemology cannot be demonstrated in a noncircular way from within our epistemology. That is not equivalent to “not exist[ing] in its own right.”

It seems I, too, am reduced to repeating myself.

104

Oh, I don’t have a problem with an arbitrary beginning per se. I agree that any beginning is necessarily arbitrary.

As well, I have given infinite regression up in favor of calling it, in this RToT manner, infinite stacks. Clearly each stack has an arbitrary beginning, but there is no way (short of adding another stack) to assess our current level. Because each level must avoid self-reference, the stack never ends. Not the same thing as infinite regression, which would be no beginning. Not only does the stack never end, but we can never say where we are at on the stack, only that we are above a certain level.

This is really my problem with RToT as a way to think about epistemology. I would definitely like to cut off circularity while keeping some matter of it. And yeah, that too would be arbitrary. But that is fine to me because at least I can talk about the epistemology from within the epistemology, even if we are not using this “talk” to validate axioms (tautologies) or deduce anything.

One last thing here…

I thought we were to determine existence from within an epistemology? If so it would be type0 or perhaps, PERHAPS, type1 while our epistemologies would reside much higher in the order (my terminology might be a little loose here but anyway). That is, if we ever refer to our epistemology as existing we have made a syntactically incorrect statement. No? Seriously, I’m having a hard time seeing why not (sorry if you need to get a bigger hammer ;)). If we only “know” from our epistemology, AND we derive existence in our epistemology, it is not even possible to ascribe existence to epistemologies themselves.

105

Not precisely. The arbotrary beginning is inescapable only from our “highest stack”. From any position, we may completely describe/define the level(s) below. Similarly, it is not necessary for the stacks to be infinite, at whatever point we decide to make our arbitrary beginning, we no longer have a need for higher levels. A corollary of this, of course, is that we cannot meaningfully justify our arbitrary beginning. This is not surprising, since we arrived at the need for an arbitrary beginning by demonstrating that no beginning could be justified.

So, you would like to include circularity even though it does not allow you to escape arbitrariness. Why? What benefit do you see that justifies accepting circular reasoning as epistemologically valid?

Is that it? You accept circularity to gain the illusion of a secure reference for your epistemology. Well, that hardly makes you unique, but I’m afraid I do not share your preference.

I do not see the ability to form statements that cannot validate deductions or provide an axiomatic base to be particularly useful. Certainly, I do not find it so attractive that I will accept circular reasoning to posess it.

I think I see your confusion. We can use a noncircular epistemology to derive the existence of objects which can be meaningfully referenced within a noncircular epistemology. Since the epistemology itself is not such an element, we cannot derive its existence from within.

Yes, as evaluated from within our noncircular epistemology. That does not imply that our epistemology does not exist; it is simply means that a noncircular epistemology cannot be self-derived. Again, that result is not particularly surprising.

Correct, but perhaps misleading. I think the problem resides in the uderstanding of the scope of epistemology as encompasing “all knowledge”. This can obviously make sense only if epistemology is circular. But, many people (myself included) would prefer not to accept circular reasoning as epistemelogically valid. Therefore, the scope of epistemology must be reduced to exclude epistemology itself.

Now, this is not a comfortable position for some people (including you, it seems), since it can be seen as impying that there is no valid method of defining an epistemology (or critiquing one, other than as inconsistent). An epistemology can only be accepted or denied arbitrarily (as it is defined).

The alternative is to accept circular reasoning. That is fine (as an arbitrary choice), but it carries with it its own implications: nothing you say about epistemology can ever be justified except through circularity; it is not possible to evaluate one set of circular propositions against another, so your base is still arbitrary; you can epistemologically critique another epistemology, but all such critiques reduce to “you began from a different set of axioms” (or critiques of consistency, still). What you gain from this is the ability to reason in a circle and call it valid and the ability to justify an arbitrary epistemological choice after the fact by constructing a circular argument to support it.

106

“That does not imply that our epistemology does not exist; it is simply means that a noncircular epistemology cannot be self-derived.”
But as I am understanding that is exactly what it implies. That is, existence is “made” or derived or postulated in our epistemology…therefore any attempt to ascribe existence to our epistemology is in error. Pretending our epistemology exists is in error as well since existence came from the epistemology itself.
You go on to say, “Correct, but perhaps misleading. I think the problem resides in the uderstanding of the scope of epistemology as encompasing ‘all knowledge’.”
Isn’t it? This is why I felt existence should not be a part of epistemology at its base, why ontology should come first. This is also why I feel some cirularity is necessary.
That is, we should start with being, existence, and so on without reaching any conclusions about it. We should also there define an epistemology and show that it exists (mainly through declaration, again arbitrary). We could also “show” that ontology itself exists. Then we may proceed to an RToT style epistemology. It could not validate itself, but at least it exists.
Of course, our epistemology could then not be used to “know” about existence, but you said it well enough : “we start from different axioms.” That can be said for any epistemology, not just one with circular reasoning.

107

Deriving teh existence of something epistemologically does not create it. Not deriving the existing of something epistemology does not uncreate it. The epistemological derivation simply lets us “know” it exists. There is no noncircular way to epistemologically “know” that the epistemology exists.

The above has no consequence on whether the epistemology exists. It just means we cannot answer the question with epistemology.

I have explained my objections to adding circularity. Perhaps you would like to respond to them?

I do not see that adding ontology first gains anything. Without an epistemology, ontology cannot lead to anything. Therefore, having the ontology does not assist in developing the epistemology.

Please clarify exactly what you mean. Are you talking about simply defining terms or asserting properties.

We can do that with a circular epistemology without reference to ontology, beyond the definition of existence. “Our epistemology exists” can certainly be viewed as a statement of ontology as well as epistemology in such a system, but what is the value?

If we decide to begin by asserting whatever properties we need to arrive at someplace we are confortable we demonstrate noting but what we need to be comfortable.

How? You cannot arrive at a noncircular epistemology from a circular beginning. Or when you said you would “show that [epistemology] exists” did you mean that you would generate a statement about knowledge which is not a part of your epistemology? If so, isn’t this exactly what you have been objecting to in a noncircular epistemology?

Again, your method does not seem to add anything to ou epistemology other than the illusion that statements about our epistemology can be epistemologically well founded. In fact, if you truly meant that your assertion of epistemology is not a statement within epistemology then you haven’t even gained that.

108

Are we done?

109

To Aristotle, it was a phrased as a problem of practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge.

110

I am way over my head here, but let me try anyway.

The OP asked what we can really “know”. One answer (sort of stated near the beginning) is that absolute certainty is elusive and that the usual scientific machinery can be deployed to evaluate the remaining levels of less-than-perfect certainty.

Another answer draws from Descartes. My understanding of it is based on my memory of B. Russell’s History of Western Philosophy. Let me know how confused I am:

While Descartes didn’t exactly prove the existence of “I” (identity being a surprisingly tricky concept, as it turns out) his argument can be restated to start with the axiom, “Perceptions exist”.

Such an axiom seems self-evident to me (or am I merely applying rhetoric?). While one could certainly argue that perceptions are illusory (heck, they probably are to some degree), their nonexistence seems pretty hard maintain.

That is, to say “I think” assumes an “I”. To take a step backwards and say, “thought (or perception) exists (we both perceive an immediate example of it [sub](or at least I do)[/sub])” seems difficult to argue with.

From there, Russell notes that we are most certain of the subjective things. The match of our perceptions to the outside world may be imperfect or conceivably poor, but the fact of our perceptions is what we have the most confidence in: that perceptions exist is what we can be said to “know”.

111

Russell did indeed argue that Descartes’ claim should have begun, and perhaps ended, with thought exists.

Now, setting aside for the moment issues of how we know that to be true, the leap from thout to perception is not trivial. The concept of perception carries with it the same implied subject that Descartes fell prey to (or an implied object, if you choose to phrase it differently). However you cast it, the gulf between “thought exists” to “we are most certain of . . .” is impassable to a noncircular epistemology. Placing the subject in the receptor of thought or perception is a shift, but it does not solve the problem of identification with an active subject (which is required to make statements like, “we are most certain of . . .”.)

112

I’ve been thinking all weekend how to phrase this and I still haven’t come up with anything good, but again I am going to try.
An RTOTE cannot just say anything about itself, it cannot say anything about anything without leading to circularity.

It cannot assert the existence of the paper it is written on, the person who reads it, the person who uses it, the ink on the paper, the table it sits on…to do so in any way would lead to circularity. It seems to me that it cannot, in fact, assert the existence of anything connected to it. If you assert that it exists it does so in a black hole of sorts.
Now we can say that the epistemology exists in its own right, like a Form, and we have merely made a representation of it on paper…would that be correct? If not I can’t see how the epistemology is useful at all, in the end, unless it somehow can seperate itself from external existence (which it couldn’t else it would be talking about itself).

I don’t know that we’re done but I am really stuck on this part. I cannot think of any definition of existence that could be used which would avoid circularity.

113
  1. “An RTOTE cannot just say anything about itself, it cannot say anything about anything without leading to circularity.”

??? I see no reason to come to such a conclusion. Can you present an argument why this should be so?

  1. I will be leaving for Ireland tomorrow, returning in a week. I may be able lof in from Cork, but I may not. If I don’t respond for a while, don’t worry.
114

My problem comes in the boundry drawing in the limits of an epistemology.
At what point can an epistemology be used to validate the existence of something external to it? That is, can we seperate the existence of one thing from the existence of another? This is more quantum mysticism, I’m afraid.

That is, if we verify the existence of paper and someone asks (about the epistemology), “What are these words written on?” is this self-referential? If the epistemology validates sensory data and we use our eyes to read it have we not created another instance of self-reference?

It might be said that there is no self-reference here because the senses do not imply or cannot be used to derive the epistemology, so it is not self-referencing. I am the one self-referencing it, not it self-referencing itself by nature of its construction. But again, if the epistemology validates my existence and I learn/read the epistemology, can I no longer say that I exist? To do so would cause this: My epist verifies your existence. You read the epistemology. If the epistemology were to verify your existence to you then we would have a tautology…the epistemology showed the existence of someone who read the epistemology. No?
Am I even being a bit clearer in this?

115

I think so. Well, I think I am clear on your objection. If I am correct, then you are not clear on the problems of self-reference.

Say we have an epistemology. We have cosen it in some maner that makes us happy, and it is noncircular with the following properties:

  1. We cannot use the epistemology to validate itself.
  2. We cannot use the epistemology to decide whether a statement is an element the epistemology.
  3. Our epistemology can be expressed finitely.

Now say that we have used our epistemology to derive the following:
4) You exist
5) Paper exists.
6) We can write statements on paper.
7) We can read statements from paper and validate them according to our episteology.

Now, let us express our epistemology on paper.
Then, let us read the paper, testing each statement for epistemological validity.
8) every statement will be valid.
9) No statement will be epistemologically assignable as an element of our epistemology.

Wait, I imagine you saying, we just said that what we wrote on the paper was our epistemology. Yes, we did. But that judgment, like our initial choice of the epistemology, is neither based in nor valid under our epistemology.

Our ability to derive the existence of paper (or our “selves”) does not introduce a circle. The circle is introduced only if we assert that what we write as our epistemology is subject to epistemological examination.

In other words, if we assume the circle exists then our epistemology will contain circularity. This is, of course, circular reasoning. :wink:

116

Spiritus:
– Yikes: I had assumed that thought and perception were synonymous. Wrong: they are usefully thought of as different (though possibly overlapping) beasts.

Still, I’ll maintain my word, “Perception”, at least during this post, because I find it difficult to work with a hypothetical thought that is not about anything, or that lacks a real or imagined object.

A limited tool, not a comprehensive framework:

When I touch, view and hear my keyboard, I am aware of a perception of a keyboard. Someone could argue that the keyboard doesn’t exist, that I am hallucinating. It could be argued that “I” (or “you”) don’t exist, or that “I” is an ill-defined construct. A stretch, I know, but a notion that, for example, forms part of Buddhist doctrine.

I find it more difficult to apply radical skepticism to the perception itself.

I am most certain of the existence (if not accuracy) of a perception -be it of my keyboard or a belief that 2+2=4- since I can’t think of an argument for its nonexistence. In contrast, it’s easier to doubt whether any particular real or imagined object exists. This appears to me to be an application of Descartes’s method, though I’m not claiming that a system of knowledge can be derived on this basis.

I suppose that I am claiming that a cogent epistemology is not required to answer the OP’s question (or at least my characterization of it). Puzzling.

I don’t think I follow. Sorry.
I’m not sure what “the problem of identification with an active subject” is. I don’t know why it is, “required to make statements like, “we are most certain of . . .””.

Trivially, we can’t say that we are anything, since we haven’t established a viewer/subject/“I” or “you”. But that’s not what I think is being argued.

I suppose that I may have to show that an argument denying the existence of a perceived subjective experience is weaker than an argument denying the material of a material phenomenon. Saying that I can’t think of an argument for the former, though I can think of one for the latter, may not cut it.

Or perhaps the observation that subjective experience is at or near the end point of skepticism isn’t necessarily helpful. Well, at least it’s sort of interesting (if true).

Oh, and have a good time in Ireland. :slight_smile:

117

I think this is where my personal hang up is… I’ve never been formally schooled in RToT style set theory…

Man, something like this takes a long time to sink in.

I still sort of wonder, though… “where” is our epistemology? It seems like you’ve gone a long way out of the way to show that epistemology is in some way platonic…err, inherent? Er… I lack the proper terminology at this hour (with these beers) but the morality thread got me thinking all over again.

118

Good God - is this back again? I’ve only just finishing syphoning my brain back into my ears.

Remember arl the simple version of RTOT - sets that contain themselves are badly defined. We cannot use the epistimology to decide whether the statement is an element of our epistimology for the same reason that we cannot say that set A contains set A, or determine the value of 0/0. “Error - badly defined”.

To see this, consider the set of sets that don’t contain themselves and try to determine whether this set contains itself or not.

I seem to remember a classic Lewis Carroll puzzle in “Through the Looking Glass” that played with this problem. There were three caskets (bronze, silver, gold), each with a statement on them. The puzzle was a kind of “The bronze casket says that the silver casket always lies” etc problem. IIRC Alice proceeds through an entirely logical argument and concludes that the desired object is in the silver casket. It isn’t. Her mistake is assuming that she can determine truth values about a system from within that system.

I’d recommend a book called “Penrose Tiles to Trapdoor Ciphers” by Martin Gardner, if you can get it from a library. One of the last chapters includes a straightforward introduction to the world of metalanguages and deals with the Alice problem mentioned above.

pan

119

arl
Did kabbes response satisfy your question? It seemed on point to me, so I took the lazy way out, but I didn’t want you to think I had missed/ignored your post.

120

Well, I’ve had quite a bit of explanation here about it. I isn’t that I can’t grasp the principle, its hat I still have a hard time seeing it as a guide for epistemology… the whole paper/non-verification thing is really hanging me up.

Perhaps I need to hit the books.