To Whom it May Concern

The BBQ Pit
61

Shag. I was told yesterday it stood for Specific, Measurable, Agreed, Realistic, Timely. I get the feeling that just maybe this is all bollocks. However.

The good guys, in whatever form this alliance finally takes, will, at a basic level, be taking actions intended to affect terrorists and persuade them, none too gently, that the game is not worth the candle. The lack of a clear understanding of the terrorists’ motives, as far as I can see, would be a handicap. Faced with two or more strategies for dealing with the problem of terrorism, how else can we judge which will have greater success, and allocate resources accordingly? The goal is to make terrorists react in a certain way as a consequence of our actions, so we have to know which buttons to push (other than the big red one, obviously). Furthermore, knowledge of terrorist motivations might even suggest new strategies which otherwise would not have been considered.

So yes, I think it’s important to understand precisely what motivated Tuesday’s atrocities, but not so as I can excuse or forgive the terrorists who committed or planned them.

AMR

62

LOL, Lib.

Never fear. I shall keep humping along for so long as my fingers remain free. I have it on good authority (thanks, dear) that my faults and foibles are entirely endearing and not the least bit annoying. Typos be damned. I’m thinking deep thoughts, here!

Et tu, kabbes. Scourging me with the blade of corporate speak? I bleed, but I do not fall. Yes! Yes! I want a SMART reason, damnit. Throw me in the oubliette of corporate seminars. Hurl me to the motivational speakers. Brand me with the mark of ISO. Yet shall I fight the last.

Give me a SMART reason or give me death[sup]1[/sup]!

Oh–and while I am sure you did not miss it, let me repeat for the sake of others my point that we already know enough about these terrorists to guide us in all practical, and probably most esoteric, matters. Hannibal Lecter couldn’t crawl through Bin Laden’s skull and come out with anything new and useful to guide our course.

[sup]1[/sup][sub]To all calls that we expend more time more energy and more effort getting to “know our enemy”.

63

amrussell
I find the idea that we can convince folks who fly an airliner into a skyscraper to “give up the game” by making the price too high extremely unlikely.
This war will be won be won by:[ul]
[li]discouraging (in terms both certain and final) those who lend active or tacit support to the fanatics.[/li]Removing the capability of teh fanatics to organize, finance, and maintain international terrorist operations.[/ul]

64

Spiritus you keep saying something to the effect that ‘we knew all we needed to about Bin Laden before’.

I fundementally disagree. While I agree we knew that he ‘hated Americans’ etc, I don’t think we had any idea he would be capable of devising a scheme where a couple hundred people would be forced to watch as they were used as instruments of destruction for thousands of civilians.

While we knew there were ‘terrorists’ about, we even knew they may target certain buildings, the level of planning involved here, to attempt to murder some 20,000 people simultaneously, that level of evil, nope, I don’t think we knew. And, I suggest that we do everything in our power to insure we know as much as possible about those who would do us harm.

(and kabbes is also correct - who knows where each piece of information will take us.)

65

No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No.

No.

Is that enough repetition? Damnit, wring, you seem determined to make me remember that this thread is in the PIT. I have, repeatedly, made clear that I am specifically addressing calls to spend more time/effort/intelligence to understand the motives and perceptions of the terrorists. How many more times do I have to say it before you will stop countering statements that I have never made.

And, I might add, my position refers to what we know now, not before the attack.
(Though how anybody could treat the attack as a sudden revelation of Bin Laden’s motives or perceptions is beyond me. Were peoiple not paying attention when he called for the targetting of American civilians? Were people not paying attention when he claimed credit for the bombings of US Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya? Were people not paying atttention when he was linked to the last terrorist attack on teh WTC?)

I think we did, but that is a separate question. I also think that we knew he had the motivation to attack both the WTC specifically and American civillian and military targets in general. I think we knew that in his perception he was fundamentally justified in attacking American citizens without warning or quarter. I think that we knew those things before. I am damned certain that we know them now.

The level of evil? If you want to delve into the metaphysical, go ahead. If you want to guide our response to this attack based upon metaphysical revelations, stop immediately. We knew he was an evil bastard yesterday. We know he is an evil bastard today. We are pretty certain he will be an evil bastard tomorrow, unless he dies first.

What has changed is our understanding of his operational capabilities. What has changed is our evaluation of teh level of threat. These are neither psychological nor metaphysical elements.

I suggest that we do everything within out ethical and practical bounds to prevent them from doing us further harm. Where additional information will provide tangible, or even reasonable, assistance to that goal–additional intelligence is called for. Where additional intelligence provides no tangible, or even reasonable, assistance to that goal, efforts would be better spent elsewhere.

kabbes is often correct, but I will wager large sums that in his decisions to “pour over data” he neither randomly examines disparate elements nor seeks to examine every available datum simultaneously. Prioritization is unavoidable in any gathering of data. One must always decide “where to look first” and second and third, etc. My contention is that looking at perceptions and motivations cannot return enough value to justify expending any effort upon it at this time.

So far, I have seen no good argument to the contrary.

66

I think it is clear that we cannot set a “surprise birtday party trap” without knowing which presents he would like, Spiritus. I mean, let’s be realistic.

67

Where I got the idea that your stance was “we’ve known his motives for a long time” :

ON the OP

and later on the same page

Seems clear to me that in that passage your stance is that America was not operating in ignorance of the motivations, prior to 9/11.

And, again, my point is that we apparently were not totally aware of the full extent of his motivations , the depth of his depravity. So I disagree with

Yes, we knew that he felt civilians were a justifiable target. Yes, we knew that he had no problem w/the concept of a suicide attack. Yes, he’d targeted the WTC before.

HOwever, this attack (in addition to the tactical advances he made from his last WTC attack - one wonders if he’d consulted experts on implosions), was unique, not only in the scale, sheer numbers of potential victims, but in using the victims themselves as weapons.

That, my friend, is IMHO a psychologically based difference. And since he has followers, I suggest that making some real attempt to discover everything we can about him, to help us possibly predict, prevent further actions on his/his followers part.

That’s one of the things most striking to me. We all knew he was a bad guy before. We underestimated how bad. (at the risk of invoking the ‘rule’, folks disagreed w/Hitler, thought he was shameful, wrong, a hat monger etc. until the death camps were opened up, the extent was unknown. )

and I don’t think our positions are all that far apart.

68

on reading comprehension
‘we knew all we needed to about Bin Laden before’
‘we’ve known his motives for a long time’

on syllogisms
His motives are something we need to know.
We know his motives.
Therefore, we know all that we need to know.

on motivation
this attack . . . was unique, not only in the scale, sheer numbers of potential victims, but in using the victims themselves as weapons.

on metaphysics
We all knew he was a bad guy before. We underestimated how bad.

asides
Planes are not victims.
Passengers were not weapons.
I do not understand the qualitative difference between a man willing to slaughter hundreds of innocents and a man willing to slaughter thousands.

without sarcasm
I don’t think our positions are all that far apart, either. We agree on many things. Truthfully, I am somewhat surprised that of the several statements in my OP this is the only one that has drawn significant comment. Nevertheless, on this point you are wrong. I sympathize with blind appeals for deeper understanding. I have great faith in knowledge myself. But in this case, this very specific case, they serve no purpose but to divert energy and focus from the tasks at hand.

69

[QUOTE]
*Originally posted by Spiritus Mundi *
**amrussell
I find the idea that we can convince folks who fly an airliner into a skyscraper to “give up the game” by making the price too high extremely unlikely.
This war will be won be won by:[ul]
[li]discouraging (in terms both certain and final) those who lend active or tacit support to the fanatics.[/li][li]Removing the capability of teh fanatics to organize, finance, and maintain international terrorist operations.[/ul] **[/li][/QUOTE]

Well, I’d interpret both those items as ways of making the price too high, but that’s semantics. My point was that an understanding of an enemy’s motivations and perceptions can be of great value when deciding upon a strategy by which to defeat him, as it increases the chances of correctly predicting his response. Being able to do that is always valuable. To choose not to know how your enemy thinks, particularly in a case like this where clearly his thinking will differ from ours massively, is to hamstring oneself.

70

I see. Can you provide me even a reasonable hypothetical situation in which additional knowledge of Bin Laden’s motives and perceptions will allow a more refined prediction of his response/actions? We are not talking about a war of troop maneuver and territorial occupation. Bin Laden has a multitude of symbolic targets of opportunity. We can reliably predict that he will attack one (or more) of them if he is able. There is no strategic advantage to be gained by preferring one over another. I ask you the same question I asked wring, are you of the opinion that further understanding Bin laden’s motives and perceptions will reliably allow us to predict teh specific targets of his next attacks? If not, then further efforts in that direction server no practical purpose.

We must already presume additoinal attacks are planned and that those plans are in various stages of progress. If the last 30 years have taught us anything about terrorism, it’s that the specific qualities of the target are secondary to the general symbolic content (i.e. an Israeli disco, an American embassy, an English department store).

71

Spiritus Mundi I really support your positions and wish that I found this thread sooner. I have been dumbfounded by the blame-the-victim mentality evidenced by more than a few. Your OP was a treasure.

72

I liked your book.

73

There’s more to this than picking specific targets. But yes, speaking as a non-US resident, I would be very interested to know what level of involvement Britain would have to take before Bin Laden percieves us as an enemy to “smite”, not so as to avoid crossing that line but to know exactly when we have crossed it and thus when to start expecting an attack, and taking appropriate precautions.

Questions:
[list=1]
[li] Will any of our actions affect the timing of Bin Laden’s attacks?[/li][li] Will bin Laden continue to attack targets in the continental US, or switch back to US targets in the Middle East?[/li][li] Will the above change in relation to any of our actions? If so, what actions?[/li][li] What would bin Laden’s response be to pro-US propaganda disseminated in his “home territories”? What would his response be to anti-bin Laden propaganda?[/li][li] Will the attack on his financial muscle provoke a violent response, or will he simply find new ways to channel funds?[/li][li] Would he attack humanitarian projects in Afghanistan a) at all? b) staffed by US citizens?[/li][li] Will he arrange attacks in Arab countries which are now supporting the US?[/li][/list=1]

There’s no yes/no answer to these, but the better we understand his motivations and perceptions then the better chance we have of correctly evaluating the probability of the various options. Which means we can allocate our finite resources accordingly.

AMR

74

You bring up a fine point. There may well be reasons for non-US organizations to spend resources determining Bin Laden’s motivations and perceptions. It is rather easy to fall into the trap of assuming that everyone os speaking from a US perspective in these threads. I should have made it clear that I was speaking strictly as a US citizen and was concerned strictly with the allocation of individual and governmental resources in the US.

This is really an operational issue. I submit that any assumption that we have a “safe period” in which no terrorist attacks will occur is foolish. Any “insight” into Bin Laden’s persepctives or motivations which leads us to presume no attaack will occur during any set period is dangerous and counter-productive. The only reasonable course is to assume that we have the insight and that it leads us to expect further threats immediately and persistently until the capability of these groups to wage international terror is curtailed.

Again–any assumption that one location or the other (or other overseas bases/embassies/etc.) is “safer” and can relax vigilance is unwarranted and foolish. Bin Laden has demonstrated that he is willing and able to attack targets on American soil, in the Middle East, and in continental Africa. We must continue under the presumption that teh threat of additional attacks exists in all operational theaters. Anything less is strategically unsound.

Any assumption, insight, or guess that the above will change except as an operational necessity when/if we manage to restrict the reach and capacity of Bin Laden’s (and associated groups) organization would be a mistake. so long as these groups have the capacity to strike targets in all theatrers, we must assume they have the will to do so. They have demonstrated that will, and they have demonstrated a commitment to their cause which we would be fools to underestimate.

Again–we must proceeed on the assumption that Bin aden will continue his campaign against the US with complete determination and using every means at his disposal. To spend time wondering whether he will react more negatively to some course of action is to waste time. We must already assume his antipathy to the US os complete and unyielding. There is no worse reaction for him to make.

Any course of action we take, including complete inaction, will provoke a violent responswe. That must be our presumption in any scenario. It serves no purpose to worry about whether any particular course of action will provoke an attack. Every acceptable course will provoke an attack, so long as these groups remain capable of attacking. I imagine that even Neville Chamberlin could see that truth.

We must assume so, and we must warn any agencies manning such missions accordingly. He has already proven himself unconcerned with slaughtering the citizens of other nations in the prosecution of his jihad aainst the US.

We must assume so. He is an outspoken opponent of teh ruling regimes of several Arab nations that support the US, including Saudi Arabia. We would be fools to imagine that our people in that nation are safe from attack.

The only way any of the above questions can provide meaningful information is if we abandon the necessary presumption, which we have learned at repeated and unfortunate cost, that these groups are dedicated, determined, unflinching enemies of the US and its citizens; that they have no compunction against saacrificing the lives of themselves or innocents of any nationality in firtherance of their vendetta, and that they will continue their campaigns using all means at their disposal for so long as they remain able to do so.

No insight into these groups will, or should, change those presumptions.

75

OK,

I’m afraid we’re now talking at cross-purposes. Just to clear up one possible area of confusion, I’m under no illusions as to the intensity of bin Laden’s hatred of the US, or the lengths to which it has, and will, drive him.

And I agree that teh only actions likely to change his mind about the US are ones which cannot in conscience be taken, or even considered.

But, I do not believe that wilful ignorance of his motives and perceptions beyond teh “He hates us a hell of a lot” stage is of any benefit to the US, or to the “West”, for lack of a better term.

Some of my questions you answered by saying they were operational issues. And yes, they are. And a good answer to them could lead to greater success in our operations. But they can still only be answered by reference to his motives and perceptions. For example, would it be, operationally speaking, a good idea to station reserve troops in Mecca? There are strategic issues involved here, obviously, but you might also consider the effect of this on bin Laden. Certainly, it would infuriate him. Would he now be more likely to order a strike against teh US reserve barracks? Would he, in fact, be provoked into doing something which exposed a part of his organisation to capture or destruction? We don’t know. But, I would submit, we should.

The blanket assumption that “we are, always and everywhere, at risk from attack”, while true, gives no information about how to defend from that. Money can only be spent once. Units can only be posted in one place at a time. Resources are not infinite. Some means of evaluating the risk posed to different areas and installations is necessary. Certainly nowhere is safe, but some places are more dangerous than others. For example, why did the terrorists attack New York and not, say, Kansas City? Because, from teh motives and perceptions of an anti-US terrorist, New York is a more symbolically important target. Cannot that analysis, simple as it is, be used to evaluate the threat to other areas of the US? Equally, while any humanitarian aid outfit in Afghanistan would be at risk, one staffed by US citizens would, quite probably, be at more risk. So should US citizens be permitted to provide humanitarian aid services in Afghanistan? Does it needlessly increase the risk?

As you say, there will be no period when we can consider ourselves safe from attack but, I submit, it would be possible to take actions which would provoke ObL to accelerating his schedule of terrorist activities, or to ordering new ones. The difference between, “They have done X? Well, when our next attack is launched, they shall know the error of their ways” and “They have done Y? Strike them now, this instant.” is a pretty serious one, and it would be good to know when we have crossed that line.

AMR